Charles Huffer v. Chelsy Huffer (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 21 2020, 6:30 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Julie C. Dixon Alan D. Wilson
Bryan L. Ciyou Kokomo, Indiana
Alexander N. Moseley
Ciyou & Dixon, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Charles Huffer, February 21, 2020
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-DR-1150
v. Appeal from the
Carroll Circuit Court
Chelsy Huffer, The Honorable
Appellee-Petitioner. Thomas R. Lett, Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
08C01-1609-DR-82
Kirsch, Judge.
[1] Charles Huffer (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s decree of dissolution of his
marriage to Chelsy Huffer (“Mother”) and its subsequent order on Father’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 1 of 19
motion to correct error. Father raises five issues for our review, which we
restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it issued
a contempt order sentencing Father to thirty days in jail
but suspending the sentence on the conditions that he
submit to a drug test and strictly comply with court orders;
II. Whether the trial court erred in awarding sole physical and
legal custody of the parties’ children to Mother because the
evidence did not support the findings and the findings did
not support the conclusions;
III. Whether the trial court erred in not giving Father credit
against his child support arrearage amount for the
overnights the children spent with him and for Father’s
payment of health insurance while the action was pending;
IV. Whether the trial court erred in its distribution of the
marital property because it inaccurately found that there
was no debt associated with the truck awarded to Father;
and
V. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
awarded Mother attorney fees associated with the finding
of contempt.
[2] We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Father and Mother (together, “the Parties”) were married on March 24, 2012,
and two children (“the Children”) were born of the marriage. Appellant’s App.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 2 of 19
Vol. 2 at 23. Prior to the marriage, the Parties entered into an Antenuptial
Agreement on March 12, 2012 (“the Antenuptial Agreement”), which they
agreed was binding and enforceable. Id. at 117; Tr. Vol. 2 at 109; Tr. Vol. 3 at
124. The Antenuptial Agreement contained a provision stating, “[t]he parties
hereby waive and release each other from any and all other claims to property,
support, maintenance, and alimony, whether temporary or permanent, as well
as attorney fees, to the full extent that they may now or in the future legally do
so . . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 120.
[4] The Parties separated on August 24, 2016. Id. at 23. On September 12, 2016,
Mother filed a petition for dissolution, and on January 4, 2017, the trial court
entered a Provisional Order. Id. at 52, 54. The Provisional Order determined
that the Parties were to have joint legal custody of the Children and that Mother
was to have primary physical custody of the Children. Id. at 54. The trial court
found that Father was to pay child support in the amount of $298.00 per week
and that the child support obligation should be retroactive to the date of the
filing of the petition for dissolution. Id. At the time of the Provisional Order,
Father was ordered to maintain health insurance for the Children. Id.
[5] Over the course of the dissolution proceedings, Mother filed an emergency
modification of custody petition, a motion to clarify whether Father was to
receive overnights, as well as numerous contempt citations against Father. Id.
at 58, 78, 81, 133. As part of an Agreed Entry and Order, the Parties stipulated
to hire and utilize a parenting coordinator to be a “conduit for communications
between the [P]arties that involve the [C]hildren, parenting time, and parenting
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 3 of 19
decisions.” Id. at 64. On February 13, 2018, Father filed a motion to modify
child support requesting that the amount of child support ordered in the
Provisional Order be modified to give Father credit for paying for the
Children’s health insurance and for the proper amount of overnights that he
exercised with the Children. Id. at 73-77. On March 19, 2018, the trial court
held a hearing on that motion and the other pending motions; however, the
hearing was not completed and was never reset for completion. Tr. Vol. 2 at 2,
14, 68-69.
[6] The final hearing on the petition for dissolution was held on September 12 and
13, 2018. At that hearing, the trial court stated that evidence would be heard at
that time on all pending motions, and “everything we’ve done so far that hasn’t
had a ruling or a resolution, [will] just be brought forward to today.” Id. at 72.
Prior to the hearing, Father had filed a request for specific findings and
conclusions pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52, and after the hearing, the Parties
filed proposed findings and conclusions. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 158, 161-82,
183-208.
