Jason L. Anderson v. State of Indiana ( 2020 )

FILED
Jan 30 2020, 10:29 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Charles W. Lahey Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Caroline G. Templeton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jason L. Anderson, January 30, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2003
v. Appeal from the LaPorte Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael S.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Bergerson, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46D01-0010-CF-124
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Jason L. Anderson appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation.
Anderson raises three issues for our review, which we restate as follows:
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1. Whether Anderson invited any error in the delay in his
sentencing on Count II when, in his plea agreement, he
affirmatively agreed to a delay of up to nearly ten years for
that sentencing.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it relied on the whole
of Anderson’s plea agreement to reject his argument that
he had been twice sentenced on Count I.
3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
the revocation of Anderson’s probation.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In September of 2000, the State charged Anderson with three counts of dealing
in cocaine, two as Class A felonies and one as a Class B felony. In February of
2001, Anderson entered into a written plea agreement with the State regarding
those three charges, which agreement the trial court later accepted. According
to the agreement:
[7(A)]. [Anderson] will ple[a]d guilty under Count I[] to the
lesser included offense of Dealing in Cocaine as [a] Class B
Felony[] and to Count II, Dealing in Cocaine, as charged as a
Class A Felony, respectively;
B. As to Count I, the State will recommend and [Anderson]
will not oppose[] a sentence of ten (10) years incarceration at the
Indiana Department of Correction[], of which ten (10) years will
be suspended and served as follows:
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i. The first five (5) years of the suspended sentence
portion shall be served through the LaPorte County
Community Corrections Work Release Program.
* * *
ii. The second five (5) years of the suspended portion
shall be served . . . under the Court’s Order of
Probation . . . .
* * *
D. As to Count II . . . , [Anderson] specifically waives his
right to be sentenced within thirty (30) days and the cause will be
continued for sentencing . . . as set forth below:
i. If, on March 17, 2011, [Anderson] has complied
with all terms and conditions of Probation and Work
Release, the State will move to dismiss;
ii. However, if[,] at the time of the sentencing hearing,
or anytime before, on motion of the State or Probation, the
Court determines that [Anderson] has violated the
conditions of Work Release or Probation, then the parties
will proceed to argue sentencing alternatives as authorized
by [law] on Count I [sic 1], Dealing Cocaine, as a Class A
felony.
1
As discussed in more detail below, here the plea agreement is of course referring to Count II, not Count I.
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E. The State will dismiss Count III[, dealing in cocaine as a
Class A felony].
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 17-18 (italics removed).
[4] In 2004, while Anderson was serving his probation pursuant to his plea
agreement, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation. Thereafter,
Anderson admitted to violating the terms of his probation. The trial court
revoked Anderson’s probation and ordered him to serve ten years in the
Department of Correction on Count I, the Class B felony, and a concurrent
term of twenty years on Count II, the Class A felony.
[5] In November of 2011, Anderson moved to modify his sentence. The court
granted his motion and ordered him to serve six months in the LaPorte County
Jail followed by work release for eighteen months. Thereafter, if compliant,
Anderson would be permitted to serve “the remainder of [his] term” on
probation. Id. at 24.
[6] In 2017, while Anderson was serving his term of probation pursuant to the
court’s 2011 order, the State filed a second petition to revoke Anderson’s
probation. According to the State’s amended petition, Anderson violated the
conditions of his probation when he committed new offenses of dealing in a
narcotic drug, as a Level 2 felony; dealing in cocaine, as a Level 2 felony; and
dealing in marijuana, as a Level 5 felony. The State also alleged that Anderson
had committed new federal offenses of felony possession of firearms, for which
Anderson had pleaded guilty in a federal district court.
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[7] Anderson moved to dismiss the State’s second petition to revoke his probation.
According to Anderson, his current term of probation was based on paragraph
7(D)(ii) of his plea agreement, that paragraph references “Count I,” Anderson
had already served his sentence on Count I, and, thus, the court was without
jurisdiction to place him on probation pursuant to the plea agreement. After a
fact-finding hearing, the trial court denied Anderson’s motion to dismiss and
found that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation as alleged
by the State. The court then ordered Anderson to serve ten years in the
Department of Correction.
