In the Matter of the Guardianship of W.S., Protected Person, Steven Strong and Susan Cocquyt v. Mallor Grodner LLP (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 31 2020, 10:04 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Brent E. Inabnit Kendra G. Gjerdingen
Nicholas J. Derda Dustin L. Plummer
Sopko, Nussbaum, Inabnit & Erick T. Gjerdingen
Kaczmarek Mallor Grodner LLP
South Bend, Indiana Bloomington, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the January 31, 2020
Guardianship of W.S., Protected Court of Appeals Case No.
Person, 19A-GU-1428
Steven Strong and Susan Appeal from the
Cocquyt, St. Joseph Probate Court
The Honorable
Appellants-Petitioners,
Jason A. Cichowicz, Judge
v. The Honorable
Barbara J. Johnston, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
Mallor Grodner LLP,
71J01-1709-GU-181
Appellee-Respondent.
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] W.S. was the subject of guardianship proceedings and was represented during
the proceedings by Mallor Grodner LLP (“Mallor Grodner”). As a part of
those proceedings, Mallor Grodner filed a petition for attorney fees to be paid
from Steven Strong and Susan Cocquyt (“the Guardians”), and the Guardians
sought discovery regarding the fee petition by filing a subpoena duces tecum
and deposition notice. The trial court denied both and, after a hearing, granted
Mallor Grodner’s petition for attorney fees. The Guardians appeal and raise
several issues, of which we find the following dispositive: whether the trial
court abused its discretion when it denied the Guardians’ subpoena duces
tecum and request for deposition.
[2] We vacate and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In early 2017, the Guardians, who are two of W.S.’s children, noticed that W.S.
was exhibiting concerning behaviors and spending habits. In August 2017,
W.S. was seen by Dr. Katherine Hanlon (“Dr. Hanlon”), a neurologist, who
determined that W.S. was totally incapacitated and in need of a guardian for
both personal and financial purposes and incapable of consenting to the
appointment of a guardian. Ex. A at 31-32. On September 5, 2017, the
Guardians filed a petition for guardianship over W.S. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at
20. W.S. retained Mallor Grodner to represent him in defending against the
guardianship petition, with Anne Curry (“Curry”) being one of the attorneys
working on the case. Curry sent W.S. to Dr. Martin Farlow (“Dr. Farlow”), a
neurologist, for additional neurological testing. On October 31, 2017, Dr.
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Farlow issued a report, in which the doctor stated his belief that W.S. could not
manage his own finances and needed someone to represent him and manage
his financial affairs. Ex. 3 at 26. On February 28, 2018, Dr. Hanlon signed an
affidavit prepared by Curry, in which Dr. Hanlon stated, “[b]ased upon Dr.
Farlow’s report and conclusions, I agree that [W.S.] is not currently in need of
the appointment of a guardian to make all decisions for him.” Id. at 24
(emphasis added).
[4] On May 1, 2018, Mallor Grodner filed a motion for summary judgment
requesting judgment in W.S.’s favor because there was no evidence supporting
a finding of incapacity. On May 16, 2018, Dr. Farlow was deposed and
testified that, as of the date of his report, it was clear that W.S. could not make
his own financial decisions and that it was also Dr. Farlow’s opinion that W.S.
needed assistance with medical decisions. Tr. Vol. 2 at 112. Dr. Hanlon was
also deposed, and she testified that her opinions in her initial report that W.S.
was totally incapacitated and in need of a guardian had not changed.
Appellants’ Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 216-17. The trial court denied the motion for
summary judgment and proceeded to trial on the guardianship petition. On
August 24, 2018, the trial court issued an order finding W.S. to be incapacitated
and appointing the Guardians to have guardianship over W.S.’s estate and
person. Appellants’ App. Vol. 3 at 29-30.
[5] On September 7, 2018, Mallor Grodner filed a petition for attorney fees,
requesting the trial court to order the Guardians to pay Mallor Grodner’s
invoice for legal fees in the amount of $64,331.10 and to pay legal fees to Jones
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Oberchain, LLP, who acted as local counsel during the guardianship
proceedings, in the amount of $1,737.50. Id. at 33-35. On November 7, 2018,
an additional petition for fees was filed to pay the expenses of Dr. Farlow as the
medical expert in the amount of $1,500.00. Id. at 95-96.
[6] On November 30, 2018, in preparation for the evidentiary hearing on the fee
petition, the Guardians served Curry with a deposition notice seeking to depose
her and a subpoena duces tecum (“the Subpoena”), requesting Curry to
produce documents related to her representation of W.S., including, but not
limited to: retainer agreements; documents reflecting W.S.’s mental capacity;
documents exchanged between Curry and Pam Burnett, W.S.’s fiancée
(“Burnett”); invoices sent from Mallor Grodner to W.S.; documents reflecting
W.S.’s authorization to retain Dr. Farlow to testify at trial; and documents
reflecting settlement communications. Id. at 113. On December 10, 2018,
Mallor Grodner filed a motion for a protective order to deny the requested
deposition and a motion to quash the Subpoena. Id. at 106-09. A hearing was
held regarding these motions, and on March 27, 2019, the trial court granted
the motions, preventing the Guardians from obtaining the requested documents
or deposing Curry prior to the hearing on the fee petitions. Appellants’ App. Vol.
