Harold Warren v. State of Indiana ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    Apr 08 2020, 8:07 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Cynthia M. Carter                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Law Office of Cynthia M. Carter, LLC                        Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Jesse R. Drum
    Caroline G. Templeton
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Harold Warren,                                              April 8, 2020
    Appellant-Petitioner,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-PC-1604
    v.                                                  Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable Barbara Crawford,
    Appellee-Respondent                                         Judge
    The Honorable Steven Rubick,
    Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause No.
    46G01-1708-PC-28299
    May, Judge.
    [1]   Harold Warren appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for
    postconviction relief. He argues his Sixth Amendment right to effective
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020                           Page 1 of 18
    assistance of counsel was infringed because his trial counsel failed to thoroughly
    investigate and present evidence implicating alternative suspects. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History                             1
    [2]   Jack Dorfman operated a small business on Washington Street in Indianapolis,
    where he would purchase precious metals and cash checks. On January 7,
    1999, a customer visited Dorfman’s shop and found Dorfman lying dead on the
    floor from a gunshot wound. Police investigated the murder and subsequently
    arrested Harold Warren. On January 14, 1999, the State charged Warren with
    murder, 2 felony murder, 3 and Class A felony robbery. 4
    [3]   Warren filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and admission to bail. At the
    hearing on the petition, Steve Jordan, the owner of a printing store located near
    Dorfman’s shop, testified that on the morning of Dorfman’s murder, a black
    pickup truck parked in the parking lot of his printing store. The truck remained
    running and an individual got out of the pickup truck and walked in the
    direction of Dorfman’s shop. 5 The individual had medium-length hair, wore
    1
    We heard oral argument in this case on February 3, 2020, at the University of Southern Indiana in
    Evansville. We commend counsel for their advocacy and thank the University of Southern Indiana’s faculty,
    staff, and students for their attendance.
    2
    Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (1997).
    3
    Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (1997).
    4
    Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (1984).
    5
    Jordan did not testify regarding how many people were in the truck.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020                            Page 2 of 18
    blue jeans with a leather jacket, and was “maybe five ten, somewhere in that
    neighborhood, dark hair, clean shaven, not very heavy, not real slender, just
    medium build.” (Ex. AAA at 16.) When asked if the individual Jordan
    described matched Warren’s appearance, Jordan answered, “Probably not.”
    (Id. at 17.) Dana Roberson also testified at the hearing. She gave an
    incomplete report of her criminal history and confirmed that she had dated
    Larry Warren (“Larry”), Harold Warren’s brother. She denied seeing Warren
    on the day of Dorfman’s murder. After Roberson’s brief background
    testimony, the court implored Warren’s counsel, Carl L. Epstein, to “get to the
    point” and Epstein ceased his examination. (Ex. BBB at 41.) The court denied
    Warren’s petition for bail.
    [4]   The court held a jury trial from February 7 through February 9, 2000. Epstein
    did not subpoena either Larry or Roberson to testify at the trial. The jury
    returned a verdict of guilty on all counts, and the court entered judgments of
    conviction for murder and Class B felony robbery, 6 which is a lesser-included
    offense of the Class A felony robbery charged. The court sentenced Warren to
    consecutive terms of sixty-five years for murder and twenty years for robbery,
    for an aggregate executed term of eighty-five years in the Indiana Department
    of Correction.
    6
    Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (1984).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020       Page 3 of 18
    [5]   On direct appeal, our Indiana Supreme Court 7 summarized the evidence
    presented to the jury during Warren’s trial:
    [T]he victim, Jack Dorfman, the proprietor of a small
    Indianapolis store that purchased and sold jewelry and precious
    metals and cashed checks, was killed by a single .22 caliber
    gunshot wound to the head, probably fired from a revolver.
    Three days after the murder, Paul Fancher had purchased a .22
    caliber revolver from the defendant’s brother, Ron Warren, who
    had obtained it from one of his brothers. After learning that the
    defendant had been arrested for the murder, Fancher turned the
    gun over to police. On the day before the murder, the defendant
    had been in Dorfman’s store to sell some rings. After Dorfman
    declined and directed that the defendant be escorted out of the
    shop, the defendant told him: “I’ll be back.” The defendant
    admitted to police that he was in Dorfman’s store on the day of
    the murder. After the murder, the defendant’s fingerprints were
    discovered on a pawn ticket found on the counter of the shop,
    and yet the defendant told police that he never could have left his
    thumbprint on a pawn card because he had never pawned
    anything. On the day of the murder, the defendant used
    Dorfman’s credit cards at a liquor store, a Meijer store, a K-Mart
    store, and a Radio Shack store.
