Thomas Wininger v. Carrie Lentz (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                                  FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                          Dec 29 2020, 9:32 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                           CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                            Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                       and Tax Court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    Carl Paul Lamb
    Matthew Fox
    Carl Lamb & Associates, P.C.
    Bloomington, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Thomas Wininger,                                        December 29, 2020
    Appellant-Petitioner,                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
    20A-DC-305
    v.                                              Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
    Court
    Carrie Lentz,                                           The Honorable Valeri Haughton,
    Appellee-Respondent,                                    Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    53C02-1711-DC-521
    Robb, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020                Page 1 of 19
    Case Summary and Issues
    [1]   When Thomas Wininger (“Father”) and Carrie Lentz (“Mother”) ended their
    domestic relationship in 2017, they had disputes about the care and custody of
    their adopted child, A.W. Father filed a Verified Petition for Orders Regarding
    Custody, Parenting Time, and Child Support in late 2017. The parties’ Interim
    Agreed Entry provided that Mother would have temporary primary physical
    custody. Following a final hearing conducted over several days in spring 2019,
    the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon at Father’s request
    determining that Mother should have primary physical custody of A.W. with
    the parties to share joint legal custody. Father appeals the custody order,
    raising two issues for our review: 1) whether the trial court applied the correct
    legal standard for initial custody determinations; and 2) whether the trial court’s
    findings support its judgment granting Mother primary physical custody.
    Concluding the trial court applied the correct standard but failed to make
    sufficient findings to support its judgment, we remand for entry of proper
    findings.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Mother and Father began dating in February 2014. In May 2014, Mother
    moved in with Father. Mother and Father each have three children from their
    previous marriages and each party’s youngest child also lived in the household
    at that time. Mother owned and operated a daycare to which A.W.’s biological
    mother began bringing him in March 2015 when he was two months old. At
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 2 of 19
    the biological mother’s request, Mother began watching A.W. after the day care
    closed, “then it continued to taking him home with me and watching him in the
    evening, and then it continued to over night stays.” Transcript of Evidence,
    Volume I at 127. A.W.’s biological mother eventually asked Mother to adopt
    A.W. Father was not very involved with A.W. for the first year or so after
    Mother started caring for him, but when A.W.’s mother inquired about
    adoption, Father was on board with the prospect. Mother and Father adopted
    A.W. in March of 2017. Around that same time, Father suggested that because
    the daycare was not profitable, Mother could work for him and spend more
    time with A.W. Mother closed her daycare at the end of March and began
    working as a property manager for Father’s business, Wininger Real Estate,
    collecting rents.
    [3]   The parties separated in September 2017. Mother moved out of Father’s house
    and took A.W. with her. She testified that for at least a month prior to this,
    Father had lost interest in her and A.W. and had stopped interacting with them.
    In October, Mother was fired from her job at Father’s business due to alleged
    financial malfeasance. And in November, Father initiated this action by filing a
    Verified Petition for Orders Regarding Custody, Parenting Time, and Child
    Support seeking, among other things, joint legal and physical custody of A.W.
    Shortly thereafter, Mother and Father reached an interim agreement providing
    that Mother would have temporary physical custody of A.W. and Father would
    have parenting time on alternate weekends, Mondays overnight, and
    Wednesday evenings.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 3 of 19
    [4]   In early 2019, A.W.’s behavior in school and at home led Mother to believe
    A.W. has Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) and she sought
    medical intervention. A.W.’s pediatrician initially prescribed medication, but
    Father was vehemently opposed: “He’s a four year old boy. He’s very
    active. . . . He’s bright, energetic, why is that a problem?” Tr., Vol. II at 39.
    Father did not believe medication was indicated for a child of A.W.’s age but
    was willing to try behavioral therapy. Ultimately, A.W. was not placed on
    medication because his pediatrician re-evaluated her diagnosis and suggested
    the parties get a second opinion.
    [5]   The final hearing began on April 26, 2019, and continued over several days
    before concluding on June 21, 2019. At the time of the final hearing, Mother
    was working at the Monroe County Community School Corporation Early
    Learning Center and living at her parents’ home. Since leaving Father’s home
    and business, she had been evicted from two residences and terminated from
    two jobs. Mother’s parents also have a home in Florida, so part of the year, it
    was just Mother, A.W., and frequently Mother’s youngest child residing in the
    home. Father has lived in the same home for twenty-five years, including at the
    time A.W. was adopted, and has had his own business since he was twenty
    years old. Father carries insurance on A.W. and pays for his daycare.
