Justin S. Counceller v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 30 2020, 11:24 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David W. Stone IV Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lauren A. Jacobsen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Justin S. Counceller, March 30, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2150
v. Appeal from the
Madison Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Angela G. Warner Sims, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C01-1604-F6-783
Altice, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] After pleading guilty to Level 6 felony fraud, Justin Counceller began serving
his sentence in the county’s community corrections Continuum of Sanctions
Program (the Program). Counceller was alleged to have violated the rules of
the Program on a number of occasions. Following a hearing, the trial court
found that Counceller violated the rules of his placement and ordered that he
serve the remainder of his sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction
(DOC). Counceller argues that (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted the testimony of a case manager with the Program, and (2) the trial
court’s finding of a violation was not supported by the evidence.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] In January 2016, Counceller made purchases with a credit card belonging to a
deceased man, whom Counceller had known. At some point, Counceller was
identified and arrested, and on April 15, 2016, the State charged him with Level
6 felony fraud. On January 10, 2017, Counceller entered into a plea agreement
which left open the total length of the sentence but capped the executed portion
at eighteen months. On March 27, 2017, the trial court sentenced Counceller to
910 days, 545 executed and 365 days suspended to probation, with Counceller
serving the executed portion of his sentence in the Program. On March 28,
Counceller reported to the Madison County Community Justice Center (CJC)
for intake into the Program’s adult day reporting program. That date,
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Counceller submitted to a urine screen and tested positive for
methamphetamine, THC, and Suboxone. The Program’s Board voted to place
Counceller into the home detention program and gave him thirty days to
complete the home detention intake requirements, and directed that, until then,
he continue to report to adult day reporting.
[4] A month later, on April 28, an adult day reporting case manager for the
Program filed a petition to terminate Counceller’s participation in the Program
for five alleged violations, including Counceller’s admitted use of marijuana,
suboxone, and methamphetamine. The Program also alleged that Counceller
resisted correctional officers, failed to obtain employment and substance abuse
evaluations, and failed to meet financial obligations of the Program. On May
22, following a hearing, the trial court issued a sanctions order, finding that
Counceller violated the terms of his placement in the Program. The trial court
revoked Counceller’s placement and suspended sentence and ordered him to
serve his sentence in the DOC. However, the court suspended those sanctions
pending successful completion of Drug Court, for which Counceller was later
found to be ineligible. On July 31, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the
trial court ordered Counceller to serve his remaining sentence on work release
through the Program.
[5] On October 4, 2017, a case manager with the Program filed a petition to
terminate Counceller’s participation in the Program for his failure to schedule
his work release intake, failure to report, and committing a new criminal
offense of misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The trial court issued a
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warrant for Counceller’s arrest, and after an October 30 hearing, the trial court
issued a sanctions order, determining that Counceller had violated conditions of
the Program. Pursuant to an agreement of the parties, the trial court imposed
62 days in the Madison County Detention Center, less accrued days and earned
credit time, “resulting in time served.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 105. The
trial court ordered Counceller to return to the Program.
[6] On June 27, 2019, Counceller was placed in the work release facility as part of
his community corrections sentence. 1 On July 2, 2019, the Program
Coordinator filed a Notice of COS Termination with the court, asking that
Counceller’s placement in the Program be terminated because (1) on June 27 at
11:45 a.m. Counceller was released from the Program facility for medical care
but failed to return, and (2) he committed a new offense, namely Level 6 felony
failure to return (later filed as Cause F6-1708).
[7] The trial court issued a warrant for Counceller’s arrest, which was served on
July 28, 2019. Counceller appeared for an initial hearing on the notice of
termination, and the court set an evidentiary hearing for Aug 19. In addition,
the trial court issued “its standard order of discovery,” which required the State
to file with the court “any . . . documents . . . [that] the prosecuting attorney
1
The record does not explain the lapse in time from late 2017 to Counceller’s placement at the work release
facility in June 2019.
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intends to use in the hearing[.]” Id. at 15, 75. The Program, through the CJC,
timely filed discovery with the court on August 12.
[8] On August 19, 2019, the trial court jointly held an evidentiary hearing on the
alleged violation and a status conference in Cause F6-1708. As evidence of
Counceller’s alleged violation, the State presented testimony from Brandy
Poffenbarger, a case manager with the Program. Poffenbarger testified that she
had not met Counceller and was representing another case manager at the
hearing. When Counceller objected based on Poffenbarger’s lack of personal
knowledge, she testified that the Program keeps a file on every person in the
Program and her knowledge was based on the contents of Counceller’s file.
Counceller objected, arguing, “They haven’t really established . . . that these
record [sic] are kept in the normal course of business, only that they are records
that this lady, who has never met my client, says . . .they keep on each client . .
. [s]o I think there’s a foundational problem.” Transcript at 13-14. The trial
court overruled the objection, and Poffenbarger testified that Counceller was
placed in the work release facility on June 27 and that he “absconded” on the
same day when he left with permission for medical treatment and “never
returned.” Id. at 14. Following cross-examination, the State asked the trial
court to take judicial notice of the Program’s filing of discovery on August 12.
The court granted the request without objection from Counceller.
[9] On August 19, 2019, the trial court issued a sanctions order, determining that
Counceller had violated the terms of the Program as follows:
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1. On 6/27/19, Defendant was released for medical care and
failed to return to work release [];
2. Defendant failed to behave well in society, to wit: on 6/28/19,
Defendant committed a new criminal offense under [F6-1708] [].
Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 17. The court ordered Counceller to serve the
remainder of his sentence in the DOC. He now appeals.