    Warren v. State, 
    757 N.E.2d 995
    , 999 (Ind. 2001). The Supreme Court affirmed
    Warren’s convictions.
    Id. at 1001.
    [6]   Warren filed a petition for postconviction relief on July 13, 2017. The petition
    alleged Warren’s trial counsel, Epstein, provided constitutionally ineffective
    7
    At the time, the appellate rules allowed for a direct appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court because Warren
    was sentenced to a term of greater than fifty years for a single offense. See Ind. Appellate Rule 4(A)(7)
    (1999).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020                               Page 4 of 18
    assistance because he “failed to present crucial defense evidence, failed to hire
    or consult expert witnesses, and failed to interview and subpoena key defense
    witnesses.” (App. Vol. II at 9-10.) The postconviction court held an
    evidentiary hearing, conducted over four non-consecutive days, on Warren’s
    petition. Epstein testified at the postconviction hearing. 8 Epstein
    acknowledged he was not able to invest as much time into preparing Warren’s
    case as he would have liked because he expended a lot of time and resources
    preparing and trying a multi-week federal criminal trial, which concluded
    shortly before Warren’s trial, and because his medical problems, including Type
    2 diabetes and a heart problem, limited the amount of time Epstein could
    devote to preparing for Warren’s trial. Epstein testified that if he had had more
    time, he would have taken Roberson’s deposition. Epstein did not talk with
    Roberson informally or take a taped statement from her before Warren’s trial.
    Epstein acknowledged receiving Indianapolis Police Department 9 inter-
    department communications about fingerprint evidence in the Dorfman
    murder, and he testified that he should have used the evidence in his arguments
    at Warren’s trial. 10
    8
    Epstein’s bar license is currently suspended without automatic reinstatement. (Tr. Vol. II at 15.)
    9
    Currently, the department is known as the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department. However, at the
    time of the investigation into the Dorfman murder, the department was known as the Indianapolis Police
    Department.
    10
    During Warren’s examination of Epstein at the post-conviction hearing, Warren marked as an exhibit and
    questioned Epstein about Indianapolis Police Department inter-department communications regarding the
    fingerprint evidence in the Dorfman murder. These inter-department communications were offered but not
    admitted as evidence at the postconviction hearing.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020                                        Page 5 of 18
    [7]   Sergeant Michael Knapp of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
    also testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Sergeant Knapp
    analyzed the latent fingerprint evidence officers collected in connection with the
    Dorfman murder. Sergeant Knapp received a pawn ticket with an inked
    fingerprint on it and latent fingerprints from the scene of the murder. Sergeant
    Knapp determined that Aaron Gill’s fingerprints matched latent fingerprints
    recovered from the murder scene. A crime scene technician recovered those
    latent fingerprints from the side of a clear cellophane bag found in the
    backroom of Dorfman’s shop. Sergeant Knapp compared the other latent prints
    to Warren’s fingerprints, and he determined the latent prints did not belong to
    Warren. However, Sergeant Knapp determined the inked print on the pawn
    ticket did belong to Warren.
    [8]   Larry testified at the postconviction relief hearing that he and Roberson were
    dating and living together at the time of Dorfman’s murder. On the morning of
    Dorfman’s murder, Larry awoke about 8:30 am and found Roberson was not
    home. Roberson returned to their residence at approximately 12:30 pm. Larry
    testified that Roberson had multiple conversations with law enforcement in the
    days after the Dorfman murder. Police officers came to their home and
    questioned them about three days after Dorfman’s murder, and a detective left
    with Roberson. Larry testified that in the days following Dorfman’s murder,
    Roberson appeared “very anxious.” (Tr. Vol. II at 79.) He also testified she
    suddenly had a lot of money. Roberson used cash to purchase a recreational
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020          Page 6 of 18
    vehicle, had her black pickup truck painted grey, and took herself and Larry to
    Florida.
    [9]    Warren subpoenaed Roberson to appear at the evidentiary hearing. However,
    Roberson did not appear at the first two days of the evidentiary hearing.
