Erik Valdez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                                  FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    Dec 17 2020, 8:41 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                            CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                                Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Andrew J. Baldwin                                       Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Baldwin, Perry & Kamish P.C.                            Attorney General of Indiana
    Franklin, Indiana
    Benjamin J. Shoptaw
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Erik Valdez,                                            December 17, 2020
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-1011
    v.                                              Appeal from the Clark Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Vicki L.
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                      Carmichael, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    10C04-1601-F3-3
    Weissmann, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1011 | December 17, 2020           Page 1 of 5
    [1]   Erik Valdez claims the trial court should have instructed the jury to view the
    evidence against him through the lens of presumed innocence. As the jury
    received such direction, albeit not through Valdez’s instruction rejected by the
    trial court, we find no error. Accordingly, we affirm Valdez’s convictions.
    Facts
    [2]   Valdez was charged with Battery and Neglect of a Dependent arising from
    serious injuries he inflicted on his four-month-old son. At Valdez’s trial, from
    which he was absent, Valdez’s counsel requested the trial court instruct the jury:
    If the conduct of the accused, Erik Valdez[,] could be interpreted
    reasonably in more than one fashion, at least one of which is
    innocent, then you should presume his conduct was in fact
    innocence (sic).
    App. Vol. III pp. 139-40.
    [3]   The trial court rejected Valdez’s tendered instruction. Instead, the court
    instructed the jury:
    Under the law of this State, a person charged with a crime is
    presumed to be innocent. To overcome the presumption of
    innocence, the State must prove the Defendant guilty of each
    element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.
    The Defendant is not required to present any evidence to prove
    innocence or to prove or explain anything. You should fit the
    evidence to the presumption that the defendant is innocent if you
    can do so.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1011 | December 17, 2020   Page 2 of 5
    App. Vol. IV p. 67.
    [4]   The jury found Valdez guilty, and the trial court imposed a nine-year sentence.
    Discussion and Decision
    [5]   Valdez claims he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court chose its own
    instruction over his. He relies exclusively on our Supreme Court’s decision in
    McCowan v. State, 
    27 N.E.3d 760
    (Ind. 2015), where the Court ruled a criminal
    defendant is entitled to the following jury instruction upon his request:
    The presumption of innocence continues in favor of the
    defendant throughout the trial. You should fit the evidence to the
    presumption that the defendant is innocent if you can reasonably
    do so.
    A trial court has discretion to reject any tendered instruction which offers
    different or supplemental language.
    Id. [6]
      Valdez’s proposed instruction differs from the mandatory instruction in
    McCowan. Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court abused its
    discretion in rejecting Valdez’s version. An abuse of discretion occurs when the
    rejected instruction correctly stated the law, was supported by the evidence
    presented at trial, and contained directives not covered by other jury
    instructions.
    Id. at 763-764, 766. [7]
      Valdez contends his instruction correctly stated the law, was supported by the
    evidence, and was not covered by other instructions. We find that last issue
    dispositive because the substance of Valdez’s proposed instruction was covered
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1011 | December 17, 2020   Page 3 of 5
    by the trial court’s instruction. According to Valdez, none of the instructions
    informed the jury how to “treat multiple interpretations of the evidence.”
    Appellant’s Brief, p. 11. Valdez is incorrect. The court specifically charged the
    jury to “fit the evidence to the presumption that the defendant is innocent if you
    can do so.” A jury would not need “to fit the evidence to the presumption of
    innocence” unless that evidence were capable of more than one interpretation.
    By its very nature, evidence of culpability susceptible to only one interpretation
    can support either guilt or innocence—but not both.
    [8]   Furthermore, the trial court’s presumption of innocence instruction contained
    language identical to the McCowan model instruction. The trial court’s
    instruction simply contained an additional paragraph, which correctly stated
    the law. See 
    McCowan, 27 N.E.3d at 762
    , 767 (finding jury properly instructed
    when the instructions included the additional language found in the trial court’s
    instruction in Valdez’s case). We conclude Valdez received what he sought: an
    instruction directing the jury to view the evidence through a presumption of
    innocence lens.
    [9]   No instructional error occurred. Even if it had, our decision would be
    unchanged because the evidence against Valdez was overwhelming. We
    reverse only where the defendant is prejudiced by the improper rejection of a
    tendered instruction. Hernandez v. State, 
    45 N.E.3d 373
    , 376 (Ind. 2015). The
    child’s injuries first became apparent while Valdez cared for the child alone.
    Valdez admitted grabbing the infant’s face and causing bruising. Valdez further
    admitted shaking the baby. Valdez offered up a medically implausible
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1011 | December 17, 2020   Page 4 of 5
    explanation to explain his son’s rib fractures. Although Valdez believed the
    child was dying, he did not call an ambulance or take the child to the hospital
    for eleven hours after the baby became unresponsive. Valdez even advised the
    infant’s mother that they should not take their baby to the hospital due to the
    bruising.
    [10]   We are confident regardless of which instruction the jury received, the result
    would have been the same. See Hancock v. State, 
    585 N.E.2d 1371
    , 1372-1373
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no prejudice from improper jury instruction where
    evidence of guilt was overwhelming). Accordingly, we find no error.
    [11]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Mathias, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1011 | December 17, 2020   Page 5 of 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-CR-1011

Filed Date: 12/17/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/17/2020