In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of E.S. (Minor Child) and J.H. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                  FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                         Jan 31 2020, 7:43 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                            Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                       and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Amy Karozos                                               Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Robert J. Henke
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In re the Termination of the                              January 31, 2020
    Parent-Child Relationship of                              Court of Appeals Case No.
    E.S. (Minor Child) and                                    19A-JT-1767
    J.H. (Father),                                            Appeal from the Greene Circuit
    Court
    Appellant-Respondent,
    The Honorable Erik C. Allen,
    v.                                                Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    Indiana Department of Child                               28C01-1902-JT-3
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Mathias, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020           Page 1 of 15
    [1]   J.H. (“Father”) appeals the Greene Circuit Court’s order terminating his
    parental rights to his minor child, E.S. He raises two issues, which we restate
    as:
    I. Whether Father was denied due process when the trial court drew a
    negative inference from Father’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment
    privilege against self-incrimination; and,
    II. Whether the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights is
    supported by clear and convincing evidence.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   K.S. (“Mother”) gave birth to E.S. on May 9, 2016. In October 2017, Mother
    and Father were found unconscious in a vehicle and in possession of
    methamphetamine, marijuana, and syringes. One-year-old E.S. was removed
    from Mother’s and Father’s care due to the parents’ pending drug charges and
    on-going substance abuse issues. In addition, Father was in violation of a no-
    contact order obtained by Mother. On October 24, 2017, DCS filed a petition
    alleging that E.S. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). E.S. was placed
    with her maternal great grandparents.
    [4]   The trial court found that E.S. was a CHINS and issued a parental participation
    order. Father was ordered to refrain from alcohol and drug use, participate in
    homebased counseling, complete a substance abuse assessment, submit to
    random drug screens, maintain stable housing and a legal source of income,
    and comply with any no contact orders. Father did not comply with the ordered
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020   Page 2 of 15
    services and failed to appear at three review hearings held on March 19, July 9,
    and October 16, 2018. Father also failed to consistently visit with E.S.
    [5]   On June 7, 2018, Father pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony possession of
    methamphetamine and was ordered to serve eighteen months in the Greene
    County Jail with all but 150 days suspended. After Father was released from
    jail, DCS made a referral for supervised visitation, a substance abuse
    assessment, and treatment at the Hamilton Center. Father missed several
    sessions of his substance abuse program and was required to restart the program
    three times between August 2018 and February 2019. Father also had positive
    drug screens in January and February 2019.
    [6]   Because Father tested positive for methamphetamine and/or THC, on January
    24, 2019, the State filed a petition to revoke his suspended sentence. In March
    2019, Father admitted to the allegations in the petition and agreed to serve 210
    days in a work release program. Father began to participate in DCS-referred
    services while he was serving his sentence in work release.
    [7]   On February 12, 2019, DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s
    and Father’s parental rights to E.S. Fact-finding hearings were held on April 17
    and June 19, 2019. Prior to the hearing, Mother agreed to voluntarily relinquish
    her parental rights to E.S. With regard to Father, the family case manager
    (“FCM”) and court appointed special advocate (“CASA”) agreed that he failed
    to address his substance abuse issues or demonstrate ability to provide a stable
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020   Page 3 of 15
    home for E.S. They also testified that termination of Father’s parental rights
    was in E.S.’s best interests. Tr. pp. 144–45, 171–72.
    [8]   On June 10, 2019, the State filed a petition to revoke Father’s probation
    alleging that Father tested positive for methamphetamine in May 2019. On the
    date of the June 19, 2019 hearing Father was incarcerated as a result of the
    petition to revoke. At the hearing, DCS moved to admit the June 10, 2019
    petition to revoke Father’s suspended sentence. Father objected. The trial court
    admitted the exhibit for the limited purpose of establishing that the State had
    filed a petition to revoke Father’s probation. DCS then called Father as a
    witness. Father invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
    and refused to testify because of the pending criminal case.