    Roberson testified on the third day, but her testimony was suspended so she
    could consult with an attorney. During her brief testimony, Roberson
    confirmed that she spoke with Detective Alan Jones of the Indianapolis Police
    Department about Warren. She also confirmed that she did not speak with
    Epstein before Warren’s trial, other than when she testified in connection with
    Warren’s petition for bail. Roberson was called to testify on the fourth day of
    the postconviction evidentiary hearing, after the court appointed her counsel,
    but on the advice of counsel, she invoked her right against self-incrimination
    under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and did not
    provide further testimony. Warren also testified at the post-conviction hearing
    that he believed Epstein should have done more to investigate his case. He
    stated that he wanted Epstein to talk to Roberson and Larry in preparing his
    defense.
    [10]   On June 12, 2019, the postconviction court issued an order with findings of fact
    and conclusions of law denying Warren’s petition. The postconviction court
    concluded:
    Here [Warren] has raised the barest inference of Ms. Roberson
    being associated with this crime and, more importantly in this
    context, [Warren] has pointed to no material evidence which
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020        Page 7 of 18
    directly connects Ms. Roberson to the crime or the crime scene.
    Without substantially more evidence, this Court cannot draw any
    rational inference connecting the murder and the alleged
    repainting of the truck, or connecting Dana Roberson’s
    possession of an indeterminate amount of money at an
    indeterminate point in time. Lacking this, this Court does not
    find that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena
    Dana Roberson at trial or in failing to further develop her as an
    alternate suspect.
    (Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 121.) Additionally, the postconviction court
    concluded Epstein was not ineffective for failing to present Aaron Gill as an
    alternate suspect because, other than Gill’s fingerprints being present at the
    crime scene, there was no other material evidence connecting Gill to Dorfman’s
    murder. The postconviction court also pointed out that Epstein raised the
    specter of an alternative suspect, though not Roberson or Gill, when cross-
    examining Detective Jones during Warren’s criminal trial.
    Discussion and Decision
    [11]   The petitioner for postconviction relief must establish that he is entitled to relief
    by a preponderance of the evidence. Timberlake v. State, 
    753 N.E.2d 591
    , 597
    (Ind. 2001), reh’g denied, cert. denied 
    537 U.S. 839
    (2002). “Because he is now
    appealing a negative judgment, to the extent his appeal turns on factual issues,
    [the petitioner] must convince this Court that the evidence as a whole leads
    unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the
    postconviction court.”
    Id. “Where the
    [postconviction] court has entered
    findings of fact and conclusions of law, we accept the findings of fact unless
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020           Page 8 of 18
    clearly erroneous, but accord no deference [to] conclusions of law.” Turner v.
    State, 
    974 N.E.2d 575
    , 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. We will reverse
    the postconviction court’s decision only if the evidence is without conflict and
    leads to a conclusion opposite that reached by the postconviction court.
    Id. at 581-82.
    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    [12]   If not raised on direct appeal, a criminal defendant may raise a claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel in a postconviction relief petition. 
    Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 597
    . The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
    provides that in all criminal prosecutions, a defendant is entitled “to have the
    assistance of counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const., Am. VI. This requires
    counsel’s assistance be effective. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 686
    (1984), reh’g denied. There is a strong presumption that trial counsel provided
    effective representation, and a petitioner must put forth strong evidence to rebut
    that presumption. McCullough v. State, 
    973 N.E.2d 62
    , 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012),
    trans. denied. “Isolated poor strategy, inexperience, or bad tactics does not
    necessarily constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”
    Id. Rather, a
    petitioner
    must show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and the petitioner
    was prejudiced by the deficiency.
    Id. at 75.
    When evaluating a defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
    claim, we apply the well-established, two-part Strickland test. The
    defendant must prove: (1) counsel rendered deficient
    performance, meaning counsel’s representation fell below an
    objective standard of reasonableness as gauged by prevailing
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020         Page 9 of 18
    professional norms; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance
    prejudiced the defendant, i.e., but for counsel’s errors the result
    of the proceeding would have been different.
    Bobadilla v. State, 
    117 N.E.3d 1272
    , 1280 (Ind. 2019) (internal citation omitted).
