In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: K.A. (Minor Child) and K.A. (Mother),and C.A. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this                        Jan 21 2020, 9:12 am
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the                      CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,                   Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Andrew R. Falk                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Hendricks County Public Defender’s                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Office
    David E. Corey
    Danville, Indiana                                      Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Termination                           January 21, 2020
    of the Parent–Child Relationship                           Court of Appeals Case No.
    of: K.A. (Minor Child)                                     19A-JT-1520
    and                                                        Appeal from the Hendricks
    Superior Court
    K.A. (Mother),and C.A. (Father)
    The Hon. Karen M. Love, Judge
    Appellants-Respondents,
    Trial Court Cause No.
    32D03-1811-JT-26
    v.
    The Indiana Department of Child
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Bradford, Chief Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020            Page 1 of 22
    Case Summary
    [1]   K.A. (“Child”) was born to K.A. (“Mother”) and C.A. (“Father”) (collectively,
    “Parents”) on December 1, 2010. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 82). In May of
    2013, Child was found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) following
    Parents’ admission that they had ongoing issues with substance abuse and drug-
    related criminal charges. This first CHINS case was closed in 2014.
    [2]   In July of 2016, the juvenile court found Child to be a CHINS a second time
    and later ordered Parents to complete several reunification services, including
    abstaining from the use of alcohol or illegal drugs. Over the course of the next
    two years, Parents continued to test positive for illegal drug use and missed
    many drug-screen appointments, which were to be considered positive screens.
    Parents failed on numerous occasions to follow plans for Child’s safety and
    repeatedly violated the terms of visitation.
    [3]   In 2018, Parents participated in an inpatient drug-treatment program but were
    discharged from follow-up treatment. In November of 2018, DCS petitioned to
    terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child (“the TPR Petition”), and both
    tested positive for illegal drugs within weeks. The juvenile court held an
    evidentiary hearing on the TPR Petition over three days in January of 2019,
    after which it terminated Parents’ parental rights to Child. Parents claim that
    several of the juvenile court’s findings of fact are unsupported by the evidence
    and that the juvenile court erred in concluding that the conditions that resulted
    in Child’s removal from Parents’ care were not likely to be remedied. Because
    we disagree, we affirm.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 2 of 22
    Facts and Procedural History
    [4]   On December 1, 2010, Child was born to Parents. In November of 2012,
    Father was convicted of Class B felony dealing in a schedule I, II, or III
    controlled substance and was eventually sentenced to 2190 days, with thirty-
    four days executed and 2156 suspended to probation. In June of 2013, Father
    was sentenced following a conviction for Class D felony possession of
    controlled substance to 910 days of incarceration, with 730 days suspended and
    104 days served in work release, to be served consecutive to his November of
    2012 dealing conviction. In June of 2013, Mother was convicted of Class D
    felony possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to 545 days of
    incarceration with 543 suspended.
    [5]   Meanwhile, in May of 2013, DCS petitioned to have Child adjudicated a
    CHINS. On May 30, 2013, the juvenile court adjudicated Child a CHINS after
    Parents admitted that they had ongoing substance-abuse issues and that Father
    had a history of drug-related criminal offenses, including charges pending at the
    time. On June 20, 2013, the juvenile court ordered Parents into reunification
    services, including substance-abuse treatment. In March of 2014, the juvenile
    court closed the CHINS case because the conditions leading to the filing of the
    CHINS case had been resolved.
    [6]   On June 22, 2016, DCS filed a second petition alleging that Child was a
    CHINS based on Parents’ substance-abuse history, Mother’s overdose on June
    18, 2016, and Parents’ daily use of heroin while Child was in the home. The
    same day, the juvenile court authorized Child’s removal from Parents’ Clayton
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 3 of 22
    home. On July 14, 2016, the juvenile court adjudicated Child a CHINS
    following Parents’ admissions that “[Parents have] untreated substance use
    addiction and will not receive services without DCS and Court intervention.
    [Parents’] substance use impairs [their] ability to care for the child.” Ex. Vol.
    IV pp. 49, 51.
