Joe Paul Hambel v. State of Indiana , 119 N.E.3d 1142 ( 2019 )

FILED
Mar 15 2019, 9:07 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Patrick J. Smith Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Bedford, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Joe Paul Hambel, March 15, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-686
v. Appeal from the Washington
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Larry W. Medlock,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
88C01-1608-MR-400
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Joe Paul Hambel appeals his convictions for two counts of murder, felonies,
and one count of criminal trespass, as a Class A misdemeanor, following a jury
trial. Hambel presents the following consolidated issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion for mistrial based on alleged juror
misconduct.
2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of the offenses and his character.
[2] We affirm.1
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On August 19, 2016, Hambel approached an officer with the Salem Police
Department, Ronald Mays, to discuss Hambel’s “concern with drugs” in
Washington County, including drug activity at a home where a woman named
Valerie Dicus lived. Tr. Vol. 2 at 168. Hambel told Officer Mays that he
wanted to become an informant, and he asked Officer Mays “how [Hambel]
could help get the drugs out of Washington County.” Id. Officer Mays told
Hambel to contact Salem Police Officer Eric Mills.
1
We held oral argument in this case on February 26, 2019, at Pike Central High School in Petersburg,
Indiana. We thank counsel for their excellent advocacy and extend our appreciation to the faculty, staff, and
students of Pike Central High School for their hospitality.
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[4] Later that evening, Hambel was out with his neighbor R.J. Sease, and they
stopped at a Circle K gas station. Officer Mills was there to investigate a motor
vehicle collision at the station. Hambel approached Officer Mills, identified
himself, told Officer Mills that he wanted to help “clean up the drug problem in
the town,” and identified Dicus as “one of the drug dealers that he was wanting
to help with.” Id. at 185. Officer Mills told Hambel that he would call him so
that the two could sit down and discuss the matter another time.
[5] After Hambel and Sease left the gas station, they went back to Hambel’s
apartment. There, Hambel took Sease to a bedroom and showed him a gun,
which Hambel put into a holster “around his ankle.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 6. Sease also
saw that Hambel had a gun “on his hip.” Id. at 7. Sease then left the apartment
with his girlfriend to run an errand.
[6] Sease returned to Hambel’s apartment a while later, and, at approximately
midnight, the two left in Hambel’s car, which Hambel wanted to sell to Sease.
Hambel drove the car back to the Circle K and bought cigarettes. After that,
Hambel drove to a house on Small Street. Hambel parked his car on the street,
turned the headlights off, and got out of the car. Sease stayed in the car. After
a few minutes had passed, Sease heard gunshots, and then Hambel ran back to
the car and got in the driver’s seat. Hambel had a gun in his hand, and he told
Sease that “he had took [sic] care of one of Washington County’s biggest drug
problems.” Id. at 17. And Hambel told Sease that he had just “shot her in the
head” and “shot him.” Id. Hambel then drove back to his apartment. Before
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he pulled the car into the parking lot, he told Sease, “[I]f you tell anyone, I’ve
got a bigger [gun] I’m going to use on you.” Id. at 18.
[7] Logan Shelton, Dicus’ half-brother, had been sleeping in his bedroom at his
family’s house on Small Street when, after midnight on August 20, he was
awakened by gunshots. Logan went to the living room to investigate and found
Dicus’ boyfriend, Joe Hobson, on the floor bleeding and “struggling to
breathe.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 149. Logan’s brother Seth was there, and they decided
that they should call 9-1-1. When Logan went for the phone, he saw Dicus
motionless on the couch, and he saw “a little pile of blood.” Id. at 150. Logan
then called 9-1-1. Dicus and Hobson were subsequently declared dead as a
result of gunshot wounds.
[8] In the early morning hours of August 20, Indiana State Police Detective David
Mitchell began investigating the murders, and he quickly learned from Officer
Mays about Hambel’s interest in Dicus’ drug-dealing activity. Accordingly,
Detective Mitchell found Hambel at his apartment, told him that he would like
to discuss the murders, and transported Hambel to the Washington County
Sheriff’s Department, where Hambel agreed to give a recorded statement.
