Lisa J. Lisk v. State of Indiana ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                           FILED
    Mar 31 2020, 10:55 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Russell B. Cate                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Cate, Terry & Gookins LLC                                 Attorney General of Indiana
    Carmel, Indiana                                           Lauren A. Jacobsen
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Lisa J. Lisk,                                             March 31, 2020
    Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-2602
    v.                                                Appeal from the Hamilton
    Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable David K. Najjar,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    29D05-1808-F6-5945
    Baker, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2602 | March 31, 2020                            Page 1 of 7
    [1]   Lisa Lisk appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after she pleaded
    guilty to Level 6 Felony Theft. Lisk argues that the amount of the restitution
    order is not supported by sufficient evidence and that the sentence is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character. Finding no
    error with respect to the restitution order and that the sentence is not
    inappropriate, we affirm.
    Facts
    [2]   On July 17, 2018, Alexis Roach arrived at Pinheads Bowling alley to begin her
    shift for the evening. She brought her purse with her, which held $400 in cash,
    debit and credit cards, a liquor license, a birth certificate, her driver’s license,
    her daughter’s social security card, and the key fob to Roach’s vehicle. Lisk
    was also working at Pinheads, and took Roach’s purse with her when she left
    for the night. Lisk received a ride home from a Lyft driver. When they arrived
    at Lisk’s house, she left Roach’s purse in the backseat of the vehicle. The driver
    contacted Roach the next morning and returned her purse; the only item
    missing was the $400 in cash, which Roach reported as stolen.
    [3]   On August 23, 2018, the State charged Lisk with theft as a Level 6 felony and
    as a Class A misdemeanor. On August 19, 2019, Lisk entered an open guilty
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2602 | March 31, 2020            Page 2 of 7
    plea to Level 6 felony theft; the State dismissed the Class A misdemeanor
    charge.1
    [4]   At the October 8, 2019, sentencing hearing, the presentence investigation report
    (PSI) was entered into evidence. The PSI included the probable cause affidavit
    prepared by the investigating officer, which stated that $400 in cash had been
    taken from Roach’s purse. No witnesses testified and the hearing primarily
    consisted of legal arguments made by the attorneys. The State requested that
    $400 in restitution be paid to Roach. Lisk did not contest this amount or object
    to restitution.
    [5]   At the close of the hearing, the trial court ordered Lisk to pay $400 in restitution
    and sentenced her to two and one-half years imprisonment, with six months to
    be served on community corrections. Lisk now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Restitution
    [6]   First, Lisk argues that the trial court committed fundamental error regarding the
    restitution order. Generally, a restitution order is within the trial court’s
    discretion and we will reverse only when its decision is clearly against the logic
    and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Sickels v. State, 
    982 N.E.2d 1
           The charging information alleges that Lisk stole Roach’s purse; it does not refer to specific contents of the
    purse, including the cash. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 12. Taking the purse is also what Lisk admitted to
    doing at the guilty plea hearing. Tr. Vol. II p. 13. At no point did Lisk admit that she took a certain amount
    of money from Roach.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2602 | March 31, 2020                                 Page 3 of 7
    1010, 1013 (Ind. 2013). Where, as here, counsel did not object, the appellant
    must show fundamental error to merit relief on appeal. Morris v. State, 
    2 N.E.3d 7
    , 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Fundamental error occurs “when the error was a
    blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is
    substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due
    process.” Halliburton v. State, 
    1 N.E.3d 670
    , 678 (Ind. 2013) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    [7]   Indiana Code section 35-50-5-3(a) states that restitution orders must be based
    upon a consideration of evidence regarding the victim’s losses. In other words,
    “[a] restitution order must be supported by sufficient evidence of actual loss
    sustained by the victim of a crime.” Garcia v. State, 
    47 N.E.3d 1249
    , 1252 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2015). In Garcia, the only evidence of the amount of the victim’s loss
    supplied by the State at the sentencing hearing was the probable cause affidavit.
    This Court “decline[d] to accept that document as a valid basis for upholding
    the order herein. The State offered no other proof of the amount of [the
    victim’s] loss, [the victim] was not present at the sentencing hearing, and no
    additional evidence or testimony concerning this estimate was presented.”
