Robert Wayne Moore v. State of Indiana ( 2020 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    Feb 28 2020, 9:19 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Matthew D. Anglemeyer                                      Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Marion County Public Defender                              Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Justin F. Roebel
    Supervising Deputy Attorney
    General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Robert Wayne Moore,                                        February 28, 2020
    Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-1125
    v.                                                 Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Grant Hawkins,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G05-1705-F6-18274
    Pyle, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020                           Page 1 of 15
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Robert Wayne Moore (“Moore”) appeals, following a bench trial, his
    conviction for Level 6 felony obstruction of justice. Moore argues that: (1) the
    trial court abused its discretion in admitting his confession; and (2) his
    conviction should be vacated because of a detective’s false trial testimony.
    Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that his
    conviction should not be vacated, we affirm Moore’s conviction.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Issues
    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
    Moore’s confession.
    2. Whether a detective’s false trial testimony is a basis for vacating
    Moore’s conviction.
    Facts
    [3]   On August 12, 2015, a man walking his dog in Fort Benjamin Harrison State
    Park found the body of a female a few feet from a closed walking trail. The
    deceased woman was Tina Moore (“Tina”), Moore’s stepmother. Tina was
    wearing a necklace, some disheveled clothing, but no pants or shoes. Detective
    Theodore Lich (“Detective Lich”) from the Lawrence Police Department was
    assigned to investigate. He observed that Tina “had been dead for a couple of
    hours.” (Tr. 103). Detective Lich also observed signs of trauma on Tina’s
    neck. While Detective Lich was investigating at the park, the Lawrence Police
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020        Page 2 of 15
    Department received a missing person report for Tina, which “matched
    somewhat” the description of the body in the park.
    [4]   The same day that Tina’s body was discovered, Moore and his father provided
    recorded statements to the police. Sergeant James Vaughan (“Sergeant
    Vaughan”) assisted Detective Lich with conducting Moore’s interview. Before
    this August 12 interview began, the detectives read Moore his Miranda rights,
    and he signed a written waiver form. During the interview, Sergeant Vaughan
    made the following statements to Moore:
    [A] jury’s going to understand that a son is going to help the
    father. He’s going to protect his father.
    ***
    [A]ssisting a criminal is sometimes, that’s like a misdemeanor
    because the jury knows, that’s family. You can help your father.
    Okay. You can help your dad. Anyone knows that.
    ***
    But maybe your end of it, you just went in there and you saw that
    she was dead and you helped your father. You helped [him] this
    far or whatever and that’s, and that’s your end of it. That’s
    probably what happened that’s why if anything happened you got
    to tell me that.
    (State’s Ex. 2a). Moore denied any involvement in Tina’s disappearance during
    the interview.
    [5]   A few days after the initial interview, Moore’s father confessed to killing Tina.
    Thereafter, on August 17, 2015, Detective Lich served Moore with an arrest
    warrant and brought him in for questioning. Before the interrogation began,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020    Page 3 of 15
    Detective Lich read Moore his Miranda rights, and he again signed a written
    waiver. At the beginning of the interrogation, when discussing the publicly
    available information regarding Tina’s death, Detective Lich stated that
    Moore’s father “did confess, but he didn’t say he did it by himself.” (State’s Ex.
    2a). Thereafter, Moore stated that his father admitted to him that he had
    “killed [Tina][,]” and had “strangled her.” (State’s Ex. 2a). Moore explained
    that after killing Tina, his father had asked for help “remov[ing] the body from
    the premises that way the kids don’t see or hear anything.” (State’s Ex. 2a).
    Moore observed Tina’s body in his father’s bedroom on the bed. Moore told
    Detective Lich that he had helped wrap Tina in a blanket, put her in his father’s
    SUV, and went with his father to dispose of Tina’s body in Fort Benjamin
    Harrison State Park.
    [6]   Throughout the August 17 interrogation, Moore asked Detective Lich several
    times what his charges were. Despite having the information, Detective Lich
    was evasive with providing Moore with the information. Detective Lich did
    not tell Moore the charges until after Moore made his incriminating statements
    describing his efforts to assist his father, approximately fifty minutes into the
    interrogation.
