Travis Pugh v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                        FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                    Feb 18 2020, 9:10 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                     CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                              Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                        and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    John A. Kindley                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    South Bend, Indiana                                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Benjamin J. Shoptaw
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Travis Pugh,                                             February 18, 2020
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-998
    v.                                               Appeal from the Clay Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable J. Blaine Akers,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Senior Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    11D01-1803-F4-253
    Bailey, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-998 | February 18, 2020                  Page 1 of 10
    Case Summary
    [1]   A jury convicted Travis Pugh (“Pugh”) of Theft, as a Level 6 felony,1 and Auto
    Theft, a Level 6 felony,2 and in the second trial stage, a bench trial, Pugh was
    convicted of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, a
    Level 4 felony.3 He challenges the convictions upon the theft counts tried to the
    jury, presenting the sole issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion by
    refusing to exclude a rebuttal witness who had failed to honor a subpoena to
    testify during the State’s case-in-chief. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In 2018, sixty-nine-year-old Stephen Lucas (“Lucas”) was living at the Brazil,
    Indiana residence of his stepfather, Tim Dove (“Dove”). Lucas was a collector
    of guns and coins, some of which he kept in a safe and closets at the Dove
    residence. Pugh became acquainted with Lucas in the course of some
    transactions at a car dealership. Lucas frequently visited the dealership, and
    Pugh sometimes stopped by the Dove residence without a specific invitation.
    At some point, Pugh learned that Lucas had some valuable collections.
    1
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1).
    2
    I.C. § 35-43-4-2.5(b)(1).
    3
    I.C. § 35-47-4-5.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-998 | February 18, 2020   Page 2 of 10
    [3]   On the morning of January 20, 2018, Lucas was home alone sleeping. Dove
    had been temporarily admitted to a nursing home but had left his truck
    available for use by some family members. When Lucas awoke, he saw Pugh
    and questioned him as to why he was there. Pugh claimed that the door had
    been unlocked and he was checking on Lucas’s well-being. Pugh left without
    incident, but Lucas called the police to report the unauthorized entry.
    [4]   That evening, Pugh returned to the Dove residence, accompanied by Cortney
    Fortner (“Fortner”), Kirstie Stanley (“Stanley”), and Dylan Sinn (“Sinn”).
    Pugh had told Fortner to distract Lucas so that the men could take Lucas’s
    coins. Stanley was carrying a bottle of vodka and drinking heavily. When
    Lucas answered his doorbell to find two women whom he did not know, he
    allowed them entry because he recognized Pugh.
    [5]   The women asked for a drink and a tour of the house; Lucas complied with the
    requests. Eventually, Lucas and the women entered the master bathroom and
    Stanley asked to bathe in the Jacuzzi. Lucas seated himself on a bath chair and
    Fortner stripped down to her bra and panties and sat on Lucas’s lap. Stanley
    removed all her clothes and took a bath. After about twenty minutes, Sinn
    entered the bathroom and insisted that they “had to go.” (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 35.)
    The women dressed and followed Sinn out.
    [6]   Fortner drove away in her Jeep, with Stanley as a passenger. Pugh and Sinn
    took off in Dove’s vehicle. The group met up and rented a motel room
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-998 | February 18, 2020   Page 3 of 10
    together. Fortner observed the men carry approximately twenty guns inside the
    motel.
    [7]    Lucas tried to enter his bedroom but found the door locked. Untroubled, he
    laid down on the sofa and went to sleep. The next morning, Dove’s son, Tony
    Dove (“Tony”), entered the residence and asked Lucas why Dove’s truck was
    missing. Lucas and Tony then forced open the bedroom door lock to discover
    that many of Lucas’s guns were missing. They notified police.
    [8]    Fortner, Pugh, and Sinn drove to Indianapolis to dispose of the stolen guns.
    After the guns were delivered and the trio smoked methamphetamine together,
    Pugh parted ways with Fortner and Sinn. Sinn retained possession of Dove’s
    truck and one gun. Subsequently, Sinn was arrested on an outstanding warrant
    and found to be in possession of Dove’s truck. Further investigation led to
    Pugh’s arrest.