Hambel initially denied having been at Dicus’ house. But he later admitted that
he had gone to her house the night of August 19 and “looked in windows.” Tr.
Vol. 3 at 84. At the conclusion of the interview, Hambel gave Detective
Mitchell consent to search his apartment.
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[9] Hambel accompanied Detective Mitchell to Hambel’s apartment, and Hambel
told Detective Mitchell that he could find his 9-mm handgun under the driver’s
seat of his car. Detective Mitchell secured that handgun. Inside Hambel’s
apartment, Detective Mitchell found a .32-caliber handgun in an ankle holster
on top of a cabinet in the bathroom. Detective Mitchell remembered that there
were “several .32 caliber shell casings at the scene” of the murders. Id. at 181.
Detective Mitchell then transported Hambel back to the Sheriff’s Department
for a second interview. In that interview, Hambel admitted that he had shot
Dicus and Hobson in “self defense.” Id. at 187. He claimed that he had gone
into the house “to scare the s*** out of” Dicus and Hobson and, following a
scuffle between Hambel and Hobson for Hambel’s gun, the gun went off. Id. at
225.
[10] The State charged Hambel with two counts of murder; two counts of felony
murder; and burglary, as a Level 5 felony. The State subsequently dismissed
the burglary count and added a count of criminal trespass, as a Class A
misdemeanor. During the voir dire portion of the ensuing jury trial, a potential
juror ultimately seated as Juror 2 engaged in the following colloquy about his
familiarity with Hambel and the murders:
Juror 2: My wife graduated High School with [Hambel].
State: Okay and not you, but your wife?
Juror 2: Yeah.
State: Do you know . . . him then?
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Juror 2: Ah, just through her.
State: Through her, does she, was she a friend . . .
Juror 2: Yeah.
State: . . . close friend?
Juror 2: Yeah, pretty close friends with her.
State: Have you talked with her about this situation then?
Juror 2: Not a lot, no.
State: Okay, have you talked to her about what kind of
person he may be?
Juror 2: Yeah.
State: Have you, I don’t want you to tell me . . . have you
developed any kind of opinions or beliefs about him
or the case, based on that conversation?
Juror 2: Yeah, a little.
State: Okay. . . . Do you feel like this may not be the right
case for you, given what you know?
Juror 2: Yeah, probably.
Voir Dire Tr. at 7. The State then moved to strike Juror 2 for cause. Defense
counsel asked Juror 2 several questions about his wife’s relationship with
Hambel, and defense counsel argued that Juror 2 could be impartial. The trial
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court agreed and denied the State’s motion to strike Juror 2 for cause. Juror 2
was ultimately seated on the jury.
[11] On the morning of the sixth day of the jury trial, the court announced that two
jurors had notified the bailiff that “one juror may have had extra judicial
conduct with a family member . . . .” Tr. Vol. 4 at 64. The juror in question
was Juror 2. Accordingly, the court conducted interviews with several jurors to
assess the situation. The first juror the court interviewed stated that he had not
heard Juror 2 make any improper comments. The second juror the court
interviewed stated as follows:
Juror: One item is, he comes in to the jury room and
continues talking about his wife making comments
about the defendant. Somewhat, to my assumption,
of course, I am making an assumption that he’s speaking
with this about [sic] his wife.
Defense: And without telling us what was said, is he saying
this to the entire group? Are all of the jurors. . .
Juror: I don’t think that all of the jurors are hearing it, no.
I mean obviously, that’s why, there was [sic] a few
[of] us that . . .
Defense: Right. Were matters being discussed without all of
the jurors present?
Juror: No.
Defense: How would he then have a discussion where only
part of the group was here and the entire group was
not here?
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Juror: When we go to the jury room everybody talks
about, not necessarily things about the case, but just
their general conversations about their day or where
they are going and things like that.
