In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: A.M. (Minor Child) and W.M. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                            FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                   Feb 28 2020, 10:47 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                     CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                 and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Alexander W. Robbins                                     Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Public Defender - Morgan County                          Attorney General of Indiana
    Bloomington, Indiana
    Katherine A. Cornelius
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In re the Termination of the                             February 28, 2020
    Parent-Child Relationship of:                            Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-JT-2035
    A.M. (Minor Child)                                       Appeal from the Morgan Circuit
    and                                                      Court
    The Honorable Matthew G.
    W.M. (Father),                                           Hanson, Judge
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Trial Court Cause No.
    55C01-1903-JT-90
    v.
    Indiana Department of Child
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner,
    Robb, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020                    Page 1 of 19
    Case Summary and Issue
    [1]   W.M. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child and
    presents the sole issue of whether the juvenile court’s order terminating his
    parental rights was clearly erroneous. Concluding it was not, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Father and J.P. (“Mother”), now deceased, are the biological parents of A.M.,
    born June 18, 2007 (“Child”). The Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
    became involved in this case in 2016. At that time, Mother had legal custody of
    Child and shared another child with her boyfriend, M.G. The four of them
    lived together. On November 1, 2016, DCS received a report that M.G. and his
    sister snorted heroin in the bedroom and M.G. overdosed; Mother was in the
    other room with Child’s half-sibling and Child was at school. DCS believed
    Mother was sober and an appropriate parent, and Mother agreed to enter into
    an informal adjustment to address M.G.’s substance abuse issues. Father was a
    “non-offending parent or at least extraneous” to the case and therefore, was not
    part of the informal adjustment. Transcript at 20.
    [3]   On December 14, 2016, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a child in need
    of services (“CHINS”).1 Around February 2017, Father became involved with
    1
    Initially, filings named Child as “A.P.” but Child’s correct name is “A.M.” See Tr. at 19; see also
    Supplemental Exhibit Index at 3-15, 39-41.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020                  Page 2 of 19
    DCS in another matter concerning his wife and his wife’s two children. DCS
    began an informal adjustment due to Father’s use of methamphetamine and
    determined that Father’s wife was an appropriate caregiver for her children.
    Father entered into an informal adjustment and agreed to participate in services
    to address his substance abuse issues. Father completed a substance abuse
    evaluation at Centerstone on February 7, which recommended substance abuse
    treatment. Despite attempts to contact Father, he never participated in any
    recommended services and was discharged. Eventually, Father and his wife
    separated and divorced; DCS successfully closed out the informal adjustment
    with Father’s wife.
    [4]   An initial/detention hearing for Child was held in February 2017, and the
    juvenile court adjudicated Child a CHINS on March 28, 2017. Following a
    dispositional hearing on April 4 at which Father failed to appear, the juvenile
    court ordered Father to (among other things): maintain weekly contact with the
    DCS family case manager (“FCM”); timely enroll in recommended programs;
    obtain and maintain suitable housing and income; refrain from drug use; obey
    the law; submit to random drug screens; and complete a substance abuse
    assessment and follow all recommended treatment. See Supplemental Exhibit
    Index at 64-67. At the time, Child remained in Mother’s care.
    [5]   The juvenile court held a periodic case review hearing on July 10 and ordered
    Child to remain in Mother’s care. Father failed to appear. On July 13, Father
    reached out to the DCS FCM and asked what he needed to do to move forward
    in the CHINS case; the FCM informed Father he needed to participate in the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 3 of 19
    recommended services but Father stated he did not want to participate in group
    services. From July 13, 2017 to September 24, 2018, Father ceased all contact
    with the FCM despite numerous attempts to contact him through his parents,
    Child, and Mother.
    [6]   Due to Mother’s own substance abuse issues, Child was removed from
    Mother’s care on July 24, 2017 and placed with her maternal grandparents.