    1. Counsel’s Performance
    A. Investigation of Roberson as Alternative Suspect
    [13]   Warren argues his trial counsel, Epstein, was ineffective because Epstein did
    not thoroughly investigate Roberson as an alternative suspect. An attorney
    “has a duty to make a reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable decision
    that the particular investigation is unnecessary.” Ritchie v. State, 
    875 N.E.2d 706
    , 719-720 (Ind. 2007). We give considerable deference to trial counsel’s
    strategic and tactical decisions, but “in order to make a reasonable tactical
    decision, counsel must have adequately investigated the client’s case because
    ‘strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
    precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the
    limitations on investigation.’” Conner v. State, 
    711 N.E.2d 1238
    , 1248 (Ind.
    1999) (quoting 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91
    ), cert. denied 
    531 U.S. 829
    (2000).
    [14]   Warren argues Epstein was delinquent in not pursuing discovery in order to
    obtain evidence of Roberson’s bad character and should have further
    investigated the theory that Roberson murdered Dorfman. Even though
    Epstein moved to compel the State to disclose Roberson’s criminal history and
    related information, Epstein filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude
    Roberson’s testimony before receiving the requested discovery. The requested
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020             Page 10 of 18
    discovery would have shown that Roberson was charged with Class D felony
    theft 11 in 1992 and had two misdemeanor theft convictions. The police spoke
    with Roberson after Dorfman’s murder, and Warren contends that he was
    arrested as a result of information Roberson gave the police.
    [15]   Warren contends Epstein provided deficient performance by not investigating
    Roberson more thoroughly and by failing to subpoena her. Epstein thought the
    individual described by Jordan in his testimony at the bail hearing could have
    been Roberson because she owned a black pickup truck and had the same build
    as a small man. Epstein testified that “[p]erhaps [he] hadn’t done a good
    enough job in terms of investigating Ms. Roberson.” (Tr. Vol. II at 25.)
    Epstein also admitted at the postconviction hearing that he “kn[e]w or ha[d]
    reason to believe” Roberson was a “fence.” 12 (Id. at 43.)
    [16]   Additionally, Warren argues Epstein should have interviewed Larry or
    subpoenaed him to be a witness. Larry testified at the postconviction relief
    hearing that he lived with Roberson at the time of Dorfman’s murder, that
    Roberson’s whereabouts at the time of the murder were unknown, that she had
    her truck painted shortly after the murder, that she came into a large amount of
    cash after the murder, and that they left for Florida after the murder. Larry also
    11
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (1986).
    12
    “Fence” is a colloquial term used to refer to “a receiver of stolen goods.” Fence, Merriam-Webster
    https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fence [https://perma.cc/EMS4-BXNP].
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020                               Page 11 of 18
    testified at the postconviction relief hearing that he believed Roberson had
    multiple conversations with law enforcement concerning the Dorfman murder
    and that she was trying to deflect blame from herself to Warren. Therefore,
    Warren argues Epstein was ineffective because he did not adequately question
    Larry in order to find out what Larry knew about the circumstances
    surrounding the crime.
    [17]   The State maintains that Epstein was not ineffective because the evidence
    pointing to Roberson as an alternative suspect was inadmissible. As our Indiana
    Supreme Court has explained:
    Evidence of a third-party motive tends [to make] it less probable
    that the defendant committed the crime, and is therefore relevant
    under Rule of Evidence 401. Joyner v. State, 
    678 N.E.2d 386
    , 389
    (Ind. 1997). However, this evidence may be excluded if its
    probative value is out-weighed by unfair prejudice, confusion of
    the issues, or the potential to mislead the jury. Ind. Evid. R. 403.
    In the context of third-party motive evidence, these rules are
    grounded in the widely-accepted principle that before evidence of
    a third party is admissible, the defendant must show some
    connection between the third party and the crime. See Holmes v.
    South Carolina, 
    547 U.S. 319
    , 327 & n. *, 
    126 S. Ct. 1727
    , 
    164 L. Ed. 2d 503
    (2006) (listing jurisdictions and quoting 41 C.J.S.,
    Homicide § 216, at 56-58 (1991) (“Evidence tending to show the
    commission by another person of the crime charged may be
    introduced by accused when it is inconsistent with, and raises a
    reasonable doubt of, his own guilt; but frequently matters offered
    in evidence for this purpose are so remote and lack such
    connection with the crime that they are excluded.”)).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020         Page 12 of 18
    Pelley v. State, 
    901 N.E.2d 494
    , 505 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied; see also Lashbrook v.