Defense: Right. Has [Juror 2] related out loud where you
could hear him say that his wife has formed an
opinion and provided that opinion to him?
Juror: Yes.
Defense: And has he carried that opinion into the jury room?
Juror: I have, no, no. Has not, no. [sic]
Defense: When, where and how was he making these
expressions to jurors?
Juror: The jurors that sit in that area, the only thing I recall
him saying is talking about his wife and her opinion
of what’s going on. And that’s it.
Defense: Okay. And does he, is that your impression or
understanding that based upon what he’s saying is
that he’s discussing what he’s hearing in court with
her?
Juror: That, that’s an assumption that, that I’m making.
Defense: And, and that’s a fair statement. But, that’s your
impression, is that. . .
Juror: That’s my impression.
Defense: . . . that him [sic] and his wife are having a
discussion about the case?
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Juror: That’s my impression, yes.
Defense: And he is quoting his wife as to how and why she’s
expressing herself to him?
Juror: Not really giving a reason, no, no. I assume that it’s
something from the past.
Defense: Okay. Is he saying that his wife is telling him that
she’s receiving communications from family
members?
Juror: No, no, no, nothing in regards to that. Just
basically making a generalized comment about how
his wife feels.
Defense: And I assume then that his wife has a firm
impression of. . .
Juror: I can’t speak for someone else.
Defense: Okay. [Juror 2] is expressing, in his words, that she
has a firm impression on these matters?
Juror: I wouldn’t say firm impression. I mean, I don’t
know either one of them so I mean that he’s making
a statement about how she feels that’s all I can tell
you.
Defense: Okay. How many times has he made statements in
that regard?
Juror: I would say at least three or four times.
Defense: Besides yourself, who are you aware of that may
have heard these comments on the jury?
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Juror: [Two other jurors], I believe. Um, [one other juror]
and I believe [one other juror] has heard. I believe,
like I said. I am definite of the first three, not sure
about the fourth.
Defense: From your observations of [Juror 2], does he appear
to have his mind made up?
Juror: I’m not Nostradamus, I can’t predict how he has his
mind.
Defense: Has he expressed any statement to you that would
lead you to believe he has his mind made up?
Juror: I guess it depends how big of a stick his wife wields.
I couldn’t tell you that, I mean, you know you’re
asking me questions that I can’t, I’m making
assumptions and I’ve probably, maybe assumed too
much already.
***
State: Do you have a, is he saying, my wife thinks he’s
guilty or my wife thinks he’s not guilty?
Juror: Not those words, no.
State: So what words?
Juror: She has basically said that Mr. Hambel, this is not
Mr. Hambel.
State: It’s not the guy she knew.
Juror: Yes.
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State: Okay, okay. So what he basically said is my wife
knows, my wife says she knows him but it’s based
on something she knew years, years ago of him.
Juror: From my understanding, they, he, he made, I
remember him when he was, during jury selection,
he stated that . . . the defendant came to his house
two years ago, or something like that.
Id. at 73-78 (emphases added). After questioning two additional jurors, the
court engaged Juror 2 in the following colloquy:
Defense: There has been some concern expressed through the
bailiff to the Court and to the attorneys that you
may be either having people attempt to approach
you to discuss the merits of the case with you or
receiving information other than the evidence that
has been introduced to the Court. Have you
discussed the matters for which you’re serving as a
juror with anyone besides either the Court, the
bailiff or other jurors?
Juror 2: Mmmm, no, I mean coworkers at Wal-Mart come
up to me and try to talk to me but I pretty much
hush it up pretty quickly.
Defense: Have you discussed this matter with your wife?
Juror 2: Mmmm, no.
Defense: Has your wife attempted to discuss this matter with
you?
Juror 2: No, not really.
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Defense: Okay. If we were receiving information that
suggested you were quoting her to other jurors and
that she had expressed an opinion and you carried
the opinion into these informal discussions, would
that be true?
Juror 2: No.
Defense: Okay. Any idea why someone else would suggest
that you’re bringing up outside conversations in the
course of your informal discussions in the jury
room?