    Later, on October 3, Father completed a new substance abuse evaluation at
    Centerstone during which he disclosed that he has been using
    methamphetamine daily for the last three or four years and he used as recently
    as three days prior to the evaluation. Centerstone referred Father to an
    intensive outpatient program (“IOP”)2 program – an addictions and parenting
    group, which focuses on parenting skills and maintaining sobriety. Father
    attended five sessions but missed eleven. Due to Father’s non-compliance with
    the program and positive drug screens, he was discharged from services.
    [7]   Following a review hearing on November 2, the juvenile court found that
    Father: had not complied with Child’s case plan; tested positive for
    methamphetamine; failed to visit Child; and had not cooperated with DCS. See
    id. at 96-97. In February 2018, the juvenile court found that Father “is not
    participating in this case.” Id. at 99. A permanency hearing was held on May
    3, 2018, and the juvenile court again found that Father was missing and not
    2
    Although not explicitly defined in the record, we believe “IOP” refers to an intensive outpatient program.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020                   Page 4 of 19
    participating in the case. The court subsequently entered an order changing
    Child’s permanency plan from reunification to reunification with a concurrent
    plan of adoption. Father failed to appear for each of these hearings.
    [8]   As of the August 9 review hearing, Father was still missing and non-compliant
    with the case plan. However, the FCM learned that Father had an active
    criminal case and successfully made contact with Father on September 24 at the
    courthouse. At the time, Father stated he would engage in services and
    “want[ed] to fight for his daughter.” Tr. at 25. However, Father never reached
    out to re-engage in services and again ceased contact with the FCM. The
    juvenile court held another review hearing on December 12 and again, Father
    failed to appear and the juvenile court found Father had been non-compliant
    with the case plan, had not enhanced his ability to fulfill his parental
    obligations, and had not visited Child. See Supp. Ex. Index at 106-07.
    [9]   In January 2019, Father was arrested on multiple counts of substance abuse
    related charges – possession of methamphetamine, possession of paraphernalia,
    possession of a narcotic drug, unlawful possession of a syringe, and maintaining
    a common nuisance. On March 1, 2019, DCS filed its petition for the
    involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights. While incarcerated, Father
    met with the FCM and indicated he was interested in participating in services.
    However, Father is not able to participate in any DCS-offered services while
    incarcerated because jail policy no longer allows service providers to work one
    on one in the jail.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 5 of 19
    [10]   The juvenile court held a termination hearing on May 15, 2019; however, the
    juvenile court was informed that Mother had recently died. Therefore, the
    juvenile court removed Mother from the case and the matter remained set for a
    full termination hearing. The fact-finding hearing was held on August 1, 2019
    during which Father testified that he has completed several courses while
    incarcerated. Following the hearing, the juvenile court entered an order
    terminating Father’s parental rights and found, in pertinent part:
    147) The main issues facing the [C]hild at the time of removal
    included drug use and a lack of supervision on the part of the
    [M]other.
    148) [A]s time progressed [M]other’s issues continued but
    [F]ather simply refused to be engaged.
    149) By not engaging in any services whatsoever he simply
    walked away from his obligations to provide any sort of security
    or support and leave [sic] the issue of his daughter being raised to
    others.
    150) [F]ather was tangentially involved with his wife and his
    other children with DCS and apparently was failing drug tests
    and not participating with those issues around the time this case
    began.
    151) It is foolish to believe that [F]ather did not understand his
    requirement to get involved in this case, foolish to believe he did
    not know how to contact the DCS since he did on several
    occasions and foolish to believe he ever had the intent to care for
    this [C]hild.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 6 of 19
    152) [A]round the time the [C]hild was taken from the [M]other
    for drug use, the [F]ather did call one (1) time in July of 2017 and
    stated a desire to be engaged.
    153) Nothing ever came from that call.
    154) Later in October of 2017 the [F]ather apparently did
    become engaged for a very short period of time and then once
    more disappeared.
