Ronald Abner, Jr. v. Aurora Abner (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  •       MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                            FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                   Mar 31 2020, 9:37 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                     CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                 and Tax Court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    Laura A. Raiman
    R. Patrick Magrath
    Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP
    Madison, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Ronald Abner, Jr.,                                      March 31, 2020
    Appellant-Respondent,                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-DC-2123
    v.                                              Appeal from the Jackson Superior
    Court
    Aurora Abner,                                           The Honorable Bruce A.
    Appellee-Petitioner.                                    MacTavish, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    36D02-1811-DC-249
    Mathias, Judge.
    [1]   Ronald (“Husband”) and Aurora (“Wife”) Abner’s marriage was dissolved in
    Jackson Superior Court. Husband appeals and raises several issues, which we
    restate as:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2123 | March 31, 2020                   Page 1 of 13
    I.      Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it failed
    to include Wife’s overtime income in its calculation of the
    parties’ respective child support obligations;
    II.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
    concluded that Husband’s child support arrearage was
    $300.00;
    III.    Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
    awarded sole legal custody of the children to Wife; and,
    IV.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its
    valuation of the parties’ marital assets.
    [2]   We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   The parties were married in 2009 and have two minor children ages eight and
    six on the date of dissolution. On November 14, 2018, Wife filed a petition to
    dissolve the marriage in Jackson Superior Court.
    [4]   Wife and Husband are both employed at a Walmart Distribution Center. Wife
    is an hourly employee and is eligible to earn overtime. She generally earned
    overtime in most pay periods. Husband is a salaried employee, and he received
    an incentive bonus while the dissolution was pending.
    [5]   The parties’ parenting time arrangement varied throughout the proceedings
    depending on the parties’ changing work schedules. On April 16, 2019, the trial
    court issued a provisional order granting Wife custody of the children, and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2123 | March 31, 2020   Page 2 of 13
    Father was awarded parenting time. Father was also ordered to pay $156 per
    week in child support and one half of the mortgage payment on the marital
    residence. Father subsequently filed a motion to correct error arguing that the
    trial court incorrectly calculated his child support obligation. The trial court
    determined it would address the issue raised in Husband’s motion to correct
    error at the final hearing.
    [6]   On August 8, 2019, the trial court held the final dissolution hearing. The trial
    court issued its decree of dissolution on August 28, 2019. Wife was awarded
    physical and legal custody of the children, and Husband was awarded parenting
    time consistent with the Parenting Time Guidelines. Husband was ordered to
    pay $143 per week in child support. The trial court denied Husband’s motion to
    correct the trial court’s alleged error in its provisional child support orders.
    [7]   With regard to division of the marital estate, Wife was awarded the marital
    residence, and Husband was awarded two other properties owned by the
    parties. Both parties presented appraisal evidence concerning the value of the
    properties. The trial court accepted the values proposed by Wife. Each party
    was awarded certain vehicles and their individual Walmart 401Ks. The trial
    court ordered Husband to make an equalization payment to Wife in the sum of
    $11,548.97 via a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. Husband now appeals.
    Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2123 | March 31, 2020   Page 3 of 13
    Standard of Review
    [8]    First, we observe that Wife has not filed an appellee’s brief. When the appellee
    fails to submit a brief, we will not develop an argument on her behalf, but
    instead, we may reverse the trial court’s judgment if the appellant’s brief
    presents a case of prima facie error. GEICO Ins. Co. v. Graham, 
    14 N.E.3d 854
    ,
    857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
    I. Child Support
    [9]    Husband claims several errors in the trial court’s child support calculation. A
    trial court’s calculation of child support is presumptively valid. Young v. Young,
    
    891 N.E.2d 1045
    , 1047 (Ind. 2008). We will reverse a trial court’s decision in
    child support matters only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
    Id. A decision
    is clearly erroneous if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the
    facts and circumstances that were before the trial court.
    Id. [10] Husband
    argues that the trial court’s child support calculation is not supported
    by the evidence because the trial court did not include Wife’s overtime income
    in determining her weekly gross income. Child support calculations are made
    utilizing the income shares model set forth in the Indiana Child Support
    Guidelines. In re Marriage of Duckworth, 
    989 N.E.2d 352
    , 354 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2013). These Guidelines apportion the cost of supporting children between the
    parents according to their means.
    Id. A calculation
    of child support under the
    Guidelines is presumed valid.
    Id. Indiana Child
    Support Guideline 3A(1)
    provides in part that “weekly gross income” is defined “as actual weekly gross
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2123 | March 31, 2020   Page 4 of 13
    income of the parent if employed to full capacity, potential income if
    unemployed or underemployed, and imputed income based upon ‘in-kind’
    benefits” and that “[w]eekly gross income of each parent includes income from
    any source, except as excluded below, and includes, but is not limited to,
    income from salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, overtime, partnership
    distributions, [and] dividends[.]” Marshall v. Marshall, 
    92 N.E.3d 1112
    , 1117
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
    [11]   Throughout the proceedings, Wife generally earned overtime income during
    most pay periods. She earned almost $5000 in overtime income from December
    2018 to July 2019. Although the trial court included Husband’s bonus in its
    child support calculation, the trial court did not consider Wife’s overtime
    income in its child support calculation. We agree with Husband that the trial
    court erred when it failed to consider Wife’s overtime income in its calculation
    of her weekly gross income when it determined the parties’ relative child
    support obligations.