    [7]   The State initially charged Moore with Level 6 felony obstruction of justice and
    Class A misdemeanor failure to report a body on August 17, 2015 under cause
    number 49G05-1508-F6029126 (“initial cause”). However, the State dismissed
    these charges in February 2016 and refiled identical charges on May 17, 2017
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020      Page 4 of 15
    under this cause.1 On May 26, 2017, Moore had his initial hearing for the
    current cause. In July 2018, Moore filed an amended motion to suppress the
    confession that he gave to police during the August 17 interrogation.2 The trial
    court held a bifurcated hearing on Moore’s amended motion to suppress in
    November 2018. The State offered a video recording and transcript for each of
    Moore’s August 12 and August 17 recorded statements into evidence. Moore
    objected to the admission of the August 17 interrogation transcript, which the
    trial court overruled. On November 29, 2018, the trial court denied the motion.
    [8]   The same day, the trial court conducted a bench trial. Prior to opening
    statements, the parties requested that the trial court incorporate the testimony
    and evidence from the suppression hearing, and the trial court agreed. Moore
    asked that the court show a continuing objection to the admission of the August
    17 transcript. Detective Lich was the only witness to testify at the trial. In
    addition to the details of his investigation, Detective Lich testified that he had
    visited Moore’s house as part of his investigation and had observed “a large
    urine spot on the center of the bed[ ]” in Moore’s father’s bedroom. Based on
    his training and experience, Detective Lich explained that sometimes people
    1
    Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201(a)(2)(c), this Court may take judicial notice of records of a court of
    this state. Here, we take judicial notice of the initial cause. Our review of those records reveal that Moore
    had an initial hearing on August 19, 2015.
    2
    Moore had originally filed a motion to suppress under the initial cause that was dismissed in February 2016.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020                              Page 5 of 15
    urinate at the time of death. On cross-examination, the following colloquy
    ensued:
    [Defense Counsel]: Do you know, do you know where the urine
    stain came from; that’s my question.
    The Court: It’s just a yes or no question, sir.
    [Detective Lich]: Yes, I do.
    [Defense Counsel]: Okay. Where did it come from[?]
    [Detective Lich]: From the victim, Tina Moore.
    [Defense Counsel]: All right. And do you know, then, under
    what circumstances it came from the victim?
    [Detective Lich]: Yes.
    [Defense Counsel]: All right. And do you know when it came
    from the victim?
    [Detective Lich]: Yes.
    [Defense Counsel]: And you’re -- you’re saying what, it came --
    [Detective Lich]: When she died, the moment she died, she
    defecated on herself, yes.
    [Defense Counsel]: She defecated on herself.
    [Detective Lich]: She urinated on herself.
    [Defense Counsel]: And how -- what, the coroner, the coroner
    told you that?
    [Detective Lich]: I was at the autopsy as well, sir, and I asked that
    exact question, yes, sir.
    [Defense Counsel]: All right. And your testimony here under
    oath is that that urine on the mattress was tested?
    [Detective Lich]: It was tested for DNA.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020     Page 6 of 15
    [Defense Counsel]: Okay. And your testimony here also under
    oath is that the coroner advised that that -- that urine that was hers
    that was on the mattress was put there during her death?
    [Detective Lich]: Yes.
    (Tr. 131-32). The trial court found Moore guilty of Level 6 felony obstruction
    of justice and not guilty of Class A misdemeanor failure to report a dead body.
    [9]   Prior to sentencing, defense counsel discovered, and the State confirmed, that
    there had not been DNA testing on the urine spot on the mattress. Three
    months after his bench trial, Moore filed a motion to vacate his conviction
    based on Detective Lich’s testimony regarding the DNA testing, and the State
    filed a response thereto. In its response, the State indicated that it was
    “unaware of such testing [at trial], but did not know for a fact that such testing
    had not been completed.” (App. 103). At the ensuing hearing on Moore’s
    motion, the trial court found that Detective Lich had testified falsely but that:
    [i]n the scheme of things it was not a factoid upon which I spent a
    lot of (Inaudible) with, I had to pay attention to other matters of
    evidence. And I can’t say we’ll have to cut the wrong information
    out, where would I be because I didn’t concentrate on the wrong
    evidence, plus I was more concerned with some of the statements
    made by the Defendant.