    [6]   Testimony at the hearing revealed that after the parties separated, Mother began
    dating Samuel Barrow and Father began dating Jodi Key. Barrow and Key
    were married to each other in 2016-17. Key testified that while they were
    married, Barrow used alcohol nightly and was physically and mentally abusive
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 4 of 19
    to her. Mother began seeing Barrow in January 2018, but except for a brief
    time when Mother and A.W. stayed at Barrow’s home before she moved into
    her parents’ house, Barrow was not around A.W. very often – “maybe, once
    every couple of weeks or once a month, if that.” Tr., Vol. I at 153. “[Barrow]
    has no part and has never had a part in raising [A.W.].” Id., Vol. II at 233.
    Although Father was concerned about A.W. being around Barrow because he
    believed Barrow to be violent based on Key’s experience with him, Mother
    testified that Barrow never exhibited an abusive attitude toward A.W. or her.
    And by the time of the final day of the hearing, Mother and Barrow were no
    longer dating, although they were still friends.
    [7]   Father and Key began dating in October 2017. They now live together, and
    Key participates in taking care of A.W. when Father has parenting time. But
    Key testified that if she were not in the picture, nothing about Father’s ability to
    care for A.W. would change:
    [Father] has [A.W.’s] schedule down[. H]e knows how to take
    care of [A.W.], brush his teeth, read a book to him at night. Get
    him in the bathtub, . . . teach him stuff[,] . . . make sure his car
    seat [is] safely . . . in his car. Things that most men don’t really
    think about, like [Father] does. He’s raised his three boys. A lot
    by himself, he knows how to take care of [A.W.].
    Tr., Vol. I at 18. Key believed it was in A.W.’s best interests for Father to have
    physical custody so that A.W. could have the kind of life his biological mother
    wanted for him: “A life, opportunity. To his fullest potential. Love. Stability.
    A family.” Id. at 29-30.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 5 of 19
    [8]   Father described A.W. as “very bright, very inquisitive, very charismatic” and
    said he “needs to be challenged” and he hopes to help A.W. find his direction.
    Tr., Vol. II at 48-49. Father described Mother’s form of discipline as yelling at
    A.W., but he “chose not to be involved in that.” Id. at 41. Instead, when
    Father has to discipline A.W., he will “[t]ell him no. Put him in time out.
    Take things away from him. And if he is endangering himself, or someone else,
    corporal punishment.” Id. If he were to be granted primary custody, Father
    said, “I could take him to school every day. I could pick him up from school
    every day. . . . Be with him [in] the evenings. Wake up with him. I look
    forward to it.” Id. at 57.
    [9]   Mother was concerned that A.W. was not disciplined at Father’s house and
    was not appropriately supervised while there. When A.W. returns from
    parenting time with Father, “he just doesn’t mind. He doesn’t listen. He jumps
    on the furniture. . . . He runs from you. . . . [W]hen he comes back, you can
    tell, he has had no structure. He’s had no discipline. He’s a completely
    different child.” Id. at 182. Mother was requesting primary custody because
    with her,
    he has structure. He has love. He has a big family that he’s very,
    very close to. . . . I’m the only mother he’s ever known. I’m the
    only one that’s raised him. . . . I want the best for him and I want
    him to grow up . . . knowing right from wrong.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 6 of 19
    Id. at 202. Mother noted that A.W. had “always been taken care of and he
    always will [be]. He’s always had a clean, safe home and I have always been
    stable.” Id. at 195.
    [10]   Mother’s sister, Michelle Carmichael, testified that Mother is a “very good
    mother.” Id. at 112. Carmichael observed Mother display love and affection
    for A.W. before ever adopting him and believed Mother would have adopted
    him on her own. Carmichael believed Mother would be the better primary
    custodian for A.W. because of
    the relationships that she has with her children, with her family,
    the support system that she has, the things that she has to offer
    [A.W.] growing up and through the years to me is so much more
    [than Father can]. The love that she has and the desire to keep
    him safe and healthy and do the right things.
    Id. at 132.