    155) [A]t no time thereafter for a period of over a year did the
    [F]ather ever try to contact the DCS, inquire about where his
    daughter was or how to see her, try to work with anyone to get
    her back nor showed any indication of presenting himself as a
    viable option to care for his [C]hild.
    156) [O]nce in jail[, F]ather has suddenly found some direction
    by passing some drug classes and indicating a desire to continue
    classes if and when released.
    157) Perhaps [F]ather is also driven by the fact of the recent
    passing of the [M]other which has left the [C]hild with only one
    viable parent.
    158) It is not a far stretch to see that [F]ather has, like most in
    jail and facing significant time, “found Jesus.”
    159) [F]ather, only once caught and facing up to thirty (30)
    years in jail, finally is trying to take some classes, has asked to
    contact the [C]hild and for the first time since December of 2016
    has shown any indication he intends to parent this [C]hild.
    160) In the meantime, this [C]hild has suffered through her
    [M]other missing visits, cutting herself, cutting off her hair to get
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 7 of 19
    her [M]other’s attention and finally her [M]other’s death all
    while [F]ather has done absolutely nothing to help her.
    161) The stability issue remains, the drug issues remain, the
    unwillingness to step up and be a parent remains and
    unfortunately this [C]hild is in a much worse position today than
    she was at the time she was taken from her parents the first time.
    162) [Child] has been through the trauma of living with others,
    her [M]other dying and her [F]ather simply ignoring her. These
    should not have to be the memories of a young lady that
    desperately has been seeking the attention and love of her
    parents.
    163) The exact same dangers that were present for this [C]hild
    when the CHINS case began still exist today and are perhaps
    even more strongly present than ever before.
    ***
    169) Father clearly has and has had issues with drugs for many
    years that are unresolved.
    170) [F]ather only is sober now due to a long incarceration.
    171) [F]ather jumpstarted his efforts but failed on at least two
    (2) occasions for a period of no more than a month to try and get
    involved and these feeble attempts are untenable.
    172) Father’s complete lack of involvement is simply
    inexcusable and rises to the level of highest neglect.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 8 of 19
    173) [F]ather’s feeble attempt to claim he had no notice or that
    DCS did not contact him appropriately to get him involved falls
    on deaf ears since [he] did contact them at least two (2) times,
    was served with personal notice when the case started and even
    worked with DCS in another case prior to this case being filed.
    174) [T]his court is aware that criminal charges do not equal
    convictions in criminal cases, there are strong indications that
    [F]ather still has a substantial drug issue and/or that he will be in
    some sort of penal facility/institution for some time whether to
    fight these charges or if they are found true.
    175) There was no indication or testimony that [F]ather even
    has the ability to care for this [C]hild even if he is released.
    176) This is indicated by the fact he never showed up for any
    hearings, never got involved in this case, has been living in
    apartments or barns during this case, has never indicated having
    a job and simply presented no indication he has any plans to do
    these things.
    Appealed Order 10-13. Based on these findings, the juvenile court concluded
    there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child’s removal
    and continued placement outside of Father’s care will not be remedied. The
    juvenile court also concluded that the continuation of the parent-child
    relationship poses a threat to Child’s well-being and termination of Father’s
    parental rights is in Child’s best interests. Father now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 9 of 19
    I. Standard of Review
    [11]   We begin, as we often do, by emphasizing that the right of parents to establish a
    home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
    United States Constitution. In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 264 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2004), trans. denied. Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension,
    they are not without limitation and the law provides for the termination of these
    rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental
    responsibilities. In re R.H., 
    892 N.E.2d 144
    , 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). We
    acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued
    relationships in our culture,” but also recognize that “parental interests are not
    absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests in determining the
    proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” Bester v. Lake Cty.
    Office of Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 147 (Ind. 2005) (internal quotations
    omitted). The involuntary termination of one’s parental rights is the most
    extreme sanction a court can impose because termination severs all rights of a
    parent to his or her children. See In re T.F., 
    743 N.E.2d 766
    , 773 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2001), trans. denied. As such, termination is intended as a last resort, available
    only when all other reasonable efforts have failed. 