    State, 
    762 N.E.2d 756
    , 758 (Ind. 2002) (holding trial court did not abuse
    discretion in excluding evidence that a third party made threatening comments
    because there was no material evidence connecting the third party to the crime).
    The State argues the evidence concerning Roberson presented at the
    postconviction hearing would not have been admitted at Warren’s trial because
    the evidence is speculative and does not directly connect Roberson to the crime.
    [18]   However, while the evidence does not directly link Roberson to the crime, it
    raises several red flags. Had Epstein interviewed Larry, he would have
    discovered substantial information that casts suspicion on Roberson. Epstein
    then could have deposed, interviewed, or subpoenaed Roberson. He could
    have asked her where she was the morning of the murder, how many
    conversations she had with law enforcement about the murder, how she was
    able to purchase the recreational vehicle, why she decided to take a trip to
    Florida with Larry shortly after the murder, whether she repainted her truck
    grey, and if so, why she repainted her truck. Roberson might have invoked her
    Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, denied Larry’s allegations, or
    provided innocent explanations, but Epstein did not find out. Therefore, we
    agree with Warren that Epstein’s performance was deficient regarding his
    investigation of Roberson. See Siglar v. State, 
    541 N.E.2d 944
    , 946 (Ind. 1989)
    (“Failure to interview defense witnesses prior to trial may constitute ineffective
    assistance if it appears that such interviews would have produced something
    substantive.”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020           Page 13 of 18
    B. Fingerprint Evidence
    [19]   Warren also contends Epstein was ineffective because he failed to utilize
    exculpatory fingerprint evidence. Specifically, Warren alleges “Mr. Epstein
    failed to present evidence that fingerprints belonging to Aaron Gill, Gallery No.
    470350, were found on cellophane in the backroom of Mr. Dorfman’s shop
    near his body. Mr. Epstein was aware of this evidence but inexplicably failed to
    use it.” (Appellant’s Br. at 24) (internal citations omitted). At the
    postconviction hearing, Epstein testified:
    Aaron Gill I might have suggested as an alternative suspect and I
    might have requested more specific discovery pertaining to his
    whereabouts on the occasion and any number of other things that
    might have suggested somebody other than Mr. Warren shot Mr.
    Dorfman.
    (Tr. Vol. II at 36.)
    [20]   Warren cites Fisher v. State, in which Fisher’s trial counsel failed to present at
    trial evidence that had been elicited during Fisher’s juvenile waiver hearing
    about three potential witnesses who failed to identify Fisher in a lineup. 
    878 N.E.2d 457
    , 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. We held Fisher’s trial
    counsel’s failure to elicit such testimony did not constitute deficient
    performance or prejudice Fisher because Fisher’s trial counsel introduced
    evidence on cross examination that one of the potential witnesses failed to
    identify Fisher in a lineup and Fisher’s trial counsel cross-examined the victim
    regarding her identification of Fisher.
    Id. We also
    held Fisher’s trial counsel’s
    failure to elicit testimony that officers were unable to lift fingerprints from the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020          Page 14 of 18
    victim’s doorknob or telephone did not prejudice Fisher because those items
    were routinely handled by multiple persons, making it difficult to lift
    fingerprints off of them.
    Id. at 465.
    [21]   Warren also cites Miller v. State, in which Miller argued that his trial counsel
    was ineffective because he failed to identify and elicit testimony from a shoe
    and tire print examiner that the shoe and tire prints found at the scene of a
    murder did not match Miller’s shoes or his vehicle’s tires. 
    702 N.E.2d 1053
    ,
    1063-64 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied, cert. denied 
    528 U.S. 1083
    (2000). Our Indiana
    Supreme Court held Miller’s trial counsel’s performance was not deficient and
    did not prejudice Miller because the State elicited testimony from a police
    officer that soil samples could not be connected with Miller’s car or shoes.
    Id. at 1064.
    [22]   Warren argues his case is different from both Fisher and Miller because Epstein
    did not introduce evidence of Gill’s prints through the State’s witnesses. The
    State maintains the fingerprint evidence was inadmissible because there is no
    evidence besides the presence of Gill’s fingerprints on a bag in the shop that
    connects Gill to the robbery and murder. The State also argues it is not
    surprising that someone else’s fingerprints would be found on cellophane wrap
    in Dorfman’s store given the nature of Dorfman’s business. Nonetheless, we
    hold the possible presence of someone other than Warren at the crime scene is a
    lead worth investigating because it suggests a possible alternative perpetrator.