    [7]   On October 28, 2016, the juvenile court entered its dispositional and parental
    participation orders, ordering Parents into reunification services. The juvenile
    court ordered Parents to maintain contact with their DCS Family Case
    Manager (“FCM”); allow the FCM to see their home; enroll in FCM-
    recommended programs; keep appointments with the FCM, Child’s guardian
    ad litem (GAL), and service providers; maintain suitable housing and a stable
    source of income; not use illegal drugs and alcohol; obey the law; complete a
    substance-abuse assessment and follow its recommendations; submit to random
    drug screens; visit Child; and complete a mental-health assessment and follow
    its recommendations. The juvenile court also ordered that any request for a
    drug screen not completed in a timely manner would be considered a positive
    screen.
    [8]   On November 9, 2016, the juvenile court found that while Parents were still
    using heroin, they had visited Child, cooperated with DCS, and enhanced their
    ability to fulfill their parental obligations. On February 8, 2017, the juvenile
    court found that Parents were compliant in services but also found that Mother
    had tested positive for heroin in October of 2016 and for heroin metabolite in
    December of 2016 and that Father “continues to test positive for morphine,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 4 of 22
    fentanyl and heroin metabolite.” Ex. Vol. IV p. 65. On March 1, 2017, Father
    was sentenced to four days of incarceration following his conviction for Class C
    misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
    [9]    On March 22, 2017, the juvenile court ordered Father to report to an inpatient
    treatment facility immediately if he failed to comply with maintaining sobriety
    or comply with attending services in the following manner:
    2.       The parties agree that Father will maintain sobriety and
    participate in individual counseling, substance abuse
    counseling, and NA/AA meetings in lieu of in-patient
    treatment for the next 90 days.
    3.       Father will provide random drug screens within 24 hours
    of request and provide negative drug screens.
    4.       Father will attend either individual counseling, substance
    abuse counseling, or an NA/AA meeting every day,
    Father may have one day per week that he does not attend
    these services if he has a visit with the child that day.
    Ex. Vol. IV p. 73.
    [10]   On May 17, 2017, the juvenile court found that Mother had tested positive for
    methamphetamine and that Father had tested positive for heroin, morphine,
    and methamphetamine. Father admitted to using heroin and morphine. Father
    declined DCS’s offer to go to a twenty-one-day inpatient program at Tara
    Treatment Center.
    [11]   In June of 2017, Mother was approved for overnight and unsupervised visits
    with Child. On August 30, 2017, the juvenile court held a show cause hearing
    and found Father in contempt: “Father has failed to maintain sobriety,
    consistently participate in substance abuse treatment and follow the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 5 of 22
    recommendations of his substance abuse service provider in attending in-patient
    drug treatment.” Ex. Vol. IV p. 88. The juvenile court sentenced Father to
    thirty days in work release starting October 17, 2017, but it allowed him to
    purge his contempt by completing a substance-abuse assessment within twenty-
    one days and following all recommended treatment, participating in all court-
    ordered services, and providing consistent negative drug screens.
    [12]   DCS FCM Steven Junkersfeld took over Child’s case in October of 2017. On
    October 10, 2017, Mother’s visits reverted back to supervised status due to
    Parents’ failure to follow the safety plan. Father, who was not to have any
    unsupervised contact with Child, had been going to Mother’s home during
    Child’s visits with Mother. On November 8, 2017, the juvenile court found that
    Father had again tested positive for illegal drugs, including heroin, morphine,
    fentanyl, and buprenorphine on September 6 and 29, 2017, and THC on
    October 13. The juvenile court also found that Mother had violated the safety
    plan by allowing Father to drive with Child while he was under the influence
    and had allowed Father to stay overnight.
    [13]   On January 3, 2018, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing. The
    juvenile court cited to Mother’s violation of the safety plan and that Father had
    not been to therapy sessions and had failed to communicate with FCM
    Junkersfeld. The juvenile court approved a concurrent permanency plan of
    reunification and termination of parental rights with adoption. By February of
    2018, Mother had again progressed to unsupervised and overnight visits. Soon
    thereafter, however, FCM Junkersfeld learned that Father had had
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 6 of 22
    unsupervised contact with Child during one of Mother’s overnight visits. On
    February 23, 2018, Mother’s visits again reverted back to supervised status due
    to the violation. In March of 2018, Mother and Father lost the apartment in
    which they had been residing and did not provide any further housing
    information to FCM Junkersfeld.