[7] On November 16, 2018, the trial court issued its findings of fact and
conclusions thereon, granting the petition for dissolution of marriage and
determining issues of child custody, child support, and property division (“the
Decree”). Id. at 22-46. In the Decree, the trial court awarded Mother sole
custody of the Children, ordered Father to pay child support, and divided the
marital property. Id. In its determination, the trial court used the $298.00 per
week obligation from the Provisional Order to calculate that Father had not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 4 of 19
paid his full amount of child support, and that an arrearage existed. Id. at 24.
The Decree determined that Father owed $3,377.00 in child support arrearage.
Id. at 24, 41. The trial court also found Father to be in indirect contempt of the
court for failing to follow several of the trial court’s orders and binding
recommendations and sentenced Father to thirty days in jail with the sentence
suspended under the conditions that Father strictly follow all orders of the trial
court and immediately submit to a previously-ordered drug screen. Id. at 42.
The trial court ordered Father to pay Mother’s attorney fees for the contempt
finding in the amount of $3,000.00 as a penalty for the indirect contempt. Id. at
42-43.
[8] On December 17, 2018, Father filed a motion to correct error arguing that the
trial court erred in not giving him credit for the correct number of overnights in
the calculation of child support in the Decree and in not giving him credit for
his payment of health insurance for the Children and for the correct number of
overnights as it pertained to child support ordered in the Provisional Order,
which resulted in an arrearage. Id. at 214-16. Father also argued, among other
things, that the trial court erred in dividing the marital estate, in its finding of
indirect contempt and ordering him to pay attorney fees, and in not making a
determination of who has legal custody of the Children. Id. at 218-21. After a
hearing, the trial court issued an order on Father’s motion to correct error,
finding that it erred by crediting Father with the incorrect number of overnights
in the calculation of child support in the Decree and correcting that error to
reflect the correct number, which lowered Father’s child support payment. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 5 of 19
at 47. The trial court also found it erred in not specifically designating a
custodial parent and awarded Mother sole legal and physical custody. Id. at 49.
The trial court further found no error in its contempt finding, award of attorney
fees, division of marital property, and arrearage determination. Id.
Specifically, in reference to the arrearage determination, the trial court found
that there had been no request to reconsider the child support determination
calculated in the provisional order. Id. Father now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Contempt
[9] Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found him in
indirect contempt of court. Specifically, he contends that the sentence of thirty
days in jail was punitive and not designed to coerce compliance and was,
therefore, erroneously imposed. We review the trial court’s ruling on a
contempt petition for an abuse of discretion. Reed v. Cassady, 27 N.E.3d 1104,
1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. We will affirm unless, after reviewing
the record, we conclude that the trial court’s decision is against the logic and
circumstances before it, and we have a firm and definite belief that a mistake
has been made by the trial court. Id.
[10] Contempt of court involves disobedience of a court order that undermines the
court’s authority, justice, and dignity. Id. (citing City of Gary v. Major, 822
N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ind. 2005)). A person who willfully disobeys a lawfully
issued court order is guilty of indirect contempt. Ind. Code § 34-47-3-1. “‘A
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 6 of 19
court’s inherent civil contempt powers are both coercive and remedial in
nature.’” S.W. ex rel. Wesolowski v. Kurtic, 950 N.E.2d 19, 22 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011) (quoting Flash v. Holtsclaw, 789 N.E.2d 955, 959 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
trans. denied). In a civil contempt proceeding, the primary objective is not to
punish, but rather, to coerce action or to compensate the aggrieved party. Id.
In such cases, imprisonment may be imposed in order to coerce compliance
with the court order. Id. “If the court uses imprisonment to coerce the
defendant into doing an affirmative act, the court must provide that the
imprisonment cease as soon as the act is done.” Reed, 27 N.E.3d at 1114 (citing
Moore v. Ferguson, 680 N.E.2d 862, 865 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied). “A
jail sentence for civil contempt must be coercive rather than punitive in nature,
and, to avoid being purely punitive, a contempt order must offer an opportunity
for the recalcitrant party to purge himself or herself of the contempt.” Id.
