Golby Desroches v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                              FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                   Jan 23 2020, 9:17 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                       CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Noah T. Williams                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Monroe County Public                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Defender’s Office
    Lauren A. Jacobsen
    Bloomington, Indiana                                     Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Golby Desroches,                                         January 23, 2020
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-1919
    v.                                               Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Valeri Haughton,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    53C02-1705-F3-513
    Baker, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1919 | January 23, 2020                     Page 1 of 11
    [1]   Golby Desroches appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after he
    pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony burglary and Level 6 felony sexual battery,
    arguing that the trial court erred in its sentencing and that the sentence is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Finding no
    error and the sentence not inappropriate, we affirm.
    Facts
    [2]   Desroches and M.M. were in an on-again, off-again sexual relationship until it
    ended sometime in 2017. On May 7, 2017, Desroches and M.M. were spending
    time at a bar in Bloomington “drinking . . . and having fun and dancing.” Tr.
    Vol. I p. 29. During this time, Desroches saw M.M. drinking a significant
    amount of alcohol. The two parted ways, and M.M. went home to her
    apartment to sleep. Later that evening, Desroches went to M.M.’s apartment
    uninvited. He first knocked on the door, but no one answered. Desroches then
    opened and climbed through M.M.’s living room window. Once inside,
    Desroches was confronted by M.M.’s roommate, who led Desroches back to
    M.M.’s bedroom after Desroches told her that M.M. had invited him over.
    [3]   Desroches entered M.M.’s bedroom, saw M.M. sleeping, laid down on the bed
    next to her, and removed her clothing. Desroches then slipped his fingers inside
    M.M.’s vagina and fondled her. Thereafter, Desroches put his penis inside her
    vagina and had sexual intercourse with M.M. while she was unconscious. After
    receiving a call on his cell phone, Desroches stopped what he was doing and
    left M.M.’s residence through the front door. M.M. woke up later that day and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1919 | January 23, 2020   Page 2 of 11
    admitted that she “didn’t remember much of what happened the night before.”
    
    Id. at 14.
    However, M.M. did testify that she “felt . . . weird in [her] genital
    area, and [she] felt like something had happened[.]” 
    Id. M.M.’s roommate
    told
    her that Desroches had been at their apartment the night before, so M.M. texted
    Desroches for clarification.
    [4]   Desroches eventually responded to M.M.’s texts and repeatedly denied that he
    had been over at her apartment. M.M. continued to press Desroches on the
    matter until Desroches admitted that he had come over, but that nothing had
    happened. Still uneasy, M.M. went to the hospital, completed a rape kit, and
    discovered that someone had had sexual intercourse with her. After a “couple
    hours,” 
    id. at 17,
    Desroches confessed that he had touched M.M.
    inappropriately. Desroches then contacted a friend and “told him about [the
    inappropriate touching] and he said, if there’s anything he could do, like talk to
    her, since me and her were like near each other, and trusted each other[.]” 
    Id. at 30.
    Desroches gave M.M.’s cell phone number to his friend, who contacted
    M.M. and told her that “[she] shouldn’t go to court.” 
    Id. [5] Soon
    enough, on May 9, 2017, Bloomington Police Department Detective
    Robert Shrake interviewed Desroches, who admitted that he had assaulted
    M.M. without her consent and after she had consumed alcohol. On May 25,
    2017, the State charged Desroches with two counts of Level 3 felony rape and
    one count of Level 4 felony burglary. Shortly thereafter, Desroches absconded.
    Desroches was finally arrested on January 26, 2019.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1919 | January 23, 2020   Page 3 of 11
    [6]   On July 16, 2019, Desroches entered into an open plea agreement, pursuant to
    which he would agree to plead guilty to Level 4 felony burglary and a new
    charge of Level 6 felony sexual battery in exchange for dismissal of the other
    charges, including those from an unrelated cause number. That same day, the
    trial court sentenced Desroches to an aggregate term of eight years, with six
    years to be executed in the Department of Correction (DOC) and two years
    suspended to probation. Desroches now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Sentencing Statement
    [7]   First, Desroches argues that the trial court’s sentencing statement is inadequate
    because it failed to cite evidence in support of its use of certain aggravators and
    it omitted several mitigators allegedly supported by the record.
    [8]   Sentencing decisions are left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Smallwood
    v. State, 
    773 N.E.2d 259
    , 263 (Ind. 2002). We will reverse a sentencing decision
    regarding certain aggravating and/or mitigating factors only if the decision is
    clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial
    court and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
    .
