Stephanie Schofield v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Jan 31 2020, 8:45 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Darren Bedwell Attorney General of Indiana
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Matthew B. MacKenzie
Appellate Division Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Stephanie Schofield, January 31, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1751
v. Appeal from the
Marion Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. David Hooper, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G12-1804-CM-12845
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Stephanie Schofield (“Schofield”) was convicted in a bench trial of criminal
mischief1 as a Class B misdemeanor and raises one issue, which we restate as
whether there was sufficient evidence to support her conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On December 8, 2017, Pamela Hearn (“Hearn”) returned to her home to find
Schofield sitting in her car in Hearn’s driveway. Tr. Vol. 2 at 11-12. Hearn was
familiar with Schofield because Schofield was dating her son John, and
Schofield and John had two children together. Id. at 9-10. When Hearn
arrived, she observed Schofield as she “jumped in her car and backed out of the
driveway at a high rate of speed.” Id. at 12. As Schofield drove away, she
nearly struck Hearn’s vehicle with her own. Id. at 14.
[4] Hearn pulled up to her home, exited her vehicle, and saw that many items
outside were damaged: windows and a window frame were cracked and
broken; siding was cracked and partially removed; a flower pot was knocked
over; a shepherd’s hook lawn ornament was bent at a forty-five degree angle;
her front door was scratched; and a Christmas wreath was broken. Id. at 16-23.
Next to Hearn’s broken window and damaged front door was a car jack that
did not belong to Hearn. Id. at 22-23.
1
See Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a).
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[5] On April 8, 2018, Schofield was charged with criminal mischief as a Class A
misdemeanor. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 18. The information alleged that
Schofield had damaged the door, window, siding, and lawn ornaments in front
of Hearn’s home. Id.
[6] On June 20, 2018, ten weeks after Schofield was charged, Schofield again came
to Hearn’s house, and the two women talked. Tr. Vol. 2 at 27. Hearn told
Schofield she was not supposed to be at the house and said, “[Y]ou broke my
window.” Id. at 38. Schofield responded, “I’ll pay for that window when John
pays for damages to my house.” Id. at 39.
[7] On May 16, 2019, Schofield was convicted following a bench trial of the lesser-
included offense of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief following a bench
trial. Id. at 70. The trial court imposed a 180-day suspended sentence and
ordered Schofield to pay restitution to Hearn. Id. at 92; Appellant’s App. Vol. II
at 104-05. Schofield now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Schofield contends the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for
criminal mischief as a Class B misdemeanor. She raises two arguments. First,
Schofield admits that Hearn’s property was damaged but argues the evidence
was insufficient to show that she was the person who damaged Hearn’s
property. She discounts Hearn’s testimony that she saw Schofield leaving
Hearn’s property by contending this testimony establishes only that she was
present at the scene of the crime, which, standing alone, is insufficient to
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support an inference of participation in the crime. See Fox v. State, 179 Ind.
App. 267, 274, 384 N.E.2d 1159, 1165 (1979). Second, Schofield claims that
her statement that she would pay for the damage to Hearn’s window was
inadmissible and should not be considered in determining whether the evidence
to support her conviction was sufficient. Relying on Indiana Rule of Evidence
408, Schofield claims this statement was a statement of negotiation or offer to
compromise and was thus inadmissible. See Ind. Evidence Rule 408(a)(2).
[9] When we review the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d
124, 126 (Ind. 2005). Rather, we will affirm a conviction if we find that any
reasonable factfinder could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
when considering all the facts and inferences that favor the conviction. Bailey v.
State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). The evidence need not exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence, but it must support a reasonable inference
of guilt to support the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007).
To prove that Schofield committed criminal mischief as a Class B
misdemeanor, the State was required to show that Schofield recklessly,
knowingly, or intentionally damaged or defaced Hearn’s property without
Hearn’s consent. See Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a).
[10] The evidence was sufficient to support Schofield’s conviction for Class B
misdemeanor criminal mischief because the evidence reasonably supported an
inference that Schofield damaged Hearn’s home and other property. When
Hearn left her home on the morning of December 8, 2017, it was not damaged.
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Tr. Vol. 2 at 20, 21, 23. When Hearn returned home later that day, Schofield
was in Hearn’s driveway, and Hearn’s property was damaged. Id. at 13, 16, 17,
18, 23. A car jack that did not belong to Hearn was found on her property. Id.
at 22. Schofield drove away from Hearn’s residence at a high rate of speed. Id.
at 12, 14. When Hearn later confronted Schofield about Hearn’s broken
window, Schofield said, “I’ll pay for that window when John pays for damages
to my house.” Id. at 39. Viewed most favorably toward the verdict, these facts
support a reasonable inference that Schofield committed Class B misdemeanor
criminal mischief. See Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2015)
(presence at scene in connection with other circumstances that show
participation, and defendant’s conduct before, during, and after the offense may
raise a reasonable inference of guilt).
[11] We reject Schofield’s argument that Hearn’s testimony that Schofield said she
would pay for Hearn’s broken window was inadmissible because it was an offer
of settlement or compromise under Indiana Evidence Rule 408. Schofield
acknowledges that she did not object on this basis in the trial court, so this
argument is waived. See Laird v. State, 103 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App.
2018), trans. denied. Moreover, Schofield’s statement was admissible under
Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(2) as a statement by a party opponent. Finally,
as the State observes, Schofield is entitled to no relief under Indiana Evidence
Rule 408 because her statement was not made “during compromise
negotiations about the claim” with her party opponent, the State of Indiana, but
was instead directed at Hearn, Schofield’s victim.
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[12] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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