    See Shuemak v. State, 
    258 N.E.2d 158
    , 159 (Ind. 1970) (noting “it is universally
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020         Page 15 of 18
    recognized a finger, palm, or bare footprint found in the place where a crime
    was committed may be sufficient proof of identity”).
    2. Probability of Different Outcome
    [23]   Having determined that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, we must
    evaluate whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
    reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
    outcome.” 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694
    . In effect, Warren must show his trial
    counsel’s failures were so prejudicial they denied him a fair trial. Turner v. State,
    
    669 N.E.2d 1024
    , 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
    [24]   The State presented substantial evidence implicating Warren. Warren used
    Dorfman’s credit cards on the day of the murder. Warren went into Emerson
    Liquors on January 7, 1999, and purchased alcohol and cigarettes using one of
    Dorfman’s credit cards. He also used Dorfman’s credit cards at a Meijer store
    and a Kmart store. Moreover, he tried to purchase items at a Radio Shack store
    with Dorfman’s credit cards. Even before Warren presented Dorfman’s credit
    card, the Radio Shack employees were suspicious because Warren’s interest
    jumped from item to item, and Warren put the hood of his jacket up over his
    head when he saw a visible camera outside the restroom. When Dorfman’s
    card was declined, Warren threw down another credit card that belonged to
    Dorfman for the clerk to try. Warren left the store without taking the credit
    cards with him, without completing a purchase and without waiting for the
    cashier to try the second card. Also, the day before the murder, Warren had
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020          Page 16 of 18
    been in Dorfman’s shop and announced he would “be back” as he was escorted
    out of the shop. 
    Warren, 757 N.E.2d at 999
    .
    [25]   Warren’s inked fingerprint was found on a pawn card at the scene of the
    murder, and no other pawn cards with inked fingerprints on them were found at
    the scene. Dorfman’s friend Craig Cross testified that Dorfman would not
    leave completed pawn cards lying around his store, and he would generally
    mail the pawn cards to the Indianapolis Police Department within a day of
    receiving them. Detective Alan Jones interrogated Warren after Dorfman’s
    murder. Warren admitted visiting Dorfman’s store. Warren told Detective
    Jones
    that as he was leaving the store he slipped on the ice and when he
    fell he found a plastic bag containing credit cards and some gold.
    [Detective Jones] asked him specifically what he did with the
    credit cards and he said that he threw them away. [Detective
    Jones] then asked him if he had used them at all and he said that
    he had not, that that was illegal.
    (Prior Case-Record of Proceedings Vol. III at 687.) Warren denied ever
    pawning anything at Dorfman’s store or filling out a pawn card.
    [26]   Additionally, a .22 caliber gun killed Dorfman, and Paul Fancher bought a .22
    caliber revolver from one of Warren’s brothers shortly after the murder. Also,
    notably, while the evidence revealed at the post-conviction relief hearing
    potentially implicates other individuals, it does not exonerate Warren. Even
    though Warren’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient, he has failed to
    show a reasonable likelihood the result of his trial would have been different.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020       Page 17 of 18
    Therefore, we hold he is not entitled to post-conviction relief. See Williams v.
    State, 
    706 N.E.2d 149
    , 156 (Ind. 1999) (holding even if defendant’s trial
    attorneys would have more thoroughly investigated blood evidence, they would
    not have been able to present information to the jury significantly different from
    that provided by the State’s witnesses), reh’g denied, cert. denied 
    529 U.S. 1113
    (2000).
    Conclusion
    [27]   Warren’s trial counsel acknowledges he did not adequately investigate a
    potential alternative suspect or follow-up on a lead that another individual’s
    fingerprints were present at the scene of Dorfman’s murder. However, despite
    trial counsel’s deficient performance, we cannot say there was a reasonable
    probability the outcome of Warren’s trial would have been different because of
    the overwhelming evidence of Warren’s guilt presented at trial. We accordingly
    affirm.
    [28]   Affirmed.
    Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PC-1604 | April 8, 2020         Page 18 of 18