    [9]    On March 28, 2018, the State charged Pugh with Unlawful Possession of a
    Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, Theft, and Auto Theft. On February 6,
    2019, the State alleged Pugh to be an habitual offender. Pugh was brought to
    trial on March 5, 2019, in trifurcated proceedings. Fortner, who had been listed
    on the State’s witness list, testified to the above-described events. Stanley, who
    had not been listed on the State’s witness list, but had been subpoenaed by the
    State, testified in the rebuttal phase.
    [10]   The jury found Pugh guilty on the charges of Theft and Auto Theft. After Pugh
    waived his right to a jury trial on the possession charge, the trial court found
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-998 | February 18, 2020   Page 4 of 10
    Pugh had committed Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent
    Felony; finally, the trial court dismissed the habitual offender allegation upon a
    motion from the State.
    [11]   On April 4, 2019, the trial court sentenced Pugh to serve twelve years
    imprisonment for the possession conviction, with two and one-half years
    suspended to probation, and two and one-half years for each of the theft
    convictions. The theft sentences were concurrent sentences, but consecutive to
    the possession sentence, providing for an aggregate sentence of fourteen and
    one-half years, with two and one-half years suspended to probation. Pugh now
    appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    Standard of Review
    [12]   Pugh contends that the trial court’s denial of his motion to exclude Stanley’s
    testimony is an abuse of discretion. The purposes of pretrial discovery include
    enhancing the accuracy and efficiency of the fact-finding process and the
    prevention of surprise by allowing the parties adequate time to prepare their
    cases. Beauchamp v. State, 
    788 N.E.2d 881
    , 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). A trial
    court typically enjoys broad discretion in ruling on discovery violations and we
    will reverse only if the court has abused its discretion. 
    Id. [13] With
    regard to rebuttal witnesses, ‘“nondisclosure [] is excused only when that
    witness was unknown and unanticipated; known and anticipated witnesses,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-998 | February 18, 2020   Page 5 of 10
    even if presented in rebuttal, must be identified pursuant to a court order, such
    as a pre-trial order, or to a proper discovery request.”’ Carrigg v. State, 
    696 N.E.2d 392
    , 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting McCullough v. Archbold Ladder
    Co., 
    605 N.E.2d 175
    , 179 (Ind. 1993)). A “known” witness refers to knowledge
    that the witness exists. 
    Id. An “anticipated”
    witness is one which a party or
    counsel anticipates the need for at trial. 
    Id. “Exclusion of
    evidence as a
    discovery abuse sanction is proper where there is a showing that the State
    engaged in deliberate or otherwise reprehensible conduct that prohibits the
    defendant from receiving a fair trial.” 
    Beauchamp, 788 N.E.2d at 892-93
    .
    Analysis
    [14]   At the commencement of the jury trial, defense counsel advised the trial court
    that counsel had been informed, just the prior evening, that the State intended
    to call Stanley as a witness. Pugh sought exclusion of Stanley’s testimony
    because she had not been included on the State’s witness list and he had not
    deposed her. After hearing argument of counsel, the trial court declined to
    exclude Stanley as a witness but instructed the State to “have her released [from
    a treatment facility] and get her here tonight” so that defense counsel could
    question her. (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 66.)
    [15]   Stanley did not honor her subpoena and a bench warrant was issued for her
    arrest. Fortner testified that Pugh had planned the robbery that she, Stanley,
    and Sinn helped execute. The State rested its case-in-chief, and Pugh testified
    in his own defense. He testified that he had not stolen anything from Lucas and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-998 | February 18, 2020   Page 6 of 10
    denied that he devised a plan for distraction. According to Pugh, he first met
    Stanley on January 20, 2018, and had provided Fortner with the address of the
    Dove residence only so that the women could go there and offer Lucas female
    companionship. He claimed that he did not accompany them but showed up
    later. He denied going to Indianapolis to dispose of any stolen property.
    [16]   After the defense rested, defense counsel advised the trial court that Stanley had
    been located and the State intended to call her as a rebuttal witness. Pugh
    objected that his decision to testify had been “based on the State resting and
    Ms. Stanley not testifying.” 
    Id. at Vol.
    III, pg. 126. The trial court refused to
    exclude Stanley as a witness but requested “assurance” from the State that the
    scope of Stanley’s testimony would be limited to “simply rebutting what the
    witness testified here to [sic].” 