[11] Here, in the Decree, the trial court found Father in indirect contempt of the
court for failing to follow several of the court’s orders and binding
recommendations that had been issued. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 42.
Specifically, Father failed to follow the trial court’s orders by failing to
communicate about the children through the parenting coordinator and instead,
repeatedly communicating directly with Mother, and by refusing to submit to a
drug screen after being ordered to do so. Id. at 42, 63-66, 68, 108. The trial
court sentenced Father to thirty days in jail and suspended the execution of the
sentence under the following terms and conditions:
a. [Father] shall strictly comply with all orders of the court.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 7 of 19
b. [Father] shall immediately submit to a hair follicle and urine
drug screen. [Father] shall report to MedOne/St. Vincent
Immediate Care . . . within 48 hours of the Order.
c. The results of the hair follicle and urine drug screen shall be
provided to [Mother’s] and [Father’s] counsel within 24 hours of
receipt.
Id. at 42.
[12] The trial court’s order that Father serve time in jail for failing to follow
numerous orders of the court by repeatedly communicating directly with
Mother instead of the parenting coordinator and by failing to submit to a drug
screen contained an opportunity for Father to purge himself of the contempt.
Although the trial court sentenced Father to thirty days in jail, the sentence was
suspended on the conditions that Father immediately submit to a drug screen
and report the results and that he strictly comply with the trial court’s orders in
the future. These conditions offered an opportunity for Father to cure or purge
himself of the contempt, which is necessary to find a sanction coercive and not
punitive. Because we find that the trial court’s contempt sanction was coercive
and not punitive, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it found Father in indirect contempt of court.1
1
Father also seems to attempt to argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it found him in
contempt because it failed to give him adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the
contempt charges. To the extent that this is his argument, he has waived it for failure to present a cogent
argument. See Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“Failure to present a cogent
argument results in waiver of the issue on appeal.”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 8 of 19
II. Custody
[13] The trial court’s decisions regarding child custody are reviewed only for an
abuse of discretion. Purnell v. Purnell, 131 N.E.3d 622, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)
(citing Sabo v. Sabo, 858 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)), trans. denied.
There is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and
deference to trial judges in family law matters. Id. (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51
N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016)). Here, Father requested specific findings and
conclusions pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52. “The purpose of Trial Rule
52(A) is ‘to provide the parties and the reviewing court with the theory upon
which the trial judge decided the case in order that the right of review for error
may be effectively preserved.’” In re Paternity of S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d 879, 885
(Ind. Ct. App. 2017). When a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions
of law pursuant to Trial Rule 52, we apply the following two-tiered standard of
review: whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings
support the judgment. Hazelett v. Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d 153, 157 (Ind. Ct. App.
2019) (citing Tompa v. Tompa, 867 N.E.2d 158, 163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). The
trial court’s findings and conclusions will be set aside only if they are clearly
erroneous, that is, if the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them.
Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with
a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. We neither reweigh the
evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses but consider only the
evidence most favorable to the judgment. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 9 of 19
[14] Father argues that the trial court erred when it awarded sole legal and physical
custody of the Children to Mother. He specifically contends that there are no
findings or conclusions that supported that it was in the best interests of the
Children for Mother to have sole legal and physical custody as required by
Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8. Father further asserts that the trial court’s
findings are improper because they are merely recitations of what witnesses
testified to at the hearing or other evidence presented and are not actual
findings that the trial court determined to be true. Father also claims that the
findings do not address the factors contained in the statute and, instead, focus
on the relationship between Mother and Father without findings on how that
relationship affects the Children.
[15] We agree with Father that the trial court’s findings are not appropriate.
Findings of fact must be specific enough to provide the reader with an
understanding of the juvenile court’s reasons, based on the evidence, for its
findings of ultimate fact. Moore v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 682 N.E.2d
545, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “A finding of fact must indicate, not what
someone said is true, but what is determined to be true, for that is the trier of
fact’s duty.” Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d at 159. Therefore, findings “‘indicat[ing] that
the testimony or evidence was this or the other are not findings of fact.’” Pack v.
Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 935 N.E.2d 1218, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
(quoting Moore, 682 N.E.2d at 547). In the present case, the majority of the trial
court’s findings pertaining to custody are merely a recitation of witness
testimony, portions of relevant orders, descriptions of evidence admitted, each
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 10 of 19
party’s custody requests, and citations to relevant legal authority. Excluding
these insufficient findings and undisputed background information, the
remaining findings and conclusions pertaining to the trial court’s custody
determination are not sufficient to determine whether the trial court’s findings
support its custody determination. Therefore, we vacate all of the findings
purporting to apply to or support the determination of legal and physical
custody of the Children and remand in order for the trial court to enter
appropriate and adequate findings that reflect what the trial court determined to
be true. See Hazelett, 119 N.E.3d at 159 (remanding a dissolution case to the
trial court with instructions to enter proper findings of fact and conclusions
thereon to support the trial court’s custody determination because the trial
court’s original findings were not sufficient and did not reflect what the trial
court found to be true).
III. Child Support
[16] “A decision to grant or deny a motion to correct error and decisions regarding
child support, such as modification of child support, are also reviewed for an
abuse of that discretion.” Lovold v. Ellis, 988 N.E.3d 1144, 1149-50 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if
the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. at 1150. When reviewing a decision
for an abuse of discretion, we consider only the evidence and reasonable
inferences favorable to the judgment. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 11 of 19
[17] Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it calculated his
child support arrearage. Specifically, he alleges that the trial court failed to
modify the provisional order to give him credit for health insurance payments
he made for the Children and for the correct number of overnights he exercised
with the Children during the time the dissolution proceedings were pending.
Father argues that, by not giving him the proper credit for the health insurance
and overnights, the trial court erroneously calculated his child support
obligation in the Provisional Order, which resulted in an incorrect arrearage
calculation.
[18] A provisional order is designed to maintain the status quo of the parties during
the dissolution proceedings. Del Priore v. Del Priore, 65 N.E.3d 1065, 1074 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2016) (citing Mosley v. Mosley, 906 N.E.2d 928, 929 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009)), trans. denied. It is an interim order that terminates when the final
dissolution decree is entered. Id. (citing Ind. Code § 31-15-4-14). “The terms of
a provisional order may be revoked or modified before the final decree on a
showing of the facts appropriate to revocation or modification.” Ind. Code §
31-15-4-15. “Any disparity or inequity in a provisional order -- can and should -
- be adjusted in the trial court’s final order.” Mosley, 906 N.E.2d at 930.
[19] In the present case, on January 4, 2017, the trial court entered a Provisional
Order, finding the Parties were to have joint legal custody of the Children, that
Mother should have primary physical custody of the Children, that Father was
to pay child support in the amount of $298.00 per week, and that Father was
ordered to maintain health insurance on the Children. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 12 of 19
54. On the Child Support Obligation Worksheet, Father was given parenting
time credit for 96-100 overnights, but there was no amount given for credit for
the Children’s weekly health insurance. Id. at 56. On February 13, 2018,
Father filed a motion to modify the child support ordered in the Provisional
Order and asserted that he was solely responsible for paying for the Children’s
health insurance but was not given credit for it and that he was not given credit
for the proper amount of overnights. Id. at 73-74. On March 19, 2018, the trial
court held a hearing on this motion in addition to other pending motions;
however, the hearing was not completed and was never reset for completion.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 2, 14, 68-69. At that hearing, Father testified that he had 141
overnights with the Children, and he testified and presented evidence that he
paid $113.56 per week for health insurance for the Children. Id. at 25-27. The
final hearing on the petition for dissolution was held on September 12 and 13,
2018, and at the beginning of the hearing, the trial court stated that evidence
would be heard at that time on all pending motions, and “everything we’ve
done so far that hasn’t had a ruling or a resolution, [will] just be brought
forward to today.” Id. at 72. In the Decree, the trial court, using the $298.00
child support amount from the Provisional Order, calculated Father’s child
support arrearage to be $3,377.00. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 24. After Father
filed a motion to correct error, the trial court issued an order and stated:
[Father] contends that the court erred in finding that he owes
child support arrearage from the Provisional Order. The court
finds that the Provisional Order was entered January 4, 2017 and
calculated the child support obligation to be $298[.00]. There
was no request to reconsider this amount filed by [Father],
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 13 of 19
therefore, this is the Provisional Support Order. The court did
not err by enforcing its Order and finding that [Father] has a
child support arrearage.