    [9]   “[T]rial courts are required to enter sentencing statements whenever imposing a
    sentence for a felony offense.” Gleason v. State, 
    965 N.E.2d 702
    , 710 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2012). “The statement must include a reasonably detailed recitation of the
    trial court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” 
    Id. “In reviewing
    a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1919 | January 23, 2020   Page 4 of 11
    sentencing decision . . . we are not limited to the written sentencing statement
    but may consider the trial court’s comments in the transcript of the sentencing
    proceedings.” Corbett v. State, 
    764 N.E.2d 622
    , 631 (Ind. 2002). Though the trial
    court’s written sentencing order does not list the aggravators and mitigators, the
    trial court stated them in its oral sentencing statement, in pertinent part, as
    follows:
    Mr. Desroches, um, while I think its [sic], I supposed, a good
    thing that there are no other convictions, I believe that you took
    advantage of the situation. You went in through a window. The
    reason you interacted with [M.M.’s] roommate wasn’t because
    you sought her out, or asked if anything was okay, was [amiss],
    you ran into her. Not physically, but you know you encountered
    her, kind of by happenstance. You went in through a window, I
    quite frankly do not believe that you thought that something was
    wrong. I just don’t believe that. I think that you went in through a
    window because nobody answered the door and you decided that
    this was something that you wanted to do. And, since you knew
    she had been drinking, and was very likely intoxicated, um, she
    was at best, and I think you kind of indicated, groggy and unaware
    of what was going on. I’m further not convinced that, I think that
    you know, Mr. Williams said that you weren’t, you were not
    much of a criminal, which may be true, on the other hand, you
    knew that you had done something wrong, you said you didn’t
    realize you’d done anything wrong, but I don’t believe that
    because, you initially denied it. You denied it to her, when she
    asked you about it. You denied that anything had happened.
    Ultimately, the facts proved that something had happened, and
    because of that, you were kind of confronted with fessing up, I
    suppose to what had, you had actually done. I think the idea that
    taking advantage of someone that you trusted, that you had [at]
    least some relationship with, is a pretty horrible betrayal of trust.
    Now what you did, that’s a violation that is traumatizing,
    troubling, um, and not something that I can easily dismiss with a
    basically a symbolic slap on the wrist. I just can’t do that. Um, I
    think it’s a very serious crime, quite frankly and the fact that you
    went through a window to commit it, made sound like not a big
    deal to some people, but it sounds like a very big deal to me. . . .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1919 | January 23, 2020   Page 5 of 11
    ***
    Um, I think I probably need to say for the record, that because this
    is, although you won’t be serving that as an executed portion of
    the sentence, I mean I’m only sentencing him to serve as an
    executed part the advisory, . . . but because the Court did take
    judicial notice of the probable cause in the other, in the other case .
    . . I felt that that was an aggravator and I also, um, well I guess I’ll
    say, just that, although, I, I would have initially been inclined to
    perhaps sentence him to more, but I did, believe it or not, take into
    account the mitigators, so for that reason, that’s the basis for the
    Court’s sentence. And I feel I should say that on the record, so
    that everybody is clear on that.
    Tr. Vol. I p. 36-37; 41.
    [10]   The crux of Desroches’s argument is that the trial court failed to cite evidence in
    support of certain aggravators (the nature of Desroches’s criminal actions, a
    previous probable cause affidavit, and Desroches’s betrayal of M.M.’s trust) and
    failed to take into account mitigators that Desroches claimed were apparent
    from the record (Desroches’s cooperation with authorities and willingness to
    plead guilty, his lack of any prior criminal conviction, and the presentence
    investigation report showing that Desroches would benefit from probation
    rather than incarceration).
    [11]   The record is replete with evidence to support the trial court’s aforementioned
    sentencing statement. Though the trial court did not explicitly state the
    aggravators and mitigators in a written sentencing order, the trial court was
    clear in its oral sentencing statement so that all parties understood how it would
    render Desroches’s final sentence.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1919 | January 23, 2020   Page 6 of 11
    [12]   There is evidence to show that Desroches did betray M.M., there was a prior
    criminal charge levied against Desroches, and the particular nature and
    circumstances of this crime were appalling. In its sentencing statement, the trial
    court admonished Desroches for his heinous acts, for having engaged in
    criminal behavior in the past, and for having taken advantage of his relationship
    with M.M. While Desroches claims that he only seeks clarity from the trial
    court’s sentencing statement, this strategy is nothing more than an attempt to
    have us reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. See Echols v. State, 
    722 N.E.2d 805
    , 808 (Ind. 2000) (reiterating that “sentencing decisions lie within
    the discretion of the trial court,” which include the trial court’s use or non-use
    of aggravators and mitigators).
    [13]   Further, the trial court was under no obligation to give weight to the mitigators
    or the evidence supporting the mitigators as proffered by Desroches. See
    Newsome v. State, 
    797 N.E.2d 293
    , 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that “[a]
    sentencing court need not agree with the defendant as to the weight or value to
    be given to proffered mitigating facts[]”); see also 
    Echols, 722 N.E.2d at 808
    (concluding that “a trial court [is not] required to find mitigating circumstances
    where there are none[.]”).
