In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of H.M. and S.B. (Minor Children) W.C. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 24 2020, 9:14 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Roberta L. Renbarger Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination January 24, 2020
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of H.M. and S.B. (Minor 19A-JT-1607
Children); Appeal from the Allen Superior
W.C. (Mother), Court
The Honorable Charles F. Pratt,
Appellant-Respondent,
Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
02D08-1809-JT-335
Indiana Department of Child 02D08-1809-JT-336
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1607 | January 24, 2020 Page 1 of 12
Statement of the Case
[1] W.C. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights
over her two minor children, H.M. and S.B. (“the Children”). 1 Mother raises
two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:
1. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded
that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal
from Mother’s care were unlikely to be remedied. 2
2. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that the
termination of Mother’s parental rights over the Children
was in the Children’s best interests.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On September 27, 2018, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights over the Children. The trial
court held a fact-finding hearing on the DCS’s petitions, after which it entered
1
Each child’s father has separately appealed the termination of his own parental rights. Although our
motions panel denied a request to consolidate the three appeals, the appeals were assigned to the same
writing panel, and we have decided each appeal on the same date.
2
Mother mistakenly characterizes this issue as whether the trial court erroneously found that the
continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to the well-being of the Children. The trial court
entered no such finding, and the substance of Mother’s argument on this issue makes clear that she intended
to challenge the finding the court did enter, namely, that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s
removal were unlikely to be remedied. Accordingly, that is the issue we address.
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the following undisputed facts with respect to Mother’s relationship with the
Children:
5. . . . [T]here was a physical altercation between the Mother
and a man on or about July 12, 2016. The incident of domestic
violence occurred in the presence of the [C]hildren and [one of
the Children] was struck. On or about August 16, 2016, another
incident of domestic violence took place in the presence of the
[child who had been struck]. The Mother was arrested for
domestic battery. The Mother tested positive for cocaine on or
about November 11, 2016. The father of the [struck child] tested
positive for cocaine as well. . . .
* * *
8. A Dispositional Hearing [in the ensuing child-in-need-of-
services (“CHINS”) case] was held on October 25, 2017[,] as to
[M]other. The [Children 3 were] continued in licensed foster care.
The Dispositional Decree incorporated a Parent Participation
Plan that required her to [comply with fifteen different
requirements].
9. The Mother was granted supervised visitation with [each
of the Children]. . . .
10. A Review Hearing was held on February 8, 2017. The
Court found that the Mother failed to secure a psychiatric
evaluation and was not participating in therapy. . . .
3
The court entered one order for each of the Children. At least with respect to Mother, the orders are
substantially similar, and for ease of readability we have substituted an order’s use of the singular “child”
with the plural “Children” where appropriate.
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11. On July 10, 2018[,] a Permanency Hearing was held. The
Court found that the Mother had not demonstrated an ability to
benefit from services . . . .
12. The Mother has tested positive for methamphetamine
during the pendency of the underlying CHINS case. From the
testimony of the toxicologist . . . , the Court finds that the Mother
tested positive for methamphetamine on November 2, 2018,
November 28, 2018, and[] December 18, 2018. She also tested
positive for methamphetamine on January 16, 2019. She tested
positive for cocaine on March 14, 2017, August 3, [2]017[,] and
September 4, 2018.
13. From the testimony of [DCS] case manager Joshua Meyer,
the [C]ourt finds that the Mother was enrolled in an in-patient
residential rehabilitation program from July 2018 [through]
August 2018. Shortly after her release from that program[,] she
tested positive for cocaine.
14. The Mother was referred for outpatient therapy and home
based services to Park Center, Inc. From the testimony of
[Meyer, t]he Mother did not engage in the services there. The
Mother was then referred for an assessment and services for
substance abuse and home based support to Dockside. That
referral was discontinued due to the Mother’s noncompliance.
Additionally[,] Dockside determined that the level of care the
[M]other required was more than that which they could provide.
15. From the testimony of [Meyer,] the [C]ourt finds that the
Mother was first referred for medication management to Park
Center, Inc. She was unsatisfactorily discharged from that
agency and a new referral was made for her to the Bowen Center.