    [14]   On April 11, 2018, the juvenile court suspended Father’s visits until he
    completed a substance-abuse evaluation and had four consecutive negative drug
    screens. On April 18, 2018, the juvenile court found that Parents had not
    complied with their case plan. Mother had failed to follow through with
    services and had missed six drug screens from December of 2017 through
    January of 2018. Mother had also violated another safety plan regarding
    visitation, so her visitations again reverted to supervised.
    [15]   Also in April of 2018, FCM Junkersfeld attempted to convince Father to go to
    Tara’s residential treatment program because Father stated he “would like to
    get help” for his substance abuse. Tr. Vol. II p. 51. After FCM Junkersfeld
    arranged everything, however, Father said that he did not need help and would
    “figure it out on his own.” Tr. Vol. II p. 51. Father told FCM Junkersfeld that
    he would “just find other ways” to achieve sobriety and “it’s none of [FCM
    Junkersfeld’s] business.” Tr. Vol. II p. 52.
    [16]   FCM Melinda Brewer (“FCM Brewer”) took over Child’s case in May of 2018.
    Father’s June 26, 2018, substance-abuse assessment recommended that he
    engage in inpatient treatment due to his daily use of heroin, methamphetamine,
    and marijuana. Father had four drug screens from March 29 through June 11,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 7 of 22
    2018, that were positive for amphetamine, heroin, THC, morphine, Tramadol,
    or combinations thereof. Father also missed twelve screens, which were
    considered positive. On July 30, 2018, Father was admitted to Tara Treatment
    Center for its twenty-one-day residential program. Tara discharged him with a
    recommendation to complete substance-abuse assessment at the Hamilton
    Center.
    [17]   On August 31, 2018, the juvenile court found that Mother had not completed
    her referred substance-abuse assessment and had tested positive for
    amphetamine, methamphetamine, acetylmorphine, and morphine on April 18,
    2018. Mother also had ten presumptive positive screens because she failed to
    screen. Mother completed Tara’s twenty-one-day residential inpatient program
    and was discharged with recommendations to complete inpatient treatment,
    individual therapy, and medication management.
    [18]   On November 16, 2018, the juvenile court found that Mother had been
    discharged from her substance-abuse treatment program at Cummins due to her
    failure to attend and that Father had not completed the recommended
    treatment at Hamilton Center. Father was also discharged from another
    intensive outpatient program on November 14, 2018, due to his failure to
    participate. The juvenile court also found that Parents “have minimally
    enhanced their ability to parent, but much work remains to be done to achieve
    and consistently maintain sobriety.” Ex. Vol. IV p. 136.
    [19]   On November 28, 2018, DCS filed its TPR Petition. In December of 2018,
    Father was discharged from substance-abuse treatment at the Hamilton Center
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 8 of 22
    due to non-compliance, and he failed to follow up with DCS’s referral for
    another provider. Father had refused treatment and had missed twenty-seven
    drug screens. On December 11, 2018, Father was sentenced for Level 6 felony
    unlawful possession of a legend drug to 365 days, with 100 days to be served on
    work release and the balance on home detention. Mother tested positive for
    cocaine on November 29, 2018, and Father tested positive for cocaine on
    November 8 and 15, 2018. On January 2, 2019, the juvenile court again found
    that Parents had not complied with their case plan. FCM Brewer testified that
    Parents had relapsed around Thanksgiving and were not engaged in substance-
    abuse treatment and had not been consistently compliant with taking drug
    screens.