    [12]   Next, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
    concluded that his child support arrearage was $300. Specifically, he claims the
    erroneous arrearage is the result of the trial court’s incorrect calculation of his
    provisional child support obligation. He argues that the trial court miscalculated
    his number of overnights and his health insurance credit. Husband also
    contends that the trial court should not have awarded Wife a childcare credit
    because third-party childcare was not necessary during the proceedings.
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    [13]   Husband’s argument with regard to the provisional child support calculation
    and arrearage is simply a request to reweigh the evidence. Husband and Wife
    gave conflicting testimony concerning the number of overnights Husband
    exercised with the children. The parties also gave conflicting testimony
    concerning Wife’s need for childcare. The parties presented conflicting evidence
    concerning Husband’s health insurance premium and the amount of that
    premium that should be considered in the child support calculation. The trial
    court credited Wife’s testimony and evidence, and our court will not reweigh
    that determination on appeal.
    [14]   In the trial court’s April 16, 2019, provisional order, the trial court determined
    that Husband’s child support arrearage was $1370. Appellant’s App. p. 87. And
    Husband’s child support obligation was $156 per week. Between April 16, 2019,
    and August 7, 2019, Husband owed $2496 in child support, and he paid $3562.
    Therefore, his remaining arrearage was $304. Accordingly, the trial court did
    not abuse its discretion when it ordered Husband to pay $300 for his child
    support arrearage.
    II. Child Custody
    [15]   The trial court’s decisions regarding child custody are reviewed only for an
    abuse of discretion. Purnell v. Purnell, 
    131 N.E.3d 622
    , 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)
    (citing Sabo v. Sabo, 
    858 N.E.2d 1064
    , 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)), trans. denied.
    There is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and
    deference to trial judges in family law matters.
    Id. (citing Steele-Giri
    v. Steele, 
    51 N.E.3d 119
    , 124 (Ind. 2016)). Appellate deference to the determinations of trial
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2123 | March 31, 2020   Page 6 of 13
    court judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of
    their unique, direct interactions with the parties face to face, often over an
    extended period of time. Best v. Best, 
    941 N.E.2d 499
    , 502 (Ind. 2011).
    Importantly, because our trial judges are required to assess credibility and
    character through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, judges are
    “in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense,
    particularly in the determination of the best interests of the involved children.”
    Id. [16] Indiana
    Code section 31-17-2-8 provides in relevant part:
    The court shall determine custody and enter a custody order in
    accordance with the best interests of the child. In determining the
    best interests of the child, there is no presumption favoring either
    parent. The court shall consider all relevant factors, including the
    following:
    (1) The age and sex of the child.
    (2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.
    (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
    child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
    (4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
    (A) the child’s parent or parents;
    (B) the child’s sibling; and
    (C) any other person who may significantly affect the
    child’s best interests.
    (5) The child’s adjustment to the child's:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2123 | March 31, 2020   Page 7 of 13
    (A) home;
    (B) school; and
    (C) community.
    (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
    (7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
    parent.
    [17]   A trial court may award joint legal custody if it finds that joint legal custody is
    in the best interest of the child. Ind. Code § 31-17-2-13. Section 31-17-2-15 sets
    forth the matters a trial court is required to consider in determining whether
    joint legal custody is in the best interests of the child:
    [T]he court shall consider it a matter of primary, but not
    determinative, importance that the persons awarded joint
    custody have agreed to an award of joint legal custody. The court
    shall also consider:
    (1) the fitness and suitability of each of the persons awarded joint
    custody;
    (2) whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and
    able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child's
    welfare;
    (3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
    child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age;
    (4) whether the child has established a close and beneficial
    relationship with both of the persons awarded joint custody;
    (5) whether the persons awarded joint custody:
    (A) live in close proximity to each other; and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2123 | March 31, 2020   Page 8 of 13
    (B) plan to continue to do so; and
    (6) the nature of the physical and emotional environment in the
    home of each of the persons awarded joint custody.
    [18]   The parties did not agree to joint legal custody. Husband argues that the trial
    court abused its discretion when it awarded sole legal custody of the children to
    Wife because he has maintained an “equal parental contribution in the
    children’s lives” since the parties separated. Appellant’s Br. at 19. He also
    claims that the parties have agreed to work together to raise the children.