Id. at 49.
[20] We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it found in its order
on the motion to correct error that Father did not file a request to reconsider the
child support amount from the provisional order. Father did, in fact, file a
motion to modify the child support amount ordered in the provisional order,
and a hearing was held on that motion, at which evidence was presented of the
amount of weekly health insurance Father paid for the Children and the actual
amount of overnights that Father had with the Children. Although the hearing
was not completed and no ruling was made on Father’s motion at that time, at
the commencement of the final hearing, the trial court incorporated all prior
hearings and exhibits into the final hearing. “The parent who pays the weekly
premium cost for the child(ren)’s health insurance should receive a credit
towards his or her child support obligation in most circumstances.” Ind. Child
Support Guideline 3(G)(3). “A credit should be awarded for the number of
overnights each year that the child(ren) spend with the noncustodial parent.”
Child Supp. G. 6.
[21] In its Decree, the trial court made no findings or conclusions regarding Father’s
motion to modify his provisional child support and the health insurance and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 14 of 19
parenting time credits he requested.2 The terms of the Provisional Order could
have been modified before the final Decree on a showing of the facts
appropriate to modification, Ind. Code § 31-15-4-15, and any disparity or
inequity in the Provisional Order could have been and should have been
adjusted in the trial court’s final order, Mosley, 906 N.E.2d at 930. Because of
its lack of resolution or any findings regarding Father’s motion to modify his
preliminary child support obligation ordered in the Provisional Order, we
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. We, therefore, vacate the
portion of the order dealing with child support in the Provisional Order and
Father’s resulting arrearage and remand to the trial court to enter findings and
conclusions regarding Father’s motion that are consistent with the Indiana
Child Support Guidelines, and if a deviation is necessary, to enter findings
supporting the deviation.
IV. Property Division
[22] Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it divided the
marital property because it based its property division on an erroneous finding
of fact. Father contends that the trial court mistakenly found that there was no
loan on the Silverado pick-up truck he was awarded in the division of marital
2
The trial court made one finding, in which it stated: “There was not testimony as to how much [Father]’s
[health] insurance costs[;] however the Child Support Obligation Worksheet entered into evidence by
[Father] indicates $113.56 a week for health insurance.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 23. As Father did present
evidence at the March 19, 2018 hearing regarding what his health insurance premiums were for the Children,
we do not know if this finding means that the trial court chose to disregard Father’s evidence as not being
credible or if the trial court merely forgot that the evidence had been presented.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 15 of 19
property when there was in fact a $17,000.00 loan on the truck. He asserts that,
based on the trial court’s division of property, which consisted of awarding him
the Silverado and awarding Mother the Tahoe that had no debt attached to it,
the result was an unequal division, and he is entitled to an equalization
payment.
[23] The division of marital property is within the sound discretion of the trial court,
and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Love v. Love, 10 N.E.3d
1005, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We will reverse a trial court’s division of
marital property only if the result is clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances, including the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom. Luttrell v. Luttrell, 994 N.E.2d 298, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans.
denied. When we review a claim that the trial court improperly divided marital
property, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s
disposition of the property without reweighing evidence or assessing witness
credibility. In re the Marriage of Marek, 47 N.E.3d 1283, 1288-89 (Ind. Ct. App.
2016), trans. denied. “Although the facts and reasonable inferences might allow
for a conclusion different from that reached by the trial court, we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Id. at 1289.