    [20]   The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on the TPR Petition on January
    15, 17, and 24, 2019. According to Child’s Maternal Grandfather, Parents had
    used drugs on and off since August of 2012. Other evidence admitted at the
    hearing indicated that, from June of 2016 to April of 2018, Father tested
    negative on eleven drug screens but tested positive on thirty-one screens for
    methamphetamine, amphetamine, THC, heroin, morphine, fentanyl, or
    combinations of these drugs. Mother’s drug screens from June of 2016 to April
    of 2018 indicate that she tested negative on forty-six screens but tested positive
    for morphine, acetylmorphine, heroin, amphetamine, methamphetamine, or
    combinations of these drugs on seven occasions. Parents also had a history of
    missing drug screens despite being told that missed screens were to be
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 9 of 22
    considered positive. In the later stages of this case, Mother missed eighteen
    screens from May to December of 2018, while Father missed twenty.
    [21]   FCM Junkersfeld testified that Parents’ compliance with services had been
    sporadic and that he had referred Father to several substance-abuse
    assessments, home-based case management, mental-health counseling, drug
    screens, and residential treatment to address Father’s substance abuse issues.
    FCM Junkersfeld had referred Mother for random drug screens, home-based
    case management, and substance-abuse assessments. As it happened, the only
    service Father completed during FCM Junkersfeld’s tenure was mental-health
    counseling for his grief after a sibling’s death. FCM Brewer testified that while
    Parents partially complied with services, they relapsed, after which they did not
    fully engage in services.
    [22]   The juvenile court also heard evidence regarding Child’s situation since
    removal. Child has been placed with her Maternal Grandfather and his wife
    since her removal on June 18, 2016, and they provide Child with a safe and
    stable home for Child that is free from substance abuse. Child participated in
    family therapy because she “wanted to know more about why she was involved
    with DCS.” Tr. Vol. II p. 172. Child knew that Parents had left over the
    summer for three weeks and that Father “needed to go to jail or something to
    that regard” and “she wanted clarity about those things.” Tr. Vol. II p. 172.
    Father, however, encouraged Child to not participate, and eventually the
    therapy ceased. Maternal Grandfather agreed that the whole process has been
    stressful for Child.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 10 of 22
    [23]   FCM Junkersfeld testified that adoption was in Child’s best interests based on
    the “overall timeline” for how long Child had been in care and Parents’
    response to services. Tr. Vol. II p. 58. FCM Brewer testified that the
    permanency plan never changed back to reunification because of Parents’
    substance abuse throughout the case. Parents had only been able to maintain
    sobriety for about three to six months when they were fully engaged in services,
    but they had not engaged sufficiently to obtain long-term sobriety. As a result,
    Parents were not able to provide care for Child. FCM Brewer opined that
    Parents had not remedied the conditions that led to Child’s removal or the
    reasons for placement outside their home, that Parents’ continued relationship
    between themselves and Child posed a threat to Child’s well-being due to the
    ongoing substance abuse, and that termination was in Child’s best interests
    because of Parents’ ongoing substance abuse and lack of participation in
    services.
    [24]   GAL Suzanne Conger was appointed in the 2013 CHINS case, the underlying
    CHINS case, and the termination case. GAL Conger testified that Child had
    been involved in two CHINS cases, that Parents had not achieved long-term
    sobriety, and that “I don’t think children need to be a roller coaster with their
    parents. Children need stability. They need consistency. And, they need a
    drug free environment.” Tr. Vol. III p. 137. GAL Conger noted that Child had
    had stability in her life only because she had been placed with Maternal
    Grandfather and opined that termination was in Child’s best interests.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 11 of 22
    [25]   DCS’s plan for the care and treatment of Child is adoption by Maternal
    Grandfather and his wife, who are willing to adopt. Maternal Grandfather
    testified that he did not intend to “cut [Child] off” from Parents. Tr. Vol. II p.
    189. When asked if he intended to let Parents still see Child, Maternal
    Grandfather also testified, “See her most definitely. That’s Mom and Dad. It
    always will be. Are they gonna take her out for ice cream for a while. No, sir.”
    Tr. Vol. II p. 190.
    [26]   On June 5, 2019, the juvenile court granted DCS’s TPR Petition in an order
    that provides, in part, as follows:
    1.       DCS has proved by clear and convincing evidence that
    there is reasonable probability the conditions that resulted
    in removal of the child from the home or the reasons for
    continued placement outside the home will not be
    remedied. Neither parent has demonstrated the ability or
    willingness to make lasting changes from past behaviors.
