Robert Shawn Humble v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 14 2020, 7:51 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kevin Wild Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Myriam Serrano
Kurt Harrison Miller
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Robert Shawn Humble, December 14, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-1314
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Charnette D. Garner,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G09-1907-F6-28224
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1314 | December 14, 2020 Page 1 of 6
Case Summary
[1] Robert Humble (“Humble”) challenges his conviction, following a bench trial,
of Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated, elevated to a Level 6 felony due to a
2017 conviction.1 He raises one issue on appeal, namely, whether the State
presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On July 19, 2019, the State charged Humble with Count I, operating a vehicle
while intoxicated in a manner that endangers a person, a Class A misdemeanor,
and Count II, operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent
(“ACE”) of .15 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or more, a Class A
misdemeanor.2 The State also filed an information elevating the charges to
Level 6 felonies based on Humble’s 2017 conviction of operating a vehicle
while intoxicated.3
[4] At Humble’s January 28, 2020, bench trial, the State presented evidence of the
following facts. On July 16, 2019, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department Officer Garrett Catt (“Officer Catt”) was
1
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2, I.C. § 9-30-5-3(a)(1).
2
I.C. § 9-30-5-1(b).
3
I.C. § 9-30-5-3(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1314 | December 14, 2020 Page 2 of 6
dispatched to the intersection of East Pleasant Parkway North Drive and
Southeastern Avenue to investigate a report of an accident. When he arrived at
the scene, Officer Catt observed a red Pontiac parked on Southeastern Avenue
and Humble standing approximately 20 feet from the car. Officer Catt observed
damage to the vehicle’s passenger side, including scrapes and a broken light
near the headlight. He also observed damage to a street sign near the
intersection; the sign was “bent forward in the direction that the car was
facing,” and there were tire tracks in the dirt that led from the street sign to the
red Pontiac. Tr. at 9.
[5] Officer Catt asked Humble how he got to the scene, and Humble replied that he
“had been dropped off there by an Uber.” Id. at 10. Officer Catt observed that
Humble was not standing steadily and was swaying to the point that he almost
fell over “a couple times.” Id. Officer Catt smelled the odor of alcohol on
Humble’s breath and observed that Humble’s eyes were red and glassy. When
Officer Catt asked Humble who owned the red Pontiac, Humble stated that the
vehicle was not his. Officer Catt then requested Humble’s identification.
When Humble reached into his pocket to retrieve his identification, Officer Catt
observed that his dexterity was poor.
[6] Another officer arrived at the scene, ran a search of the license plate of the red
Pontiac, and discovered that the vehicle was registered to Humble. Officer Catt
then read Humble the Miranda warnings and again asked Humble how he got
to the scene and who owned the red Pontiac. Humble then admitted that the
vehicle was his and that he “drove the vehicle from a bar.” Id. at 12. Humble
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1314 | December 14, 2020 Page 3 of 6
also admitted to Officer Catt that he had consumed “a couple beers” that night.
Id. at 13. Humble was disoriented and asked Officer Catt why the officer had
pulled him over, even though Humble had been standing near his vehicle by the
time Officer Catt arrived at the scene.
[7] Officer Catt asked Humble to perform a series of tasks for a field sobriety test
and a certified chemical test. Humble refused to participate in any alcohol
testing. At approximately 11:49 p.m., Officer Catt submitted a request for a
blood draw warrant to the Marion County warrant clerk, obtained the warrant,
and transported Humble to Eskenazi Hospital for a blood draw. The
subsequent blood draw test showed Humble had an ACE of 0.288 grams per
one hundred milliliters of blood.
[8] The trial court found Humble guilty as charged and merged Count II into
Count I. Humble stipulated to having a prior conviction of operating a vehicle
while intoxicated, and his conviction for Count I was entered as a Level 6
felony. The trial court sentenced Humble to a term of 730 days on probation.
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Humble alleges the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his
conviction.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the fact-finder’s decision. Drane
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1314 | December 14, 2020 Page 4 of 6
v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is the fact-finder’s
role, and not ours, to assess witness credibility and weigh the
evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a
conviction. Id. To preserve this structure, when we are
confronted with conflicting evidence, we consider it most
favorably to the fact-finder’s decision. Id. We affirm a
conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It
is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence is
sufficient if an inference reasonably may be drawn from it to
support the fact-finder’s decision. Id. at 147.
Dowell v. State, 155 N.E.3d 1284, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Moreover, a
conviction may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone. Sallee v. State, 51
N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2016).
[10] To prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Humble operated a vehicle while
intoxicated in a manner that endangered a person, the State must have provided
evidence that: (1) Humble; (2) operated a vehicle; (3) while intoxicated; (4) in a
manner that endangers a person. I.C. § 9-30-5-2(a) & (b). The State met that
burden here. The evidence established that Humble was the only person at the
scene of the accident, the damaged vehicle was registered to him, and there
were also no other vehicles at the scene. Humble eventually admitted that the
vehicle was his and that he had driven it to the scene from a bar. And both
Officer Catt’s observations of Humble and subsequent testing soon after
Humble’s arrest showed that Humble was intoxicated. That is sufficient
evidence from which a fact-finder could reasonably infer that Humble was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1314 | December 14, 2020 Page 5 of 6
guilty of operating a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangers a
person.4
[11] Humble contends that his conviction must be reversed because there is no
evidence that he drove the vehicle while intoxicated. That is not true; Officer
Catt testified that Humble admitted to Officer Catt that Humble drove the
vehicle from a bar to the scene of the accident that evening, and there was
testimonial and laboratory evidence that Humble was intoxicated that evening.
Moreover, Humble’s own admission is bolstered by the circumstantial
evidence. Humble’s arguments to the contrary are merely requests that we
reweigh the evidence and/or witness credibility, which we will not do. E.g.,
Dowell, 155 N.E.3d at 1286.
[12] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
4
Humble wisely does not dispute that the State proved the endangerment element of the crime; it is well-
established that the endangerment clause in the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering
another person does not require that the State prove a person other that the defendant was actually in the
path of the defendant’s vehicle or in the same area in order to obtain a conviction. See, e.g., Staton v. State,
946 N.E.2d 80, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.
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