[8] Anderson filed a motion to correct error and alleged, in addition, that the trial
court had lost jurisdiction over him because the original sentencing order,
which accepted the plea agreement, “created an unreasonable delay in
sentencing and the sentence on Count II . . . was, consequently, without
judicial authority and therefore void.” Id. at 45 (underlining removed).
Anderson also renewed his argument from his motion to dismiss. The court
heard argument on Anderson’s motion to correct error, after which it denied his
motion. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Purported Delay in Sentencing
[9] On appeal, Anderson first asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law
when it failed to sentence him on Count II within thirty days of accepting his
plea agreement in 2001. But we will not consider this argument. “[I]nvited
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error typically forecloses appellate review altogether.” Batchelor v. State, 119
N.E.3d 550, 556 (Ind. 2019). “An appellant will not be permitted to take
advantage of errors which he himself committed, or invited or induced the trial
court to commit . . . .” Id. at 557 (quoting Armstrong v. Presslor, 225 Ind. 291,
295, 73 N.E.2d 751, 753 (1947)). “[T]o establish invited error, there must be
some evidence that the error resulted from the appellant’s affirmative actions as
part of a deliberate, ‘well-informed’ trial strategy.” Id. at 558.
[10] The trial court’s delay in sentencing Anderson on Count II resulted from the
plain terms of Anderson’s own plea agreement. The agreement could not be
more clear on precisely this point: “As to Count II . . . , [Anderson] specifically
waives his right to be sentenced within thirty (30) days and the cause will be
continued for sentencing” up to “March 17, 2011.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at
18. Anderson’s complaint on appeal that the trial court erred when it “created a
delay in sentencing for more than ten years” as to Count II simply disregards
the fact that the delay was the product of his own affirmative agreement.
Appellant’s Br. at 10. Any error in the delay was invited by Anderson and is
not available for appellate review.
Issue Two: Whether Anderson Was Twice Sentenced On Count I
[11] Anderson next relies on an obvious typographical error to assert that the court
erred when it placed him on probation. Specifically, Anderson complains
about the italicized language below from his plea agreement:
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D. As to Count II . . . , [Anderson] specifically waives his
right to be sentenced within thirty (30) days and the cause will be
continued for sentencing . . . as set forth below:
i. If, on March 17, 2011, [Anderson] has complied
with all terms and conditions of Probation and Work
Release, the State will move to dismiss;
ii. However, if[,] at the time of the sentencing hearing,
or anytime before, on motion of the State or Probation, the
Court determines that [Anderson] has violated the
conditions of Work Release or Probation, then the parties
will proceed to argue sentencing alternatives as authorized
by [law] on Count I, Dealing Cocaine, as a Class A felony.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 18 (emphasis added). According to Anderson, the
italicized reference to Count I above means that the trial court had no authority
to either sentence him to probation on Count II, because that is not what is
written, or on Count I, in that, by that time, Anderson had served his sentence
on Count I. In effect, Anderson continues, his placement on probation
sentences him twice on Count I.
[12] We interpret plea agreements de novo. State v. Smith, 71 N.E.3d 368, 370 (Ind.
2017). Our ultimate goal is to determine the intent of the parties at the time
they made the agreement. Id. We consider the agreement as a whole in
determining its meaning. Care Grp. Heart Hosp., LLC v. Sawyer, 93 N.E.3d 745,
752 (Ind. 2018).
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[13] Anderson’s argument on this issue is that “Count I, Dealing Cocaine, as a Class
A felony” in paragraph 7(D)(ii) of his plea agreement speaks for itself. We
agree that it does speak for itself—as an obvious typographical error. In the
plea agreement, Anderson pleaded guilty to “Count I, . . . Dealing Cocaine as a
Class B felony, and to Count II, Dealing in Cocaine, as charged as a Class A
Felony . . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 17 (italics removed). That is, the only
Class A felony he pleaded guilty to was charged under Count II, as made clear
by paragraph 7(A) of his plea agreement. The plea agreement then, in
paragraph 7(B), disposes of his sentence “[a]s to Count I.” Id. (italics removed).
[14] Having disposed of that sentence, in paragraph 7(D) the agreement then
proceeds to explain how the delayed sentencing “[a]s to Count II” will proceed.
