Michael D. Crawley v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing Dec 30 2020, 9:29 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Devon M. Sharpe Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Jenner, Pattison & Sharpe Attorney General
Madison, Indiana Tina L. Mann
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael D. Crawley, December 30, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-1002
v. Appeal from the
Jefferson Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff Richard Striegel, Sr. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
39C01-1803-F4-303
Vaidik, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1002 | December 30, 2020 Page 1 of 10
Case Summary
[1] Michael D. Crawley was convicted of two counts of dealing in
methamphetamine and one count of maintaining a common nuisance. He now
appeals, challenging some of the trial court’s rulings and the sufficiency of the
evidence for his dealing convictions. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In February 2018, Deputy Linton Spry of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s
Department arrested Chad Uebel for possession of methamphetamine and
possession of paraphernalia. Deputy Spry asked Uebel if he wanted to “work
off” his charges by becoming a confidential informant, and Uebel agreed to do
so. Tr. p. 15. On February 21, Uebel contacted Crawley, an acquaintance, to
buy “half of an eight-ball” of methamphetamine for $85. Id. at 29. Uebel then
told police about the buy he had set up.
[3] Before going to Crawley’s apartment to purchase methamphetamine, Uebel met
Deputy Yancy Denning and Deputy Timothy Armstrong for a pre-buy
interview and search. Deputies Denning and Armstrong searched Crawley’s
person and motorcycle for money and contraband and, finding none, gave him
$85 dollars in buy money. After Uebel was fitted with an audio-recording
device, he drove his motorcycle to Crawley’s apartment in Hanover. Deputies
Denning and Armstrong followed Uebel, never losing visual or audio contact
with him. Uebel parked his motorcycle in front of Crawley’s apartment, and
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Deputies Denning and Armstrong parked across the street from it. When Uebel
entered the apartment, Deputies Denning and Armstrong lost visual contact
with him but listened to the events in real time through the recording device.
[4] Uebel entered Crawley’s apartment and, after briefly speaking with him, gave
him $85 in buy money in exchange for what was later determined to be 1.69
grams of methamphetamine. Uebel then left the apartment and drove to the
post-buy location, where he gave Deputy Armstrong the methamphetamine he
had just purchased. Deputies Denning and Armstrong again searched Uebel
and his motorcycle for contraband and money, finding none.
[5] Two days later, on February 23, Uebel set up another buy with Crawley for half
of an eight ball of methamphetamine for $85 and told police about the buy.
Similar to before, Uebel met with police for a pre-buy interview and search.
Deputies Denning and Spry searched Uebel’s person and motorcycle, gave him
$85 in buy money, and fitted him with a recording device. Uebel then drove to
Crawley’s apartment. Deputy Spry and Deputy Ben Flint followed Uebel,
maintaining visual and audio contact with him until he arrived at Crawley’s
apartment.
[6] Crawley was not home when Uebel got there, so Uebel waited outside.
Deputies Spry and Flint watched Crawley enter the apartment and heard Uebel
and Crawley engage in conversation in real time through the recording device.
Uebel gave Crawley $85 in buy money in exchange for what was later
determined to be 1.68 grams of methamphetamine. Uebel then left the
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apartment and met Deputies Spry and Flint at the post-buy location. There,
Uebel gave Deputy Spry the methamphetamine he had just purchased.
Deputies Spry and Flint again searched Uebel and his motorcycle for
contraband and money, finding none.
[7] The State charged Crawley with two counts of Level 4 felony dealing in
methamphetamine, two counts of Level 6 felony possession of
methamphetamine, and one count of Level 6 felony maintaining a common
nuisance. At the jury trial, Uebel testified he purchased methamphetamine from
Crawley on February 21 and 23, 2018. Uebel also testified the State dismissed
his possession charges in exchange for his work as a confidential informant in
this case. In addition, the State admitted into evidence the audio recordings of
the controlled buys. See Exs. 1, 2. A court reporter had prepared transcripts of
the audio recordings, and the State asked the trial court if the jury could use
them as an aid while listening to the recordings.1 Tr. pp. 104, 168. Crawley
objected on grounds there was “absolutely no foundation that’s been laid for the
transcript as far as who did it.” Id. at 104, 168. The State responded the court
reporter who prepared the transcripts attached the following “Certificate” at the
end of each transcript:
I . . . do hereby certify that the above and foregoing, is a true and
accurate transcript, typed to the best of my ability, of the audio of
1
It is unclear from the record whether defense counsel knew about the transcripts before the State asked the
trial court if the jury could use them as an aid. On appeal, Crawley does not say one way or the other.
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a controlled buy as provided to me. I am not related to,
employed by, or interested in any of the parties in this action.
Ex. 1A, p. 40; Ex. 2A, p. 61. The trial court found the court reporter’s
“Certificate” made the transcript “valid” and ruled the jury could use the
transcripts while listening to the recordings. Tr. p. 170. Before the recordings
were played for the jury, the trial court gave the following admonishment:
[A] transcript should normally be used only to assist the jury as it
listens to an audio tape, but there may be a need for transcripts
due to inaudibility of portions of the tape. In such a case the jury
should be instructed to rely on what they hear rather than on
what they read when there is a difference.
Id. at 106, 171. The transcripts were not admitted into evidence; rather, they
were only used by the jury when listening to the recordings.
[8] During Deputy Denning’s testimony, the State asked him if he could “ascertain
when the deal, the transaction took place” on the recording of the February 21
controlled buy. Id. at 109. Crawley objected as follows:
I mean [the jury has] heard the tape. They’ve had a transcript to
aid them in hearing the tape. We don’t need Detective Denning
to give his own interpretation as to what the jurors already heard.