    [14]   Though Desroches believes that his willingness to plead guilty and his
    cooperation with law enforcement were significantly mitigating, the trial court
    clearly did not agree. And based on the record, the trial court did not err in
    reaching that determination. First, a trial court need not give excessive weight
    to a criminal defendant’s willingness to plead guilty, especially when he
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1919 | January 23, 2020   Page 7 of 11
    receives a substantial benefit by doing so. See Sanchez v. State, 
    891 N.E.2d 174
    ,
    176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); see also Roney v. State, 
    872 N.E.2d 192
    , 206 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2007). Here, Desroches had three major felony charges dropped in
    exchange for pleading guilty and will serve only six years in the DOC.
    Moreover, the record does not show that Desroches fully complied with law
    enforcement. Immediately following his interview with Detective Shrake,
    Desroches absconded and was not arrested until nearly two years after the State
    charged him with multiple felonies. The trial court decided to not weigh those
    factors as mitigators, and we find that the trial court did not err in that respect.
    [15]   Additionally, the trial court simply did not give much weight to the fact that
    Desroches has no prior criminal convictions and the fact that the presentence
    investigation report shows that Desroches would benefit from probation rather
    than incarceration. This was mainly because the trial court believed that the
    severity of Desroches’s criminal actions outweighed any possible mitigating
    factor. Likewise, we will not second-guess the trial court’s decision.
    [16]   Thus, in looking at the trial court’s sentencing statement and the record as a
    whole, we find that the trial court was not vague in its sentencing statement and
    that it did not err in finding—or not finding—certain aggravators and mitigators
    when rendering Desroches’s sentence.
    II. Appropriateness
    [17]   Next, Desroches argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1919 | January 23, 2020   Page 8 of 11
    [18]   Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) states that a “Court may revise a sentence . . . if,
    after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the
    sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character
    of the offender.” The question is not whether another sentence is more
    appropriate, but whether the defendant’s specific sentence is inappropriate.
    Steinberg v. State, 
    941 N.E.2d 515
    , 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In determining
    whether the sentence is inappropriate, we will consider numerous factors such
    as culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to
    others, and a “myriad [of] other factors that come to light in a given case.”
    Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1224 (Ind. 2008). The defendant bears the
    burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind. 2006).
    [19]   For a Level 4 felony offense, the maximum sentence is twelve years, and the
    minimum sentence is two years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. The advisory sentence
    is six years. 
    Id. For a
    Level 6 felony offense, the maximum sentence is two and
    one-half years, and the minimum sentence is six months. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b).
    The advisory sentence is one year. 
    Id. Here, the
    trial court imposed an
    aggregate term of eight years, with six years to be executed in the DOC and two
    years suspended to probation.
    [20]   First, as to the nature of the offenses, Desroches entered M.M.’s residence
    without any invitation or consent to do so. After no one answered Desroches’s
    knocks at the door, he entered the residence through a living room window—a
    felony in and of itself—and lied to M.M.’s roommate just to get access to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1919 | January 23, 2020   Page 9 of 11
    M.M.’s bedroom. In other words, Desroches manipulated the situation so that
    he could take advantage of M.M. And to that point, Desroches was fully aware
    that M.M. had consumed a significant amount of alcohol and that she would be
    more intoxicated than usual. With this knowledge, Desroches fondled M.M.
    and had unprotected sex with her. And before M.M. awoke, Desroches left her
    bedroom and escaped through the front door. These actions are tantamount to
    a betrayal of M.M.’s and M.M’s roommate’s trust all for the purpose of sexual
    gratification. What Desroches did was, in blunt terms, abhorrent and
    psychologically traumatizing. Therefore, we find that the nature of the offenses
    does not render Desroches’s sentence inappropriate.
    [21]   Next, as to his character, Desroches has displayed a pattern of deceitful
    behavior. After being confronted by M.M. with questions about what happened
    that evening, Desroches lied and said that he did not know what M.M. was
    talking about. Eventually, Desroches admitted that he was at M.M.’s
    apartment, but insisted that nothing happened. Then, only after M.M. had
    completed a rape kit did Desroches admit that he had touched her
    inappropriately. However, Desroches decided to enlist the help of a friend who
    contacted M.M. to convince her that she should not go to the police with this
    information. Moreover, it took the Bloomington Police Department nearly two
    years before they could find and arrest Desroches, who had absconded after he
    voluntarily told Detective Shrake what had occurred.
    [22]   Though Desroches claims that he willingly cooperated with the police
    investigation and told officers everything he knew, it is not apparent that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1919 | January 23, 2020   Page 10 of 11
    Desroches has fully owned up to his actions or learned the error of his ways.
    Therefore, we find that Desroches’s character does not render his sentence
    inappropriate.
    [23]   In sum, we will not revise Desroches’s sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate
    Rule 7(B).
    [24]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1919 | January 23, 2020   Page 11 of 11