Kyle Hackney v. Pendu Manufacturing, Inc. ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                                  FILED
    Apr 13 2020, 8:51 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    Bryan H. Babb                                               Christopher A. Pearcy
    Bradley M. Dick                                             Hume Smith Geddes Green &
    Bose McKinney & Evans LLP                                   Simmons, LLP
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                       Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Kyle Hackney,                                               April 13, 2020
    Appellant-Plaintiff,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CT-1080
    v.                                                  Appeal from the
    Lawrence Circuit Court
    Pendu Manufacturing, Inc.,                                  The Honorable
    Appellee-Defendant.                                         Andrea K. McCord, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    47C01-1606-CT-595
    Kirsch, Judge.
    [1]   This case involves an action by Kyle Hackney (“Hackney”) against Pendu
    Manufacturing, Inc. (“Pendu”), alleging that a piece of machinery
    manufactured by Pendu contained a design defect that made it unreasonably
    dangerous under the Indiana Product Liability Statute. Hackney appeals the
    trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Pendu and raises several
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020                             Page 1 of 20
    issues, of which we find the following issue dispositive: whether the trial court
    erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Pendu because the defense of
    misuse barred any liability by Pendu.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   On November 17, 2015, Hackney was an employee of American Fibertech
    (“Fibertech”), working at the Mitchell, Indiana facility that produces boards for
    wooden pallets. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 12; Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 46. On
    that date, Hackney was working at a machine called the Pendu Edger 3000
    (“the Machine”), which was manufactured by Pendu and had been delivered to
    Fibertech in July or August 2015. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 12; Appellant’s App.
    Vol. IV at 129. The Machine trimmed edges off the boards that were cut to
    make four-inch and six-inch boards used to build the wooden pallets, and the
    Machine was comprised of three separate components: (1) the infeed; (2) the
    edger itself, and (3) the custom built outfeed (“the Outfeed”). Appellant’s App.
    Vol. III at 13, 49. The Outfeed is the only component at issue in this case.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 162. The Machine was a part of Fibertech’s much
    larger production line and fed into Fibertech’s main conveyor belt. Id. at 129.
    [4]   The Machine was shipped by freight from Pendu to Fibertech. Id. at 98-100.
    Pendu did not accompany the Machine to Fibertech and did not have any
    involvement in the installation and incorporation of the Machine and Outfeed
    into Fibertech’s main production line. Id. at 92-93. After the Machine was
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020        Page 2 of 20
    delivered, Fibertech did not contact Pendu for any reason regarding the
    Machine. Id. at 129. Included with the Machine was the Pendu Safety Manual
    (“the Safety Manual”), which expressly advised all operators on the safe use
    and operation of the Machine. Id. at 56; Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 53-63. The
    Safety Manual was in Fibertech’s possession at all relevant times, and Fibertech
    testified the Safety Manual was available to any and all operators of the
    Machine, including Hackney. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 56-57.
    [5]   The Outfeed of the Machine was custom built and its design was based on
    photos provided by Fibertech of an older edger it was using and other custom
    requirements of Fibertech. Appellant’s App. Vol. V at 105-06. Pendu was not
    told how Fibertech intended to incorporate the Outfeed into its main
    production line/conveyor belt. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 129; Appellant’s App.
    Vol. V at 125-26. Pendu was not told what the conveyor would look like or
    how the custom Outfeed would be incorporated. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 129.
    It was Pendu’s understanding with Fibertech that Fibertech was going to install
    any guarding as part of its incorporation of the Outfeed into its main production
    line. Id. at 95, 129. That understanding/agreement was established by the
    parties’ course of dealing and memorialized by the language on their
    contract/change order. Id. at 95, 100, 129; Appellant’s App. Vol. V at 105-06.
