Wayne Williams v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 22 2020, 10:23 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Evan B. Broderick Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Courtney Staton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Wayne Williams, April 22, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1924
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David A. Happe,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C04-1703-F6-806
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1924 | April 22, 2020 Page 1 of 10
[1] Wayne Williams appeals his convictions for Level 6 Felony Maintaining a
Common Nuisance,1 Level 6 Felony Dealing in a Synthetic Drug,2 Class A
Misdemeanor Resisting Law Enforcement,3 and Class B Misdemeanor
Possession of Marijuana,4 arguing that the trial court erred when it admitted
evidence that stemmed from what Williams contends was an unconstitutional
interrogation and search. Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] On March 23, 2017, Detective Lance Blossom and Sergeant Chad Boynton of
the Madison County Drug Task Force drove to Williams’s home in Anderson.
The officers had received anonymous tips mentioning Williams and his wife by
name and stating that there had been drug activity occurring at Williams’s
house. The tipster also said that Williams was “bringing in large quantities of
drugs from . . . Chicago, Illinois.” Tr. Vol. II p. 65.
[3] Sergeant Boynton and Detective Blossom walked up to Williams’s front door,
introduced themselves as law enforcement, and knocked. While Sergeant
Boynton knocked, Detective Blossom heard a noise coming from the side of the
house and saw someone—who later identified himself as Williams—exit
1
Ind. Code § 35-45-1-5(c).
2
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-10.5(c)(1), -10.5(e)(1).
3
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).
4
I.C. § 35-48-4-11(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1924 | April 22, 2020 Page 2 of 10
through a door and get into a pickup truck in the driveway. The two officers
then walked around and engaged Williams in conversation. Sergeant Boynton
identified himself and Detective Blossom as police officers and explained that
they had received anonymous tips about drug activity at this residence.
Williams denied that anything illegal was happening inside, so Sergeant
Boynton asked if Williams could walk them through his house to confirm this.
Williams asked if he could first tie up his dogs before taking the officers through
the house because the canines were aggressive.
[4] During their conversation, Williams “did express some concerns about letting
[the officers] in the house[] [and] whether or not he should ask a lawyer some
questions[.]” Id. at 78. Williams also expressed some “hesitation” about
actually letting the two officers in the house. Id. at 77. To calm the situation and
to ease Williams’s nerves, Sergeant Boynton and Detective Blossom told
Williams that “we weren’t looking to take anyone to jail for possession –
possessing marijuana if it was like a dime bag.” Id. at 96.
[5] After some time, Williams confessed to being in possession of marijuana.
Thinking that he had probable cause to believe there was criminal activity afoot
and to “respect [Williams’s] Constitutional Rights,” tr. vol. III p. 43, Sergeant
Boynton attempted to Mirandize5 Williams. However, Williams became more
agitated and combative with the officers. Each time Sergeant Boynton tried to
5
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1924 | April 22, 2020 Page 3 of 10
advise Williams of his rights, Williams interrupted him, shifted his stance and
position, and indicated at different times that he had placed the small amount of
marijuana in various locations, including inside the house.
[6] Eventually, Williams stood up from his place on the front steps and told the
officers to “come on, come on, come on.” Id. at 45. The two officers followed
Williams to the back of his house and discovered that some of Williams’s dogs
were unrestrained. Not heeding Sergeant Boynton’s concerns about getting
bitten, Williams continued walking towards his house. Sergeant Boynton then
fired a warning shot near one of the dogs to scare it away and called for backup.
Meanwhile, Detective Blossom followed Williams into the home, but Williams
had already gone inside and locked the door. Detective Blossom tried to kick
down the door, but Williams, with an unknown object in this hand, quickly
opened the door. Unsure of what the object was, Detective Blossom ordered
Williams to the ground. Williams followed orders and was detained. Detective
Blossom discovered that the object in Williams’s hand was a cell phone.
[7] Williams eventually started to calm down and cooperate with law enforcement.
Sergeant Boynton approached Williams and read him his Miranda and Pirtle6
rights. Williams stated that he understood his rights and consented to a
protective search, which Sergeant Boynton and backup conducted. Ultimately,
the officers discovered 1.98 grams of a substance later determined to be
6
Pirtle v. State, 263 Ind. 16, 323 N.E.2d 634 (1975).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1924 | April 22, 2020 Page 4 of 10
marijuana, 83.89 grams of a substance later determined to be synthetic
marijuana, plastic baggies with labels, bins containing the drugs and other
paraphernalia, and tools used for measuring.
[8] On March 24, 2017, the State charged Williams with one count each of Level 6
felony maintaining a common nuisance, Level 6 felony dealing in a synthetic
drug, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class B
misdemeanor possession of marijuana. On March 12, 2019, Williams filed a
motion to suppress, arguing that any incriminating statements made by him
were elicited from a custodial interrogation without advisement of his Miranda
rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution. Additionally, Williams
argued that any evidence obtained from his residence should be suppressed
because it was the result of a warrantless, unreasonable search in violation of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section
11 of the Indiana Constitution.
[9] Following a July 8, 2019, hearing on the matter, the trial court denied
Williams’s motion and proceeded to a July 10, 2019, jury trial. During his trial,
Williams objected to the admission of his statements and all items obtained
from inside his home—the same evidence involved in the motion to suppress.
The trial court repeatedly overruled his objections. The jury ultimately found
Williams guilty as charged. Following Williams’s July 16, 2019, sentencing
hearing, the trial court sentenced Williams to an aggregate term of two and one-
half years in the Department of Correction. Williams now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[10] Williams’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred when it admitted
evidence discovered as a result of the encounter at his home. Specifically,
Williams contends that the officers illegally obtained evidence via a custodial
interrogation without notifying him of his Miranda rights—a violation of both
the Fifth Amendment and Article 1, Section 14—and via a warrantless,
unreasonable search—a violation of both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1,
Section 11.