    (Tr. 149). The trial court denied Moore’s motion. The trial court then
    sentenced Moore to one and a half (1½) years in the Marion County Jail.
    Moore now appeals.
    Decision
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020        Page 7 of 15
    [10]   On appeal, Moore argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in
    admitting his August 17 confession; and (2) his conviction should be vacated
    because of Detective Lich’s false testimony regarding DNA testing. We will
    address each argument in turn.
    1. Admission of Moore’s Confession
    [11]   Moore’s abuse of discretion argument is twofold. First, Moore argues that his
    confession was involuntary because Detective Lich violated his Indiana
    Constitutional rights by refusing to advise him of the charges he faced. Next,
    Moore argues that his confession was involuntary because “detectives lied to
    [him] about the facts and misrepresented the law.” (Moore’s Br. 20). Moore
    concedes that he “does not claim [that] he did not understand his rights or that
    he did not validly waive his right to counsel.” (Moore’s Br. 20).
    [12]   The decision whether to admit a defendant’s confession is within the discretion
    of the trial court, and it will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
    Wright v. State, 
    916 N.E.2d 269
    , 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). A trial court abuses
    its discretion only if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
    and circumstances before it, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Wells v.
    State, 
    904 N.E.2d 265
    , 269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Upon reviewing
    a challenge to the trial court’s decision to admit the defendant’s confession, we
    do not reweigh the evidence but instead examine the record for substantial
    probative evidence of voluntariness. Wright, 
    916 N.E.2d at 277
    . When a
    defendant challenges the admissibility of his confession, the State must prove
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020         Page 8 of 15
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was given voluntarily. Carter v.
    State, 
    730 N.E.2d 155
    , 157 (Ind. 2000).
    [13]   The voluntariness of a confession is determined from the “totality of the
    circumstances.” Berry v. State, 
    703 N.E.2d 154
    , 157 (Ind. 1998). The totality of
    the circumstances may include the crucial element of police coercion, the length
    of the interrogation, its location, its continuity, the defendant’s maturity,
    education, physical condition, and mental health. Miller v. State, 
    770 N.E.2d 763
    , 767 (Ind. 2002). On review, our focus is whether the waiver or confession
    was free and voluntary and not induced by any violence, threats, promises, or
    other improper influences. Atteberry v. State, 
    911 N.E.2d 601
    , 606 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2009). We will not reweigh the evidence but instead, we view the evidence
    most favorable to the State, together with the reasonable inferences that can be
    drawn therefrom, in order to determine if there is substantial, probative
    evidence of voluntariness. 
    Id.
     If there is substantial evidence to support the
    trial court’s conclusion, we affirm the trial court’s decision. 
    Id.
    [14]   Moore asserts that Detective Lich violated Article 1, section 13 of the Indiana
    Constitution, which provides in relevant part that the accused shall have the
    right to “demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to
    have a copy thereof[.]” When reviewing our Indiana Constitution, it is
    appropriate that we to look to “the language of the text in the context of the
    history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of
    our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions.” Ajabu v.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020       Page 9 of 15
    State, 
    693 N.E.2d 921
    , 929 (Ind. 1998) (quoting Boehm v. Town of St. John, 
    675 N.E.2d 318
    , 321 (Ind. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    [15]   While Article 1, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution provides the accused
    with the right to demand and have a copy of the charges he is facing, there is no
    authority stating that an investigating officer must provide the accused with the
    information, as suggested by Moore. Instead, case law interpreting this
    provision requires that an accused be sufficiently informed of the crime of
    which he is charged in writing so that he is able to prepare a defense. See;
    Manna v. State, 
    440 N.E.2d 473
    , 475 (Ind. 1982) (recognizing that “the
    accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
    accusation in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense, to protect
    him in the event of double jeopardy, and to define the issues so that the court
    will be able to determine what evidence is admissible and to pronounce
    judgment.”); Hinshaw v. State, 
    122 N.E. 418
    , 420 (Ind. 1919) (explaining that
    “[t]he words ‘nature and cause of the accusation’ have a well-defined meaning,
    and had such a meaning at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. That
    meaning is, that the gist of an offense shall be charged in direct unmistakable
    terms.”); State v. Laker, 
    939 N.E.2d 1111
    , 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding
    that “[t]he purpose of the charging information is to provide a defendant with
    notice of the crime of which he is charged so that he is able to prepare a
    defense.”), trans. denied.