    Fibertech did all installation and configuration of the Outfeed into its
    production line, made several changes, and added guarding to the top of the
    Machine as part of its configuration. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 35-42,132-33.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020         Page 3 of 20
    [6]   Pendu testified that installing a guard on the Outfeed when it manufactured the
    Machine for Fibertech was not feasible “[b]ecause [Pendu] didn’t know exactly
    what [Fibertech’s] belt conveyor’s going to look like.” Appellant’s App. Vol. V at
    101. Pendu “had no idea what [Fibertech was] putting up for guarding or how
    they’re manufacturing” from where the Outfeed ended. Id. at 130. For those
    reasons, Pendu “built exactly what [Fibertech] wanted[,]” and Fibertech never
    said it wanted any guarding on the Outfeed of the Machine. Id. at 105-06.
    That was done per industry standards for custom machinery, like the Outfeed. 1
    [7]   Fibertech was “very capable of doing their own installation” of equipment and
    employed their own riggers and installation personnel or would retain
    contractors to assist them with the install or modifications. Appellant’s App. Vol.
    IV at 66-67, 95. It was common for Fibertech to make modifications to the
    Machine after delivery. Id. at 96-97. Fibertech made at least the following
    known modifications to the Machine since delivery:
    1. Performed or oversaw the entire installation of the Machine
    and incorporation into its production line;
    2. Added an extensive catwalk in front of the Machine, and over
    its main conveyor system, stairs, and countless other
    modifications shown in photos, with some contractor assistance;
    1
    ANSI industry standards 4.3 for custom machinery states that “the user shall communicate its specific
    safety requirements as part of the machinery purchase . . . . The supplier and user shall develop a set of
    specifications suited to the user’s location and application specifics of the machine.” Appellant’s App. Vol. IV
    at 101-02.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020                                   Page 4 of 20
    3. Added a guard on top of the Machine that was in place at the
    time of Hackney’s accident;
    4. Added poles to the side of the Machine;
    5. Removed the guards that surround the chain conveyors on the
    outfeed and replaced them with central chain support;
    6. Altered the shaft involved in Hackney’s accident by damaging
    it with the improper use of a pipe wrench.
    Id. at 132-33.
    [8]   Hackney’s normal position while working was at the rear of the Machine at the
    infeed area, where he would feed boards into the Machine, which would be
    edged or trimmed inside the Machine and then come out of the Machine via the
    Outfeed. Id. at 22. Occasionally, while performing this job, Hackney would
    notice scrap wood that would get caught in the Outfeed at the opposite end of
    the Machine, and the scrap wood would need to be removed so it would not
    cause a jam. Id. at 22-23. Both the Safety Manual and Fibertech required a
    person to turn off the Machine before reaching into it or servicing it in any way.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 53-63. On November 17, 2015, the date of the
    incident, Hackney was operating the Machine when he noticed a piece of scrap
    wood standing vertically in the Machine. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 20. He
    then walked around to the end of the Machine to remove the piece of wood. Id.
    On his way to remove the scrap wood, Hackney walked past both the E-Stop
    and Main Control box, which both had buttons that would have stopped the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020        Page 5 of 20
    Machine; Hackney testified that turning off the Machine first would have
    “obviously” prevented his accident. Id. at 22-23, 28. When Hackney got to the
    end of the Machine, he reached his body over the still-operating Machine while
    balancing on one foot. Ex. H. Seconds later, the shirttail of Hackney’s
    sweatshirt got caught in the Machine and became entangled until the sweatshirt
    was removed from Hackney’s body, causing injury to Hackney’s arm and
    shoulder. Id.
    [9]    Fibertech trained Hackney to either use the E-Stop or the lockout/tagout
    procedure to stop the machine before removing scrap wood from the Outfeed.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 60. Fibertech taught Hackney that failure to follow
    the safety rules could result in serious personal injury. Id. at 58. Hackney
    stated that he was trained to turn off the machine before removing a jam, and if
    he had hit one of those two stop buttons that he walked past, the accident
    would not have happened. Id. at 23, 28. The Safety Manual, the safety training
    Hackney received twice a week and signed attendance forms for attending, and
    the Fibertech Safety Policy, which he signed and initialed, all required him to
    stop the Machine before reaching into the machine to service it, such as
    removing scrap wood. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 53-63, 95-96; Appellant’s App.
    Vol. IV at 45, 81-90.