Juror 2: No, well my wife went to school with him so that
would be one. I have brought up conversations that
she’s had with him in school.
Defense: Okay. Would that be during times when you were
guys were back in the jury room waiting to come
back into Court?
Juror 2: Yeah.
Defense: Okay. Has anyone approached your wife in an
attempt to communicate with you?
Juror 2: Not that I know of, no.
Defense: Have you carried into those informal discussions
her thoughts or her recollections or opinions about
Mr. Hambel?
Juror 2: Yeah.
Defense: Tell the Court what those thoughts or recollections
may have been.
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Juror 2: Uh, just her opinion of him when they were in
school, their friendship, their conversations and
that’s pretty much it.
Defense: Were they friends by your understanding when they
were in school together?
Juror 2: Yeah.
Defense: And you talked about that in jury selection I
believe, is that right?
Juror 2: Yes.
Id. at 88-90.
[12] At that point, Hambel moved for a mistrial “based upon what [he] believe[d]
[we]re inappropriate communications that a juror had with a non-witness, in
direct violation of the admonitions provided by the Court to the jury.” Id. at 92.
Hambel also moved for a mistrial “based upon the disclosures, most notably
from [one particular juror, that] the deliberations ha[d] already commenced.”
Id. After hearing argument, the trial court took the matter under advisement
and, after a recess, the court interviewed the remaining jurors. The court
admonished each of the jurors not to discuss the interviews with the other
jurors. At the conclusion of those interviews, the court denied Hambel’s
motion for a mistrial. And, without objection from Hambel, the court removed
Juror 2 from the jury.
[13] The jury found Hambel guilty as charged on all five counts. The court entered
judgment of conviction on three counts: two counts of murder, felonies; and
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one count of criminal trespass, as a Class A misdemeanor. The court then
sentenced Hambel to an aggregate term of 121 years. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Mistrial Motion
[14] Hambel challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial. A trial
court is in the best position to evaluate whether a mistrial is warranted because
it can assess first-hand all relevant facts and circumstances and their impact on
the jury. Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 935 (Ind. 2014). We therefore review
the denial of a motion for mistrial only for abuse of discretion. Id.
[15] Hambel contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion for a mistrial because: (1) the court did not apply a presumption of
prejudice when it came to light that Juror 2 “was bringing outside information
into the jury room”; (2) in the alternative, the court erred when it concluded
that Juror 2 did not commit gross misconduct that probably harmed Hambel;
and (3) the court erred when it concluded that the jury had not begun
deliberating prior to the conclusion of the parties’ submission of evidence.
Appellant’s Br. at 22. We address only Hambel’s first and third contentions,
which are dispositive of this issue.2
2
We need not address Hambel’s contention in the alternative that the trial court abused its discretion when
it concluded that Juror 2 did not commit gross misconduct that probably harmed Hambel. As we explain
below, the trial court did not make such a conclusion.
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Rebuttable Presumption
[16] In Ramirez, our Supreme Court addressed confusion among our courts
regarding the presumption of prejudice in cases with alleged tainting of the jury.
The Court held as follows:
Defendants seeking a mistrial [in such cases] are entitled to the
presumption of prejudice only after making two showings, by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) extra-judicial contact or
communications between jurors and unauthorized persons
occurred, and (2) the contact or communications pertained to the
matter before the jury. Currin[ v. State], 497 N.E.2d [1045,] 1046
[(Ind. 1986)]. The burden then shifts to the State to rebut this
presumption of prejudice by showing that any contact or
communications were harmless. See Myers v. State, 240 Ind. 641,
646, 168 N.E.2d 220, 223 (1960); Oldham v. State, 249 Ind. 301,
305, 231 N.E.2d 791, 793 (1967). If the State does not rebut the
presumption, the trial court must grant a new trial. On the other
hand, if a defendant fails to make the initial two-part showing,
the presumption does not apply. Instead, the trial court must
apply the probable harm standard for juror misconduct, granting
a new trial only if the misconduct is “gross and probably
harmed” the defendant. Henri v. Curto, 908 N.E.2d 196, 202 (Ind.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). But in egregious cases
where juror conduct fundamentally compromises the appearance
of juror neutrality, trial courts should skip Currin’s two-part
inquiry, find irrebuttable prejudice, and immediately declare a
mistrial. May[ v. State], 716 N.E.2d [419,] 422-23 [(Ind. 1999)];
Kelley[ v. State], 555 N.E.2d [140,] 142 [(Ind. 1990)]; Woods[ v.