Discussion & Decision
I. Admission of Evidence
[10] Counceller argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed
Poffenbarger to testify even though she had no personal knowledge of
Counceller or his participation in the Program. Generally, the admission of
evidence is within the trial court’s discretion, and its decisions are only
reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. Holmes v. State, 923 N.E.2d 479, 483
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010). An abuse of discretion occurs if a decision is clearly
against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before the court or if
the court has misinterpreted the law. Id.
[11] It is well established that, while a community corrections placement revocation
hearing has certain due process requirements, it is not to be equated with an
adversarial criminal proceeding. Monroe v. State, 899 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009). Rather, its procedures are to be more flexible. Id. We have
explained:
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[T]he Indiana Rules of Evidence in general and the rules against
hearsay in particular do not apply in community corrections
placement revocation hearings. See Ind. Evidence Rule 101(c)
(providing that the rules do not apply in proceedings relating to
sentencing, probation, or parole). In probation and community
corrections placement revocation hearings, therefore, judges may consider
any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability. This
includes reliable hearsay. The absence of strict evidentiary rules
places particular importance on the fact-finding role of judges in
assessing the weight, sufficiency and reliability of proffered
evidence.
Id. (some internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Courts may admit
evidence during the hearing that would not be permitted in a full-blown
criminal trial. Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 442 (Ind. 2007). This includes
“letters, affidavits, and other material” that would generally not be admissible.
Id.
[12] As our Supreme Court recognized, there are sound policy justifications for such
flexibility. Smith v. State, 971 N.E.2d 86, 91 (Ind. 2012). Alternative sentencing
such as community corrections serves the humane purposes of avoiding
incarceration and permitting the offender to meet the offender’s financial
obligations, “‘but for sentencing alternatives to be viable options for Indiana
judges, judges must have the ability to move with alacrity to protect public
safety when adjudicated offenders violate the conditions of their sentences.’”
Id. (quoting Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind. 1999)). Stated differently,
“‘obstacles to revoking an alternative sentence may diminish the likelihood of
community corrections placements being made in the first place.’” Id.
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[13] Here, Counceller acknowledges that the Ind. Rules of Evidence do not apply in
community corrections revocation proceedings but asserts that “the hearsay
evidence . . . did not have substantial guarantee of trustworthiness” and should
not have been admitted. Appellant’s Brief at 8. We disagree.
[14] Here, to establish that Counceller violated the terms of his placement, the State
called Poffenbarger, a representative of the Program, to testify. Poffenbarger
testified that she was a case worker with the Program, had worked at the
Madison County CJC in the Program for five years, and was testifying on
behalf of another case worker. Counceller objected to Poffenbarger’s lack of
personal knowledge and to the fact that she was testifying from documents.
The trial court asked for “a foundation” and Poffenbarger testified, “we keep a
file on” each person in the Program and that it was from those records that she
was testifying. Transcript at 13. The trial court overruled Counceller’s objection
and permitted Poffenbarger to testify to the facts recorded in Counceller’s file
surrounding his alleged violation of leaving the Program for medical treatment
and not returning on June 27. Based on the record before us, and given the
flexibility expressly granted to trial courts when determining admissibility of
hearsay in community corrections revocation proceedings, we find that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Poffenbarger’s testimony
possessed the necessary indicia of reliability to be admissible. 2 Accordingly,
2
We note that, during the hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of “the discovery and its attachment”
that the Program had filed prior to the hearing pursuant to the court’s discovery order. Transcript at 17. The
State suggests that Poffenbarger was testifying from the same documents that the Program had filed with the
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Counceller has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion when it
permitted Poffenbarger to testify about the events that occurred on June 27.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[15] Our standard of review of an appeal from the revocation of a community
corrections placement mirrors that for revocation of probation. Holmes, 923
N.E.2d at 483 (quoting Monroe, 899 N.E.2d at 691). A probation hearing is
civil in nature and the State need only prove the alleged violations by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. We will consider all the evidence most
favorable to supporting the judgment of the trial court without reweighing that
evidence or judging the credibility of the witnesses. Id. If there is substantial
evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion that a
defendant has violated any terms of community corrections, we will affirm its
decision to revoke placement. McQueen v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1237, 1242 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007).
[16] Counceller argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
Poffenbarger to testify from documents of Counceller’s file and because “there
was no other evidence to support the alleged violation[,]” the evidence was
trial court prior to the hearing and of which the trial court took judicial notice, and, therefore, any error in the
admission of Poffenbarger’s testimony was harmless. In furtherance of that position, the State filed an
Appellee’s Appendix containing, among other things: (1) the Program’s June 27, 2019 conduct report; (2) a
work release failure to return checklist; and (3) the probable cause affidavit for Cause F6-1708. However, we
do not know with certainty what documents the Program filed pursuant to the court’s discovery order, nor do
we know if the documents in Appellee’s Appendix were the same documents from which Poffenbarger was
testifying. Because we find Poffenbarger’s testimony was properly admitted, we do not reach the State’s
harmless error argument.
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insufficient. Appellant’s Brief at 10. Having already found that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting Poffenbarger’s testimony, we now turn to
whether that evidence was sufficient to establish a violation. We find that it
was.
[17] Poffenbarger testified that Counceller was assigned to and placed in the work
release facility on June 27 pursuant to his conviction for fraud. She stated that
Counceller left, that same day, with permission to go to St. Vincent Hospital in
Anderson for medical treatment, but he did not return. When asked on cross-
examination whether anyone from the Program ever spoke to Counceller to
determine whether he might have had a good reason for not returning,
Poffenbarger replied, “He didn’t return to our facility, so we couldn’t have.”
Transcript at 16.
[18] The State presented sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that Counceller
violated the terms of the Program.
[19] Judgment affirmed.
Bradford, C.J. and Robb, J., concur.
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