    Finally, Husband notes that the trial court did not determine that awarding sole
    legal custody to Wife was in the children’s best interests.1
    [19]   Husband has been involved in caring for the children. But Wife makes the
    decisions regarding the children’s attendance at church, medical care, and
    school. The parties generally agreed on these issues. Wife testified that Husband
    does not communicate with her. There were also occasions during these
    proceedings where Husband refused to allow the children to communicate with
    Wife while the children were in Husband’s care.
    [20]   Throughout the proceedings, Wife raised concerns that Husband was
    continuing to use steroids and drink excessively, as had been his practice
    throughout their marriage. During the proceedings, Husband was ordered to
    1
    Neither party requested Trial Rule 52 findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case. Moreover, a trial
    court is presumed to know and follow the applicable law. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 
    132 N.E.3d 428
    (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2019).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2123 | March 31, 2020                     Page 9 of 13
    abstain from drinking twenty-four hours before and while the children were in
    his care. He violated the order on at least one occasion. Husband also publicly
    posted a picture of himself with the children where he was buried in sand at the
    beach but had an item protruding from his groin area. And shortly after the
    parties’ separated, Husband began residing with his girlfriend, who is
    approximately twenty years his junior, and her infant child.
    [21]   It was within the province of the trial court to weigh the parties’ evidence while
    considering the factors enumerated in Indiana Code section 31-17-2-15. We
    cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded sole
    legal custody of the children to Wife.
    III. Division of the Marital Estate
    [22]   The division of marital property is within the sound discretion of the trial court,
    and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Love v. Love, 
    10 N.E.3d 1005
    , 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We will reverse a trial court's division of
    marital property only if the result is clearly against the logic and effect of the
    facts and circumstances, including the reasonable inferences to be drawn
    therefrom. Luttrell v. Luttrell, 
    994 N.E.2d 298
    , 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans.
    denied. When we review a claim that the trial court improperly divided marital
    property, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s
    disposition of the property without reweighing evidence or assessing witness
    credibility. In re Marriage of Marek, 
    47 N.E.3d 1283
    , 1287–88 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2016), trans. denied. “Although the facts and reasonable inferences might allow
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2123 | March 31, 2020   Page 10 of 13
    for a conclusion different from that reached by the trial court, we will not
    substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.”
    Id. at 1288.
    [23]   Husband complains that the trial court adopted Wife’s valuation of the three
    parcels of real estate owned by the parties “without explanation.” Appellant’s
    Br. at 21. But there was appraisal evidence from both parties concerning the
    value of those properties, and it was within the trial court’s discretion to accept
    Wife’s proposed valuations. Generally, there is no abuse of discretion if a trial
    court’s chosen valuation is within the range of values supported by the
    evidence. Del Priore v. Del Priore, 
    65 N.E.3d 1065
    , 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016),
    trans. denied. “A valuation submitted by one of the parties is competent evidence
    of the value of property in a dissolution action and may alone support the trial
    court's determination in that regard.”
    Id. (citing Alexander
    v. Alexander, 
    927 N.E.2d 926
    , 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied).
    [24]   Husband also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it adopted
    Wife’s proposed values for the parties’ three vehicles because Wife did not
    know how those proposed values were calculated. First, the parties’ proposed
    values for Husband’s Chevy Silverado were $4450 and $5000. Given the slight
    disparity between the two values, we cannot conclude that the trial court
    abused its discretion when it valued the Silverado at $5000. With regard to the
    other two vehicles, neither party presented evidence beyond their respective
    opinions of the vehicles’ worth. Husband claims his values were based on the
    Kelley Blue Book, but that evidence is not in the record. For this reason, we
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2123 | March 31, 2020   Page 11 of 13
    cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it credited Wife’s
    opinion of the value of the vehicles.2
    [25]   Finally, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed
    to value the parties’ personal property. As with their vehicles, the only evidence
    presented concerning the value of the personal property that each party retained
    from the marital estate was minimal and speculative. Both parties testified that
    they kept certain items such as televisions, appliances, and furniture. Given the
    lack of evidence of the personal property retained by each party and/or the
    value of that property, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
    discretion when it failed to value and divide that property in its order dissolving
    the marital estate.
    Conclusion
    [26]   In his appeal of the trial court’s dissolution order, Husband has requested that
    our court reweigh the evidence and credibility of witnesses, which our court
    will not do. However, Husband established reversible error in the trial court’s
    calculation of the parties’ respective child support obligations because the court
    failed to include Wife’s overtime income in its calculation.
    2
    The trial court found that the parties’ fourteen-year-old Chevrolet Trailblazer had a value of $500. Although
    the vehicle runs, Wife testified that it had 220,000 miles and it was not worth more than $500. Final Hearing
    Tr. p. 44. Wife also owned the 2006 Jeep Commander prior to the marriage.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2123 | March 31, 2020                   Page 12 of 13
    [27]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent
    with this opinion.
    Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DC-2123 | March 31, 2020   Page 13 of 13