State], 233 Ind. [320,] 323-24, 119 N.E.2d [558,] 560-61 [(Ind.
1954)]. At all times, trial courts have discretion to decide
whether a defendant has satisfied the initial two-part showing
necessary to obtain the presumption of prejudice or a finding of
irrebuttable prejudice. See May, 716 N.E.2d at 421-22.
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Id. at 939.
[17] Here, in response to Hambel’s motion for a mistrial, and after questioning a few
jurors, including Juror 2, about the extra-judicial contact, the trial court stated
as follows:
Well, my . . . analysis is as would be required by Ramirez, that
two prong test: proof by a preponderance of the evidence that
extra judicial information or communications occurred. It seems
obvious that [Juror 2] has at least communicated some
information or opinion about Mr. Hambel to perhaps, limited
members, perhaps all members, but many of them appear to have
not paid any attention or didn’t hear him. And that the
communications occurred and that pertained to a matter pending
before the jury. That . . . portion is not obvious to the court.
Even if Ramirez would indicate that the State does not rebut, but
[sic] the presumption, [the] trial court must grant a new trial and
on the other hand if the defendant fails to make an initial two
part showing the presumption does not apply, instead the trial
court must apply a probable harm standard for juror misconduct
granting a new trial only if the misconduct is gross and probably
harmed the defendant. My analysis is that the communication
did not harm the defendant, in fact, it appeared from the court’s
perception that it may have been trying to help the defendant. So
I find that the communications w[ere] harmless. Now, I think that it
also appears appropriate that, therefore your motion to, for
mistrial is denied. . . .
Tr. Vol. 4 at 125 (emphasis added).
[18] On appeal, Hambel first notes that “[t]he trial court’s ruling is hardly a model of
clarity” and interprets it to mean that the court did not apply the rebuttable
presumption under Ramirez. Appellant’s Br. at 24. We agree that, at first
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glance, it is unclear whether the court applied the presumption here. On the
one hand, the trial court found that it was “obvious” that the first prong under
Ramirez was satisfied, and the court then stated that whether the second prong
had been satisfied was “not obvious.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 125. However, the court
concluded that Juror 2’s extra-judicial “communications w[ere] harmless,”
which is a direct reference to the State’s burden under Ramirez to rebut the
presumption.3 Id. Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling, when read as a whole,
demonstrates that the court properly applied the rebuttable presumption under
Ramirez, and we reject Hambel’s contention that the court erred on this issue.
[19] Further, the evidence is overwhelming that Juror 2’s communications to some
of the jurors were harmless. Hambel asserts that he was prejudiced by Juror 2’s
remarks because another juror described Juror 2 as “trying to throw [the jurors]
in another direction” while discussing the case. Tr. Vol. 4 at 79. But it is
undisputed that Juror 2 communicated only information that was favorable to
Hambel. Thus, there is no evidence that Hambel was harmed by the substance
of Juror 2’s remarks.4 Hambel concedes that only two or three jurors had even
heard Juror 2 remark on his wife’s opinions of Hambel. And, after Juror 2 was
3
Hambel asserts that the trial court applied the probable harm standard, but the court only mentioned the
probable harm standard in explaining the test under Ramirez.
4
To the extent Hambel contends that he was harmed by the trial court’s removal of Juror 2 from the jury
because Juror 2 had a favorable opinion of Hambel, Hambel did not object to his removal and cannot now
complain.
