Ryann S. Clark v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) , 121 N.E.3d 151 ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                    Jan 31 2019, 6:11 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                       CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                          Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Kurt A. Young                                            Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Nashville, Indiana                                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Evan Matthew Comer
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Ryann S. Clark,                                          January 31, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-1136
    v.                                               Appeal from the Brown Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Judith A. Stewart,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    07C01-1702-F3-140
    Pyle, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1136 | January 31, 2019                      Page 1 of 9
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Ryann Clark (“Clark”) appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, for Level 3
    felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury. 1 He asserts that
    the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Concluding
    that there was sufficient evidence to find Clark guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt, we affirm his conviction.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Issue
    Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Clark’s conviction.
    Facts
    [3]   In early July of 2016, TJ was born to Christina Pritchard (“Pritchard”) and
    Clark. Clark voluntarily admitted to paternity and received visitation with TJ
    every week on his day off from work and again from Saturday morning until
    Sunday night. By the end of August, the visitation schedule had been adjusted
    to allow TJ to stay with Clark and his mother, Gidgette Hall (“Hall”), for
    extended periods of time. This change was intended to allow TJ to spend more
    time with Hall, who was terminally ill.
    1
    IND. CODE § 35-46-1-4.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1136 | January 31, 2019   Page 2 of 9
    [4]   Eight-week old TJ went to stay with Clark at his house for a week, beginning
    on August 30th. On the morning of September 2nd, Clark “saw this lump . . . the
    size of [his] pinky . . . on the side of [TJ’s] head.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 15). He took
    TJ to Hall, who “started to freak out.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 15). Hall then called TJ’s
    pediatrician, Dr. Rachel Woods (“Dr. Woods”), to schedule an appointment
    for later that day.
    [5]   Clark and Hall accompanied TJ to Dr. Woods’ office. Dr. Woods performed
    an examination and found TJ very fussy. When she examined TJ’s head,
    “there was a squishiness to it,” and she saw that “the skull could possibly be
    fractured.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 60). She also saw “a bruise on his right cheek.” (Tr.
    Vol. 2 at 60). Dr. Woods questioned Clark about the head injury, but Clark
    initially stated that he did not know what had happened. Dr. Woods asked
    Clark what happened a second time, and he stated that “TJ was laying on a bed
    and then perhaps something hit him.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 60).
    [6]   Dr. Woods referred TJ to Columbus Regional Hospital for an emergency CT
    scan of his head. The CT scan revealed that TJ suffered from “a right parietal
    fracture and then a hematoma in the brain.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 62). Following the
    CT scan, Dr. Woods flagged TJ’s case for possible child abuse and contacted
    the Department of Child Services (“DCS”). DCS initiated an investigation and
    TJ was transferred to Riley Hospital for Children (“Riley Hospital”) for further
    care.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1136 | January 31, 2019   Page 3 of 9
    [7]    Pritchard, who met Clark, Hall, and TJ at Columbus Regional, rode in the
    ambulance with TJ to Riley Hospital. After arriving at Riley, Pritchard called
    Clark and asked him to explain what had happened to TJ. Clark told her that
    he had tripped over the dog and dropped TJ onto a mattress.
    [8]    The Riley Hospital doctors diagnosed TJ with a fractured skull and soft tissue
    swelling, both of which are indicators of possible trauma in a non-mobile
    infant. They then ordered TJ to undergo an MRI, which revealed bleeding on
    the surface of his brain. Based on the nature of the injuries, Riley Hospital
    social worker, Jennifer Benson (“Social Worker Benson”), was notified. Social
    Worker Benson completed a full psycho-social assessment of TJ and then spoke
    with the emergency room physicians and the neurosurgeon. Together, they
    concluded that TJ’s injuries were not consistent with Clark’s claim that TJ was
    dropped on a mattress. They then decided to make another report to DCS to
    ensure an investigation occurred outside of the hospital.
    [9]    At approximately 8:00 p.m. on September 2nd, DCS family case manager,
    Stephanie Clephane (“Case Manager Clephane”), received a call from the child
    abuse hotline. Thereafter, she requested assistance from the Brown County
    Sheriff’s Office and Deputy Brian Shrader (“Deputy Shrader”) was assigned to
    the case. Clark voluntarily participated in an interview with Case Manager
    Clephane and Deputy Shrader.
    [10]   Initially, Clark explained that he had no idea what had happened to TJ. He
    acknowledged that he was TJ’s sole caregiver from August 30th until the time of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1136 | January 31, 2019   Page 4 of 9
    the injury. Clark eventually stated that on the night of September 1st, he was
    walking to put TJ in his bassinet when his dog jumped on him causing him to
    fall. He explained that he then threw TJ onto the bed, and he landed in a
    “crevice” between his mattress and the wall of his bedroom. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 106).
    Clark further explained that he had heard a “thud” after throwing TJ, but TJ
    did not cry at all. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 101). Clark then checked TJ over and saw no
    signs of injury. After the interview, Case Manager Clephane conducted a home
    visit. During this visit, she took photographs of Clark’s bedroom and did not
    find a crevice between the mattress and the wall.
    [11]   TJ was discharged from Riley Hospital on September 3rd but was readmitted
    one day later. During the second admission, TJ was seen by Dr. Shannon
    Thompson (“Dr. Thompson”), a general pediatrician who also specializes in
    child abuse pediatrics. Dr. Thompson performed a physical examination of TJ
    and observed that he had bruising on his right temple, his right cheek, his lower
    right buttock, and small abrasions under his chin. She also reviewed TJ’s
    records from his previous hospital stay. Dr. Thompson noted that, while skull
    fractures ordinarily cause blood to pool directly underneath the injury, in TJ’s
    case, blood was present elsewhere in his brain. She concluded that TJ