    There is no reasonable probability that either parent will be
    able to maintain sobriety and stability in order to care and
    provide adequately for the child.
    2.       DCS has proved by clear and convincing evidence that
    continuation of the parent–child relationships poses a
    threat to the well-being of the child. The child needs
    stability in life. The child needs parents with whom the
    child can form a permanent and lasting bond to provide
    for the child’s emotional and psychological as well as
    physical well-being. The child’s well-being would be
    threatened by keeping the child in parent–child
    relationships with either parent whose own choices and
    actions have made them unable to meet the needs of this
    child.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 12 of 22
    3.       DCS has proved by clear and convincing evidence that
    DCS has a satisfactory plan of adoption for the care and
    treatment of this child following termination of parental
    rights. The child can be adopted and there is reason to
    believe an appropriate permanent home has been found for
    this child with maternal grandfather and step
    grandmother.
    4.       DCS has proved by clear and convincing evidence that it is
    in the best interests of [Child] that the parental rights of
    [Parents] be terminated.
    5.       DCS has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
    Child has been removed from the home and in custody of
    relative placement under DCS supervision for at least
    fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months.
    Order pp. 36–37.
    Discussion and Decision
    [27]   The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
    traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v.
    Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 145 (Ind. 2005). Further,
    we acknowledge that the parent–child relationship is “one of the most valued
    relationships of our culture.” 
    Id. However, although
    parental rights are of a
    constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights
    when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents.
    In re T.F., 
    743 N.E.2d 766
    , 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Therefore,
    parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children’s
    interest in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the
    parent–child relationship. 
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 13 of 22
    [28]   In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the
    evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Invol. Term. of Parental
    Rights of S.P.H., 
    806 N.E.2d 874
    , 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider
    the evidence that supports the juvenile court’s decision and reasonable
    inferences drawn therefrom. 
    Id. Where, as
    here, the juvenile court includes
    findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights,
    our standard of review is two-tiered. 
    Id. First, we
    must determine whether the
    evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the
    legal conclusions. 
    Id. In deference
    to the juvenile court’s unique position to
    assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment
    terminating a parent–child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. 
    Id. A finding
    of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn
    therefrom to support it. 
    Id. A judgment
    is clearly erroneous only if the legal
    conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact
    or the conclusions do not support the judgment. 
    Id. [29] Indiana
    Code section 31-35-2-4(b) governs what DCS must allege and establish
    to support the termination of parental rights, namely,
    (A) that […] the following is true:
    (i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least
    six (6) months under a dispositional decree.
    [….]
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 14 of 22
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be
    remedied [or]
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
    of the parent–child relationship poses a threat to the well-
    being of the child.
    […]
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
    the child.
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).1 Parents challenge several of the juvenile court’s
    findings and also contend that insufficient evidence supports its conclusion that
    (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s
    removal or the reasons for placement outside Parents’ home will not be
    remedied and that (2) there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of
    the parent–child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Child.
    I. Challenged Findings of Fact
    [30]   Parents challenge several of the juvenile court’s findings of fact. Our review is
    limited to whether the evidence supports the challenged findings, considering
    the evidence supporting the findings and reasonable inferences drawn
    therefrom. See 
    S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879
    .
    1
    Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(B)(iii), DCS could also satisfy subsection (B) with proof that
    “[t]he child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services[.]” It does not
    appear that this basis was argued by DCS below, and, in any event, the juvenile court made no such finding.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020                 Page 15 of 22
    [31]   Finding of Fact 16 provides, in part, that “Mother admitted that she has an
    untreated substance abuse addiction and will not receive services without DCS
    and Court intervention. Mother further admitted that Mother’s substance use
    impairs her ability to care for the child.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 85.
    Although Parents contend that this finding misleadingly implies that Mother
    has consistently admitted these things, the finding itself clearly indicates that
    Mother’s admissions were made on July 15, 2016.
    [32]   Finding of Fact 35 provides in relevant part that “FCM Junkersfeld tried
    regularly and repeatedly to remedy the parents[’] lack of suitable housing[.]