    [10]   Fibertech testified that the Safety Manual was available to “any and all
    operators” of that same machine. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 56. On page two of
    the Safety Manual, under “Introduction,” it reads: “Maintenance personnel
    and operators should read this manual thoroughly and become familiar with the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020         Page 6 of 20
    various assemblies and sub-assemblies. This will be helpful when ordering
    replacement parts and reduce the possibility of errors.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II
    at 54. On page three of the Safety Manual, it reads in all capital letters and bold
    font: “WARNING: FAILURE TO FOLLOW THESE RULES MAY
    RESULT IN SERIOUS PERSONAL INJURY.” Id. at 55 (emphasis in
    original). On the same page, it states under the heading “SAFETY RULES
    FOR ALL MACHINES”: “FOR YOUR OWN SAFETY, READ
    INSTRUCTION MANUAL BEFORE OPERATING THE MACHINE.
    Learn the machine application and limitations as well as the specific hazards
    peculiar to it.” Id. (emphasis in original). It further states on page three:
    “WEAR PROPER APPAREL. Loose clothing, gloves, neckties, rings,
    bracelets, or jewelry can get caught in moving parts.” Id. (emphasis in original).
    On page four of the Safety Manual, it states the OSHA “Lock-Out Standard.”
    Id. at 56. Page four also contained the following language: “DO NOT
    OVERREACH. Keep proper footing and balance at all times.” Id. On page
    five under the heading, “WEAR PROTECTIVE CLOTHING,” it states,
    “Wear close-fitting clothing and safety equipment appropriate to the job.” Id.
    at 57. On page five, it also reads: “Follow OSHA approved, documented
    lockout/tagout procedures when cleaning, servicing, adjusting, or doing any
    maintenance on a machine. The lockout/tagout procedures should be
    permanently attached to each machine.” Id. Additionally, on page seven of the
    Safety manual, it stated that “During operation:”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020         Page 7 of 20
    5. Follow the instructions below before performing inspections,
    adjustments, repairs, or removing lodged material:
    a) Push the emergency stop button located on the operator’s
    console,
    b) Turn the key switch to the off position and remove the key.
    c) Follow approved lockout/tagout procedures specific to the
    machine.
    d) Be sure material feed has stopped and the arbors have stopped
    turning.
    Id. at 59.
    [11]   Fibertech kept the “lockout/tagout” procedures attached to the Machine, and
    part of the new employee training at Fibertech included instruction on
    lockout/tagout procedures specific to the machines that an employee utilized in
    their job duties. Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 59, 96-97. Employees additionally
    were required to attend safety meetings twice per week at Fibertech where a
    variety of general workplace hazards were discussed. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at
    49-50, 53-54. Lockout/tagout procedures were listed or discussed in all of the
    bi-weekly safety meetings due to their “paramount” importance. Id. at 50-51,
    81-90. On October 9, 2015, Hackney initialed and signed that he read and
    understood the Fibertech Safety Policy. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 95-96.
    Hackney testified in his deposition that he understood the lockout/tagout rules
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020        Page 8 of 20
    and that the lockout/tagout rules would have required him to turn the Machine
    off prior to attempting to remove a scrap of wood. Id. at 192, 200, 202, 235.
    [12]   After Hackney’s accident and injury, Fibertech investigated and determined the
    accident was caused by Hackney’s behavior, violation of safety rules, and
    failure to first turn off the Machine. Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 81-82; Appellant’s
    App. Vol. IV at 72, 74-77. The report concluded that the “incident’s root cause
    was behavioral in nature.” Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 77. Additionally, the
    report concluded that Hackney was injured “when his jacket got entangled in a
    shaft at the end of the [M]achine.” Id. (emphasis added).
    [13]   When the Machine was shipped from Pendu to Fibertech, the Outfeed had a
    smooth and machine-polished shaft. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 130-31. Pendu’s
    expert opinion stated that this would have made the shaft resistant to friction,
    but that the post-accident photos of the Outfeed’s shaft showed that it had been
    damaged and was no longer smooth. Id. at 139-40. The expert stated that the
    damage to the shaft notched and serrated the shaft, enabling it “to grab
    [Hackney’s] loose clothing.” Id. at 141. The expert also opined that it appeared
    that someone had used a pipe wrench on the shaft, causing the damage. Id. at
    122, 139-41.