    Id. (also observing
    that the statement of facts in a probable cause affidavit poses a
    risk of unreliability that the hearsay rule is designed to protect against). This
    Court noted that the State could have met its burden of establishing the
    restitution amount by obtaining an affidavit from the victim (or offering the
    victim’s testimony at the hearing).
    Id. at 1253.
    Absent that evidence, the
    restitution order was erroneous.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2602 | March 31, 2020          Page 4 of 7
    [8]   We find Garcia to be distinguishable from the case before us. Whereas in
    Garcia, the defendant objected to the restitution order and amount, in this case,
    no such objection was made—either to the PSI, the included probable cause
    affidavit, or the restitution order—meaning that the trial court did not have the
    opportunity to address the issue. Under these circumstances, we do not believe
    that Garcia compels a reversal.
    [9]   Moreover, even if it there was error with respect to the restitution order, we find
    that it was not fundamental. “Evidence supporting a restitution order is
    sufficient ‘if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject
    the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.’” J.H. v. State, 
    950 N.E.2d 731
    , 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting T.C. v. State, 
    839 N.E.2d 1222
    , 1227
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). Additionally, the “[s]trict rules of evidence do not apply
    in sentencing hearings, and hearsay evidence . . . is admissible.” Lasley v.
    State, 
    510 N.E.2d 1340
    , 1342 (Ind. 1987). In this case, the uncontested
    evidence presented to the trial court regarding restitution can be found in the
    probable cause affidavit, which was supported by Roach’s statement that $400
    had been stolen from her purse. We can only find that this evidence provided a
    sufficient basis for determining the loss and did not require the trial court to
    base its order on mere speculation or conjecture. Consequently, we decline to
    reverse the restitution order.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2602 | March 31, 2020          Page 5 of 7
    II. Appropriateness
    [10]   Lisk also argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate in
    light of the nature of the offense and her character pursuant to Indiana
    Appellate Rule 7(B). We must “conduct [this] review with substantial
    deference and give ‘due consideration’ to the trial court’s decision—since the
    ‘principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ and not to
    achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence.” Knapp v. State, 
    9 N.E.3d 1274
    , 1292
    (Ind. 2014) (quoting Chambers v. State, 
    989 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1259 (Ind. 2013))
    (internal citations omitted).
    [11]   Lisk pleaded guilty to a Level 6 felony, for which she faced a sentence of six
    months to two and one-half years, with an advisory term of one year. Ind.
    Code § 35-50-2-7(b). The trial court imposed the maximum term but ordered
    that six months of the sentence be served on community corrections.
    [12]   As to the nature of Lisk’s offense, she took advantage of a coworker by stealing
    an unattended purse from the employee area at their place of work. After
    taking the cash from the purse, Lisk then left it in the backseat of a Lyft vehicle.
    Given that the purse contained many important personal items, including a
    social security card and birth certificate, this action could have caused Roach
    substantial harm. Lisk’s actions also left Roach stranded at work, with no
    money, driver’s license, or car keys.
    [13]   As to Lisk’s character, she has a lengthy criminal history that includes
    convictions related to dishonesty, such as theft, fraud, and identity deception.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2602 | March 31, 2020          Page 6 of 7
    She has violated the terms of alternative placement in previous cases and was
    on probation at the time she committed the instant offense. The trial court also
    noted that Lisk had lied during the presentence investigation interview,
    reporting that she was receiving several types of counseling that she was not
    actually enrolled in or attending.
    [14]   While it may seem to some that a maximum sentence under these
    circumstances is harsh,2 we cannot say that it is inappropriate given the trial
    court’s conclusions about Lisk’s history of dishonesty, including her past
    convictions as well as her dishonest behavior during these proceedings.
    [15]   In sum, the length of the sentence imposed by the trial court is not
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and Lisk’s character.
    [16]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Bradford, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    2
    Indeed, the sentence imposed by the trial court substantially exceeded that recommended by the probation
    department. The probation department recommended that Lisk be sentenced to 545 days on community
    corrections work release. In this way, the probation department believed that Lisk’s mental health needs
    could be met on an ongoing basis.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2602 | March 31, 2020                              Page 7 of 7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-CR-2602

Filed Date: 3/31/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/31/2020