Natalie Stoops v. Justin T. Fowler (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 23 2020, 8:53 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Bryan L. Ciyou Daun A. Weliever
Alexander N. Moseley Neal Bowling
Ciyou and Dixon, P.C. Lewis Wagner, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Natalie Stoops, December 23, 2020
Appellant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-DC-1009
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
Justin T. Fowler, The Honorable David J. Dreyer,
Appellee. Judge
The Honorable Patrick Murphy,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49D10-1803-DC-8620
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Natalie Stoops (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order modifying custody of
the parties’ two young children in favor of Justin Fowler (“Father”).
Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in modifying
custody of the parties’ two young children in favor of
Father.
Facts
[3] Mother and Father, who were married in November 2012, are the parents of
daughter, E.M.F. (“Daughter”), who was born in November 2014, and son,
E.J.F. (“Son”) (collectively “the Children”), who was born in October 2016.
Father filed a petition to dissolve the parties’ marriage in March 2018. The trial
court issued its decree of dissolution in October 2018.
[4] The dissolution decree incorporated the parties’ mediated settlement agreement,
wherein the parties agreed to share joint legal custody of the Children. The
parties also agreed that Mother would have primary physical custody of the
Children, subject to Father’s parenting time in accordance with the Indiana
Parenting Time Guidelines. The settlement agreement further provided that
“[a]ll holidays and special days shall be discussed and agreed upon by the
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parties. In the event of a disagreement, the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines
shall be applied.” (App. Vol. 2 at 21).
[5] Just two months later, in December 2018, Mother took an ill Daughter to the
emergency room at Riley Children’s Hospital. Father arrived at the hospital
shortly after Daughter was scheduled to be released and planned to take her and
Son to his home because it was his parenting time. Mother became angry
because she wanted to take Daughter to her home. As Father was bending
down to help Daughter put on her coat and shoes, Mother physically attacked
Father. Specifically, Mother grabbed Father’s ears and dug her fingernails into
the back of them. Mother then attempted to kick Father in the groin. As
Father moved Daughter out of the way of the altercation, Mother grabbed his
ears two more times, dug her fingernails into them, and twisted them. Mother
was aware that Father has an implant in his left ear due to damage from his
childhood and his military service. This physical altercation, which took place
in the presence of the children, caused Father pain as well as lacerations and
abrasions on both of his ears. Father sought medical treatment at a nearby
hospital and received a shot to prevent an infection in the cartilage of his ears.
As a result of the altercation, the State charged Mother with Level 6 felony
domestic battery committed in the presence of a child less than sixteen years
old.
[6] Shortly after the altercation at the hospital, Mother confronted Father on the
front porch of his house. During the confrontation, which occurred in the
Children’s presence, Mother called Father “the biggest fucking pussy that ever
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lived” because he called the police after she had attacked him at the hospital.
(Ex. 1). Mother also told Father to “squat and piss[.]” (Ex. 1).
[7] Two months later, Father noticed a large bite mark on Son’s forearm. Mother
admitted that she had bitten Son to punish him for biting Daughter. Father
contacted the Department of Child Services to report the bite because,
according to Father, “a parent should not be biting [her child] enough that [the
other parent] can count every single tooth mark.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 15).
[8] On Easter 2019, Father and the Children had lunch at a restaurant with
Father’s parents. Father let Mother know that, because of a delay at the
restaurant, Father would be transferring the Children to her fifteen minutes late.
Mother, who was angry that the Children would be late, contacted the police.
When Father returned home to transfer the Children to Mother, she was
waiting for Father and the Children with the police.
[9] In April 2019, Father sent an email to Mother advising her that, pursuant to the
parenting time guidelines, he was planning a vacation with the Children from
June 28, 2019 through July 6, 2019. Mother responded, “[n]o[,] you ask[ed] for
a week in [M]ay.” (Ex. Vol. at 12) Father explained that, pursuant to the
parenting time guidelines, Father was entitled to four non-consecutive weeks of
parenting time with a sixty-day notice. Mother told Father that she was
denying his request because she wanted to take the Children to her company
picnic during that week. Father ultimately selected a different week for the
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vacation because other family members were going on the trip and they had to
make reservations.
