Karen C. Roebuck v. Andrew Paul Christensen (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 27 2020, 8:13 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Karen C. Roebuck Ameen R. Najjar
Chicago, Illinois State Farm Litigation Counsel
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Karen C. Roebuck, March 27, 2020
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-SC-2337
v. Appeal from the Washington
Township of Marion County Small
Andrew Paul Christensen, Claims Court
Appellee-Defendant The Honorable Steven G. Poore,
Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49K07-1902-SC-730
Crone, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Karen Roebuck sued Andrew Paul Christensen in small claims court, claiming
that her vehicle lost $4000 in value as a result of being involved in a collision
caused by Christensen. The trial court found in favor of Christensen, and
Roebuck now appeals. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On March 11, 2018, Roebuck was driving a 2015 Volvo and traveling north on
Washington Boulevard toward its intersection with Kessler Boulevard in
Indianapolis. At that time, Christensen was parked in a vehicle facing north on
Washington Boulevard when he pulled away from a parked position and
caused a collision with Roebuck’s vehicle. The parties agree that the collision
was a result of Christensen’s negligence, and that the collision caused damage
along the right side of Roebuck’s vehicle.
[3] Roebuck had the damage to her vehicle repaired between March 13 and April
10, 2018, at Howard Orloff Volvo in Chicago, Illinois, for $7009. The record
indicates that Roebuck’s vehicle had already been damaged and repaired
following two previous accidents. Specifically, the vehicle’s rear bumper was
repaired in October 2016 for $510.84, and the passenger door was repaired in
January 2017 for $1496.88. On March 9, 2019, Roebuck sold her vehicle to
Jonathan V. Warsh for $19,200. The agreement indicated that $17,000 was for
the vehicle and $2200 was for warranties.
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[4] On February 25, 2019, Roebuck filed a notice of claim in the Washington
Township Small Claims Court alleging,
The Plaintiff complains of the Defendant and says that the
Defendant is indebted to the Plaintiff in the sum of $4000
because of a crash that occurred on March 11, 2018 due to the
negligence of [Christensen]. The crash was on Washington Blvd
in Indianapolis, Indiana. This crash created a loss of value, or
deminished [sic] value to Plaintiff’s vehicle. Greg Leach, Sales
Manager at dealership that repaired the vehicle reports a
deminished [sic] value of $4,000 as a result of the crash.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 6.
[5] A small claims trial was held on June 27, 2019. During trial, Roebuck
submitted, among other things, the affidavit of Greg Leach from Howard Orloff
Volvo. Leach stated that he evaluated Roebuck’s vehicle on April 11, 2018,
after it had been repaired following Roebuck’s collision with Christensen.
Taking into account all three collisions, Leach stated that the assessed value of
Roebuck’s vehicle prior to the third collision was $21,000. Leach stated that he
could “with a great deal of certainty” assess the value of Roebuck’s vehicle after
the third collision as $17,000. Ex. Vol. at 22. Accordingly, Leach concluded
that the third collision resulted in a $4000 loss of value for the vehicle.
[6] On September 3, 2019, the trial court issued extensive findings of fact and
judgment. Specifically, the court found in relevant part:
20. Plaintiff request[s] that the court find that plaintiff’s vehicle
had a fair market value of $21,000 immediately before the March
11, 2018 accident caused by defendant and a fair market value of
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$17,000 after the vehicle was repaired. Nevertheless, the plaintiff
sold the vehicle eleven (11) months later for the same amount
that plaintiff’s expert, Greg Leach, valued the vehicle in April
2018.
….
22. It is reasonable and within the knowledge of a lay person to
conclude that a 4 year old motor vehicle will depreciate in value
over eleven (11) months.
23. Plaintiff’s sale in March 2019 for the fair market value
claimed in April 2018 undermines the assertion by Greg Leach
that the plaintiff’s vehicle had a fair market value of $17,000 in
2018.
24. Plaintiff’s evidence does not include depreciation between the
time the repairs were completed and the time of trial and[/]or
how they can be reconciled with plaintiff’s request for damages
calculated on the value in April 2018.
