Michelle R. Ruggio v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
Nov 18 2014, 9:37 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MICHELLE R. RUGGIO GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Monticello, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KYLE HUNTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MICHELLE R. RUGGIO, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1405-EX-336
)
REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA )
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE )
DEVELOPMENT, et al, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
The Honorable Steven F. Bier, Chairperson
Cause No. 14-R-00619
November 18, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Petitioner, Michelle R. Ruggio (Ruggio), appeals the Notice of
Dismissal issued by Appellee-Respondent, Unemployment Insurance Review Board of
the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (Review Board).
We affirm.
ISSUE
Ruggio raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the
Review Board erred in dismissing her appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 7, 2012, Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (Employer) hired Ruggio to work
as an accounting clerk at its facility in Logansport, Indiana. Employer’s attendance
policy provides that the accumulation of eight excused absences or two unexcused
absences in a rolling twelve-month period will result in termination. Between February
19, 2013, and December 20, 2013, Ruggio accrued more than eight absences. As a result,
on December 23, 2013, Employer terminated Ruggio for excessive absenteeism.
Ruggio subsequently filed a claim with for unemployment compensation benefits,
and a deputy at the Department of Workforce Development made an initial determination
that she was eligible for benefits. On February 17, 2014, Employer appealed. On March
5, 2014, the matter was heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ). On March 7, 2014,
the ALJ issued her opinion, concluding that Ruggio had been discharged for just cause
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and, therefore, was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. A copy of the
ALJ’s opinion was mailed to Ruggio the same day. On March 31, 2014, Ruggio
appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Review Board. On April 11, 2014, the Review Board
dismissed Ruggio’s appeal, finding it had not been timely filed.
Ruggio now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Ruggio seeks reinstatement of her unemployment compensation benefits. She
claims that the Review Board and the ALJ improperly determined that she was
terminated for just cause. However, Ruggio entirely fails to address the dispositive issue
of this case: the Review Board’s dismissal of her appeal as untimely.
“The time period for perfecting an appeal from an ALJ’s determination is
statutorily defined.” Szymanski v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 656
N.E.2d 290, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Indiana’s unemployment compensation law
stipulates that an ALJ’s decision “shall be deemed to be the final decision of the
[R]eview [B]oard, unless within fifteen (15) days after the date of notification or mailing
of such decision, an appeal is taken by the commissioner or by any party adversely
affected by such decision to the [R]eview [B]oard.” Ind. Code § 22-4-17-3(b). When
notice is served by mail, an additional three days is added to the prescribed time period.
I.C. § 22-4-17-14(c). Thus, Ruggio was required to file her appeal no later than eighteen
days after the ALJ’s decision was mailed.
It is undisputed that the ALJ’s decision was mailed to Ruggio on March 7, 2014;
as such, Ruggio’s appeal was due to be filed with the Review Board no later than March
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25, 2014. Ruggio does not contest that she did not file her appeal until March 31, 2014.
It is well established that the failure to strictly comply with a statutory filing deadline
“results in dismissal of the appeal.” Quakenbush v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of
Workforce Dev., 891 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Accordingly, by filing her
appeal six days after the statutory time limit, Ruggio forfeited her right to appeal the
ALJ’s ruling to the Review Board.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Review Board properly dismissed
Ruggio’s appeal because it was not timely filed.
Affirmed.
MATHIAS, J. and CRONE, J. concur
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