    [11]   The trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on January 10,
    2020, determining the parties would share joint legal custody of A.W., with
    Mother to have primary physical custody and the “ultimate decision-making
    authority if a dispute arises.” Appealed Order at 17. Father was awarded
    parenting time according to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Father
    now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 7 of 19
    I. Standard of Review
    [12]   Mother did not submit an appellee’s brief. When an appellee does not file a
    brief, we do not need to develop an argument for her, and we apply a less
    stringent standard of review. In re Guardianship of R.M.M., 
    901 N.E.2d 586
    , 588
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We may reverse the trial court if the appellant is able to
    establish prima facie error, which is error at first sight, on first appearance, or
    on the face of it. 
    Id.
     Where an appellant is unable to meet that burden, we will
    affirm. Howard v. Daugherty, 
    915 N.E.2d 998
    , 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The
    appellee’s failure to submit a brief, however, does not relieve us of our
    obligation to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to
    determine whether reversal is required. Khaja v. Khan, 
    902 N.E.2d 857
    , 868
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
    [13]   The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law at Father’s
    request. When reviewing such findings, we apply a two-tiered standard of
    review: we first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then
    whether the findings support the judgment. Tompa v. Tompa, 
    867 N.E.2d 158
    ,
    163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We will not set aside the findings or judgment unless
    they are clearly erroneous, and we will give due regard to the opportunity of the
    trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A).
    “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to
    support them either directly or by inference.” Yanoff v. Muncy, 
    688 N.E.2d 1259
    , 1262 (Ind. 1997). “A judgment is clearly erroneous when it is
    unsupported by the findings of fact and the conclusions relying on those
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 8 of 19
    findings.” TMC Transp., Inc. v. Maslanka, 
    744 N.E.2d 1052
    , 1055 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2001), trans. denied. Moreover, “[a] judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies
    the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Yanoff, 688 N.E.2d at 1262.
    [14]   “In conjunction with the Trial Rule 52 standard, there is a longstanding policy
    that appellate courts should defer to the determination of trial courts in family
    law matters.” D.G. v. S.G., 
    82 N.E.3d 342
    , 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans.
    denied. Our supreme court has stated:
    Appellate deference to the determinations of our trial court
    judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted
    because of their unique, direct interactions with the parties face-
    to-face, often over an extended period of time. Thus enabled to
    assess credibility and character through both factual testimony
    and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in a superior
    position to ascertain information and apply common sense,
    particularly in the determination of the best interests of the
    involved children.
    Best v. Best, 
    941 N.E.2d 499
    , 502 (Ind. 2011). It is not enough on appeal that the
    evidence might support some other conclusion; rather, the evidence must
    positively require the result sought by the appellant. D.C. v. J.A.C., 
    977 N.E.2d 951
    , 957 (Ind. 2012). Accordingly, we will not substitute our own judgment if
    any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court’s judgment. 
    Id.
    II. Child Custody
    [15]   Husband challenges the trial court’s physical custody determination.
    Determinations regarding child custody fall within the trial court’s sound
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 9 of 19
    discretion. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 
    103 N.E.3d 690
    , 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018),
    trans. denied. In an initial custody determination, both parents are presumed
    equally entitled to custody. 
    Id.
     The trial court “shall determine custody and
    enter a custody order in accordance with the best interests of the child” by
    considering all relevant factors, including:
    (1) The age and sex of the child.
    (2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.
    (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
    child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
    (4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
    (A) the child’s parent or parents;
    (B) the child’s sibling; and
    (C) any other person who may significantly affect the
    child’s best interests.
    (5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s:
    (A) home;
    (B) school; and
    (C) community.
    (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
    (7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
    parent.
    (8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto
    custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall
    consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.
    
    Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8
    . The trial court’s consideration of the best interests of the
    child is not limited to those factors explicitly listed in the statute. Russell v.
    Russell, 
    682 N.E.2d 513
    , 515 (Ind. 1997). Further, when “a trial court is making
    an initial custody determination, it is required to consider all evidence from the
    time of [the] child’s birth in determining the custody arrangement that would be
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 10 of 19
    in the best interest of [the] child.” In re Paternity of M.W., 
    949 N.E.2d 839
    , 843
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
    [16]   In deference to the trial court’s proximity to the issues, we do not reweigh the
    evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Hughes v. Rogusta, 
    830 N.E.2d 898
    , 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Instead, we consider the evidence most
    favorable to the judgment, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the
    judgment. 
