Reginald Raglin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 14 2020, 9:53 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Daniel Hageman Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Matthew B. MacKenzie
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Reginald Raglin, April 14, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2634
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Angela Dow
Appellee-Plaintiff, Davis, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G16-1809-F6-30438
Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2634 | April 14, 2020 Page 1 of 5
Case Summary and Issue
[1] Following a bench trial, the trial court found Reginald Raglin guilty of Count I,
domestic battery in the presence of a child, a Level 6 felony; Count II, domestic
battery, a Class A misdemeanor; and Count III, domestic battery with a prior
domestic battery conviction, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court then
announced it would vacate Counts II and III on double jeopardy grounds and
sentence Raglin only for Count I. The written sentencing order reflects the
disposition and sentence on Count I but does not show Counts II or III at all.
Raglin appeals, arguing the sentencing order should reflect the disposition of all
counts as announced by the court at the conclusion of the bench trial and asks
that we remand to the trial court to correct the sentencing order. The State
agrees there is a conflict between the oral and written sentencing orders and that
the case should be remanded. We also agree, and therefore remand to the trial
court.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In late 2018, Raglin pushed his live-in girlfriend to the ground in their home
while she was holding their one-year-old child and while her nine-year-old son
was present. The State charged Raglin with Count I, domestic battery in the
presence of a child, a Level 6 felony; Count II, domestic battery, a Class A
misdemeanor; Count III, battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A
misdemeanor; and Count IV, invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor. As
to Count II, the State also alleged Raglin had a prior battery conviction which
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2634 | April 14, 2020 Page 2 of 5
would elevate Count II from a Class A misdemeanor to a Level 6 felony. Prior
to trial, the State dismissed part II of the information for Count II and also
dismissed Count IV.
[3] Raglin waived his right to a jury trial and was tried to the bench on Counts I, II,
and III. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found him guilty of
all counts:
The Court is going to find you guilty of the Domestic Battery as a
Level 6 felony. The Court will find you guilty of the Domestic
Battery as a Class A Misdemeanor. I am going to vacate that
Count as I find it is the same incident. The Court will find you
guilty of the Battery Resulting in Bodily Injury but I’m also going
to vacate Count III because I do find those are the same
incidents. So, he’s found guilty of Counts I, II, and III but he
will only be sentenced under Count I.
Transcript, Volume II at 24. The Chronological Case Summary (“CCS”) is
consistent with the trial court’s statements from the bench, showing:
Appellant’s Appendix, Volume II at 7.
[4] At the outset of the sentencing hearing (that was held immediately following
the conclusion of the bench trial), the court reiterated that it was “on its
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2634 | April 14, 2020 Page 3 of 5
own . . . vacating Counts II and III because they all happened at the same time,
the same incident. So, he’s being sentenced on the Domestic Battery as a Level
6 Felony.” Tr., Vol. II at 25. The trial court sentenced Raglin to one year for
Count I, with ninety days to be executed on home detention and the remainder
suspended to probation. The written sentencing order reflects only the
disposition of Count I:
Appealed Order at 1.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Raglin contends, and the State agrees, that remand is necessary to correct a
conflict between the trial court’s oral and written sentencing statements. When
oral and written sentencing statements conflict, we examine them together to
discern the intent of the court. Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010). We may remand the case for correction of clerical errors if the
intent of the trial court is unambiguous. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2634 | April 14, 2020 Page 4 of 5
[6] Here, it is clear from the trial court’s statements at the bench trial and
sentencing hearing that although it found Raglin guilty of Counts II and III, it
was vacating those counts. The CCS shows this as well. The intent of the trial
court with respect to the charges against Raglin is unambiguous; yet the written
sentencing order, which calls for a list of the defendant’s crimes and the
corresponding dispositions, plural, shows only one charge: Count I. Because
the better practice is for sentencing orders to be complete and accurate with
respect to the charges that were tried and the disposition of each, we remand to
the trial court to amend its sentencing order to reflect, as its oral sentencing
statement does, that Raglin was also tried on Counts II and III and that the
guilty verdicts on those counts were vacated.
Conclusion
[7] Based on the unambiguous nature of the trial court’s oral sentencing
pronouncement, we conclude the written sentencing order contains clerical
errors and remand this case for correction of those errors.
[8] Remanded.
May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.
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