Carlton Hillman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing FILED
the defense of res judicata, collateral Dec 28 2020, 9:55 am
estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John L. Tompkins Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Tompkins Law Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Carlton Hillman December 28, 2020
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-PC-350
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana The Honorable Alicia A. Gooden,
Appellee-Respondent. Judge
The Honorable Richard E.
Hagenmaier, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G21-1804-PC-13016
Bradford, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-PC-350 | December 28, 2020 Page 1 of 7
Case Summary
[1] On June 4, 2012, while executing an arrest warrant for Carlton Hillman,
Detective Richard Wilkerson and other Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department (“IMPD”) officers searched the area of 38th Street and Boulevard
Place. During this search, Detective Wilkerson observed Hillman lying on his
back on the front porch of a residence on Rookwood Avenue (“the Rookwood
property”). Hillman was arrested, and IMPD officers recovered cocaine and
heroin under a nearby chair cushion. Hillman was convicted of various drug-
related offenses. He subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief (“PCR”)
arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Hillman claimed that his
trial counsel should have moved to suppress evidence recovered subsequent to
his arrest. Hillman appeals from the denial of his request for relief. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On June 4, 2012, pursuant to an arrest warrant, Detective Wilkerson and other
IMPD officers searched the area of 38th Street and Boulevard Place for Hillman.
While Detective Wilkerson was briefing one of the other officers about their
search, another detective directed Detective Wilkerson’s attention toward the
Rookwood property. Detective Wilkerson approached the Rookwood property
and observed Hillman lying on the floor of the enclosed porch. Hillman did not
comply with Detective Wilkerson’s requests to show his hands. Instead,
Hillman put his hands into his pockets and then under a nearby chair cushion
before showing his hands to Detective Wilkerson. Hillman was arrested, and
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IMPD officers recovered cocaine and heroin from under the chair cushion and
items consistent with drug dealing from Hillman’s person.
[3] On June 13, 2012, the State charged Hillman with Class A felony dealing in
cocaine, Class C felony possession of cocaine, Class B felony dealing in
narcotic drug, and Class D felony possession of a narcotic drug. Unbeknownst
to trial counsel, Hillman had been an overnight guest at the Rookwood
property several times. Trial counsel did not move to suppress evidence prior to
trial on the basis that police lacked the authority to enter the Rookwood
property, though counsel later claimed that she would have had she known that
Hillman was an overnight guest. Hillman was found guilty and the trial court
imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty years of incarceration. His
convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. See Hillman v. State, 49A05-1305-
CR-241 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2014).
[4] On April 30, 2018, Hillman filed a PCR petition, alleging that trial counsel was
ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress evidence recovered following his
arrest. At the evidentiary hearing on June 21, 2019, the post-conviction court
reviewed the evidence, including Detective Wilkerson’s trial testimony; new
testimony from Wallace, the owner of the Rookwood property; testimony from
trial counsel; and a photograph of the Rookwood property. Wallace testified
that she did not believe that someone could have seen into the porch from
anywhere outside the property and Hillman argued that the photograph of the
Rookwood property showed that officers could not have seen him before
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entering the property. The post-conviction court denied Hillman’s request for
relief.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Hillman contends that the post-conviction court abused its discretion in denying
his PCR petition. “The petitioner bears the burden of establishing his grounds
for post-conviction relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” See Ind. Post-
Conviction Rule 1(5). “A petitioner who has been denied post-conviction relief
faces a rigorous standard of review on appeal.” Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167,
170 (Ind. 2001). “Because the [petitioner] is now appealing from a negative
judgment, to the extent his appeal turns on factual issues, he must convince this
Court that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a
decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” Stevens v. State,
770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. 2002). “In other words, the [petitioner] must
convince this Court that there is no way within the law that the court below
could have reached the decision it did.” Id.[6] The right to effective counsel is rooted in the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ind. 2006). “‘The
Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it
envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial
system to produce just results.’” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 685 (1984)). “‘The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
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adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). When reviewing claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, we start with the strong presumption that
counsel rendered adequate legal assistance. Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746. To
rebut this strong presumption, petitioner must show that: (1) counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on the
prevailing professional norms; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
at, 687–88, 694). “A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. “Isolated mistakes, poor strategy,
inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render
representation ineffective.” Id. Further, if we are to judge whether a lower
court abused its discretion, we must evaluate the factual context surrounding
the issue, and will only “second guess” a fact-finding court when it responds to
that factual context in an unreasonable manner. Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581,
585 (Ind. 2001).
[7] Hillman claims that the post-conviction court erred by finding that he did not
suffer ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We disagree. Detective
Wilkerson’s testimony established that he and other officers were summoned to
the Rookwood property during their attempt to execute an arrest warrant for
Hillman by another officer’s flashlight gesturing. Because Wilkerson and other
officers were in the area to find Hillman, it was reasonable for Detective
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Wilkerson to assume that the other officer was indicating that Hillman was on
the property. Hillman does not contest the validity of the search warrant. The
United States Supreme Court has held that for “Fourth Amendment purposes,
an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the
limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is
reason to believe the suspect is within.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 574
(1980). Officers reasonably inferred, after observing Hillman on the front
porch, that he was staying at the Rookwood property at the time. Thus, the
post-conviction court was within its discretion to conclude that officers were
justified in entering the property regardless of whether Hillman should have
been afforded an extra level of constitutional protection by virtue of his status as
an overnight guest at the dwelling. The post-conviction court, therefore,
properly determined that Hillman was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s
failure to move to suppress the evidence recovered following his arrest.
[8] We are likewise unconvinced by Hillman’s allegation that the post-conviction
court improperly disregarded evidence which he claims proves that police could
not have seen Hillman on the porch before entering the property. The post-
conviction court was under no obligation to credit this evidence and apparently
did not. So long as there is a reasonable evidentiary justification for the post-
conviction court’s decision to deny Hillman’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, we will affirm. See McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 391 (Ind. 2002)
(stating that a petitioner who has been denied post-conviction relief appeals
from a negative judgment must convince the appellate court that the evidence
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as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that
reached by the post-conviction court). In this case, contrary to evidence cited
by Hillman, the officers approached Hillman after an officer personally
observed his presence on the porch. Hillman’s claims that the officer could not
have done so without entering the porch amounts to nothing more than an
invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Cheney v. State, 488
N.E.2d 739, 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
[9] The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.
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