    Id.
     The purpose of
    terminating parental rights is to protect children, not to punish parents. In re
    D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d at 265
    .
    [12]   When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the
    evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of Family
    & Children, 
    861 N.E.2d 366
    , 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Instead, we
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 10 of 19
    consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable
    inferences that can be drawn therefrom. 
    Id.
     In deference to the trial court’s
    unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its judgment
    terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re
    L.S., 
    717 N.E.2d 204
    , 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied; cert. denied, 
    534 U.S. 1161
     (2002). Thus, if the evidence and inferences support the decision, we
    must affirm. 
    Id.
    [13]   As required by Indiana Code section 31-35-2-8(c), the juvenile court entered
    findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Therefore, we apply a two-tiered
    standard of review: we first determine whether the evidence supports the
    findings, then determine whether the findings support the judgment. Bester, 839
    N.E.2d at 147. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains
    no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 
    671 N.E.2d 98
    , 102 (Ind. 1996). A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the findings
    do not support the court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the
    judgment thereon. 
    Id.
    II. Termination of Father’s Parental Rights
    [14]   Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in Indiana, DCS
    must allege and prove, in relevant part:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 11 of 19
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be
    remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
    being of the child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services;
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
    the child.
    
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4
    (b)(2). DCS must prove the foregoing elements by clear
    and convincing evidence. 
    Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2
    ; In re V.A., 
    51 N.E.3d 1140
    ,
    1144 (Ind. 2016). However, because subsection (b)(2)(B) is written in the
    disjunctive the juvenile court need only find one of the three elements in that
    subsection has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., In re
    I.A., 
    903 N.E.2d 146
    , 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). If a juvenile court determines
    the allegations of the petition are true, then the court shall terminate the parent-
    child relationship. 
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8
    (a).
    [15]   We begin by noting that Father does not challenge any of the juvenile court’s
    findings; therefore, we accept the findings as true. McMaster v. McMaster, 
    681 N.E.2d 744
    , 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Father challenges the juvenile court’s
    conclusion that a reasonable probability exists that the conditions that led to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 12 of 19
    Child’s removal and continued placement outside of his care will not be
    remedied. Specifically, Father argues this conclusion is erroneous because he
    has demonstrated a “lengthy commitment . . . to better himself in an effort to
    assume care for his daughter” by participating in several courses while
    incarcerated. Appellant’s Brief at 9. We disagree.
    [16]   We engage in a two-step analysis to determine whether conditions will be
    remedied: “First, we must ascertain what conditions led to [Child’s] placement
    and retention in foster care. Second, we determine whether there is a
    reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re K.T.K.,
    
    989 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1231 (Ind. 2013) (quotation omitted). With respect to the
    second step, a juvenile court assesses whether a reasonable probability exists
    that the conditions justifying a child’s removal or continued placement outside
    his parent’s care will not be remedied by judging the parent’s fitness to care for
    the child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration
    evidence of changed conditions. In re E.M., 
    4 N.E.3d 636
    , 643 (Ind. 2014).
    Habitual conduct may include criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history
    of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and
    employment, but the services offered to the parent and the parent’s response to
    those services can also be evidence of whether conditions will be remedied.
    A.D.S v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    987 N.E.2d 1150
    , 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),
    trans. denied. DCS “is not required to provide evidence ruling out all
    possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 13 of 19
    probability the parent’s behavior will not change.” In re I.A., 
    903 N.E.2d at 154
    .
    [17]   Here, Child was removed from Mother’s care due to her substance abuse issues;
    however, Child remained outside of Father’s care due to his substance abuse
    issues and failure to participate in services. We conclude there is ample
    evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that there is a
    reasonable probability that the conditions for Child’s continued placement,
    namely Father’s substance abuse and related issues, will not be remedied.