    [14]   Hackney testified that prior to his accident he was told that another employee
    had lost a finger in the Outfeed of the Machine, in the same “roller” and
    location on the Outfeed allegedly involved in Hackney’s accident. Id. at 31-32.
    For such an injury to be possible, that unknown employee would have had to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020           Page 9 of 20
    have failed to turn off the machine and put his fingers or body in or near the
    Outfeed. Id. at 141. However, Fibertech denied that anyone else had ever been
    injured using the Machine, and there were no workers compensation claims or
    other evidence to support Hackney’s belief that someone else had been injured.
    Id. at 73.
    [15]   On June 8, 2016, Hackney filed his complaint against Pendu, alleging that the
    Machine was negligently designed and that, under Indiana’s Product Liability
    Act (“IPLA”), the Machine was unreasonably dangerous and a defective
    product. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 12-14. On June 21, 2018, Pendu filed a
    motion for summary judgment, arguing that Hackney’s injuries were caused by
    Hackney’s misuse of the Machine, which included failure to read the Safety
    Manual and failure to follow several safety warnings, that Pendu did not breach
    its duty to Hackney and was not the proximate cause of Hackney’s injuries, and
    Hackney should be barred from recovery because he had prior knowledge of the
    Machine’s danger. Id. at 27-42. Hackney filed his response in opposition to
    Pendu’s motion for summary judgment, contending that summary judgment
    should be denied because material issues of fact existed as to whether Pendu
    acted negligently and whether the Machine had a design defect. Id. at 129-41.
    Pendu filed a response arguing that Hackney’s accident was not caused by a
    design defect, the violation of safety rules and warnings by Hackney was misuse
    that constituted a complete defense under IPLA, alterations to the shaft of the
    Machine constituted a complete defense under IPLA, and Hackney’s incurred
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020      Page 10 of 20
    risk and knowledge of the danger of reaching into the Machine constituted a
    complete bar to recovery, among other things.
    [16]   After a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting summary judgment in
    favor of Pendu on February 1, 2019, and held that the “issues of misuse and
    alterations of the equipment as they relate to the holding in [Campbell
    Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson], 
    109 N.E.3d 953
     (Ind. 2018) are dispositive.”
    Appellant’s App. Vol. V at 153. Hackney filed a motion to correct error, which
    the trial court denied. Hackney now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [17]   When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, our standard of review is the
    same as that of the trial court. FLM, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 
    973 N.E.2d 1167
    , 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Wilcox Mfg. Grp., Inc. v. Mktg. Servs. of
    Ind., Inc., 
    832 N.E.2d 559
    , 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied. We stand in
    the shoes of the trial court and apply a de novo standard of review. 
    Id.
     (citing
    Cox v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 
    848 N.E.2d 690
    , 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). Our
    review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated
    to the trial court. Ind. Trial Rule 56(H); Thornton v. Pietrzak, 
    120 N.E.3d 1139
    ,
    1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Summary judgment is appropriate only
    where the designated evidence shows there are no genuine issues of material
    fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. T.R.
    56(C). For summary judgment purposes, a fact is “material” if it bears on the
    ultimate resolution of relevant issues. FLM, 973 N.E.2d at 1173. We view the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020        Page 11 of 20
    pleadings and designated materials in the light most favorable to the non-
    moving party. Id. Additionally, all facts and reasonable inferences from those
    facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Id. (citing Troxel Equip.
    Co. v. Limberlost Bancshares, 
    833 N.E.2d 36
    , 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans.
    denied). The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of
    any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue, at which point the burden
    shifts to the non-movant to come forward with contrary evidence showing an
    issue for the trier of fact. Hughley v. State, 
    15 N.E.3d 1000
    , 1003 (Ind. 2014).
    [18]   A trial court’s grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of
    validity, and the party who lost in the trial court has the burden of
    demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Henderson v.
    Reid Hosp. and Healthcare Servs., 
    17 N.E.3d 311
    , 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.
    denied. We will affirm upon any theory or basis supported by the designated
    materials. 