[24] Because the Parties had an Antenuptial Agreement, the marital estate consisted
only of the Silverado and any associated debt, the Tahoe and any associated
debt, an IRS debt, and the Parties’ personal property. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at
36. In the Decree, the trial court found that the Tahoe owned by the Parties
was valued at $20,000.00 and had been paid in full at the time of the final
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 16 of 19
hearing. Id. at 24. Although Father testified that the Silverado owned by the
Parties had a loan on it for $17,000.00, the trial court found that neither party
entered any loan documentation regarding the Silverado into evidence. Id. at
25. The trial court awarded the Tahoe and any associated indebtedness to
Mother and awarded the Silverado and any associated indebtedness to Father.
Id. at 36.
[25] Father asserts that the trial court’s award of the vehicles to the Parties resulted
in an unequal division of the marital property because he was given a vehicle
with a $17,000.00 loan on it, while Mother was given a vehicle that had no debt
on it. Although Father testified at the hearing, and contends now, that there is
a $17,000.00 loan on the Silverado, there was no documentation admitted at
the hearing to support this assertion. It was within the trial court’s discretion to
not believe Father’s statement about the indebtedness on the Silverado without
proper documentation, and we do not judge witness credibility or reweigh the
evidence on appeal. In re Marek, 47 N.E.3d at 1288-89. Further, even if we
were to find that Father was given an unequal share of the debt by being given
the debt associated with the Silverado, the trial court found that “an equal
division [of the marital estate] would not be just and reasonable due to the
economic circumstances of each party at the time of the disposition of the
property and the earning abilities of the parties related to the final division of
property.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 37. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in its division of the marital property.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 17 of 19
V. Attorney Fees
[26] Father argues that the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay Mother’s
attorney fees for the contempt finding in the amount of $3,000.00. He asserts
that this award of attorney fees was erroneous because the Parties had an
Antenuptial Agreement that specifically stated that they would waive and
release each other for claims of attorney fees.
[27] A trial court has inherent authority to award attorney fees for civil contempt.
J.S. v. W. K., 62 N.E.3d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “In other words, no statutory
sanction is needed, as a court’s power to enforce compliance with its orders and
decrees duly entered is inherent.” Kahn v. Baker, 36 N.E.3d 1103, 1116 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. “Accordingly, apart from any statutory authority,
a court has the inherent authority to enforce its orders and to compensate the
aggrieved party for losses and damages resulting from another’s contemptuous
actions.” Id. We review the trial court’s ruling on a contempt petition for an
abuse of discretion, and we will neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess the
credibility of witnesses. J.S., 62 N.E.3d at 9. We will affirm the trial court’s
decision unless it is against the logic and circumstances before it and we have a
firm and definite belief that a mistake has been made. Id.
[28] Here, the trial court found Father in indirect contempt for failing to abide by
several of the trial court’s orders and ordered him to pay Mother’s attorney fees
for the finding of contempt in the amount of $3,000.00. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2
at 42-43. In ordering this, the trial court acknowledged that the Antenuptial
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 18 of 19
Agreement provided that the Parties shall pay their own attorney fees but found
that the agreement did not apply to the contempt finding. Id. at 42. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Father to pay Mother’s attorney
fees for the contempt finding. Evidence was presented that Father repeatedly
violated the trial court’s orders and testified that he knowingly and intentionally
disobeyed the trial court’s orders. Tr. Vol. 3 at 202-12. As a result of Father’s
contempt, Mother was forced to file citations and contempt motions and
suffered damages. Because the trial court had the inherent authority to enforce
its orders and to compensate Mother as an aggrieved party for damages
resulting from Father’s acts of contempt, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in ordering Father to pay $3,000.00 in attorney fees.3
[29] Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
3
In his reply brief, Father asserts that the present case is very similar to Young v. Young, 81 N.E.3d 250 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2017), where an award of attorney fees related to a protective order modification was found to be
erroneous because the parties had entered into a dissolution settlement agreement, which contained a
provision that each party shall be responsible for their own attorney fees. Id. at 257-59. We find the Young
case to be distinguishable from the present case because that case did not deal with a contempt finding and
the trial court’s inherent authority to award attorney fees for civil contempt.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-DR-1150 | February 21, 2020 Page 19 of 19