    Id.
     We review the trial court’s custody determination only for an
    abuse of discretion. Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d at 695.
    A. Custody Standard
    [17]   Father first contends the trial court wrongly applied the standard for custody
    modifications rather than the standard for initial custody determinations. The
    rules and standards to be applied by the trial court differ for an initial custody
    order versus a custody modification order. When making an initial custody
    determination, there is no presumption in favor of either parent and the trial
    court determines what custody arrangement is in the best interests of the child.
    
    Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8
    . When making a custody modification decision, a more
    stringent standard applies and the parent seeking modification bears the burden
    of showing the existing custody order should be changed. Hughes, 
    830 N.E.2d at 900
    ; 
    Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21
    (a).
    [18]   We agree with Father that the parties’ interim agreement for Mother to have
    custody of A.W. during these proceedings was a provisional order only and that
    the order now being appealed was the first court determination regarding
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 11 of 19
    custody. See Tr., Vol. I at 4 (Father’s counsel noting at outset of hearing, and
    trial court agreeing, that there was a temporary custody determination via
    interim agreed entry in 2017 and “today is for the full custody determination”).
    “[P]rovisional orders are temporary orders that suffice until a full evidentiary
    hearing can be held.” Klotz v. Klotz, 
    747 N.E.2d 1187
    , 1191 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2001). Therefore, the trial court was making an initial custody determination
    and that standard applies.
    [19]   In the trial court’s conclusions of law, the court quotes the Indiana Code
    section 31-17-2-8 factors, cites case law stating that the court is not limited to
    consideration of those factors in making a best interests determination and that
    it has discretion in weighing the evidence relevant to each factor as well as
    weighing the factors against each other, states that it “has considered each of
    the above quoted statutory factors[,]” and concludes that “the best interests of
    the child supports a finding that the Mother shall have primary physical custody
    of [A.W.].” Appealed Order at 15.
    [20]   Father contends that in reaching this conclusion, the trial court did not apply
    the initial determination standard because the order cites several cases that were
    decided in the custody modification context. Indeed, of the six cases the trial
    court cites in its conclusions pertaining to custody, five were decided in the
    context of a modification of child custody. See Appealed Order at 13-15.
    Although the trial court could have been more precise in the case law it cited,
    we do not believe citation to modification cases necessarily means the trial
    court applied the wrong standard.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 12 of 19
    [21]   The trial court appropriately quoted the factors in Indiana Code section 31-17-
    2-8 as those primarily guiding its determination. The court also properly noted
    that it was not limited to considering only those factors, as the statute itself
    charges the court to consider “all relevant factors.” 
    Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8
    ; see
    Appealed Order at 13 (citing Russell, 682 N.E.2d at 515). The trial court did not
    cite Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21(a) (custody modification standard) and
    did not mention “modification” or a “substantial change” in the section 8
    factors in rendering its decision. The only language that could conceivably refer
    to the modification standard is the quote from Fields v. Fields that “permanence
    and stability are considered best for the welfare and happiness of the child.”
    Appealed Order at 15. Although that may be a universal truth, the context in
    which that language appears is that “[i]n subsequent hearings to modify custody, the
    burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that the existing custody order is
    unreasonable because permanence and stability are considered best for the
    welfare and happiness of the child.” Fields, 
    749 N.E.2d 100
    , 108 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2001) (emphasis added), trans. denied. Nonetheless, the trial court’s order does
    not indicate that the fact that Mother had temporary primary physical custody
    of A.W. during these proceedings factored into its decision or that it placed a
    greater burden on Father to prove that arrangement was unreasonable.
    Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court erred in the standard it applied to
    determining custody in this case.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 13 of 19
    B. Custody Determination
    [22]   Father also contends that even if the trial court applied the correct standard, the
    findings are insufficient to support the judgment. Specifically, Father contends
    that many of the “findings” are mere recitations of witness testimony and that
    the majority of the remaining findings “suggest [Father] was more capable of
    providing for [A.W.’s] best interests.” Brief of Appellant at 29.