    [9]   On July 3, 2019, the trial court issued its order involuntarily terminating
    Father’s parental rights to E.S. finding in pertinent part:
    6. The father testified at the hearing conducted on April 17, 2019,
    but then asserted his 5th Amendment Privilege and did not testify
    when called by DCS at the hearing conducted on June 19, 2019.
    During his testimony the father acknowledged that he had not
    successfully completed his substance abuse program and was not
    aware that he had been required to re-start the group program 3
    times. The father further acknowledged that he had not
    completed the substance abuse program because he is a
    “struggling addict.” As of April 17, 2019, the father admitted that
    he continues to use methamphetamine and marijuana. The father
    testified that he believes the root of his addiction is childhood
    trauma that involved the loss of his mother when he was 14, and
    he has not had counseling or otherwise addressed this childhood
    issue. The father acknowledged that he did not comply with
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020   Page 4 of 15
    services the first 8-9 months of the CHINS case because he felt
    hopeless. More recently the father has attended visits with the
    child and the visits have gone well and without any issues.
    7. Drug screens were admitted that were collected on December
    21, 2018, January 2, 10, 16, 24, and 28, 2019, and February 25,
    2019, and all screens were positive for methamphetamine, and
    several were positive for marijuana as well.
    8. Kent Huber is a therapist with Hamilton Center and a referral
    was made for him to provide services to the father beginning in
    August 2018. Mr. Huber’s services began after the father decided
    to comply with services after being non-compliant the first 8-9
    months of the CHINS case. Mr. Huber’s group program is based
    on the Matrix Program and requires attendance at 2 meetings
    each week for 12 weeks (total of 24 meetings) and a client cannot
    miss more than 3 meetings without having to start over. The
    father was required to start over 3 times due to missing too many
    meetings and never successfully completed Mr. Huber’s program.
    Mr. Huber testified that attendance is paramount to being
    successful in the program. The father had very inconsistent
    attendance at the group meetings and Mr. Huber characterized
    the father’s progress with substance abuse treatment as “fairly
    minimal” until after the first TPR hearing on April 17, 2019.
    After the first TPR hearing on April 17, 2019, the father attended
    15 sessions in a row while he was in the Greene County
    Community Corrections Work Release Program. The father’s
    attendance ended when he was again incarcerated. Mr. Huber
    observed that the father participated well in group when he
    attended, but he has a limited support system and a strong
    support system is important. The father was referred for
    individual therapy at Hamilton Center but only had one session
    due to his work schedule, attending group sessions, and a lack of
    availability of staff at Hamilton Center. Mr. Huber opined that
    the program provided for the father was the appropriate service
    to meet his needs and address his addiction.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020   Page 5 of 15
    9. [Father] was charged . . . with Possession of
    Methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony, Invasion of Privacy, a class
    A misdemeanor, and Possession of Marijuana, a class B
    misdemeanor, and pled guilty to and was convicted of Possession
    of Methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony. In this same case a
    Petition to Revoke Suspended Sentence and an Amended
    Petition to Revoke Suspended Sentence have been filed that
    allege a violation of probation due to multiple positive drug
    screens, and a Negotiated Plea Agreement has been filed but an
    admission hearing had not yet been conducted at the time of the
    TPR hearings.
    10. On June 10, 2019, a new Petition to Revoke Suspended
    Sentence was filed . . . that alleges the father tested positive for
    methamphetamine on drug screens administered on May 24,
    2019 and May 29, 2019. This Petition is the basis for the father
    asserting his 5th Amendment Privilege to not testify and DCS
    requested the Court draw an adverse inference against the father
    for asserting this privilege. The Court does draw an adverse
    inference that the father violated probation due to continued
    substance abuse as alleged in the Petition to Revoke Suspended
    Sentence. This alleged substance abuse is during the period of
    time after the first TPR hearing on April 17, 2019, during which
    the father regularly attended group meetings while in work
    release and claims to be finally serious about rehabilitation.
    11. Sahrayah Blackburn was appointed as the child’s Court
    Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) on or about July 2, 2018.
    The child was born with a heart defect and continues to have
    significant heart issues that require annual check-ups and close
    monitoring during many activities and in many circumstances.
