Steven E. Ingalls, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                    FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                Apr 07 2020, 8:31 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                 CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                          Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Brian Buckner Baldwin                                     Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Martinsville, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Tiffany A. McCoy
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Steven E. Ingalls, Jr.,                                   April 7, 2020
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee/Defendant,                       Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-950
    v.                                                Appeal from the Morgan Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Brian H. Williams,
    Judge
    Appellee/Cross-Appellant/Plaintiff.
    Trial Court Cause No.
    55D02-1806-CM-1013
    Friedlander, Senior Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-950 | April 7, 2020                  Page 1 of 3
    [1]   On May 24, 2018, Steven Ingalls, Jr., carved his initials and his girlfriend’s first
    initial and last name on the wall of the lockup in the Morgan County
    Courthouse during a recess in his trial on other charges. On June 28, 2018, the
    State charged Ingalls with Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief for his act of
    vandalism. On January 25, 2019, the trial court found Ingalls guilty as charged
    and imposed a thirty-day sentence, all suspended. On January 31, 2019, the
    trial court appointed appellate counsel to Ingalls. On March 4, 2019, Ingalls’s
    appellate counsel entered his appearance and sought leave to file a belated
    motion to correct error, which the trial court granted. On March 25, 2019,
    Ingalls filed a belated motion to correct error, which the trial court denied the
    next day. On April 26, 2019, thirty-one days later, Ingalls filed a notice of
    appeal.
    [2]   Ingalls argues that the trial court committed fundamental error in failing to
    timely advise him of the consequences of failing to timely file a written demand
    for a jury trial and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We
    need not address these claims on their merits, however, as we agree with the
    State that Ingalls forfeited his right to appeal.
    [3]   It is undisputed that Ingalls filed his notice of appeal thirty-one days after the
    trial court’s denial of his motion to correct error, or one day late. Pursuant to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-950 | April 7, 2020   Page 2 of 3
    Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A)(5), “[u]nless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed,
    1
    the right to appeal shall be forfeited except as provided by P.C.R. 2.”
    [4]   It is true that the Indiana Supreme Court has concluded that forfeiture of the
    right to appeal can be forgiven if there are “extraordinarily compelling reasons
    why this forfeited right should be restored.” In re Adoption of O.R., 
    16 N.E.3d 965
    , 971 (Ind. 2014). Ingalls, however, does not explain exactly which
    “extraordinarily compelling” reasons should excuse his untimely filing. Ingalls
    mentions that the fundamental liberty interest at issue in O.R. (the right of
    parents to establish a home and raise their children) was part of the basis for the
    restoration of the biological father’s right to appeal in that adoption case.
    While this is true, no such interest is at stake in this case, as Ingalls’s thirty-day
    sentence was wholly suspended. Ingalls also does not claim that circumstances
    largely beyond his control, whether excusable neglect or something else, caused
    his notice of appeal to be untimely. Based on the record before us, we have a
    late notice of appeal but no apparent extraordinarily compelling reasons that
    would justify restoring Ingalls’s right to appeal. Consequently, we dismiss
    Ingalls’s appeal.
    [5]   Appeal dismissed.
    Najam, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
    1
    Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2(1) allows an eligible defendant to petition the trial court for permission to
    file a belated notice of appeal, which Ingalls did not do.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-950 | April 7, 2020                         Page 3 of 3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-CR-950

Filed Date: 4/7/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/7/2020