C.D. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 10 2020, 9:00 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kelly Starling Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
C.D., September 10, 2020
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-JV-436
v. Appeal from the
Marion Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Petitioner Marilyn Moore, Judge
The Honorable
Geoffrey Gaither, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49D09-1907-JD-876
Vaidik, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-436 | September 10, 2020 Page 1 of 4
Case Summary
[1] C.D. appeals the juvenile court’s true finding that he committed what would be
Level 6 felony battery against a public-safety official if committed by an adult,
arguing that the court erred by admitting certain evidence. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 26, 2019, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department officers took
fourteen-year-old C.D. into custody and handcuffed him because they believed
he possessed or had recently possessed a handgun. After he was handcuffed, an
officer asked C.D. to sit down, but he refused to do so, yanked his arm away,
and told the officer to “get his hands off of him.” Tr. p. 17. A second officer
assisted, and they were able to “place [C.D.] on the ground.” Id. After he was
on the ground, C.D., who was “belligerent and argumentative,” “purposely”
and “forcefully” “cock[ed]” his leg back and “struck” the second officer in the
foot with the heel of his foot. Id. at 17, 18.
[3] The State filed a petition alleging that C.D. was a delinquent child for
committing what would be Level 6 felony battery against a public-safety official
if committed by an adult for “stomping” on the officer’s foot.1 Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 17. At the fact-finding hearing, C.D. asked the trial court to exclude
1
The State also alleged that C.D. committed what would be Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun
without a license and Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm if committed by an adult, but
it dismissed these charges before the fact-finding hearing.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JV-436 | September 10, 2020 Page 2 of 4
evidence of what happened after he was taken into custody, i.e., his alleged
battery against the officer, arguing that the officers did not have reasonable
suspicion to seize him. The court admitted the evidence and entered a true
finding for battery against a public-safety official.
[4] C.D. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] C.D. contends that his seizure was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of
the Indiana Constitution because the officers “did not have information to
believe [he] committed a crime” and that therefore the juvenile court should
have excluded the evidence of what happened after he was taken into custody,
i.e., his alleged battery against the officer. Appellant’s Br. p. 11. However, even
if C.D. was illegally seized in violation of Article 1, Section 11, he is not
entitled to any relief.
[6] In C.P. v. State, this Court held that if a suspect commits a “new and distinct”
crime in response to an illegal search or seizure by law enforcement, evidence
of that new crime is admissible under the new-crime exception to the
exclusionary rule under the Indiana Constitution. 39 N.E.3d 1174, 1183 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; see also Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307, 314 (Ind.
2018) (acknowledging this Court’s adoption of the new-crime exception in
C.P.); K.C. v. State, 84 N.E.3d 646, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (rejecting the
juvenile’s argument that C.P. was wrongly decided), trans. denied. We noted that
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if evidence that a suspect committed a new crime in response to an illegal
search or seizure was excluded, then “‘suspects could shoot the arresting
officers without risk of prosecution.’” C.P., 39 N.E.3d at 1181 (quoting United
States v. Pryor, 32 F.3d 1192, 1196 (7th Cir. 1994)).
[7] C.D. acknowledges this Court’s opinion in C.P. but asks us to make an
“exception” when the accused is a juvenile and “no harm or injury [is] caused
by the juvenile’s response.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 18, 21. C.D. then argues this
exception would apply here because he is a juvenile and the officer did not
testify that he “experienced any pain or harm as a result of his foot being struck
by C.D.’s foot.” Id. at 22. We decline to narrow the new-crime exception. First,
any physical attack on a police officer has the potential to harm the officer, even
if no harm is ultimately inflicted. And second, any physical attack on a police
officer can lead to responsive force by the officer, which could easily escalate
the encounter into something much more serious. Because the juvenile court
properly admitted the officer’s testimony that C.D. “forcefully” stomped on his
foot, we affirm the true finding for battery against a public-safety official.
[8] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Baker, Sr.J., concur.
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