Appealed Order at 4-5. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of
Christensen and against Roebuck. Roebuck filed a motion to correct error,
which was subsequently denied by the trial court. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[7] We begin by noting that Roebuck brings this appeal after a negative judgment
against her in small claims court. “On appeal, we will not reverse a negative
judgment unless it is contrary to law.” Kim v. Vill. at Eagle Creek Homeowners
Ass’n, 133 N.E.3d 250, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). That is to say, the “judgment
will be reversed only if the evidence leads to but one conclusion, and the trial
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court reached the opposite conclusion.” Id. “Our standard of review in small
claims cases is particularly deferential in order to preserve the speedy and
informal process for small claims.” Heartland Crossing Found., Inc. v. Dotlich, 976
N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[8] The court here issued a five-page judgment including findings of fact. Another
panel of this Court has recently explained,
Pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A), the findings or judgments rendered
by a small claims court are upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous. Because small claims courts were designed to dispense
justice efficiently by applying substantive law in an informal
setting, this deferential standard of review is particularly
appropriate. We consider the evidence most favorable to the
judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that
evidence. However, we still review issues of substantive law de
novo. The burdens of proof are the same in a small claims suit as
they would have been if suit had been filed in a trial court of
general jurisdiction.
N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Josh’s Lawn & Snow, LLC, 130 N.E.3d 1191, 1193 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2019).
[9] We must also acknowledge that Roebuck is proceeding pro se. However, “this
does not mean that we will treat [her] brief any differently than we would if
[she] was represented by counsel. Indeed, it has long been the rule in Indiana
that pro se litigants without legal training are held to the same standard as
trained counsel and are required to follow procedural rules.” Receveur v. Buss,
919 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (italics omitted), trans. denied.
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[10] Roebuck purports to raise several issues on appeal that we may easily
consolidate into one: Whether the trial court’s judgment is clearly erroneous or
contrary to law. We conclude that it is neither.
[11] “It is a well-established principle that damages are awarded to fairly and
adequately compensate an injured party for her loss, and the proper measure of
damages must be flexible enough to fit the circumstances.” Bader v. Johnson, 732
N.E.2d 1212, 1220 (Ind. 2000). “In tort actions generally, all damages directly
related to the wrong and arising without an intervening agency are
recoverable.” Id. The trial court here specifically looked to this Court’s opinion
in Wiese-GMC, Inc. v. Wells, 626 N.E.2d 595, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans.
denied (1994), which summarized the law regarding damages for the diminution
in value of personal property as follows:
[T]he fundamental measure of damages in a situation where an
item of personal property is damaged, but not destroyed, is the
reduction in fair market value caused by the negligence of the tort
feasor. This reduction in fair market value may be proved in any
of three ways, depending on the circumstances. First, it may be
proved by evidence of the fair market value before and the fair
market value after the causative event. Secondly, it may be
proved by evidence of the cost of repair where repair will restore
the personal property to its fair market value before the causative
event. Third, the reduction in fair market value may be proved by
a combination of evidence of the cost of repair and evidence of
the fair market value before the causative event and the fair
market value after repair, where repair will not restore the item of
personal property to its fair market value before the causative
event.
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The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the fair market value of the property.
Campins v. Capels, 461 N.E.2d 712, 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
[12] Roebuck attempted to prove her damages (reduction in fair market value) by
presenting evidence of the fair market value of her vehicle before and the fair
market value after it had been repaired following the collision with Christensen.
However, the trial court simply did not find her evidence credible. Specifically,
the court determined that the credibility of Roebuck’s evidence of reduction of
fair market value was undermined by the fact that she sold the vehicle eleven
months after the appraisal for the exact same amount as the appraisal. This was
the prerogative of the trial court, as the trier of fact, and we will defer to its
credibility determination. Contrary to Roebuck’s suggestion, the trial court was
not obligated to accept her valuation of the vehicle simply because it was
unrebutted by Christensen. Moreover, it was well within the discretion of the
trial court, in evaluating the credibility of Roebuck’s fair market/diminished
value evidence, to sua sponte observe that a four-year-old vehicle will lose at
least some value over eleven months. See generally Wolverine Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Oliver, 933 N.E.2d 568, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (noting informal small claims
process and finding “no meaningful rationale” that would justify forbidding
small claims court from sua sponte soliciting or considering argument not put
forth by parties), trans. denied (2010). Although Roebuck argues that the trial
court confused and conflated diminished value with depreciation, the court was
making no substantive determination regarding either. Rather, the court was
simply observing the fact that Roebuck sold her vehicle eleven months after
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appraisal for the exact same amount, despite obvious depreciation, calls the
credibility of that appraisal, and hence the resulting diminished value
calculation, into question. In short, the trial court concluded that Roebuck did
not meet her burden to prove a $4000 reduction in fair market value of her
vehicle caused by Christensen’s negligence. That conclusion was neither clearly
erroneous nor contrary to law, and therefore we affirm.
[13] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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