16. [DCS] referred the Mother [for] a drug and alcohol
assessment at C.A.P., Inc. She completed the assessment [i]n
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December[] 2018. The assessment recommended that the
Mother enroll in an “inpatient treatment program with a follow
up in a sober living house[.”] She has not enrolled in an
inpatient program.
17. The Mother is receiving home based services through
C.A.P., Inc. based on a December 2018 referral from [DCS].
Her home based service provider, Pat Geimer, testified that the
Mother is making an effort in that on or about the week before
the [f]actfinding [hearing], the Mother admitted that she needed
help. Her admission, Ms. Geimer testified, is a first step.
18. Ms. Geimer testified that she has provided the Mother
with transportation.
19. At the time of the [f]actfinding [hearing,] the Mother was
living in a motel, . . . having recently moved from another motel
that [Geimer] described as “not a good place[.”] The current
motel residence is not large enough for a family residence.
[Geimer] testified that the motel is in the proximity of “strip
joints” and is in a “rough part of town[.”]
20. The Department has provided referrals to multiple
agencies for the supervision of Mother’s visits with the
[Children]. The Mother asserted that she had transportation
issues with regard to the referral to SCAN, Inc. A second referral
was made to Dockside. Again[,] she asserted that she lacked
transportation but was unsure if she had been provided with bus
passes. A third referral was made to Lifeline and a fourth was
made to Whittington Services.
21. The Mother’s assertions regarding transportation issues are
not entirely supported by the testimony of Lifeline Family
Consultant, Ashley Bienz. From her testimony[,] the Court finds
that[,] on October 1, 2018, the [M]other cancelled explaining she
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had car trouble. However, on the third scheduled visit in
November the Mother called and advised she was in
Indianapolis. The Mother advised she would be present for the
next scheduled visits. However, the Mother texted the agency
and advised that she was again in Indianapolis . . . . Similarly,
the Court finds from the testimony of Bruno Taylor of
Whittington that[,] between November 2018[] and January 16,
2019, the Mother cancelled her scheduled visits with the
[Children].
22. The Mother visited the [Children] one time in July 2018[]
and one time in November 2018. She has not seen the [Children]
since.
* * *
29. The [Children have] been placed outside the home under a
dispositional decree for more than six (6) months.
30. From the testimony [of] Tracy Kearns, the [Children’s]
licensed foster care provider, the Court finds that [H.M.] was
suffering from nightmares and anxiety when . . . first placed into
her care in August 2016 [and S.B. had multiple screaming temper
tantrums each day]. Since then[, H.M.’s] nightmares have
decreased and he is less anxious [and S.B. is no longer displaying
the extreme behaviors].
31. [H.M.’s] issues and progress in foster care are supported by
the testimony of Whittington Homes and Services[] therapist[]
Annette Cook. Therapist Cook provides therapy for [H.M.] She
is addressing his anxiety and coping mechanisms. She testified
that [H.M.] is stable in his foster home. . . .
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32. [H.M.’s] therapist also testified that the child exhibits
Attention [D]eficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) symptoms
and is “very order oriented” and requires consistency.
33. Should parental rights be terminated[,] [DCS] has an
appropriate plan, that being adoption. The [Children are] in a
potential pre-adoptive home.
34. The [Children’s] Guardian ad Litem has concluded that
the [Children’s] best interests are served by the termination of
parental rights. In support of his conclusion[,] he testified that
the parents have not demonstrated . . . continuity of life stability
[sic]. He also cited the Mother’s recent positive drug screens.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 69, 71-74 (H.M.); 76-80 (S.B.) (record citations
omitted).
[4] In light of its findings, the court concluded as follows:
By the clear and convincing evidence[,] the [C]ourt determines
that there is a reasonable probability that [the] reasons that
brought about the [Children’s] placement outside the home will
not be remedied. Shortly after her inpatient treatment in 2018,
[Mother] tested positive for cocaine. The Mother has continued
to use methamphetamine and had a positive test for the illegal
substance on or about January 26, 2019, a few weeks before the
commencement of the [f]actfinding [hearing]. The Mother is
residing in a motel in a neighborhood that is described as being in
a rough part of town and which is inadequate for the care of the
[Children]. She only recently took a “first step” toward
rehabilitation by her admission that she needs help. She has not
visited her [Children] since November 2018. . . .
