Joy Thornton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 16 2020, 6:17 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Tarek E. Mercho Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Mercho Caughey Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Myriam Serrano
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Joy Thornton, January 16, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2082
v. Appeal from the
Marion Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff David Hooper, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G08-1901-CM-3489
Vaidik, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2082 | January 16, 2020 Page 1 of 5
Case Summary
[1] Joy Thornton appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor criminal
trespass, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support it. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In January 2019, Yesenia Ceja was the manager at Peddler’s Mall on West 38th
Street in Indianapolis. Peddler’s Mall is a flea market that rents booth space to
different vendors. As the manager, Ceja had the authority to ask people to
leave Peddler’s Mall. On January 25, Ceja saw Thornton walk into Peddler’s
Mall. Ceja approached Thornton and told him that he was not allowed to be
there as a result of an incident that occurred in September 2018 and asked him
to leave. Thornton ignored Ceja and walked to a cell-phone repair booth
operated by Luis Perez. Ceja went to her office and called the police.
[3] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Nicholas Wroblewski
arrived at Peddler’s Mall a few minutes later. Ceja told Officer Wroblewski
that she had asked Thornton to leave but that he didn’t do so. Officer
Wroblewski was the same officer who responded to the September 2018
incident and remembered Thornton. Officer Wroblewski and Ceja then
approached Thornton at Perez’s booth, and Ceja, again, asked him to leave.
Thornton responded that it was a “public place” and that he didn’t have to
leave. Tr. p. 34. Officer Wroblewski told Thornton that he had to leave and
that if he didn’t do so he would be arrested. When Thornton then became
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2082 | January 16, 2020 Page 2 of 5
“rude,” “argumentative,” and “hostile,” Officer Wroblewski arrested him for
criminal trespass. Id.
[4] Thereafter, the State charged Thornton with Class A misdemeanor criminal
trespass based on Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2(b)(2).1 Following a bench
trial, he was convicted.
[5] Thornton now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Thornton contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his criminal-
trespass conviction. In order to convict Thornton of criminal trespass as
charged here, the State had to prove that he (1) did not have a contractual
interest in Peddler’s Mall and (2) knowingly or intentionally refused to leave
Peddler’s Mall after having been asked to leave by Peddler’s Mall or its
agent. See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(2); Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 8.
[7] Thornton first argues that the State failed to prove that he was on the property
of Peddler’s Mall when he was asked to leave. Specifically, he claims that no
evidence was presented that he was “on Peddler’s Mall property versus the
leased property of Perez.” Appellant’s Br. p. 9. Thornton’s argument,
1
The State filed a second criminal-trespass count against Thornton based on Section 35-43-2-2(b)(1), but the
trial court granted Thornton’s motion for judgment on the evidence as to this count and dismissed it.
Accordingly, we do not address it.
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however, ignores the fact that vendors merely rent booth space from Peddler’s
Mall. As such, a customer who visits a booth is necessarily on Peddler’s Mall
property. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to prove that Thornton was on
the property of Peddler’s Mall when he was asked to leave.
[8] Thornton next argues that the State failed to prove that he lacked a contractual
interest in Peddler’s Mall, as he was there to do business with Perez. Even
though Peddler’s Mall is open to the public, as the owner of the property,
Peddler’s Mall had the right to determine whom to invite, the scope of the
invitation, and the circumstances under which the invitation could be revoked.
Accordingly, Peddler’s Mall could revoke Thornton’s invitation to be there. See
Olsen v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that the
evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant did not have a contractual
interest in a hotel lobby because the hotel had revoked his invitation to be
there); see also Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. 2012) (finding that the
evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant lacked a contractual interest
in his bank’s property because he was “neither an owner nor an employee of the
bank” and “the bank manager had authority to ask customers to leave the bank
premises”). Because the evidence shows that Peddler’s Mall revoked
Thornton’s invitation to be there, the evidence is sufficient to prove that
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Thornton did not have a contractual interest in Peddler’s Mall. 2 We therefore
affirm Thornton’s conviction for Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass.
[9] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
2
Thornton also argues that the State failed to prove that Ceja was an agent of Peddler’s Mall. Thornton
relies heavily on Glispie v. State, 955 N.E.2d 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), reh’g denied. In its brief, the State points
out that this Court clarified Glispie in Berry v. State, 4 N.E.3d 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, and
argues that Berry—not Glispie—controls this case. Thornton did not acknowledge Berry in his brief or file a
reply brief to respond to the State’s argument.
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