    Id.
     When a trial court grants summary judgment, we carefully
    scrutinize that determination to ensure that a party was not improperly
    prevented from having his or her day in court. 
    Id.
    [19]   Hackney’s complaint claimed that the Machine was unreasonably dangerous
    and a defective product under the IPLA. Pursuant to the IPLA, a plaintiff must
    prove that a product was placed into the stream of commerce in a defective
    condition that was unreasonably dangerous to the user and that plaintiff's
    injuries were caused by this dangerous product. 
    Ind. Code § 34-20-2-1
    . A
    product can be defective within the meaning of the IPLA because of a
    manufacturing flaw, a defective design, or a failure to warn of dangers while
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020       Page 12 of 20
    using the product. Cook v. Ford Motor Co., 
    913 N.E.2d 311
    , 319 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2009), trans. denied. In an action based on an alleged design defect in the
    product or based on an alleged failure to provide adequate warnings or
    instructions regarding the use of the product, the party making the claim must
    establish that the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise reasonable care under
    the circumstances in designing the product or in providing the warnings or
    instructions. 
    Ind. Code § 34-20-2-2
    . To establish a prima facie case of liability
    under IPLA, the plaintiff must show that (1) the product is defective and
    unreasonably dangerous, (2) the defective condition existed at the time the
    product left the defendant’s control, and (3) the defective condition is the
    proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Coffman v. PSI Energy. Inc., 
    815 N.E.2d 522
    , 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans denied.
    [20]   The IPLA provides three non-exclusive defenses to a products liability action:
    incurred risk under Indiana Code section 34-20-6-3; misuse of the product
    under Indiana Code section 34-20-6-4; and modification or alteration of the
    product under Indiana Code section 34-20-6-5. All three statutory defenses act
    as a complete bar to recovery in a products liability action, but all three defenses
    must “be proven.” Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson, 
    109 N.E.3d 953
    , 959 (Ind. 2018).
    [21]   Here, in response to Hackney’s complaint alleging that the Machine was a
    defective product due to an alleged design defect, Pendu filed a motion for
    summary judgment, arguing that, among other reasons, Hackney’s injuries
    were caused by his misuse of the Machine, which included failure to read the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020       Page 13 of 20
    Safety Manual and failure to follow several safety warnings. After a hearing,
    the trial court issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of Pendu
    and held that the “issues of misuse and alterations of the equipment as they
    relate to the holding in [Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson], 
    109 N.E.3d 953
     (Ind. 2018) are dispositive.” Appellant’s App. Vol. V at 153. It
    further concluded, “the undisputed evidence is clear that Hackney misused the
    machine in multiple ways that together could not be reasonably expected by
    Pendu (including failing to follow lockout procedures to turn off the machine
    before he attempted to remove a scrap piece from the machine) and that misuse
    was the cause of his injuries.” Id. at 154.
    [22]   Hackney contends on appeal that it was error for the trial court to grant
    summary judgment on the basis of the misuse defense. Specifically, he asserts
    that a jury should decide whether the violations of warnings and instructions
    alleged by Pendu even constitute violations and whether they combine in the
    aggregate to constitute misuse. He also argues that a jury must decide if Pendu
    could have reasonably expected him to reach inside an operating, unguarded
    Machine because the evidence supported that, since the Machine did not
    include guards and Pendu included a warning on the Machine that users not
    operate the Machine without guards, it expected an operator like Hackney to
    fail to follow instructions and reach into the Machine while it was operating.
    Hackney maintains that there is no other reason why Pendu would warn
    against operating the Machine without guards under any circumstances, other
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020        Page 14 of 20
    than that Pendu understood that its other written warnings on how to operate
    the Machine might not be followed.