    [16]   Furthermore, INDIANA CODE § 35-33-7-4 provides that “[a] person arrested in
    accordance with the provisions of a warrant shall be taken promptly for an
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020    Page 10 of 15
    initial hearing before the court issuing the warrant or before a judicial officer
    having jurisdiction over the defendant.” At this initial hearing, INDIANA CODE
    § 35-33-7-5(6) requires the trial court to advise a defendant “of the nature of the
    charge against the person[.]” Our review of the record reveals that Moore
    asked Detective Lich several times what charges he was facing. Despite having
    the information, Detective Lich was evasive with providing Moore with the
    information until after Moore made his incriminating statements. However,
    Moore received an initial hearing for the instant cause in May 2017 and for the
    initial cause in August 2015. At these hearings, he was informed of the nature
    and cause of the charges he was facing, thereby providing him with the
    opportunity to present a defense. Accordingly, we cannot say that Moore’s
    rights under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution were violated.
    [17]   Moore next contends that his confession was involuntary because the officers
    told him that: (1) a jury would understand why he helped his father; and (2) his
    father did not claim to have acted alone. Here, Moore spoke with police on
    August 12 and August 17. During the August 12 interview, five days before
    Moore confessed, Sergeant Vaughn stated that a jury would understand that
    Moore was helping his father. According to Moore, Sergeant Vaughn’s
    statements misrepresented the law by assuring Moore that he had a “definitive
    legal defense[.]” (Moore’s Br. 26). We disagree and conclude that the
    sergeant’s statements that a jury would be understanding do not equate to legal
    advice. Turning to the August 17 interrogation, Detective Lich stated that
    Moore’s father “did confess, but he didn’t say he did it by himself.” (State’s Ex.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020     Page 11 of 15
    2a). Given the context in which the statement arose – during a discussion of
    the unreported details of Tina’s death – we cannot agree that Detective Lich’s
    statement rendered Moore’s confession involuntary.
    [18]   Moreover, Moore concedes that he was informed of his Miranda rights, that he
    understood his rights, and that he waived his right to counsel. See Heavrin v.
    State, 
    675 N.E.2d 1075
    , 1081 (Ind. 1996) (signing a waiver of rights form
    provides some indication that a defendant’s confession was made voluntarily).
    Law enforcement did not use violence or threaten Moore at any point during
    the interrogations. Furthermore, the August 17 interrogation, when Moore
    confessed, lasted less than an hour. See Light, 547 N.E.2d at 1079 (noting that
    in most cases where confessions are held involuntary, the suspects are
    interrogated for days, not hours).
    [19]   In the end, we must determine whether the police conduct overbore Moore’s
    will, thus rendering his statement involuntary. Henry v. State, 
    738 N.E.2d 665
    ,
    665 (Ind. 2000). Although we disapprove of deceptive police interrogation
    tactics, such conduct is not conclusive but rather weighs heavily against the
    voluntariness of the defendant’s confession. Heavrin, 675 N.E.2d at 1080.
    Indeed, our Indiana Supreme Court has upheld the trial court’s admission of a
    defendant’s statement into evidence on facts more egregious than those
    presented here. See Light, 547 N.E.2d at 1079 (holding that the trial court did
    not err by admitting defendant’s statement despite evidence of a four-hour
    interrogation punctuated by conduct of the interrogators involving cursing,
    lying, and smacking the defendant on the arm). Considering the circumstances
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020    Page 12 of 15
    of the interrogation, including the detectives’ advisement of Moore’s rights, the
    written waiver forms, the relatively short duration, and the absence of the use of
    violence or threats, we conclude that Moore’s incriminating statement was not
    involuntary. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    admitting the August 17 confession into evidence at trial.
