In the Matter of the Supervised Estate of David M. Christian: Woodrow Garry DeRossett and William Larry DeRossett v. Estate of David M. Christian (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 15 2020, 9:13 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Robert J. Hardy Douglas E. Johnston
Hardy Law Office Dana K. Carlson
Auburn, Indiana Tourkow, Crell, Rosenblatt &
Johnston, LLP
Fort Wayne, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Supervised April 15, 2020
Estate of David M. Christian: Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-ES-2815
Appeal from the Dekalb Circuit
Woodrow Garry DeRossett and Court
William Larry DeRossett,
The Honorable Kurt Bentley Grimm,
Appellants, Judge
v. Trial Court Cause No.
17C01-1908-ES-4
Estate of David M. Christian,
Appellee.
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Woodrow Garry DeRossett and William Larry DeRossett (“the DeRossetts”),
brothers-in-law of decedent David M. Christian (“Christian”), bring this appeal
pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14. They appeal the denial of their motion
to correct error, which challenged a grant of summary judgment, upon the
motions of the Estate of David M. Christian (“the Estate”) and the Indiana
Family and Social Services Agency (“FSSA”),1 disposing of the DeRossetts’s
claim that Christian had deeded real property to them. The DeRossetts present
the sole issue of whether summary judgment was improvidently granted. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On September 17, 1986, Christian and his wife, Nancy, executed a mutual will
(“the Will”) providing that the survivor of them would take the entire estate of
the decedent, which would then pass upon the death of the last surviving spouse
to their three children, April Christian Blank, David Mark Christian, and
William Christian (“the Heirs”). The Heirs were minors when the Will was
executed, and thus the Will designated the DeRossetts to serve as personal
representatives.
1
The FSSA is not an active party on appeal.
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[3] Nancy died in 2003, owning an interest as a tenant in common with her
brothers, the DeRossetts, in two farms located in Noble County, Indiana.
Nancy owned a 1/9 interest in 48.83 acres on Waits Road (“the Waits Farm”)
and a 1/3 interest in 5.739 acres on Mapes Road (“the Mapes Farm”).
Pursuant to the Will, this property interest passed to Christian. Christian filed
in the office of the Recorder of Noble County (“the Recorder”) an affidavit as
surviving spouse and the Recorder documented the transfer of Nancy’s interest
to Christian.
[4] On November 26, 2016, Christian signed before a Notary Public a document
providing in its entirety as follows:
To Whom It May Concern:
I request that I, [signed] David M. Christian, (David M.
Christian) have my name be removed from any deed or record
that lists me as a part owner on any property, which also has W.
Garry DeRossett and W. Larry DeRossett as co-owners. It is my
desire to have the ownership of the property in the names of W.
Garry DeRossett and W. Larry DeRossett.
Sincerely,
[Signature and Notary Block]
(Appellee’s App. Vol. II, pg. 30.)
[5] Christian died on April 16, 2017, and an unsupervised estate was opened on
September 14, 2017. On October 30, 2017, the FSSA filed a claim against the
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Estate in the amount of $33,356.94. On December 12, 2017, the DeRossetts
filed a claim against the Estate for contribution to operational expenses of the
Waits Farm and the Mapes Farm. Because of the latter claim, the Heirs argued
that there was a conflict of interest in having either DeRossett brother serve as a
personal representative. The probate court appointed a special personal
representative. The interested parties then filed a Stipulation of Relevant Facts,
acknowledging that Christian had inherited and recorded Nancy’s interest in
the Waits Farm and the Mapes Farm.
[6] On July 17, 2018, the DeRossetts filed in the Recorder’s office a document
titled “Quitclaim Deed Under IC 32-21-1-15.” Id. at 32. According to the face
of the document, it commemorated a “Quitclaim executed on this 26th day of
November 2016 by grantor, David M. Christian.” Id. Appended to the
unsigned quitclaim deed was a notarized copy of the November 26, 2016
document. On November 5, 2018, the appointed personal representative of the
Estate filed a “Petition for Declaratory Ruling on One Critical Issue Involving
Title to Real Estate. Id. at 9.
[7] On January 21, 2019, the DeRossetts filed a motion for summary judgment in
their favor upon the personal representative’s request for declaratory relief. The
Estate and the FSSA filed cross-motions for summary judgment, collectively
contending that the document signed by Christian in November of 2016 was
not a valid deed to transfer any interest to the DeRossetts, that Christian was
prohibited by the terms of the Will from transferring any such property interest,
and that the purported transfer was procured by fraud. On August 23, 2019, the
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probate court issued its summary judgment order, identifying two grounds for
the decision: Christian had not executed a valid deed granting a real property
interest to the DeRossetts, and the Will prohibited Christian’s disposition of his
interest in the Waits Farm and the Mapes Farm.2 The court did not address the
alternate grounds of fraud. The probate court, sua sponte, ordered that the
unsupervised estate be converted to a supervised estate.
[8] On September 20, 2019, the DeRossetts filed a motion to correct error. The
motion was summarily denied, and this appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[9] In general, the denial of a motion to correct error is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Poiry v. City of New Haven, 113 N.E.3d 1236, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App.