    The CASA has observed the father to display periodic motivation
    in services with a quick lack of follow through. The CASA
    observed that the father’s only sustained participation in services
    was after the first TPR hearing on April 17, 2019, during the time
    that he was in work release and he was in a structured and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020   Page 6 of 15
    monitored environment. However, the father’s sustained
    participation ended when he was re-arrested on the latest
    [petition to revoke] (see paragraph 10 above). During the
    CASA’s involvement the father has not successfully completed
    any services and she testified that he continues to use
    methamphetamine and marijuana. The father has been arrested
    four times during the life of the CHINS case and remains
    incarcerated at the time of the second TPR hearing on June 19,
    2019. The CASA has observed the father to have a consistent
    pattern of short-term sobriety and then return to drug use. The
    CASA acknowledged that there were no concerns noted during
    the father’s visits with the child and that the father and child have
    a bond, but she opined that termination of the parent-child
    relationship is in the best interest of the child. She further opined
    that the child is thriving in a stable and consistent home with the
    maternal grandparents and they are willing to adopt the child.
    The CASA testified that she believes the appropriate services
    have been referred for the father to meet his needs.
    12. Ethan Brown has been the on-going FCM since January 23,
    2019 . . . . FCM Brown has not observed any problems with the
    father interacting with services providers, however, he observed
    that the father was not substantially compliant with substance
    abuse treatment, random drug screens, or visits, during times that
    he was not in jail or work release. Through his involvement in
    the case FCM Brown opined that the father has not made any
    significant progress in addressing the underlying issues of
    substance abuse, transportation, housing, or stability in his life.
    At a case and family team meeting (“CFTM”) on April 25, 2019,
    the father refused to discuss or address an alternative plan if the
    child was in his care and he had a relapse, and the father would
    only say he is not going to use. . . .
    13. The Court finds persuasive the evidence presented by CASA
    and FCM Brown that the father has a history of short term
    sobriety followed by a return to his previous substance abuse, and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020   Page 7 of 15
    that the recent compliance with services after the first TPR
    hearing on April 17, 2019, was a result of being a resident in the
    work release program and having the services scheduled into his
    day. Due to the father’s continued pattern of using
    methamphetamine and marijuana, with short periods of
    compliance and sobriety, that has repeatedly resulted in his
    incarceration up to the current time, it is unlikely that the
    conditions that resulted in the child’s removal will be remedied.
    Appellant’s App. pp. 9–11. The trial court also concluded that termination of
    Father’s parental rights was in E.S.’s best interests.
    [10]   Father now appeals the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating his parental
    rights to E.S.
    Standard of Review
    [11]   Indiana appellate courts have long had a highly deferential standard of review
    in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re D.B., 
    942 N.E.2d 867
    ,
    871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness
    credibility. 
    Id. We consider
    only the evidence and reasonable inferences
    favorable to the trial court’s judgment. 
    Id. In deference
    to the trial court’s
    unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating
    a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. 
    Id. Clear error
    is that
    which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
    made. J.M. v. Marion Cty. Office of Family & Children, 
    802 N.E.2d 40
    , 44 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2004), trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020   Page 8 of 15
    [12]   Father does not challenge any of the trial court’s factual findings as being
    clearly erroneous. We therefore accept the trial court’s findings as true and
    determine only whether these unchallenged findings are sufficient to support
    the judgment. In re A.M., 
    121 N.E.3d 556
    , 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans.
    denied); see also T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    971 N.E.2d 104
    , 110 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2012) (holding that when the trial court’s unchallenged findings support
    termination, there is no error), trans. denied.
    I. Father’s Refusal to Testify
    [13]   During the April 2019 fact-finding hearing, Father testified that he was a drug
    addict and continued to use methamphetamine and marijuana. Tr. pp. 24–25.
    The hearing was continued to June 19, 2019, at which DCS called Father to
    testify. Father asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
    Tr. pp. 126–27. DCS requested “an adverse inference be drawn against [Father]
    for refusing to testify. The adverse inference being that his testimony, if truthful,
    would be harmful to his case in this TPR trial.” Tr. p. 128.