2 at 14.
[7] On April 11, 2019, the Guardians filed a second subpoena duces tecum on
Curry commanding her to appear at the hearing on the fee petition and
requesting her to produce documents related to the petition for fees. Appellants’
App. Vol. 3 at 126. In response, Mallor Grodner filed another motion to quash
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the subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 127. On April 17, 2019, the trial court held
an evidentiary hearing on the fee petition. After taking the matter under
advisement, the trial court issued an order granting Mallor Grodner’s fee
petitions and awarding $64,331.10 to Mallor Grodner, $1,737.50 to Jones
Oberchain, LLP, and $1,500.00 for the expert fees of Dr. Farlow. The
Guardians now appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[8] A trial court has broad discretion in discovery matters, and therefore, our
review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. C&J Real Estate, Inc., 996 N.E.2d 803, 804 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court reaches a conclusion
that is against the logic and natural inferences to be drawn from the facts of the
case. Id. Indiana Trial Rule 26(B)(1), which governs discovery, states in
pertinent part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject-matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party
. . . . It is not ground for objection that the information sought
will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.
“Indiana’s discovery rules are designed to ‘allow a liberal discovery process, the
purposes of which are to provide parties with information essential to litigation
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of the issues, to eliminate surprise, and to promote settlement.’” Waterfield v.
Waterfield, 61 N.E.3d 314, 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Brown v. Katz, 868
N.E.2d 1159, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)), trans. denied.
[9] The Guardians argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted
Mallor Grodner’s motion for protective order and motion to quash the
Subpoena, precluding the Guardians from obtaining the requested documents
and deposing Curry prior to the hearing on the fee petitions. By granting these
motions, the Guardians contend that the trial court prevented them from
adequately presenting a case in opposition to Mallor Grodner’s fee petition.
The Guardians maintain that they had an obligation to conduct due diligence
and obtain information regarding whether the fees incurred were reasonable,
and the trial court’s preclusion of any discovery from Mallor Grodner regarding
the fees wholly prevented the Guardians from gaining the information
necessary to present their case. We agree.
[10] Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 26(C), “for good cause shown” a trial court may
enter an order protecting “a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Under this rule, the burden is
initially on the party seeking the protective order to show “good cause” why
such an order is required to protect it from “annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]” Estate of Lee ex rel. McGarrah v. Lee
& Urbahns Co., 876 N.E.2d 361, 367-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Once a showing
of good cause has been made, the burden shifts to the party seeking discovery of
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protected material to establish that the trial court’s protective order constitutes
an abuse of discretion. Id. at 368.
[11] Here, the Guardians sought to depose Curry and requested that certain
documents related to her representation of W.S. be produced in order to
determine whether Mallor Grodner was entitled to the fees requested in its
petition and whether those fees were reasonable. Appellants’ App. Vol. 3 at 114-
15. In requesting the deposition of Curry, the Guardians had offered to limit
the deposition to ninety minutes, conduct it over the telephone or internet so
that Curry would not have to leave her office, and schedule it at a time
convenient for Curry. Id. at 115; Tr. Vol. 2 at 12. In the motion for protective
order, Mallor Grodner stated that the requested deposition was “designed to
oppress attorney Curry with unnecessary expense” and that the document
request was “unreasonable and oppressive” for the same reasons. Appellants’
App. Vol. 3 at 108. Mallor Grodner asserted that, through their discovery
requests, the Guardians were seeking to relitigate the guardianship and to
improperly claim that Curry had engaged in misconduct. Id. at 107.
[12] It was Mallor Grodner’s burden to show good cause why the protective order
should be granted. Mallor Grodner failed to meet that burden. The Guardians
sought to depose Curry to ascertain whether the requested attorney fees were
reasonable and if Mallor Grodner was actually entitled to the fees. In order to
alleviate any undue burden or expense on Curry in conducting the deposition,
the Guardians offered to keep it brief and conduct it over the phone or internet.
In order to determine if the requested attorney fees were reasonable, the
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Guardians sought to perform their due diligence by deposing Curry, and we
conclude that Mallor Grodner failed to show good cause why a protective order
should have been granted and the Guardians’ request for a deposition should be
denied. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant the protective
order and deny the request to depose Curry. Further, to the extent that the
documents requested by the Guardians are relevant to the ascertainment of
whether the attorney fees are reasonable and are able to be produced under the
rules of discovery, they should have been produced, and it was an abuse of
discretion to deny the Guardians the ability to conduct discovery. We conclude
that the trial court’s order granting the protective order and the motion to quash
should be reversed, and, therefore, the order granting the fee petition is vacated.
We remand to the trial court so further discovery can be conducted.
[13] Vacated and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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