    [23]   Misuse is typically a question of fact for a jury to decide. Campbell, 109 N.E.3d
    at 959. However, summary judgment based on misuse is appropriate when the
    undisputed evidence proves that the plaintiff misused the product in an
    unforeseeable manner. Id. Misuse is established as a matter of law when the
    undisputed evidence proves that plaintiff used the product in direct
    contravention of the product’s warnings and instructions. Id. The misuse
    defense acts as a complete bar to recovery in a products liability action but must
    “be proven.” Id. “[I]n order to successfully employ misuse as a defense, the
    seller must show both that the misuse of the product is: 1) the cause of the
    harm; and 2) not reasonably expected by the seller.” Id. at 957. Therefore, if “a
    plaintiff misuses a product but it is not the cause of the harm and/or the misuse
    can reasonably be expected by the seller, then the misuse would not serve as a
    complete defense and comparative fault principles would apply.” Id. at 959.
    [24]   Here, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pendu and held that
    the “issues of misuse and alterations of the equipment as they relate to the
    holding in [Campbell] . . . are dispositive.” Appellant’s App. Vol. V at 153. In
    Campbell, Johnson was seriously injured while using a hand-held grinder
    designed by Campbell Hausfeld. 109 N.E.3d at 954. “The [g]rinder is an
    approximately eight-inch, hand-held, air-powered tool intended for grinding,
    polishing, deburring, and smoothing sharp surfaces.” Id. at 955. Johnson did
    not use the tool for any of those intended purposes and, instead, used it to help
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020        Page 15 of 20
    a friend do some work on the friend’s truck by “cut[ting] around the truck’s
    headlight opening to accommodate larger headlights.” Id. Johnson “took the
    [g]rinder and attached a cut-off disc to it using a mandrel. Johnson’s friend
    expressed concern about him using the cut-off disc, which was rated lower than
    25,000 RPM, but Johnson used the cut-off disc anyway.” Id. Johnson wore his
    prescription glasses as he cut around the headlights with the grinder, believing
    they were sufficient to serve as safety glasses. Id. While using the grinder, the
    cut-off disc came apart and a piece struck him in the left side of his face,
    breaking his eyeglasses and causing serious injuries to his cheek and eye. Id.
    [25]   Johnson sued Campbell Hausfeld, alleging the tool was defective in its design
    and that the manufacturer failed to provide adequate warnings, and Campbell
    Hausfeld sought summary judgment, contending, among other things, that
    Johnson had misused the tool by failing to follow its instructions. Id.
    Specifically, Campbell Hausfeld alleged that Johnson “misused the [g]rinder in
    three ways [in violation of its instructions]: he did not wear proper safety
    glasses; he attached and used a cut-off disc without a safety guard in place; and
    the cut-off disc had an inadequate RPM rating.” Id. at 959.
    [26]   Our Supreme Court determined that the misuse statutory defense turned on
    “whether Johnson’s failure to follow the instructions was reasonably expected
    by Campbell Hausfeld.” Id. The Court found, “while Campbell Hausfeld
    could have perhaps reasonably expected a user to not use proper eyewear or for
    a user to attach a cut-off disc without a guard, or for a user to attach something
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020        Page 16 of 20
    with an improper RPM rating, it was not reasonably expected for a user to
    disregard the safety instructions in all three of these ways.” Id. at 960.
    [27]   Here, Pendu alleges that Hackney committed multiple violations of the
    warnings and instructions for the Machine and misused the Machine in several
    ways. Specifically, Pendu asserts that: (1) Hackney failed to turn off the
    Machine before reaching into it; (2) Hackney overreached and did not maintain
    proper balance and footing when he reached into the Machine; (3) Hackney
    leaned over and in front of the Machine, putting his body in front of the
    Outfeed, which was not otherwise accessible due to the placement of the
    conveyor belt; (4) Hackney failed to wear proper apparel by wearing a baggy
    sweatshirt; (5) Hackney ignored his training about the nip points of the
    Machine and his belief that someone had previously lost a finger on the
    Machine; (6) Fibertech failed to ensure that Hackney reviewed the Safety
    Manual, contrary to the warnings that all operators must review it; and (7)
    Fibertech damaged the shaft by using a pipe wrench on it.