    [14]   In addition, over Father’s objection, the trial court admitted DCS Exhibit 4.1
    which contained the State’s June 10, 2019 Petition to Revoke [Father’s]
    Suspended Sentence. Ex. Vol., Ex. 4.1. The State alleged that Father’s
    suspended sentence should be revoked because Father tested positive for
    methamphetamine on May 24 and May 29, 2019. 
    Id. The trial
    court admitted
    the exhibit for the limited purpose of establishing that the probation revocation
    petition was pending. Tr. p. 131.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020   Page 9 of 15
    [15]   In its finding of facts and conclusions of law, the trial court drew “an adverse
    inference that the father violated probation due to continued substance abuse as
    alleged in the Petition to Revoke Suspended Sentence. This alleged substance
    abuse is during the period of time after the first TPR hearing on April 17, 2019,
    during which the father regularly attended group meetings while in work release
    and claims to be finally serious about rehabilitation.” Appellant’s App. p. 10.
    Father argues that the trial court violated his due process rights when it drew an
    adverse inference from the invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against
    self-incrimination.
    [16]   Our supreme court recently addressed this issue in Matter of Ma.H., 
    134 N.E.3d 41
    , 46–47 (Ind. 2019), where they observed that “in any proceeding—civil or
    criminal—the Fifth Amendment protects an individual from being compelled to
    answer questions when the answers might be used in a future criminal
    proceeding.” 
    Id. at 46
    (citations omitted). Consequently, “in CHINS and TPR
    proceedings, a court may not compel a parent’s admission to a crime—if the
    admission could be used against him or her in a subsequent criminal
    proceeding—under the threat of losing parental rights.” 
    Id. at 46
    –47 (citing
    Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 
    431 U.S. 801
    , 805 (1977) (“[W]hen a State compels
    testimony by threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless the constitutional
    privilege is surrendered, that testimony is obtained in violation of the Fifth
    Amendment[.]”)); In re A.D.L., 
    402 P.3d 1280
    , 1285 (2017) (collecting cases)).
    [17]   However, our supreme court has held that in CHINS and termination
    proceedings, a trial court may “draw a negative inference from a claim of the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020   Page 10 of 15
    Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” In re 
    Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 47
    . Therefore, it was not improper for the court to infer that Father violated
    his probation in May 2019 by using methamphetamine as alleged in the State’s
    petition to revoke his probation. And, as is addressed below, even without
    considering Father’s most recent probation violation, the evidence is more than
    sufficient to support the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights.
    For this reason, we note that even if the trial court had erred by drawing a
    negative inference from Father’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right
    against self-incrimination, the error would be harmless. See Everhart v. Scott Cty.
    Office of Family & Children, 
    779 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans.
    denied.
    II. Clear and Convincing Evidence
    [18]   Father also argues that the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating his
    parental rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Indiana Code
    section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate parental rights must
    allege:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be
    remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
    being of the child.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020   Page 11 of 15
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services;
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
    the child.
    [19]   DCS must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code §
    31-37-14-2; In re G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1261 (Ind. 2009). But because Indiana
    Code subsection 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the trial court is
    required to find that only one prong of subsection 4(b)(2)(B) has been
    established by clear and convincing evidence. In re A.K., 
    924 N.E.2d 212
    , 220
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
    [20]   Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of
    the parent is wholly inadequate for the child’s very survival. Bester v. Lake Cty.
    Office of Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 148 (Ind. 2005). It is instead
    sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child’s emotional
    and physical development are put at risk by the parent’s custody. 
    Id. If the
    court
    finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-
    child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
    [21]   The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents but instead
    to protect their children. In re S.P.H., 
    806 N.E.2d 874
    , 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
    Although parental rights have a constitutional dimension, the law allows for
    their termination when the parties are unable or unwilling to meet their
    responsibilities as parents. 
    Id. Indeed, parental
    interests must be subordinated to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020   Page 12 of 15
    the child’s interests in determining the proper disposition of a petition to
    terminate parental rights. In re 
    G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1259
    .