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removed from the jury and replaced, the trial court admonished the jurors as
follows:
I want to remind the jury of the preliminary instructions that the
court had previously provided to the jury. As I admonish you,
each and every time that you leave, you are not to have any
discussions with anyone other than yourselves and only while
you’re together in the jury room. Only consider that evidence
which comes before you in this court room and was admitted by
the Court.
Tr. Vol. 4 at 129. There is no evidence that Juror 2’s remarks impacted the
jurors’ ability to remain impartial. In any event, assuming any prejudice to
Hambel, we presume that the court’s admonishment cured it. Jones v. State, 101
N.E.3d 249, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it concluded that Juror 2’s remarks to a few jurors were
harmless and denied Hambel’s motion for mistrial on that basis. See, e.g.,
Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 16 (Ind. 2015) (holding trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied mistrial motion where, after extrajudicial
communication to jurors was exposed, court questioned each juror,
admonished the jurors, and dismissed the offending juror).
Deliberations
[20] Hambel next contends that the jurors engaged in deliberations “prior to the
conclusion of the evidence in the case.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. In support of
that contention, Hambel directs this court to a juror’s statement that Juror 2
“was thwarting the jury’s deliberations.” Id. In particular, when asked about
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Juror 2’s inappropriate remarks about Hambel, one juror said: “[W]e’d be
sitting there, deliberating and [Juror 2 would] come off with something to try to
get us in another direction.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 80. When defense counsel asked that
juror to clarify what he had meant by “deliberating,” the juror agreed that they
were “discussing the evidence that had been presented during the most recent
session in court.” Id.
[21] Indiana Jury Rule 20(a)(8) provides in relevant part that jurors “are permitted
to discuss the evidence among themselves in the jury room during recesses from
trial when all are present, as long as they reserve judgment about the outcome
of the case until deliberations commence.” With the promulgation of that rule,
our Supreme Court “has unambiguously made a distinction between
discussions and deliberations.” Weatherspoon v. State, 912 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
[22] The State maintains that there is no evidence that the jurors began deliberations
before all of the evidence had been submitted. Indeed, each of the jurors
questioned about whether deliberations had begun when the court removed
Juror 2 responded that there had only been discussions, but no judgments about
the ultimate outcome. We agree with the State and hold that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it denied Hambel’s motion for mistrial on this
basis.
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Issue Two: Sentence
[23] Hambel contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he
Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of
the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” This court
has held that “[t]he advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has
selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State,
71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). And the Indiana Supreme Court has
explained that:
The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to
leaven the outliers . . . but not achieve a perceived “correct”
result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind.
2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the
sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer v.
State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind.), as amended (July 10, 2007),
decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).
Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).
[24] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate
sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should
receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we
regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of
the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to
others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.
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The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather
whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265,
268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless
overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the
offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the
defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples
of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[25] With respect to the nature of the offenses, Hambel asserts that, while there were
“young persons in the residence” at the time of the murders, “there is no
evidence that the young persons did see the offenses, and little evidence that
Hambel thought they would see the offenses.” Appellant’s Br. at 38. And
Hambel points out that “it should be considered that the events of August 20
were set into motion by Hambel’s serious concerns about drug use and dealing
in Washington County.” Id. With respect to his character, Hambel maintains
that: he has no criminal history; despite his PTSD, anxiety, and depression, he
has maintained steady employment; and he has two children. Hambel
characterizes his character as “excellent.” Id. at 39.
[26] However, as the State points out, the nature of the offenses supports the 121-
year sentence in that Hambel: planned the murders; shot Dicus in the head
from close range; shot Hobson six times; and threatened to kill Sease if he told
anyone about the murders. As for his character, Hambel may have been
motivated to commit these murders by his concern about the drug problem in
Washington County and his interest in helping law enforcement. But when he
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 21 of 22
became a vigilante and took the law into his own hands, he displayed a blatant
disrespect for the law, which reflects poorly on his character. We cannot say
that Hambel’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and
his character.
[27] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-686 | March 15, 2019 Page 22 of 22