Terrence Wayne Roach v. State of Indiana , 119 N.E.3d 170 ( 2019 )

FILED
Jan 30 2019, 9:07 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Yvette M. LaPlante Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Keating & LaPlante, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Evansville, Indiana Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Terrence Wayne Roach, January 30, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1767
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert J. Pigman,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
82D03-1704-MR-1984
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1767 | January 30, 2019 Page 1 of 6
Statement of the Case
[1] Terrence Roach (“Roach”) appeals his conviction following a jury trial for
Level 6 felony abuse of a corpse.1 Specifically, Roach argues that there was
insufficient independent evidence of a crime or corpus delicti to serve as a basis
for the trial court to admit his confession into evidence. However, because
Roach failed to object when the trial court admitted his confession into
evidence, Roach must establish fundamental error. Concluding that Roach has
failed to do so, we affirm his conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether Roach has established that fundamental error occurred
when the trial court admitted his confession into evidence.
Facts
[3] In March 2017, Roach confessed to police that, in July 2016, he had opened the
window to nineteen-year-old severely disabled A.B.’s (“A.B.”) bedroom from
the outside and pulled A.B. out of the window. According to Roach, he had
then driven A.B. to an abandoned house, carried her up to that house’s attic,
and placed her on a mattress. Roach further admitted to the police that he had
1
IND. CODE § 35-45-11-2 provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse with a
corpse commits Level 6 felony abuse of a corpse. Roach was also convicted of Level 3 felony confinement;
however, he does not appeal this conviction. We also note that although Roach’s appellate brief provides
that he was convicted of kidnapping, the jury acquitted Roach of that charge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1767 | January 30, 2019 Page 2 of 6
wrapped duct tape around A.B.’s mouth to keep her quiet when he left the
house. Roach also explained to the police that he had returned to the house to
find Roach dead. According to Roach, he believed that he had suffocated A.B.
with the duct tape. Roach also confessed that he had sexual intercourse with
A.B.’s corpse. Roach’s DNA was found on duct tape discovered next to A.B.’s
body and also on a cigarette butt found in the attic.
[4] The State charged Roach with three counts of felony murder, Level 2 felony
burglary, Level 3 felony confinement, Level 3 felony kidnapping, and Level 6
felony abuse of a corpse. At trial, Roach had “no objection” to the admission
of his recorded confession into evidence. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 24). The jury convicted
Roach of confinement and abuse of a corpse, and Roach now appeals the abuse
of a corpse conviction.
Decision
[5] Roach’s sole argument is that the trial court erred when it admitted his
confession to abuse of a corpse into evidence because there was an insufficient
corpus delicti. At the outset, we note that Roach did not object at trial to the
admission of his confession into evidence. He has therefore waived appellate
review of this issue. See Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 730 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012) (holding that failure to make a contemporaneous objection when the
evidence is introduced at trial results in waiver of the issue on appeal), trans.
denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1767 | January 30, 2019 Page 3 of 6
[6] Because Roach has waived appellate review of this argument, he must establish
fundamental error, which is only available in egregious circumstances. See
Absher v. State, 866 N.E.2d 350, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). To qualify as
fundamental error, the “‘error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the
defendant as to make a fair trial impossible’ and must ‘constitute a blatant
violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial,
and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.’” Id.(quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002)).
[7] In Indiana, a crime may not be proven based solely on a confession. Workman
v. State, 716 N.E.2d 445, 447 (Ind. 1999). Rather, admission of a confession
requires some independent evidence of the crime, including evidence of the
specific kind of injury and evidence that the injury was caused by criminal
conduct. Id. This evidence need not prove that a crime was committed beyond
a reasonable doubt but merely provide an inference that a crime was
committed. Id. at 447-48. This inference of a crime may be established by
circumstantial evidence. Id. at 448.
[8] We further note that “where a defendant confesses to several crimes of varying
severity within a single episode, strict and separate application of the corpus
delicti rule to each offense adds little to the ultimate reliability of the confession
once independent evidence of the principal crime is introduced.” Willoughby v.
State, 552 N.E.2d 462, 467 (Ind. 1990). Under these circumstances, a
confession to other crimes in the same episode is admissible if there is
independent evidence of the principal offense. Workman, 716 N.E.2d at 448.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1767 | January 30, 2019 Page 4 of 6
[9] Here, Roach confessed to both confinement and abuse of a corpse. He does not
contest the corpus delicti to support his confinement confession. Further, our
review of the evidence reveals that Roach’s DNA was found on duct tape and
on a cigarette butt collected from the abandoned attic room where A.B.’s
mummified body was discovered. Because there is independent evidence of
confinement, Roach’s confession to abuse of a corpse was admissible without
independent evidence of that crime. See id. (explaining that Workman’s
confession to abuse of a corpse was admissible without independent evidence
given that there was independent evidence of the principal crime of murder, to
which Workman had also confessed).2 See also Willoughby, 552 N.E.2d at 467-
68 (explaining that trial court properly admitted Willoughby’s confession to
confinement, despite lack of independent evidence establishing that crime,
because there was a sufficient corpus delicti with respect to the crimes of
murder and robbery, to which Willoughby had also confessed); Owens v. State,
732 N.E.2d 161, 163-64 (Ind. 2000) (concluding that trial court properly
admitted Owens’ confession to murder and rape even though there was no
independent evidence of rape because there was sufficient independent evidence
of murder). We find no error here, fundamental or otherwise.
2
We note that the State correctly points out that although Roach’s appellate brief “discusses Workman as a
case where the [Indiana] Supreme Court found the positioning of the [victim’s] body to constitute
independent corroboration of sexual activity (Appellant’s Br. at 14-15), in fact the Court never reache[d] that
issue because it [held] that the State was not required to present any corroboration of the abuse of a corpse
charge at all. Workman, 716 N.E.2d at 447-48.” (State’s Br. at 11, n. 2).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1767 | January 30, 2019 Page 5 of 6
Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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