[10] In September 2019, Mother was convicted in a bench trial of Level 6 felony
domestic battery in the presence of a child less than sixteen years old based on
the incident at the hospital. The trial court sentenced her to one-hundred and
eighty (180) days in the county jail with one-hundred and seventy-eight days
(178) suspended to probation. The terms of Mother’s probation required her to
attend anger management counseling and parenting classes.
[11] In October 2019, Father had a conflict with Mother regarding parenting time on
Halloween. Pursuant to the parenting time guidelines, it was Father’s year to
have the Children on Halloween. However, Mother told Father that she
planned to take the Children out of town. Father decided not to attempt to pick
up the children on Halloween because he “did not want [the Children] drawn
into the middle of an argument.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20).
[12] Lastly, two months before Christmas 2019, Father emailed Mother that, in
accordance with the parenting time guidelines, it was his year to have the
Children for the first week of the Christmas holiday. Father told Mother that
he would be taking the Children from December 22 through December 29 and
that Mother could have the Children from 9 a.m. until 8 p.m. on Christmas
day. Mother responded that she “w[ould] not allow [him] to take [the
Children’s] Christmas parties with [Mother’s] aunts and uncles and all their
cousins on [Mother’s] side of the family.” (Ex. Vol. at 15). Mother stated that
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she was “standing up to [Father] and telling [him] no on this vacation time.”
(Ex. Vol. at 15). Mother also told Father that he might have “taken [her] job
because of the lies [he] told in court and [he] caused [her] to have a felony” but
that she would “not allow [him] to ruin the holidays for [her] kids.” (Ex. Vol.
at 15). Father took the Children from December 27 through January 3.
[13] In December 2019, Father filed a petition to modify child custody, parenting
time, and child support. Mother filed a motion to modify child support wherein
she argued that, based on her recent suspension without pay from her job, there
had been a substantial change in circumstances that would warrant a
modification of support. The trial court held a hearing on both parents’
motions in February 2020 and heard testimony about the facts as set forth
above.
[14] Also at the hearing, Father testified that Mother had not consulted with him
about medical decisions concerning the Children and that he often learned
about the Children’s medical visits when he received emails from his medical
insurer. According to Father, he had asked Mother for information about the
Children’s dental provider, but Mother had not responded to Father’s request.
Father also testified that Daughter would be starting school in the Fall and that
he had attempted to discuss with Mother where the Daughter would be
attending school. Mother told Father that she had not decided yet where the
Daughter would attend school. Mother had also told Father that she had “full
custody” of the Children and could “basically do whatever she please[d].” (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 6). In addition, Father told the trial court that he likes to talk to the
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Children every other day when they are with Mother and that when he has
attempted to telephone them in the evening, Mother has refused to answer the
telephone “on a fairly regular basis.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 25). Father asked the trial
court to award him primary physical custody of the Children and to order all
exchanges of the Children between Mother and Father to occur at the
Children’s daycare facility.
[15] Mother testified that she and Father “should share holidays equally” and that
she had not withheld medical or educational information from Father. (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 52). According to Mother, she had simply been trying to find “a
school that [would be] very good for [the Children] to go to.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 67).
Mother further testified that Father “ha[d] a tendency to make [her] angry” and
that the Children were “very angry [and] depressed” when they returned from
visits with Father. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 54, 61). When asked what she had learned in
anger management counseling, Mother initially responded that that was
“patient and client information.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 65). She later responded that
she had learned “[h]ow to deal with [Father]” when they exchanged the
Children. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 66). Mother also testified that she had been suspended
from work “[d]ue to the felony charges [that Father had] put on [her].” (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 68). In addition, Mother testified that she would follow the trial
court’s order and parenting time guidelines in the future.
[16] In April 2020, the trial court issued an order modifying custody of the Children
in favor of Father. Mother now appeals.
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Decision
[17] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying custody in
favor of Father. We review custody modifications only for an abuse of
discretion. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d 282, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020),
trans denied. A trial court’s custody determination is afforded considerable
deference on appeal as it is the trial court that sees the parties, observes their
conduct and demeanor, and hears their testimony. Kondamuri v. Kondamuri,
852 N.E.2d 939, 945-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Thus, on review, we will not
reweigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court. Id. at 946. We will reverse the trial court’s
custody determination only if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. “‘[I]t is
not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must
positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a
basis for reversal.’” McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 288 (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770
N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)).