    experienced some form of trauma and that the injuries were the result of a
    single impact. Based on her experience, she believed that TJ “was a victim of
    non-accidental trauma or abuse.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 222).
    [12]   The State charged Clark with Level 3 felony domestic battery resulting in
    serious bodily injury to a person less than fourteen years old and Level 3 felony
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1136 | January 31, 2019   Page 5 of 9
    neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury. The trial court
    conducted a three-day jury trial. Dr. Woods, Case Manager Clephane, Deputy
    Shrader, Pritchard, Social Worker Benson, Dr. Thompson, and TJ’s maternal
    grandmother, Tonya Jackson, testified to the facts above for the State.
    [13]   Clark testified on his own behalf. He stated that as he was going to put TJ into
    his bassinet, his dog jumped up, and he tripped over the dog. Clark further
    explained that as he fell to the ground, his “first reaction” was to toss TJ on the
    bed. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 19). When Clark got up, he found TJ “in the crevice of –
    between . . . – the wall and [his] mattress.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 19). On cross-
    examination, Clark acknowledged that “throwing a 56[-]day old child” would
    endanger the child. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 28).
    [14]   Dr. Andre Lloyd (“Dr. Lloyd”), a bio-mechanical engineer with a PhD in
    pediatric head injuries, also testified on behalf of Clark. Dr. Lloyd reviewed all
    of TJ’s medical records, the police report, and the DCS interview. He testified
    that he believed TJ’s head injury was the result of a “single impact event.” (Tr.
    Vol. 3 at 54). He further explained that he did not believe TJ’s injury had
    occurred the way Clark had stated. Specifically, Dr. Lloyd concluded that the
    “characteristics tell you that . . . the tossing on the bed wasn’t . . . [the] abrupt
    event.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 54-55).
    [15]   The jury found Clark guilty of neglect of a dependent, and not guilty of
    domestic battery. The court then sentenced Clark to ten (10) years in the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1136 | January 31, 2019   Page 6 of 9
    Department of Correction, with six (6) years suspended to probation. Clark
    now appeals.
    Decision
    [16]   On appeal, Clark challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his Level 3
    felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury conviction. Our
    standard of review for sufficiency of evidence claims is well-settled. We do not
    assess the credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining
    whether the evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 146 (Ind.
    2007). We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
    supporting the verdict. 
    Id. Reversal is
    appropriate only when no reasonable
    fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt. 
    Id. The evidence
    is not required to overcome every reasonable
    hypothesis of innocence and is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be
    drawn from it to support the verdict. 
    Id. at 147.
    [17]   Clark does not dispute that he was in a position of care concerning TJ at the
    time he was injured, nor does he contest the fact the TJ suffered serious bodily
    injury. Instead, Clark argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish
    that he knowingly placed TJ in a situation endangering TJ’s life or health
    resulting in serious bodily injury.
    [18]   To obtain a conviction for neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily
    injury, a Level 3 felony, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt that Clark had the care of a dependent and knowingly placed the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1136 | January 31, 2019   Page 7 of 9
    dependent in a situation endangering the dependent’s life or health resulting in
    serious bodily injury. I.C. § 35-46-1-4. A person engages in conduct knowingly
    if, “when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is
    doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b).
    Under the child neglect statute a ‘knowing’ mens rea requires a
    subjective awareness of a ‘high probability’ that a dependent had
    been placed in a dangerous situation. Because, in most cases,
    such a finding requires the factfinder to infer the defendant’s
    mental state, this Court must look to all the surrounding
    circumstances of a case to determine if a guilty verdict is proper.
    Pierson v. State, 
    73 N.E.3d 737
    , 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (internal citations and
    quotations omitted), trans. denied.
    [19]   Here, the jury heard evidence that TJ was not injured in the manner described
    by Clark, specifically that TJ hit his head on a mattress. Three of the State’s
    witnesses explained that, at the least, it was extremely unlikely that TJ’s skull
    fracture resulted from falling on a bed. Additionally, Clark’s own witness, Dr.
    Lloyd, testified that “the tossing on the bed wasn’t . . . [the] abrupt event.” (Tr.
    Vol. 3 at 54-55). In addition to the skull fracture, TJ also had significant
    bruising on his right temple, right cheek, and right buttock. Dr. Thompson
    believed all of TJ’s injuries were the result of a single impact. In further
    contrast to Clark’s explanation for TJ’s injuries, Dr. Thompson stated that TJ’s
    injuries were caused by “non-accidental trauma or abuse.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 222).
    Dr. Woods similarly believed the most likely cause of the injuries was due to
    “[s]ome sort of trauma.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 62). Importantly, Clark, the only adult
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1136 | January 31, 2019   Page 8 of 9
    present in the bedroom when TJ sustained his injuries, acknowledged that
    “throwing a 56[-]day old child” would endanger the child. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 28).
    Based on all the evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Clark
    was aware of a high probability that he placed TJ in a dangerous situation by
    throwing him. See, e.g., Dexter v. State, 
    945 N.E.2d 220
    , 224 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2011) (affirming neglect conviction of defendant who, despite being warned not
    to do so by defendant’s mother and child’s mother, threw a wet three-year-old
    child into the air above a bathtub, failed to catch the child, and child sustained
    fatal head trauma after hitting the tub), trans. granted, summarily aff’d in relevant
    part, 
    959 N.E.2d 235
    , 237 (Ind. 2012). Accordingly, we hold that the evidence
    was sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Clark knowingly placed
    TJ in a situation endangering TJ’s life or health resulting in serious bodily
    injury.
    [20]   Affirmed.
    Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1136 | January 31, 2019   Page 9 of 9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case 18A-CR-1136

Citation Numbers: 121 N.E.3d 151

Judges: Pyle

Filed Date: 1/31/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024