A.L. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 21 2020, 9:02 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David M. Payne Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Ryan & Payne Attorney General of Indiana
Marion, Indiana
Courtney Staton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
A.L., January 21, 2020
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-JV-1629
v. Appeal from the Grant Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Dana J.
Appellee-Petitioner. Kenworthy, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
27D02-1905-JD-47
Barteau, Senior Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] A.L. appeals the juvenile court’s determination that she is a juvenile delinquent
for an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute disorderly conduct, a
Class B misdemeanor. We affirm.
Issue
[2] A.L. raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the State presented
sufficient evidence to rebut her claim of self-defense.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On the night of May 17, 2018, Rebecca Wesling, A.L., D.M., and others were
at Cody Roberts’ apartment in Gas City, Indiana. Wesling and others prepared
to leave. D.M., who was Wesling’s ex-boyfriend, said “make sure you take that
bitch, directing towards [Wesling], with you.” Tr. p. 10. Wesling responded to
D.M.’s insult. A.L. approached Wesling and struck her.
[4] Wesling left the building, but A.L. and D.M. followed her to her car. A.L.
struck Wesling again, and Wesling “started to defend [her]self.” Id. at 11. The
fight ended, and Wesling left.
[5] On May 18, 2018, Wesling arrived at the Gas City Police Department to
complain that A.L. had attacked her. While she was there, she displayed signs
of medical distress and was transported to a hospital. Wesling returned to the
department the next day to complete her statement. She had bruises on her
face.
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[6] Wesling later saw a post on one of A.L.’s social media accounts. In the post,
A.L. stated she attacked Wesling because Wesling was “running her mouth.”
Id. at 14. A.L. threatened to “beat” Wesling again. Id. at 15.
[7] On May 28, 2019, the State filed a delinquency petition, claiming A.L. was a
delinquent child for acts that, if committed by an adult, would amount to
battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor (Count I), and
disorderly conduct (fighting), a Class B misdemeanor (Count II).
[8] The juvenile court held an initial hearing on May 29, 2019, and A.L. denied the
allegations in the State’s petition. The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing
for June 17, 2019.
[9] The court held the hearing as scheduled. At the end of the hearing, the court
stated, “I can’t find that you committed the act of battery. But, I am going to
find that you committed disorderly conduct – fighting.” Id. at 38. The court
further explained as to the allegation of battery that there was “enough
uncertainty” about the circumstances. Id. at 43. Next, the court placed A.L. on
probation for six months for the juvenile adjudication on Count II. On June 24,
2019, the court issued a fact-finding order and a dispositional order setting forth
the court’s decisions. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Conclusion
[10] A.L. argues there is insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court’s
determination that she was a juvenile delinquent for committing an act of
disorderly conduct. “A child commits a delinquent act if, before becoming
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eighteen (18) years of age, the child commits an act that would be an offense if
committed by an adult, . . . .” Ind. Code § 31-37-1-2 (1997). In this case, the
State claimed A.L. had committed the act of disorderly conduct, a Class B
misdemeanor. The General Assembly has provided the following definition, in
relevant part: “A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally . . .
engages in fighting or in tumultuous conduct . . . commits disorderly conduct, a
Class B misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a) (2014).
[11] A.L. does not dispute that her conduct fulfilled the elements of disorderly
conduct. She instead argues the State failed to disprove her claim of self-
defense. A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise
unlawful act. McCullough v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1135, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),
trans. denied. The General Assembly has explained:
(c) A person is justified in using reasonable force against any
other person to protect the person or a third person from what
the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of
unlawful force. However, a person:
(1) is justified in using deadly force; and
(2) does not have a duty to retreat;
if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to
prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or
the commission of a forcible felony. No person, employer, or
estate of a person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of
any kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third person
by reasonable means necessary.
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Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (2019).
[12] The Assembly further provided, “a person is not justified in using force if . . .
the person has entered into combat with another person or is the initial
aggressor unless the person withdraws from the encounter and communicates
to the other person the intent to do so and the other person nevertheless
continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g).
[13] The Indiana Supreme Court has explained that in order to prevail upon a claim
of self-defense, “the defendant must show that he: (1) was in a place where he
had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the
violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.” Wilson
v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). Once a person claims self-defense,
the State bears the burden of disproving at least one of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt. McCullough, 985 N.E.2d at 1138. The State may meet this
burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the person
did not act in self-defense, or by relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in
chief. Id.
[14] The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a
claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the
evidence claim. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801. We neither reweigh the evidence
nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is sufficient evidence of
probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, then the verdict
will not be disturbed. Id.
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[15] At the fact-finding hearing, Wesling testified that A.L. struck her inside the
apartment. She further explained that A.L. struck her again outside the
apartment, provoking Wesling into fighting back. Wesling also read to the
court one of A.L.’s social media posts, in which A.L. stated she attacked
Wesling because of something Wesling had said. A.L. further threatened to
attack Wesling again. This evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that A.L. instigated the fight with Wesling. As a result, the
State successfully disproved A.L.’s claim of self-defense. A.L. points to other
evidence indicating that Wesling attacked her first, but A.L. is asking the Court
to reweigh the evidence, which our standard of review forbids.
[16] A.L. further argues the juvenile court had “accepted self-defense” in declining
to determine that A.L. had committed an act of battery and should have also
accepted her defense as to the allegation of disorderly conduct. She further
argues the trial court’s split decision “makes no sense.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13.
[17] With respect to the battery allegation, we cannot agree that the juvenile court
accepted A.L.’s claim of self-defense. The court instead merely stated there was
“uncertainty” about the facts. Tr. p. 43. In any event, if A.L. is arguing that
the court’s different determinations on Counts I and II are erroneously
inconsistent, the Indiana Supreme Court has explained, in the context of jury
verdicts in criminal cases, that a finder of fact’s judgments “are not subject to
appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or
irreconcilable.” Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010). “A jury’s
right to exercise lenity is an important component of our criminal justice
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system.” Id. at 648-49. Applying the reasoning in Beattie to the fact-finder’s
decision in this case, we will not examine the possible reasons for the juvenile
court’s differing decisions on Count I and Count II.
Conclusion
[18] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
[19] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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