Jason B. Conn v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 19 2020, 10:46 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
– Appellate Division
George P. Sherman
Indianapolis, Indiana Supervising Deputy Attorney
Michael C. Borschel General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jason B. Conn, February 19, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1988
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable H. Patrick
Appellee-Plaintiff. Murphy, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G16-1904-CM-16165
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Jason B. Conn (“Conn”) appeals his conviction in the Marion Superior Court
for domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor. Conn claims that insufficient
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evidence supports his conviction under the incredible dubiosity rule.
Concluding that the evidence is sufficient, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The night of April 26, 2019, Conn was at the home he had, up to that time,
shared with his partner Balinda Jones (“Jones”). Jones was moving out of the
house and had spent the day packing her belongings with the help of her son.
Around 11:00 p.m., Jones’s son departed, and Jones and Conn were left with a
friend of Conn’s, who was visiting. Conn and the friend had been drinking
alcohol and using illicit drugs that evening. After midnight, the friend left the
house to buy more drugs and alcohol.
[3] Jones and Conn sat in the darkened living room, and at some point, the two
had an argument. Then, while looking down at her phone, Jones saw a “flash
of something” in her peripheral vision and was suddenly struck “very hard” on
the mouth with a small, heavy object. Tr. pp. 13–14. Jones ran out the front
door with her phone in her hand and hid behind her parked car. She called 911
and waited, crouched behind her car until law enforcement arrived. Blood from
her injury dripped down her neck, hand, and onto her phone.
[4] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Matthew Harris (“Officer
Harris”) responded to Jones’s report of the domestic disturbance. He saw Jones
“hiding” and acting panicked near her car when he arrived. Tr. p. 25. Officer
Harris called for an ambulance, and emergency personnel photographed and
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treated the injury to Jones’s mouth and chin on the scene. Officer Harris did not
recover the object Jones believed had hit her, a glass candle holder.
[5] Conn was charged on April 30, 2019, with Class A misdemeanor domestic
battery and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury; a no
contact order was also ordered that day. A bench trial was held on July 29, and
Conn was found guilty of both offenses; judgment of conviction was entered as
to domestic battery, for which Conn received a 365-day sentence with 355 days
suspended. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
[6] When addressing a claim of insufficient evidence, we neither reweigh the
evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. McAllister v. State, 91 N.E.3d
554, 558 (Ind. 2018). Rather, we look to the evidence most favorable to the
verdict with all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. Id. If
there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the verdict and the
evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will remain undisturbed. Id.
Moreover, it is for the trier of fact to reject a defendant’s version of what
happened, to determine all inferences arising from the evidence, and to decide
which witnesses to believe. Lewis v. State, 438 N.E.2d 289, 293 (Ind. 1982). The
evidence need not “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Sallee
v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016).
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[7] Conn asserts that the verdict cannot stand because Jones’s testimony was
“incredibly dubious” and was presented as the only evidence in support of the
State’s case. Appellant’s Br. at 10. In general, the uncorroborated testimony of
one victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133,
135 (Ind. 2012). Under the incredible dubiosity rule, a reviewing court will
impinge on the factfinder’s responsibility to judge the credibility of a witness
only when it has confronted inherently improbable testimony or coerced,
equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity. Herron v.
State, 808 N.E.2d 172, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. If a sole witness
presents incredibly dubious or inherently improbable evidence such that no
reasonable person could believe it and if there is a complete lack of
circumstantial evidence, a defendant’s conviction may be reversed. Id.
[8] Conn argues that the incredible dubiosity rule should apply because Jones’s
testimony was the “only” evidence supporting his conviction. We disagree.
Here, Jones testified as to the nature of the injury that Conn inflicted upon her,
which consisted of a cut to Jones’s lip and chin. Photographic evidence that the
State offered corroborated Jones’s testimony in that it showed the injury to her
lip and chin. Officer Harris testified that no other individual was in the house
with Conn and Jones. Based on the evidence before the trial court, application
of the incredible dubiosity rule is not warranted because Jones was not the sole
witness and because her testimony was corroborated by circumstantial
evidence. See Holeton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 539, 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
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(declining to reverse conviction because victim’s testimony was corroborated by
other evidence and was not incredibly dubious).
[9] Furthermore, Conn’s argument that Jones’s guilty plea to a charge of false
informing from 2012 renders her testimony incredibly dubious in the present
case is not well taken. The weight given to evidence of a prior conviction for a
crime of dishonesty is a question of witness credibility for the factfinder. Cohen
v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1168, 1180 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. This
Court will not “invade the province” of the factfinder by reevaluating witness
credibility on appeal. Id. As for Conn’s assertion that Jones’s testimony was
inherently improbable because she did not actually see Conn throw an object at
her, and because Officer Harris did not recover a projectile in Conn’s house, we
are unpersuaded. Jones’s testimony was that she had ended a long-term
relationship with Conn and was moving out of his house. The two had argued
earlier that night, and Conn was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the
time of the incident. From the sequence of events Jones described and the
injury she received, the trial court could reasonably infer that Conn threw an
object at Jones, causing her injury.
Conclusion
[10] We conclude that Jones’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence and
was not incredibly dubious. Thus, sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
judgment, and we affirm Conn’s conviction for domestic battery.
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[11] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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