[18] INDIANA CODE § 31-17-2-21 provides that a trial court may not modify an
existing child custody order unless: (1) the modification is in the best interests
of the child; and (2) there has been a substantial change in one or more of the
statutory factors that are outlined in INDIANA CODE § 31-17-2-8. These factors
are:
(1) The age and sex of the child.
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(2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
(A) the child’s parent or parents;
(B) the child’s sibling; and
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child’s
best interests.
(5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s:
(A) home;
(B) school; and
(C) community.
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
parent.
(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto
custodian[.]
IND. CODE § 31-17-2-8. In interpreting Indiana Code § 31-17-2-21, this Court
has held that “‘all that is required to support modification of custody . . . is a
finding that a change would be in the child’s best interest, a consideration of the
factors listed in I.C. § 31-17-2-8, and a finding that there has been a substantial
change in one of those factors.’” McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 289 (quoting Nienaber
v. Nienaber, 787 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).
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[19] We further note that neither party requested special findings under Indiana
Trial Rule 52(A) and that the trial court entered its findings sua sponte. As to
the issues covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether
the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the
judgment. McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 289. We review any remaining issues
under the general judgment standard and will affirm the judgment if it can be
sustained on any legal theory consistent with the evidence. Id. “‘We may look
both to other findings and beyond the findings to the evidence of record to
determine if the result is against the facts and circumstances before the court.’”
McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 289 (quoting Stone v. Stone, 991 N.E.2d 992, 998 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2013)). Clear error occurs when our review of the evidence most
favorable to the trial court’s judgment leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake
has been made. Quinn v. Quinn, 62 N.E.3d 1212, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
[20] Here, the trial court found that there was a substantial change in INDIANA
CODE § 31-17-2-8(7) because there was evidence of a pattern of domestic or
family violence by Mother. Mother contends that “the trial court’s
determination that there was a ‘substantial change in I.C. 31-17-2-8(7)’ is clearly
erroneous because the only reasonable inference that can be gleaned from the
findings of fact and record evidence is that Mother’s actions were isolated acts
of misconduct.” (Mother’s Br. 14).
[21] We disagree with Mother’s characterization of the evidence. Our review of the
record reveals that Mother physically attacked Father at the hospital in front of
the Children. Mother’s physical attack against Father caused pain and
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lacerations to Father, required him to seek medical care, and resulted in a
felony domestic battery conviction. Shortly thereafter, Mother verbally
attacked Father on his front porch in front of the Children. Mother then bit Son
on his forearm and left indentations of “every single tooth mark.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at
15). This evidence supports the trial court’s finding that there was a substantial
change in INDIANA CODE § 31-17-2-8(7) because there was evidence of a
pattern of domestic or family violence by Mother. Mother’s argument is a
request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Kondamuri, 852
N.E.2d at 946.
[22] The trial court also found that a modification of custody was in the Children’s
best interests. Mother argues that “the evidence and findings fail to support
[this] determination[.]” (Mother’s Br. 17). Again, we disagree.
[23] Our review of the record reveals that Mother interfered with and/or failed to
accommodate Father’s parenting time for vacations and holidays, including a
planned summer vacation with Father’s family, Halloween, and Christmas.
Mother’s interference and/or failure to accommodate Father’s parenting time
negatively affected Father’s ability to exercise parenting time with the Children.
We agree with Father that Mother’s interference with his parenting time was
“harmful to the [C]hildren in that it undermine[d] their relationship with him.”
(Father’s Br. 14-15). The record further reveals that Mother was increasingly
making decisions regarding the Children, including medical, dental, and
educational decisions, without advising and/or consulting with Father. The
totality of this evidence supports the trial court’s determination that a
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modification of custody was in the Children’s best interests. See McDaniel, 150
N.E.3d at 290 (concluding that the trial court’s findings supported its judgment
that a modification of custody was in the child’s best interests). Mother’s
argument is an invitation for us to judge the credibility of witnesses and reweigh
the evidence, which we cannot do. See Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d at 946. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in modifying custody of the parties’ two young
children in favor of Father.
[24] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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