    [Home-based care work] was an appropriate service to offer the parents due to
    their lack of suitable housing.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 90. Finding of Fact
    181 provides, in relevant part, that “Parents have delayed permanency for Child
    through their own actions, such as taking too long to find stable housing[.]”
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 111. Parents claim that the evidence does not
    support these findings. Parents, however, admitted to FCM Junkersfeld that
    they were “moving place to place[,]” and FCM Junkersfeld was unable to verify
    what their housing situation was. Parents have failed to establish that the
    juvenile court’s finding in this regard was clearly erroneous.
    [33]   Parents also challenge the following findings of fact:
    18.      On August 11, 201[6] [A.A.], the parents’ youngest child
    passed away as a result of injuries she received at the
    hands of her babysitter on or about August 8, 2016. [….]
    36.      […] Both parents missed drug screens while FCM
    Junkersfeld was on the case. [….]
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 16 of 22
    40.      […] Court suspended Father’s parenting time on April 12,
    2018 until Father has four consecutive negative random
    drug screens. Father never satisfied this requirement while
    FCM Junkersfeld supervised the case. [….]
    49.      […] Mother violated the safety plan by allowing Father
    unsupervised contact with child. [….]
    55.      Parents were not cooperating and they were not
    maintaining sobriety. Parents were not completing
    services. [….]
    80.      Parents[’] failure to achieve and maintain sobriety has
    placed child on a roller coaster emotionally. Child needs
    consistency and stability without DCS involvement. [….]
    91.      Parents have failed to cooperate With DCS and failed to
    stay in contact With both FCM[s], failed to provide
    random drug screens and failed to engage in services. [….]
    111. […] Parents have been unable to effectively address their
    addiction to illegal substances in the over thirty (30)
    months the second CHINS Matter has been open. [….]
    127. […] FCM Junkersfeld was never able to verify that Father
    actually worked, i.e., no pay stubs, etc. [….]
    138. Parents had another child, [A.A.], who passed away on
    August 11, 2016 as a result of injuries inflicted upon her by
    a daycare provider. [….]
    146. Although [A.A.]’s passing has been a tremendous burden
    for Parents, Child’s ongoing stability and permanency
    should not remain unresolved indefinitely. [….]
    158. […] After Father was discharged from Tara, Tara staff
    discovered a video of Father and two other men standing
    in a common area and one of the men reached up and
    turned the camera.
    159. […] Before he left Tara, Father was struggling. [….]
    179. […] Parents remain unable to maintain long term
    sobriety[.]
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 17 of 22
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 86, 90, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 101, 104, 105, 106, 108,
    111. Parents do not argue that any of the preceding fourteen findings are
    unsupported by evidence. Parents claim , however, that some of the findings
    imply more than the evidence establishes, that the juvenile court failed to put
    some findings into the proper context, or that some are undercut by contrary
    evidence. These challenges are all variations on the same theme, i.e., that the
    juvenile court failed to weigh the evidence properly. We do not accept Parents’
    invitation to reweigh the evidence.
    II. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)
    [34]   Parents argue that DCS has failed to establish that there is a reasonable
    probability that the reasons for Child’s continued removal would not be
    remedied or that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
    parent–child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Child. Because
    Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, DCS need
    only establish one of these circumstances. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)
    (providing, in part, that DCS must establish that one of the following is true:
    “[t]here is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the
    child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents
    will not be remedied[, or t]here is a reasonable probability that the continuation
    of the parent–child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child[.]”).
    [35]   We choose to address Parents’ contention that DCS failed to establish that there
    is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child’s removal will
    not be remedied. In making such a determination, a juvenile court engages in a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 18 of 22
    two-step inquiry. First, the juvenile court must “ascertain what conditions led
    to their placement and retention in foster care.” K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
    Servs., 
    989 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1231 (Ind. 2013). After identifying these initial
    conditions, the juvenile court must determine whether a reasonable probability
    exists that the conditions justifying a child’s continued “placement outside the
    home will not be remedied.” In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 266 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2004) (citation omitted). The statute focuses not only on the initial reasons for
    removal “but also those bases resulting in continued placement outside the
    home.” In re A.I., 
    825 N.E.2d 798
    , 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. In
    making this second determination, the juvenile court must judge a parent’s
    fitness to care for her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into
    consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re 
    D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 266
    .
    DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it must establish that
    there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior will not change. In re
    B.J., 
    879 N.E.2d 7
    , 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
    [36]   Here, Child was removed because of Parents’ long-standing issues with drug
    use. As for whether this situation is likely to be remedied, there is ample
    evidence to support a conclusion that it would not be. Parents began using
    drugs in August of 2012. In May of 2013, Child was first found to be a CHINS
    after Parents admitted that they had substance-abuse issues and that Father had
    a history of drug-related criminal offenses, including charges pending at the
    time. In June of 2016, Child was again removed from Parents’ care due to their
    drug use and Mother’s recent overdose. Child was again found to be a CHINS
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 19 of 22
    following Parents’ admissions that they had untreated substance-abuse issues
    and would not receive services without court intervention.
    [37]   From June of 2016 to April of 2018, Father tested positive on thirty-one drug
    screens for methamphetamine, amphetamine, THC, heroin, morphine,
    fentanyl, or combinations of these drugs while testing negative on eleven
    screens. Over the same period of time, Mother tested positive for morphine,
    acetylmorphine, heroin, amphetamine, methamphetamine, or combinations of
    these drugs on seven occasions while testing negative on forty-six drug screens.
    On June 11, 2018, Father tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine,
    THC, morphine, and fentanyl and positive for cocaine on December 8 and 15.
    Mother tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and morphine on
    June 11, 2018; amphetamine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl on July 12;
    fentanyl on July 17; and cocaine on November 29. Parents also missed drug
    screens, which the juvenile court made clear were to be considered positive
    results. Mother missed eighteen screens from May to December of 2018, while
    Father missed twenty. In summary, both Parents have a years-long history of
    substance abuse, and both had positive and missed drug screens within
    approximately six weeks of the first termination hearing.
    [38]   Parents have also not taken advantage of the treatment opportunities they have
    been given. On July 30, 2018, Father was admitted to Tara Treatment Center
    for its twenty-one-day residential program. Tara discharged Father with a
    recommendation to complete substance-abuse assessment at the Hamilton
    Center. At around the same time, Mother also completed Tara’s twenty-one-
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 20 of 22
    day residential inpatient program and was discharged with recommendations to
    complete inpatient treatment, individual therapy, and medication management.
    On November 16, 2018, however, the juvenile court found that Mother had
    been discharged from a substance-abuse treatment program at Cummins due to
    her failure to attend and that Father had not completed the recommended
    treatment at Hamilton Center. Father was also discharged from another
    intensive outpatient program on November 14, 2018, due to his failure to
    participate. As mentioned, both parents tested positive for illegal drugs after
    their failures to complete the recommended treatments explained above.
    [39]   By the time of the termination hearing, Parents had an over-six-year history of
    drug abuse, including drug-related criminal charges and convictions for each
    and despite Child’s long-standing removal, with the last verified relapse
    occurring after inpatient-treatment and mere weeks before the termination
    hearing. The number of failed drug screens and no-shows indicate that neither
    Parent has been able to maintain sobriety for long, if at all, since Child’s
    removal, and support an inference that neither was particularly interested in
    trying. The Indiana Supreme Court has made clear that the “purpose of
    terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children.”
    Egly v. Blackford Cty. Dep’t. of Pub. Welfare, 
    592 N.E.2d 1232
    , 1234–35 (Ind.
    1992). The Egly Court also explained that “[a]1though parental rights are of a
    constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights
    when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents.”
    
    Id. at 1234.
    Given the evidence of Parents’ unaddressed substance-abuse
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1520 | January 21, 2020   Page 21 of 22
    problems (whether they are unable to address them or merely unwilling), the
    juvenile court did not err in finding that there was a reasonable probability that
    the conditions that had led to Child’s removal would not be remedied.2
    [40]   The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    2
    Because of our disposition of this claim, we need not address Parents’ claim that DCS failed to establish
    that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent–child relationship poses a threat to
    the well-being of Child.
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