    2. Detective Lich’s Testimony
    [20]   Next, Moore alleges that his conviction should be vacated because the State,
    through Detective Lich, presented false testimony to obtain his conviction. It is
    well-settled that the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair,
    and a conviction obtained by the use of such testimony will not be upheld. Wallace
    v. State, 
    474 N.E.2d 1006
    , 1008 (Ind. 1985) (emphasis added). A conviction
    obtained through the use of false testimony must fall where the State, knowing
    the testimony to be false, either solicits such testimony or allows it to go
    uncorrected when it appears. Napue v. Illinois, 
    360 U.S. 264
    , 269 (1959). As our
    supreme court has explained:
    [i]n determining whether to vacate a conviction because of the
    State’s solicitation of false evidence or knowing use of it without
    correction, . . . the proper question is: did the State impermissibly
    use false testimony to obtain a conviction in violation of a
    defendant’s due process rights? The main thrust of the case law in
    this area focuses on whether the [factfinder’s] ability to assess all of
    the facts and the credibility of the witnesses supplying those facts
    has been impeded to the unfair disadvantage of the defendant.
    Smith v. State, 
    34 N.E.3d 1211
    , 1220 (Ind. 2015).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020       Page 13 of 15
    [21]   Below, the State sought to elicit testimony from Detective Lich that he had
    observed a large urine stain on the mattress in the bedroom of Moore’s father,
    and that based on his training and experience, people urinate at the time of
    death. On cross-examination, Detective Lich testified that the urine stain had
    been DNA tested and that the results indicated that the urine stain belonged to
    the victim. Prior to sentencing, defense counsel discovered, and the State
    confirmed, that there had not been DNA testing on the urine spot on the
    mattress. Moore then filed a motion to vacate his conviction based on
    Detective Lich’s false testimony. The deputy prosecutor represented to the trial
    court that she “did not know for a fact” at the time of trial that DNA testing
    had not been completed. (App. 103). When the trial court denied Moore’s
    motion, it found that although the detective had testified falsely, “[it] didn’t
    concentrate on the wrong evidence, plus [it] was more concerned with some of
    the statements made by the Defendant.” (Tr. 149).
    [22]   It should be noted that considerable taxpayer dollars are spent training law
    enforcement officers to protect all people within the borders of Indiana from
    criminal activity. See IND. CODE § 5-2-1-9. Law enforcement officers also take
    an oath to support and defend both the Federal and the Indiana Constitutions;
    they also promise to obey and enforce the laws of this state. Further, law
    enforcement officers, like all other witnesses, give their oath to tell the truth
    under penalty of perjury. As a result, when law enforcement officers lie under
    oath, they ignore their publicly funded training, betray their oath of office, and
    signal to the public at large that perjury is something not to be taken seriously.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1125 | February 28, 2020      Page 14 of 15
    This type of conduct diminishes the public trust in law enforcement and is
    beneath the standard of conduct to be expected of any law enforcement officer.
    [23]   We reiterate that Detective Lich’s testimony was before the trial court and not a
    jury. We generally presume that in a proceeding tried to the bench, a court
    renders its decisions solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence.
    Hinesley v. State, 
    999 N.E.2d 975
    , 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) reh’g denied, trans.
    denied. The risk of prejudice is quelled when the evidence is solely before the
    trial court. 
    Id.
     Had this been a jury trial, where we do not make the same
    assumptions and a jury does not provide a statement about what influenced its
    decision, Detective Lich’s testimony would have been interpreted differently.
    Whether or not the urine on the bed belonged to the victim was not an element
    of the obstruction of justice crime. Because this was a bench trial, and the trial
    court specifically found that Moore’s confession served as the basis for his
    conviction, we conclude that Detective Lich’s false testimony regarding DNA
    testing is not a basis for vacating Moore’s conviction. Accordingly, Moore’s
    conviction stands.
    [24]   Affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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