    [18]   As demonstrated through the record, Father has failed to participate in this case
    by not complying with services to address his substance abuse issues, not
    attending court hearings, and not attending visitation with Child. Initially, as
    part of an informal adjustment, Father completed a substance abuse evaluation
    at Centerstone on February 7, 2017. Melissa Oran, DCS liaison at Centerstone,
    testified that treatment was recommended based on the evaluation; however,
    despite numerous attempts to contact Father, he never participated in any
    treatment. See Tr. at 14.
    [19]   FCM Wendy Tolliver3 has been involved in Father’s case since its inception in
    November 2016. In July 2017, Father reached out to Tolliver and asked what
    he needed to do to move forward in the case. Tolliver stated that he needed to
    participate in services and “laid out everything that was recommended for
    3
    The record establishes that Ms. Tolliver previously went by Wendy Pickett.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 14 of 19
    him.” Id. at 24. However, Father stated he would not participate in groups
    “because he did not want people in town knowing his business.” Id. at 22.
    Father subsequently ceased all contact with Tolliver until September 2018 –
    over fourteen months later. During this time, Tolliver attempted to contact
    Father through his parents, Child, and Mother, but was unsuccessful. It was
    not until Tolliver discovered that Father had an active criminal case that she
    was able to make contact with Father on September 24, 2018 by going to the
    courthouse. At that time, Father again indicated he would engage in services
    and “want[ed] to fight for his daughter.” Id. at 25. After this interaction,
    Father did not reach out to Tolliver, never engaged in services, and again
    ceased all contact with her.
    [20]   In October 2017, Father again completed a substance abuse assessment at
    Centerstone with Ashley Risk, a crisis access therapist. During the evaluation,
    Father indicated he has been using methamphetamine daily for the last three to
    four years and had used three days prior to the evaluation. Based on Father’s
    history, Risk acknowledged an IOP was “definitely warranted” and Father
    needed to complete the recommended treatment. Id. at 11. Risk referred
    Father to an IOP; he participated in five substance use and parenting group
    sessions but missed eleven. Ultimately, Father did not complete the program
    and was discharged from the group in November 2017 due to his
    “[n]oncompliance with attendance and then there were positive [drug] screens.”
    Id. at 15. At the fact-finding hearing, Oran testified that Father did not make
    any progress with respect to obtaining and maintaining sobriety and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 15 of 19
    consequently, toward reunification with Child. Tolliver also testified that
    Father did not make any kind of progress with respect to completing services
    and addressing his original issues. She further stated that substance abuse
    continues to be an issue for Father and there is “no proof that [Father] has
    remedied his substance abuse issues. He’s currently in jail on charges related to
    substance abuse. [A]nd has throughout the life of this case continued to receive
    charges related to substance abuse.” Id. at 30.
    [21]   Father’s criminal history also supports the juvenile court’s conclusion there is a
    reasonable probability Father will not remedy his substance abuse problems.
    Since this case began in November 2016, Father has been charged with multiple
    criminal charges related to his unresolved substance abuse issues, including
    multiple counts of possession of methamphetamine, possession of
    paraphernalia, possession of a narcotic drug, unlawful possession of a syringe,
    and maintaining a common nuisance. Father was arrested in January 2019 and
    has remained incarcerated since.
    [22]   Around that time, Father’s case was transferred to FCM Alexa Smith. In
    March 2019, Smith met with Father and he stated he was interested in
    participating in services. Smith then submitted referrals to Ireland Homebased
    Services for fatherhood engagement and individual therapy; however, the
    referrals were rejected because jail policy no longer allows service providers to
    work one on one in the jail. Therefore, Father is not able to participate in any
    DCS-offered services while incarcerated. At the fact-finding hearing, Smith
    testified that in her discussions with Father, he indicated he was potentially
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 16 of 19
    facing up to thirty years in prison. More recently, Father told Smith he was
    trying to get a plea agreement that would allow him to join the Indiana Dream
    Team, which is a three-year program. Smith testified that Father’s “criminal
    charges indicate . . . ongoing substance abuse issues. [And] from the time he
    wasn’t incarcerated . . . I would have concerns for him to be able to maintain
    his sobriety outside of the incarceration.” Id. at 45. Ultimately, Smith opined
    that the issues prompting DCS involvement have not been resolved.