Id. The trial court overruled Crawley’s objection, and Deputy Denning testified
he believed the deal took place when Uebel said, “Man, I never thought it
would come to the day where I’d have to pay 85 dollars for a ball. You know,
what I mean?” Id. at 111-12. Likewise, during Deputy Spry’s testimony, the
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State asked him if he “believe[d] [he was] able to hear when the deal took
place” on the recording of the February 23 controlled buy. Id. at 172. Crawley
again objected, and the court again overruled his objection. Deputy Spry then
testified he believed the deal took place when Crawley said “Yeah, it’s 1.7” and
Uebel referenced $85. Id. at 172-73.
[9] The jury found Crawley guilty as charged. The trial court merged the
possession counts into the dealing counts and sentenced Crawley to twelve
years for each dealing conviction and one year for the maintaining-a-common-
nuisance conviction, to be served concurrently.
[10] Crawley now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Transcript
[11] Crawley first contends the trial court erred in letting the jury use the transcripts
while listening to the audio recordings. A transcript should normally be used
only after the defendant has had an opportunity to verify its accuracy and then
only to assist the jury as it listens to the recording. Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d
742, 748 (Ind. 2000) (citing Bryan v. State, 450 N.E.2d 53, 59 (Ind. 1983)). “If
accuracy remains an issue, a foundation may first be laid by having the person
who prepared the transcripts testify he has listened to the recordings and
accurately transcribed their contents.” Bryan, 450 N.E.2d at 59 (emphasis
added, quotation omitted). Because the need for a transcript is generally caused
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by two circumstances—inaudibility of portions of the recording or the need to
identify speakers2—it may be appropriate, in the sound discretion of the trial
court, to furnish the jury with a transcript to assist it while listening to the
recording. Small, 736 N.E.2d at 748. The court should instruct the jury to rely
on what it hears rather than on what it reads when there is a difference. Id.
[12] Crawley argues “the State did not provide any foundation regarding accuracy of
the transcripts other than that there was a certification provided by the Court
reporter at the conclusion of the transcript.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. Crawley,
however, cites no authority that says a court reporter’s certification that a
transcript is “accurate” is not a sufficient foundation to allow a jury to use a
transcript as an aid while listening to a recording. But even if the court
reporter’s certification did not provide a sufficient foundation, Crawley has
identified no inaccuracy in the transcripts. See Bryan, 450 N.E.2d at 60 (finding
no reversible error because “neither at trial nor on appeal has [the defendant]
identified the typed statements in the transcript that are not identical with the
conversation.”). The trial court did not err in letting the jury use the transcripts
while listening to the recordings.
2
Crawley notes the transcripts in this case do not identify the speakers, but he does not explain how, if at all,
this prejudiced him.
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II. Officers’ Testimony
[13] Crawley next contends the trial court erred in allowing Deputies Denning and
Spry to testify when they believed the drug deals took place on the recordings in
violation of Indiana Evidence Rule 701, which provides:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of
an opinion is limited to one that is:
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; and
(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s
testimony or to a determination of a fact in issue.
Specifically, Crawley claims their testimony went “beyond” assisting the jury
with drug-dealing terminology and concepts and amounted to “pure
speculation as to what [was] going on in a room based on audio recordings,”
unduly influencing the jurors. Appellant’s Br. p. 12.
[14] The State responds that even if the trial court erred in allowing this testimony,
the error is harmless. We agree. An error is harmless when it results in no
prejudice to the “substantial rights” of a party. Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645,
652 (Ind. 2018). To determine whether an error in the introduction of evidence
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, we assess the probable impact of that
evidence upon the jury considering all the other evidence that was properly
presented. Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. 2014). If we are satisfied the
conviction is supported by independent evidence of guilt such that there is no
substantial likelihood that the challenged evidence contributed to the verdict,
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the error is harmless. Id. As detailed below in the Section III, there is substantial
independent evidence Crawley delivered methamphetamine to Uebel on both
occasions, including Uebel’s own testimony. Notably, Crawley did not file a
reply brief responding to the State’s harmless-error argument. Accordingly, we
find any error is harmless.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[15] Finally, Crawley contends the evidence is insufficient to support his dealing
convictions. When reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, we neither
reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Willis v. State, 27
N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015). We will only consider the evidence supporting
the verdict and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.
Id. A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative
value to support each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.[16] Crawley argues the State failed to prove he delivered methamphetamine to
Uebel. Uebel testified he purchased methamphetamine from Crawley on
February 21 and 23, 2018, and gave the methamphetamine to the officers after
each buy. Tr. pp. 32-33, 39. In addition, the officers testified they searched
Uebel before and after each controlled buy. The officers kept Uebel in constant
visual contact as they drove to and from Crawley’s apartment and listened in
real time through the recording device on Uebel. Crawley acknowledges
Uebel’s testimony he purchased methamphetamine from him on February 21
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and 23; however, he claims it is “self-serving,” as Uebel had “a great deal to
gain” with “the need to produce results.”3 Appellant’s Br. p. 16. The jury heard
all the testimony, including Uebel’s testimony about getting his charges
dismissed in exchange for his work as a confidential informant in this case, and
found Crawley guilty. Crawley’s argument is merely a request for us to reweigh
the evidence, which we cannot do. We therefore affirm Crawley’s dealing
convictions.
[17] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
3
Crawley does not claim Uebel’s testimony was “incredibly dubious.” See Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756
(Ind. 2015).
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