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Id. at 74 (H.M.); 80-81 (S.B.). The court further concluded that DCS had a
satisfactory plan in place for the care and treatment of the Children and that
termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests.
This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[5] Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights over the
Children. The court’s termination order recites findings of fact and conclusions
thereon following an evidentiary hearing before the court. As our Supreme
Court has explained, in such circumstances
[w]e affirm a trial court’s termination decision unless it is clearly
erroneous; a termination decision is clearly erroneous when the
court’s findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or
when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision.
We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and
we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that
support the court’s judgment.
M.H. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re Ma.H.), 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019)
(citations omitted).
[6] “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not
absolute.” Id. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental
responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45-46. To
terminate parental rights, Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2019) requires
DCS to demonstrate, as relevant here, that “[t]here is a reasonable probability
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that the conditions that resulted in the [Children’s] removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied” and that the
“termination is in the best interests of the [Children].”
Issue One: Whether The Conditions That Resulted
In Removal Will Not Be Remedied
[7] Mother first asserts on appeal that the trial court’s conclusion that the
conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal will not be remedied is
clearly erroneous. In determining whether the conditions that led to a child’s
placement outside the home will not be remedied, a trial court is required to (1)
ascertain what conditions led to the child’s removal or placement and retention
outside the home; and (2) determine whether there is a reasonable probability
that those conditions will not be remedied. R.C. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re
K.T.K.), 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). Here, the trial court found that
DCS had removed the Children from Mother’s care because of incidents of
domestic violence in the presence of the Children while they were in Mother’s
care and also because of Mother’s drug use.
[8] In order to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in removal will not be remedied, the court should assess
a parent’s “fitness” at the time of the termination hearing, taking into
consideration any evidence of changed conditions. E.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). The court must weigh any
improvements the parent has made since removal against the parent’s “habitual
patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of
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future neglect or deprivation.” Id. When making such decisions, courts should
consider evidence of a “parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse,
history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing, and
employment.” Evans v. St. Joseph Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re A.L.H.), 774
N.E.2d 896, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
[9] The evidence demonstrates that Mother continued to test positive for illegal
substances throughout the proceedings before the trial court. Indeed, Mother
tested positive for methamphetamine on four different occasions after DCS had
filed its petitions for the termination of her parental rights. And she tested
positive for cocaine on three occasions during the CHINS proceedings.
[10] Mother also failed to successfully complete recommended services. She did not
engage in the home-based services with Park Center; her referral to Dockside
was discontinued due to her noncompliance; she was unsatisfactorily
discharged from Park Center’s medication management program; and she never
enrolled in a recommended inpatient treatment program. Further, she lacked
adequate housing at the time of the fact-finding hearing, as she had been living
in a motel that was not large enough for a family and was located near several
strip clubs and otherwise in an unsafe area for the Children. Finally, Mother
visited the Children one time following the DCS’s filings on the petitions to
terminate.
[11] The evidence supports the trial court’s findings, and the findings support the
court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
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resulted in the Children’s removal will not be remedied. Mother’s argument on
appeal is simply a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we
cannot do. The trial court did not clearly err when it concluded that there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s
removal or the reasons for placement outside of Mother’s home will not be
remedied.
Issue Two: Children’s Best Interests
[12] Mother next contends that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that
the termination of her parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. In
determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a
child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.S. v.
Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
“A parent’s historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability[,] and
supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a
finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best
interests.” Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an
important consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re A.K.,
924 N.E.2d at 224.
[13] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the
parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re J.S.),
906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a
child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.”
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Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the
family case manager and court-appointed advocate to terminate parental rights,
coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be
remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that
termination is in the child’s best interests. Id.
[14] Here, the Children’s court-appointed special advocate testified that termination
of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests due to her life
instability and continued drug use. Further, the Children’s therapist testified
that each child’s mental health had improved since removal from Mother’s care
and placement in foster care. And, as explained above, the evidence is
sufficient to show that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal
will not be remedied.
[15] Children need consistent and reliable care as well as permanency. The totality
of the evidence, including Mother’s continued substance abuse issues,
instability, and failure to successfully complete recommended services, supports
the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the
Children’s best interests. Mother’s argument on this issue is, again, simply a
request for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. We affirm
the trial court’s termination of her parental rights.
[16] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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