    [23]   The purpose of Trial Rule 52(A) is “to provide the parties and the reviewing
    court with the theory upon which the trial judge decided the case in order that
    the right of review for error may be effectively preserved.” In re Paternity of
    S.A.M., 
    85 N.E.3d 879
    , 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). As we have previously
    explained:
    Findings of fact are a mechanism by which a trial court
    completes its function of weighing the evidence and judging
    witnesses’ credibility. A satisfactory finding of fact is a simple,
    straightforward statement of what happened. A court . . . does
    not find something to be a fact by merely reciting that a witness
    testified to X, Y, or Z. Rather, the trier of fact must find that
    what the witness testified to is the fact. As such, where a trial
    court’s findings are merely recitations of a witness’ testimony,
    they cannot be construed as true factual determinations. We
    treat the trial court’s inclusion of these findings as mere
    surplusage rather than harmful error. However, where the trial
    court has adopted the witness’ testimony, such a finding may be
    considered a finding of fact.
    Pitcavage v. Pitcavage, 
    11 N.E.3d 547
    , 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quotations and
    citations omitted). “A finding of fact must indicate, not what someone said is
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 14 of 19
    true, but what is determined to be true, for that is the trier of fact’s duty.” Moore
    v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 
    682 N.E.2d 545
    , 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
    [24]   Here, a great number of the trial court’s 104 “Findings of Fact” are merely
    undisputed background information; the procedural history of the case,
    including the terms of the interim order; a recitation or summary of witness
    testimony; and descriptions of evidence admitted. The findings are laid out to
    describe, from beginning to end, what happened on each of the four days of the
    hearing. For example, the findings include:
    16) Day one (1) of the parties’ Final Hearing commenced on
    April 26, 2019.
    17) The Court admitted and published [Father’s] Exhibit “1”,
    which was [Mother’s] deposition transcript.
    18) Father’s first witness called was Jodi Key . . . .
    ***
    40) The second day of the Final Hearing was on May 9, 2019.
    41) Prior to the presentation of evidence at the May 9th hearing,
    the Court indicated that it was going to accept [certain] testimony
    from the April 26th hearing . . . .
    42) [Father] called [Mother] as his first witness at the May 9th
    Final Hearing.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 15 of 19
    Appealed Order at 4, 6. Many of the findings acknowledge a conflict in the
    evidence without resolving the conflict. See, e.g., id. at 5 (finding 38 stating
    Key’s daughter “disputed [Mother’s] contention that [A.W.] runs wild without
    boundaries while in [Father’s] care”); and at 6 (finding 48 stating Mother
    “denied that Mr. Barrow was abusive”). Others merely state the parties’
    contentions or concerns, again without stating what the trial court determined
    to be true. See, e.g., id. at 10 (finding 84 stating that Father “expressed concern
    for Mother’s lack of stability and questioned her ability to financially provide
    for [A.W.]”). Twenty-eight of the findings contain the phrase “[witness]
    testified” or “[witness] stated,” and even where the findings do not so begin,
    most are essentially just a re-statement of the testimony given by each witness
    with no indication the trial court had adopted that testimony as fact. Most
    importantly, however, the trial court’s findings do not clearly indicate the
    theory for its custody decision.
    [25]   Excluding the insufficient findings and undisputed background and procedural
    information, the remaining findings and conclusions pertaining to the trial
    court’s custody determination are not sufficient to support the trial court’s
    judgment. The age and sex of the child and the wishes of the child’s parents are
    clear from the order. And the trial court did find that “[n]either party suffers
    from any disability that would undermine his/her ability to provide for
    [A.W.’s] safety and wellbeing,” thus presumably commenting on their mental
    and physical health. Appealed Order at 9; see 
    Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8
    (6).
    However, there are no findings by the court that could feasibly be said to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 16 of 19
    comment upon the relationship of A.W. with Mother and Father, with each of
    his siblings, or with his extended family or the significant others in his parents’
    lives.1 There are no findings that reflect A.W.’s adjustment to the parties’
    homes or to his school.2 And despite noting testimony about possible domestic
    violence perpetrated by Mother’s most recent boyfriend, the trial court made no
    findings about whether such abuse occurred, and if so, whether it occurred in
    A.W.’s presence or otherwise affected him.