Id. at 18 (italics removed). In particular, that paragraph states that Anderson’s
“sentencing” for “Count II” will be “as set forth below,” and subparagraphs (i)
and (ii) then follow. Id. (italics removed). Those two subparagraphs operate to
say, in effect, that, if Anderson were to successfully complete his suspended
sentence on Count I, the State would move to dismiss Count II. “However,” if
Anderson did not successfully complete the suspended sentence on Count I,
“the parties [would] proceed to argue sentencing alternatives as authorized by
[law] on Count I [sic], Dealing Cocaine, as a Class A Felony.” Id.
[15] The last reference to “Count I” does not make any sense if read literally, as
Anderson urges us to do. The reference is clearly intended to be to “Count II”
based on the structure of the agreement, the whole of the text, and the
immediately subsequent reference to a Class A felony. And, again, our goal in
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the interpretation of an agreement is to give effect to the intent of the parties
based on the agreement as a whole. Accordingly, we reject Anderson’s
argument on this issue.
Issue Three: Sufficiency of the Evidence
[16] Last, Anderson asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
support the revocation of his probation. 2 A trial court’s decision that a violation
of probation has occurred is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Bennett v.
State, 119 N.E.3d 1057, 1058 (Ind. 2019). An abuse of discretion occurs when
the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court. Id.
[17] The State alleged, among other things, that Anderson had violated the
conditions of his probation when he committed new offenses. But, according to
Anderson, the State failed to prove the date of any such offenses. Therefore, he
continues, the State failed to prove that the alleged new offenses occurred
“during the probationary period,” as necessary to establish those offenses as the
grounds for revoking his probation. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3 (a)(1) (2019).
[18] Anderson’s probation officer, Lyn Swanson, testified at the probation
revocation hearing. According to Swanson, Anderson reported to probation on
November 27, 2012, and his scheduled release date from probation was
2
Insofar as Anderson’s argument on this issue is dependent on our agreeing with him on Issue Two,
Anderson’s argument fails just as his argument on Issue Two fails.
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February 5, 2019. A condition of Anderson’s probation was that he not
commit new offenses. In its second petition to revoke Anderson’s probation,
the State alleged that he had committed new state-level offenses consisting of
two Level 2 drug offenses and one Level 5 drug offense. The State further
alleged that Anderson had also committed new federal firearms offenses.
Neither the probable cause affidavits nor informations for any of the new
offenses are included in the record on appeal.
[19] Swanson testified that, during that probationary period, Anderson was arrested
on March 24, 2017, by the Michigan City Police Department on the three
alleged drug offenses. However, Swanson did not testify as to when any of
those three offenses were alleged to have occurred. Further, there is no
limitations period for bringing Level 2 felony charges, and a Level 5 felony
charge generally must be brought within five years of the commission of the
offense. I.C. § 35-41-4-2. Thus, it is possible that each of those three offenses
occurred prior to the commencement of Anderson’s probation in November of
2012, while Anderson was on work release.
[20] In the trial court, the State appears to have assumed that evidence of
Anderson’s date of arrest was equivalent to the dates of the alleged offenses.
But the two are not equivalent. Here, the dates of alleged offenses control, and
a date of arrest, without more, is not sufficient to show that the new offenses
were committed during the probationary period.
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[21] Nonetheless, the State admitted into evidence, without objection, certified
documents from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana regarding the federal firearms offenses. According to those documents,
“while [Anderson was] a county jail detainee on drug charges”—there is no
dispute that this is a reference to Anderson’s detainment following his March
24, 2017, arrest—officers learned from “a monitored phone call from”
Anderson that he had “three firearms, a large capacity magazine . . . , and drugs
packaged for sale in a locked lock box” in violation of federal law. Ex. Vol. at
15. Anderson was then transferred to the jurisdiction of the federal court,
where he pleaded guilty to federal firearm offenses. The federal court sentenced
Anderson for those offenses on August 2, 2018.
[22] Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence that Anderson committed
the federal firearms offenses during his probationary period. Sometime after
March 24, 2017, and prior to August 2, 2018, Anderson possessed and admitted
to possessing firearms in violation of federal law. As Anderson’s violation of
federal law occurred during his probation, we affirm the trial court’s revocation
of his probation.
[23] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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