2018). However, where issues raised are questions of law, our review is de
novo. Id. Here, the motion to correct error challenged the grant of summary
judgment. The Indiana Supreme Court has explained that
2
The Will contained Item 8, a non-revocation provision:
We have made a Will containing certain mutual provisions in favor of each other with the understanding
and upon the condition that neither of us will revoke such provision nor make any changes therein
without the written consent of the other and we have further agreed that neither of us shall transfer any
property during our lifetime without the consent of the other.
(Appellee’s App. Vol. II, pg. 25.)
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[w]e review summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of ... the non-moving parties, summary judgment is
appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Williams v.
Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T. R. 56(C)).
“A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of
the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to
resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the
undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable
inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014).
[10] A trial court’s findings and conclusions offer insight into the rationale for the
court’s judgment and facilitate appellate review but are not binding on this
Court. Denson v. Estate of Dillard, 116 N.E.3d 535, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
Additionally, we are not constrained to the claims and arguments presented to
the trial court, and we may affirm a summary judgment ruling on any theory
supported by the designated evidence. Id. The fact that the parties have filed
cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter this standard of review or
change our analysis. Id. The party that lost in the trial court has the burden of
persuading us that the trial court erred. Id.
[11] Here, the DeRossetts contended that they, and not the Estate, owned the
property previously owned by Nancy, as evidenced by a quitclaim deed
incorporating a deed from Christian. The probate court concluded that the
purported quitclaim deed failed to comply with the requirements of Indiana
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Code Section 32-21-1-15. Where, as here, the relevant facts are not in dispute
and the interpretation of a statute is at issue, such statutory interpretation
presents a pure question of law for which summary judgment disposition is
appropriate. Clem v. Watts, 27 N.E.3d 789, 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The first
step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the legislature has spoken
clearly and unambiguously on the point in question. Id. When a statute is clear
and unambiguous, we need not apply any rules of construction other than to
require that the words and phrases be taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual
sense. Id.
[12] A valid deed must satisfy certain requirements; that is,
[i]n order that an instrument purporting to convey title to land or
an interest or estate in land may be valid as a deed and operative
to pass such title to or interest in land, it is essential that there be
a grantor, a grantee, and a thing granted, and that it convey a
present interest or estate. It is further necessary that the
instrument be signed by the grantor, or someone whom he directs
to sign for him, or his authorized agent, be attested and
acknowledged in conformity to the local statutory requirements,
and delivered by the grantor to the grantee or to someone in his
behalf and accepted by the grantee.
Bercot v. Velkoff, 111 Ind. Ct. App. 323, 332, 41 N.E.2d 686, 689 (1942).
[13] Regarding quitclaim deeds in particular, Indiana Code Section 32-21-1-15(a)
provides:
A conveyance of land that is:
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(1) worded in substance as “A.B. quitclaims to C.D.” (here
describe the premises) “for the sum of” (here insert the
consideration); and
(2) signed, sealed, and acknowledged by the grantor (as defined
in IC 32-17-1-1);
is a good and sufficient conveyance in quitclaim to the grantee
and the grantee’s heirs and assigns.
[14] The purported quitclaim deed filed by the DeRossetts was not signed, sealed,
and acknowledged by Christian as the grantor. In order to ostensibly satisfy the
requirement of that action by the grantor, the DeRossetts appended the
November 2016 document. The quitclaim document itself included a legal
description of some real property, albeit not a description derived from the
purportedly incorporated conveyance document. At bottom, the DeRossetts
have contended they were able to draft and execute a quitclaim deed because
Christian had earlier conveyed his interest in the farms in a form that the
DeRossetts had accepted and considered to be a deed. However, the
underlying document suffered from a fatal deficiency.
[15] It has long been the law that “deeds purporting to convey lands, which do not
describe or designate the lands, are invalid for uncertainty.” Wilson v. Johnson,
145 Ind. 40, 38 N.E. 38, 39 (1894). The DeRossetts observe that Indiana Code
Section 32-21-1-15 “does not define what is an adequate description” and they
argue that “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the November 26, 2016
document did in fact contain an adequate description.” Appellant’s Brief at 11.
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They encourage liberality in evaluating a property description and argue that,
given Christian’s reference to property he co-owned with the DeRossetts, “it is
possible that a finder of fact could conclude the description sufficient when only
two parcels in existence meet that description.” Id. at 12. Our Indiana
Supreme Court has plainly stated, “It is a familiar rule, that the part of the deed
describing the premises conveyed shall be construed with the utmost liberality.”
Rucker v. Steelman, 73 Ind. 396, 407 (1881). That said, nothing is left to a
factfinder here. As a matter of law, a property description is required for a valid
deed. The document signed by Christian stating his request that his name be
removed from unspecified deeds or records does not contain any description to
which the principle of liberal construction might be applied.
[16] The probate court properly concluded that the purported quitclaim deed,
derivative of a document lacking a property description, was invalid. The
Estate is entitled to summary judgment on this basis, and we need not address
whether Christian was contractually proscribed, by the terms of the Will, from
conveying any property inherited from his wife.
Conclusion
[17] Summary judgment was properly granted to the Estate disposing of the
DeRossetts’s claim that they had been granted Christian’s interest in the Waits
Farm and the Mapes Farm.
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[18] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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