[11] When there is a challenge to a trial court’s admission of evidence, we will
reverse only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before it. Fansler v. State, 100 N.E.3d 250, 253 (Ind. 2018).
This Court will sustain a trial court’s decision regarding the admission of
evidence “if it can be done on any legal ground apparent in the record.” Jester v.
State, 724 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind. 2000).
I. Interrogation and Testimony
[12] First, Williams argues that Sergeant Boynton and Detective Blossom elicited
statements from him during a custodial interrogation without first notifying him
of his Miranda rights, a violation of both the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution.
“[W]here, as here, a constitutional violation is alleged, the proper standard of
appellate review is de novo.” Dycus v. State, 108 N.E.3d 301, 304 (Ind. 2018).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1924 | April 22, 2020 Page 6 of 10
[13] The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides generally that
a criminal suspect cannot be forced to incriminate himself. Similarly, pursuant
to Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, “[n]o person, in any
criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself.” This
prohibits coercing any suspect into making admissions without first advising
him of his rights. If law enforcement fails to advise a suspect of his rights, “the
prosecutor cannot use any statements the subject does make against him in
court.” Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1053 (Ind. 2013).
[14] Here, Williams contends that Sergeant Boynton and Detective Blossom, before
reading him his Miranda rights, coerced him through a custodial interrogation
into admitting that he was in possession of marijuana. Therefore, as Williams
argues, any incriminating statements he made during that interrogation cannot
be used in a court of law.
[15] To determine if a person is in police custody, we objectively evaluate whether a
reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe that they were
in custody or free to leave. Hammond v. State, 82 N.E.3d 880, 884 (Ind. Ct. App.
2017). This Court has looked at whether a defendant was handcuffed or
physically restrained in any way, or whether the police have somehow implied
that the suspect was not free to leave without consequence. See generally
Meriwether v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1259, 1263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Based on these
criteria, we find that Williams was not in police custody.
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[16] Despite arguments to the contrary by Williams, Sergeant Boynton and
Detective Blossom were permitted, as police officers, to come up to Williams’s
door, knock, and ask to speak with him. This is commonly referred to as a
routine “knock and talk” investigation. Hayes v. State, 794 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2003) (defining a knock-and-talk investigation as one where officers
come to an individual’s door, clearly identify themselves as law enforcement,
ask to speak with someone about a complaint, and request permission to search
the home). Such a tactic “does not per se violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
[17] Thereafter, the record demonstrates that Detective Blossom saw Williams
leaving through his side door and attempting to get into a pickup truck. They all
talked for a while before Sergeant Boynton asked if the officers could go inside
his home and look around. Williams became visibly nervous and asked if he
could first go and tie up his dogs because they were aggressive. Both officers
noticed that Williams’s demeanor changed and that he was hesitant to let the
officers inside. Sergeant Boynton calmly told Williams that “we weren’t looking
to take anyone to jail for possession – possessing marijuana if it was like a dime
bag.” Tr. Vol. II p. 96. It was at this point that Williams admitted to possessing
a small amount of marijuana and that the situation got out of hand. “Williams
became excitable, interrupted officers and began walking towards the back of
his residence.” Appellant’s Br. p. 6. Sergeant Boynton then had to deal with
Williams’s dogs and Detective Blossom had to go after Williams, who by that
point had already locked himself inside his house.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1924 | April 22, 2020 Page 8 of 10
[18] Nothing in these facts indicates to us that Williams was ever in police custody.
Neither Sergeant Boynton nor Detective Blossom ever implied that there would
be some legal consequence if Williams were to end the conversation, Williams
was never handcuffed, the officers never surrounded Williams or exhibited the
threat of force, and Williams himself acknowledged that it was a routine
conversation, despite his initial hesitation. And Sergeant Boynton eventually
administered the Miranda and Pirtle advisements before conducting the search of
Williams’s home and before arresting him.7 As such, any testimony uttered by
Williams—including the admission that he possessed marijuana and that he
was storing contraband in his house—could have been used against him.
[19] Thus, under both the federal and state constitutions, we find that the trial court
did not err by admitting Williams’s statements into evidence because the
officers did not violate Williams’s right against self-incrimination.
II. Search and Seizure
[20] Moreover, because Williams was advised of his Miranda and Pirtle rights and
because he consented to a search of his home, he cannot now claim a violation
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
7
Further, Sergeant Boynton continuously tried to administer both the Miranda and Pirtle rights over the
course of their conversation, but Williams kept interrupting him. In other words, Sergeant Boynton
attempted to follow proper protocol.
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[21] It is well established that:
To constitute a valid waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, a
consent must be the intelligent relinquishment of a known right or
privilege. Such waiver may not be conclusively presumed from a
verbal expression of assent unless the court determines, from the
totality of the circumstances, that the verbal assent reflected an
understanding, uncoerced, and unequivocal election to grant the
officers a license which the person knows may be freely and
voluntarily withheld.
Navarro v. State, 855 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citation
omitted). And based on the totality of the circumstances here, it is unequivocal
that Williams himself consented to a search of his house after Sergeant Boynton
read him his Miranda and Pirtle rights. It is also undisputed that Williams stated
that he affirmatively understood his rights under the law following the
advisement. Although Williams hesitated, he gave permission to search after he
incriminated himself and consented to the officers’ requests.
[22] Because Williams consented to the search after being advised of his rights, we
need not conduct any further analysis under the Fourth Amendment or Article
1, Section 11 about whether the warrantless search was unconstitutional.
[23] In sum, the trial court did not err when it admitted evidence found as a result of
the search of Williams’s home.
[24] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bradford, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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