    [22]   First, Father claims that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that there
    was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in E.S’s removal
    from his care, or the reasons for E.S.’s continued placement outside Father’s
    home, would not be remedied. When considering whether DCS has proven this
    factor by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must determine a
    parent’s fitness to care for the child at the time of the termination hearing while
    also taking into consideration evidence of changed circumstances. A.D.S. v. Ind.
    Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    987 N.E.2d 1150
    , 1156–57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans.
    denied. The trial court may disregard efforts made only shortly before
    termination and give more weight to a parent’s history of conduct prior to those
    efforts. In re K.T.K., 
    989 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1234 (Ind. 2013).
    [23]   Father argues that the evidence is insufficient to support this factor because he
    “had been consistently participating in visitation and substance abuse treatment
    in the weeks leading up to his arrest.”1 Appellant’s Br. at 22. But Father fails to
    1
    Several pleadings, orders, and the chronological case summary in Father’s pending criminal case were
    admitted into evidence at the fact-finding hearings. Ex. Vol., Exs. 4, 4.1. Therefore, we do not think it would
    be inappropriate to take judicial notice of the updated chronological case summary in Father’s pending
    criminal case. See e.g. Matter of D.P., 
    72 N.E.3d 976
    , 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Horton v. State, 
    51 N.E.3d 1154
    , 1161–62 (Ind. 2016) (discussing judicial notice in light of the fact that court records are now more
    readily available due to implementation of the Odyssey case management system)). The petition to revoke
    Father’s probation alleging that he used methamphetamine twice in May 2019 is still pending, and two
    amended petitions to revoke his probation have been filed. The trial court issued a warrant for Father’s arrest
    after the second amended petition to revoke his suspended sentence was filed. Father also failed to appear for
    an evidentiary hearing on August 21, 2019.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020                   Page 13 of 15
    acknowledge his extensive history of drug abuse, criminal convictions, and
    probation violations. He has not demonstrated ability to refrain from substance
    abuse and criminal conduct for any significant duration. Throughout the
    CHINS and termination proceedings, Father was unable to complete substance
    abuse treatment. He also attended only one session of individual therapy during
    these proceedings. Father has been able to maintain sobriety only when he is in
    structured and monitored environment, such as work release. Father’s habitual
    conduct established that he cannot maintain a law-abiding and sober life. For
    all of these reasons, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports
    the trial court’s determination that there is a reasonable probability that the
    conditions that resulted in E.S’s removal from Father’s care, or the reasons for
    E.S.’s continued placement outside his home, would not be remedied.2
    [24]   Father also argues that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that
    termination of his parental rights was in E.S.’s best interests. In determining
    what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court must look beyond the
    factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. 
    A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158
    . In so doing, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the
    parent to those of the child and need not wait until the child is irreversibly
    harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. 
    Id. Moreover, a
    2
    Because Indiana Code subsection 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, we decline to address
    Father’s additional claim that DCS failed to prove that continuation of the parent-child relationship threatens
    E.S.’s well-being. In re 
    A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 220
    .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020                 Page 14 of 15
    recommendation by the case manager or a child advocate is sufficient to show
    by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.
    
    Id. at 1158–59.
    [25]   The family case manager and CASA both testified that terminating Father’s
    parental rights was in E.S.’s best interests. Tr. pp. 144–45, 171–72. Father’s
    continued substance abuse and frequent incarcerations demonstrate that he is
    unable to provide and maintain a stable home for himself, much less an
    adolescent child. E.S. has been in her grandparents’ care throughout these
    proceedings and is thriving in that placement. For all of these reasons, we
    conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding
    that termination of Father’s parental rights is in E.S.’s best interests.
    Conclusion
    [26]   Father has not established that the trial court violated his due process rights by
    drawing an adverse inference from Father’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment
    privilege against self-incrimination. And overwhelming evidence supports the
    trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights to E.S. We therefore affirm
    the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights.
    [27]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1767 | January 31, 2020   Page 15 of 15