    Id. at 127.
    The State advised that the questions
    to be posed to Stanley would consist of exploring whether she had met Pugh
    before January 20, 2018, whether he was at the Dove residence on that date,
    whether she observed him in the stolen vehicle that evening, and whether he
    was in Indianapolis the following day.
    [17]   The State elicited testimony from Stanley that she had met Pugh at Fortner’s
    home; Pugh, Fortner, Stanley, and Sinn rode together to the house of an older
    man she described as Pugh’s friend; she became very intoxicated; and she
    remembered waking up in a hotel room with a few guns there. During cross-
    examination, Stanley admitted that she had not seen Pugh take any property,
    she had heard no discussion of a plan, and she had been offered reduction of
    her felony charge to a misdemeanor in exchange for her testimony.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-998 | February 18, 2020   Page 7 of 10
    [18]   Pugh now argues that Stanley’s testimony should have been excluded because:
    she had failed to comply with the State’s subpoena and had failed
    to appear to testify for the State during its case-in-chief. What
    she had to say on rebuttal could have been said in the State’s
    case-in-chief, and therefore should have been presented at that
    time. The reason for requiring advance disclosure of all
    witnesses, including rebuttal witnesses, is to prevent surprise.
    The State already has the considerable advantage of getting to go
    last in a criminal case. When the defense forms and presents its
    case, including the crucial decision of whether the defendant will
    testify or not, it is entitled to be informed of the evidence against
    him. When a witness is not listed on the State’s witness list, and
    when the judge nevertheless signifies that he will let that witness
    testify for the State but that witness fails to show up to testify for
    the State, the defendant in forming and presenting his own case is
    entitled to rely on the assumption that he is fully informed of the
    evidence against him.
    Appellant’s Brief at 7. At bottom, Pugh suggests that he would not have
    testified if he had known that Stanley was going to do so. Pugh is not
    contending that the State “engaged in deliberate or otherwise reprehensible
    conduct,” 
    Beauchamp, 788 N.E.2d at 893
    , that denied him a fair trial.
    [19]   Stanley’s testimony was delayed because she did not timely honor her
    subpoena; this evinces misconduct on her part and not the part of the State.
    That said, the State should have listed Stanley on its pretrial witness list.
    Nonetheless, Pugh learned well in advance of his testimony that the State
    hoped to elicit testimony from Stanley. And he cites no authority for the
    proposition that the severe discovery sanction of witness exclusion may be
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-998 | February 18, 2020   Page 8 of 10
    imposed because a witness’s recalcitrance factored into a defendant’s decision
    to testify or not to testify.
    [20]   Even assuming that the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of
    evidence, “[a]n error is harmless when it results in no prejudice to the
    ‘substantial rights’ of a party.” Durden v. State, 
    99 N.E.3d 645
    , 652 (Ind. 2018)
    (citing Indiana Trial Rule 61).4 The basic premise of the rule is that “a
    conviction may stand when the error had no bearing on the outcome of the
    case.” 
    Id. Here, the
    jury heard Lucas’s testimony that he awoke to find Pugh
    in his house; Pugh returned that evening uninvited; and Lucas discovered, as
    soon as he gained entry to his bedroom, that many of his guns were missing.
    The jury also heard Fortner’s testimony that Pugh had identified Lucas as a
    target and enlisted her help with a plan of distraction. Fortner further testified
    that she saw Pugh drive away in Dove’s truck; she saw Pugh in possession of
    numerous guns; and she, Sinn, and Pugh went to Indianapolis to dispose of the
    guns. This evidence is such that we can conclude that Stanley’s testimony of
    her drunken escapade (while denying knowledge of a criminal plan or having
    observed any taking of property) “had no bearing on the outcome of the case.”
    
    Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 652
    . Allowing Stanley’s testimony was, at worst,
    harmless error.
    4
    Indiana Trial Rule 61 provides in relevant part: “[t]he court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard
    any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-998 | February 18, 2020                  Page 9 of 10
    Conclusion
    [21]   Pugh has failed to demonstrate an abuse of the trial court’s discretion
    warranting reversal of his convictions.
    [22]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-998 | February 18, 2020   Page 10 of 10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-CR-998

Filed Date: 2/18/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2020