    [26]   Father requested that the trial court make special findings of fact and
    conclusions of law under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). Therefore, the trial court’s
    findings were required to “contain all facts necessary for recovery by a party in
    whose favor conclusions of law are found.” Bowman v. Bowman, 
    686 N.E.2d 921
    , 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). In other words, they were required to contain a
    statement of the ultimate facts from which the trial court made its custody
    1
    For example, with respect to A.W.’s relationship with the parties, the trial court’s finding include:
    “[Mother] testified that [Father] loves [A.W.], and that he plays, and interacts with [him]” and “[Mother]
    stated that [A.W.] enjoys spending time with [Father] and that he is a good financial provider[.]” Appealed
    Order at 7 (findings 51 and 52). The trial court’s findings also include that Mother’s sister “stated that
    [Mother] is an excellent parent.” Id. at 9 (finding 69). With respect to A.W.’s relationship with his six
    siblings, the trial court found that “Ms. Key testified that [Father’s twenty-six-year-old son] Colton and
    [A.W.] . . . interact well with each other[,]” id. at 4 (finding 23), and that “[Mother’s] daughter Allyson . . .
    and Allyson’s boyfriend . . . stay at [Mother’s] home on a regular basis[,]” id. at 6 (finding 49). And with
    respect to A.W.’s relationship with Father’s live-in girlfriend, the trial court’s findings include that “Ms. Key
    testified that [A.W.] warmed up to her, especially after they went to Florida together on a family vacation in
    December 2018.” Id. at 5 (finding 29). None of these “findings” shed light on what the trial court
    determined this testimony meant in relation to the section 8 factors.
    2
    As above, the trial court’s “findings” that a) “Ms. Key testified that [A.W.] has his own bedroom at
    Father’s” and “[Mother] lives at her parents’ home, in Bloomington, Indiana . . . since October 2018[,]”
    Appealed Order at 5-6 (Findings 32 and 43), and b) “[A.W.] attends daycare/preschool at Children’s
    Village,” id. at 5 (Finding 34), shed no light on the trial court’s determination of the import of this testimony
    on A.W.’s adjustment to the parties’ homes or his school.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020                    Page 17 of 19
    determination. Id. Simply regurgitating the evidence without making
    credibility determinations or weighing conflicting evidence and then stating
    “the Court has considered each of the [section 8] factors” is insufficient when
    special findings have been requested. Appealed Order at 15; cf. Russell, 
    682 N.E.2d at 515
    , 515 n.2 (noting that although the trial court must consider all
    relevant factors in making its custody determination, it is not required to make
    specific findings unless a party so requests in writing). Simply put, the trial
    court’s findings need to illustrate and not just state that the section 8 factors have
    been considered.
    [27]   We cannot discern from the trial court’s findings whether it based its custody
    order on proper statutory considerations.3 We therefore remand in order for the
    trial court to enter appropriate and adequate findings based on evidence from
    the final hearing to support its judgment. See Hazelett v. Hazelett, 
    119 N.E.3d 153
    , 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (remanding a dissolution case to the trial court
    with instructions to enter proper findings of fact and conclusions thereon to
    support the trial court’s custody determination because the trial court’s original
    3
    Although Father contends the “evidence and Findings of Fact before the Trial Court clearly indicate that
    [he] . . . should have been awarded primary custody[,]” Br. of Appellant at 36, we cannot agree. First,
    because Father requested special findings, we are not at liberty to look beyond the trial court’s findings and
    independently consider whether the evidence supports the judgment as we would be if the trial court had
    entered findings sua sponte; instead, we are limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings support
    the judgment. Second, the findings as a whole are insufficient regarding the section 8 factors in favor of
    either parent, as Father himself acknowledges. See id. at 35-36 (“Nothing in the Trial Court’s [order]
    indicate[s] that there was proper assessment of facts relevant to [the] best interests’ inquiry in the context of
    an initial physical custody determination.”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020                    Page 18 of 19
    findings were not sufficient and did not reflect what the trial court found to be
    true).
    Conclusion
    [28]   Although the trial court applied the appropriate standard for an initial custody
    determination, the trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support its
    custody decision. We therefore remand to the trial court for further findings
    and retain jurisdiction. The judgment of the trial court shall be filed with this
    court within thirty days from the issuance of this opinion.
    [29]   Remanded for the entry of proper findings of fact and conclusions of law.
    Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-DC-305 | December 29, 2020   Page 19 of 19