    [28]   The designated evidence showed that Hackney testified that turning off the
    Machine first would have “obviously” prevented his accident and that he was
    trained to turn off the Machine before removing a jam, and if he had hit one of
    those two stop buttons that he walked past on the way to remove the scrap of
    wood, the accident would not have happened. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 22-23,
    28. Evidence also showed that the Safety Manual, the safety training Hackney
    received twice a week and signed attendance forms for attending, and the
    Fibertech Safety Policy, which he signed and initialed, all required him to stop
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020           Page 17 of 20
    the Machine before reaching into the machine to perform service on it, such as
    removing scrap wood. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 53-63, 95-96; Appellant’s App.
    Vol. IV at 45, 81-90. The evidence further showed that, on the day of the
    accident, Hackney left his normal position at the infeed area of the Machine
    and walked to the end of the Machine where the Outfeed was located to remove
    the scrap wood and reached his body over the still-operating Machine while
    balancing on one foot. Ex. H. As he leaned over the moving Machine, the
    shirttail of Hackney’s loose-fitting sweatshirt got caught in the Machine and
    became entangled. Id. After Hackney’s accident and injury, Fibertech
    investigated and determined the accident was caused by Hackney’s behavior,
    violation of safety rules, and failure to first turn off the Machine. Appellant’s
    App. Vol. III at 81-82; Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 72, 74-77. The report concluded
    that the “incident’s root cause was behavioral in nature.” Appellant’s App. Vol.
    IV at 77. Additionally, the report concluded that Hackney was injured “when
    his jacket got entangled in a shaft at the end of the [M]achine.” Id. (emphasis
    added).
    [29]   The evidence therefore showed that the accident would not have occurred if, by
    Hackney’s own admission, he had turned the Machine off before going to
    remove the scrap wood. Further leading to the accident was the fact that
    Hackney leaned over the moving Machine while not being properly balanced
    on two feet and allowed his sweatshirt to come in contact with the shaft of the
    Machine. It is clear that if Hackney had turned off the Machine, the accident
    would not have occurred, and even if he had not done so, the accident may
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020         Page 18 of 20
    have been avoided if he did not lean directly across the moving Machine, had
    maintained proper footing, and was not wearing a loose-fitting shirt that easily
    caught in the moving shaft. Thus, Hackney’s failure to follow the instructions
    and warnings was the cause of his injuries.
    [30]   We must then determine whether Hackney’s failure to follow the instructions
    and warnings was reasonably expected by Pendu. The trial court found that
    “the undisputed evidence is clear that Hackney misused the [M]achine in
    multiple ways that together could not be reasonably expected by Pendu
    (including failing to follow lockout procedures to turn off the [M]achine before
    he attempted to remove a scrap piece from the [M]achine) and that misuse was
    the cause of his injuries.” Appellant’s App. Vol. V at 154. Hackney argues that
    because Pendu included a warning on the Machine that stated “DO NOT
    OPERATE WITHOUT GUARDS,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 137, it expected
    an operator like Hackney to fail to follow instructions and reach into the
    Machine while it was operating. He claims that there is no other reason why
    Pendu would include such a warning against operating the Machine without
    guards, other than that Pendu understood that its warnings and instructions on
    how to operate the Machine might not be followed.
    [31]   We find the present case to be similar to Campbell, where our Supreme Court
    found that Johnson’s multiple failures to follow the grinder’s instructions were
    the cause of his injuries and taken together, could not be reasonably expected
    by a seller. 109 N.E.3d at 960. Here, Hackney also had multiple failures to
    follow the Machine’s warnings and instructions that were the cause of his
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020     Page 19 of 20
    accident and injury. While Pendu could have perhaps reasonably expected an
    operator to not follow one of the warnings or instructions, it could not have
    reasonably expected an operator to disregard the safety warnings and
    instructions in all of the ways that Hackney did. Hackney could have avoided
    injury if he had shut the Machine off before reaching into it to remove the piece
    of scrap wood or if he not leaned directly in front of the moving Machine or
    maintained proper footing or worn proper attire that would not have gotten
    caught in the Machine. His multiple failures to follow the Machine’s warnings
    and instructions were the cause of his injuries and taken together, could not be
    reasonably expected by Pendu. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did
    not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Pendu.
    [32]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1080 | April 13, 2020     Page 20 of 20