    [23]   Furthermore, Father failed to attend court hearings and failed to consistently
    visit Child. Tolliver testified that from February to July 2017, Father attended
    supervised visitation but “[f]rom that point forward because he was completely
    non-compliant in services and not participating in this case, he was not
    attending court[,] we were no[t] offering him visitation any longer.” Id. at 27.
    [24]   Father contends he has made progress by completing several substance abuse
    and religious courses available to him while incarcerated, including Mothers
    Against Methamphetamine and Reformers Institutional Program classes. See
    Exhibit Index at 5-20. Given Father’s completion of these courses, he argues
    his case is similar to K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    39 N.E.3d 641
     (Ind. 2015),
    in which our supreme court reversed the termination of an incarcerated father’s
    parental rights where he made “substantial efforts towards bettering his life” by
    participating in numerous programs available to him during his incarceration.
    Id. at 648. In K.E., the father’s release was pending, he had completed twelve
    programs that were voluntary and did not result in sentence reductions, and he
    began participating in AA and NA. Id. at 648-49. In addition, the father
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 17 of 19
    testified that he was sober, prepared to be a good father, would like to receive
    additional services from DCS upon his release, and stated even if his child is
    adopted, he hoped to remain in his life as much as possible. Id. at 649. Our
    supreme court held that despite the father’s criminal and substance abuse
    history, “[g]iven the substantial efforts that [the father] is making to improve his
    life by learning to become a better parent, . . . it was not proven by clear and
    convincing evidence that [the father] could not remedy the conditions for [his
    child’s] removal.” Id.
    [25]   Father’s situation is distinguishable from the father’s in K.E. Although we
    acknowledge Father is unable to participate in DCS-offered services while
    incarcerated, his recent completion of these programs alone, while
    commendable, does not rise to the level of progress in K.E. nor does it negate
    years of his non-compliance. Critically, there is no evidence that Father’s
    release is pending. To the contrary, all of his criminal cases remain unresolved
    and he faces potentially up to thirty years of incarceration, if convicted.
    Moreover, Father has not demonstrated the ability to remain sober when he is
    not incarcerated.
    [26]   We have often noted that evidence of a parent’s pattern of unwillingness or lack
    of commitment to address parenting issues and to cooperate with services
    demonstrates the requisite reasonable probability that the conditions will not
    change. Lang, 
    861 N.E.2d at 372
    ; see also A.F. v. Marion Cty. Office of Family &
    Children, 
    762 N.E.2d 1244
    , 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“A parent’s failure to
    appear for assessments and court hearings reflects ambivalence, and the failure
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020   Page 18 of 19
    to attend parenting classes reflects an unwillingness to change existing
    conditions.”), trans. denied. Such is the case here. In sum, we conclude there is
    sufficient evidence in the record establishing Father’s failure to participate in the
    case plan, preventing him from making any progress toward reunification. For
    these reasons, we conclude the juvenile court’s findings supported its
    conclusion.4
    Conclusion
    [27]   We conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order
    terminating Father’s parental rights as to Child. Accordingly, the judgment of
    the juvenile court is affirmed.
    [28]   Affirmed.
    Bradford, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
    4
    Having determined that DCS met its burden of showing that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal
    and continued placement outside of Father’s care will not be remedied, we need not address the juvenile
    court’s conclusion that DCS also met its burden of proving that the continuation of the parent child
    relationship poses a threat to Child’s well-being. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2035 | February 28, 2020             Page 19 of 19