Molly Ann Melton v. Indiana Athletic Trainers Board ( 2020 )

FILED
Sep 14 2020, 9:01 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kevin W. Betz Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Sandra L. Blevins Attorney General of Indiana
Courtney E. Endwright
Frances Barrow
Betz + Blevins Benjamin M.L. Jones
Indianapolis, Indiana Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Molly Ann Melton, September 14, 2020
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CT-1972
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
Indiana Athletic Trainers Board, The Honorable Gary L. Miller,
et al., Judge
Appellee-Defendants, Trial Court Cause No.
49D03-1704-CT-16808
Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 1 of 59
Case Summary and Issues
[1] After Molly Melton’s athletic trainer’s license was suspended by the Indiana
Athletic Trainers Certification Board (the “Board”) for conduct that violated
the standards of professional practice, she filed a complaint seeking judicial
review of the Board’s sanction decision and asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (“Section 1983”) for alleged violations of her constitutional rights in the
disciplinary process. Her complaint named the Board, the Indiana Professional
Licensing Agency (“IPLA”), and the five members of the Board at the time of
the disciplinary decision in their official and individual capacities (“Members,”
and collectively with the Board and IPLA, the “Defendants”). The trial court
heard the judicial review petition first and, finding that Melton had been
prejudiced by the agency action, reversed the Board’s sanctions order. The
Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment asserting immunity
defenses to the Section 1983 claims which the trial court granted. Melton
appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on her Section 1983 claims;
the Board cross appeals the trial court’s grant of relief on the petition for judicial
review. Concluding the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the
Defendants but erred in granting relief on Melton’s petition for judicial review,
we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Facts and Procedural History
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I. Background and Prior Proceedings
[2] The Board regulates the practice of athletic trainers within Indiana and is
responsible for establishing standards for the practice of athletic training. Ind.
Code § 25-5.1-2-6(2)(C). The Board consists of five members appointed by the
governor. Ind. Code § 25-5.1-2-2(a). Among other things, the Board has been
given the power to conduct hearings, keep records of proceedings, and do all
things necessary to properly administer and enforce the law involving licenses
for athletic trainers. Ind. Code § 25-5.1-2-6(5). Upon finding an athletic trainer
has violated a standard of professional practice, Ind. Code § 25-1-9-4, the Board
has authority to impose a range of disciplinary sanctions, including suspension
of a practitioner’s license, Ind. Code § 25-1-9-9(a).
[3] Melton was a licensed athletic trainer in the State of Indiana from September
20, 2011 until her license expired on December 31, 2012. 1 In August 2012,
Melton was hired as an athletic trainer by IU Health Paoli Hospital’s Rehab
and Sports Medicine Department (“IU Health”). As part of her duties with IU
Health, she worked at Paoli Jr. & Sr. High School (the “School”). In
November/December of 2012, Melton, then twenty-three years old, began a
sexual relationship with an eighteen-year-old male athlete (“C.J.”)2 at the
1
Until 2015, an athletic training license expired on a date established by the Board in each even-numbered
year. Ind. Code § 25-5.1-3-4(a) (2006). In 2015, the statute was amended to allow for a three-year renewal
cycle ending December 31, 2017, after which a license expired on a date established by the Board in each
odd-numbered year. Ind. Code § 25-5.1-3-4(a) (2015). In other words, no athletic training licenses expired in
2016.
2
C.J. was eighteen when he began treatment with Melton; he turned nineteen during their relationship.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 3 of 59
School whom she had been treating for a knee injury. After approximately
three weeks, C.J.’s parents discovered the relationship and filed a complaint
with the School. Melton initially denied anything inappropriate occurred other
than text message exchanges initiated by C.J. that were “words of friendship”
and specifically denied there was any physical contact “at all.” Appellant’s
Corrected Appendix (“App.”), Volume 3 at 45. Sometime in December 2012,
Melton’s employment with IU Health was terminated. Melton did not renew
her license when it expired at the end of 2012, which would have required only
the payment of a renewal fee. Ind. Code § 25-5.1-3-4(b). Her license became
invalid on December 31, 2012 by operation of statute and without any action by
the Board. Ind. Code § 25-5.1-3-4(c).
[4] On May 10, 2013, the State of Indiana filed an administrative complaint with
the Board alleging that Melton had a sexual relationship with an athlete whom
she was treating, violating Indiana Code sections 25-1-9-4(a)(5) (for engaging
“in a course of lewd or immoral conduct in connection with delivery of services
to the public”) and 25-1-9-4(a)(11) (for engaging “in sexual contact with an
athlete in her care”). App., Vol. 2 at 211. A Board hearing was first held in
September 2013, but Melton did not personally appear. Instead, her counsel
appeared on her behalf to admit to the factual basis and argue the sanction.
The Board deemed this insufficient and issued a notice of proposed default,
which Melton opposed. In January 2014, the Board voted unanimously to find
Melton in default, and on February 3, issued an order suspending Melton’s
license for at least seven years.
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[5] Melton filed a complaint in the trial court alleging that the Board, IPLA, and
six members of the Board who were involved in the proceedings3 violated her
federal constitutional rights by holding her in default and arguing that she was
therefore entitled to damages under Section 1983.4 The trial court granted the
Board’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Melton’s Section
1983 complaint. The Court of Appeals held that the Board’s decision to find
Melton in default was in error because it “deprived Melton of her opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner[.]” Melton I, 53
N.E.3d at 1220 (quotation omitted). We therefore reversed the trial court’s
order dismissing Melton’s complaint and remanded with instructions for the
Board to vacate its February 3, 2014 order and hold a hearing on the
administrative complaint against her that comports with due process. Id. The
court offered no opinion on the Board’s order on its merits but confined its
decision to the conduct of the hearing.
[6] Following the Court of Appeals’ decision, the Board changed the status of
Melton’s license from “suspended” (due to Board action) to “expired.” See
Transcript of the Evidence, Volume II at 16. This returned the status of
3
Melton’s complaint named David Craig, A.T.; Larry Leverenz, A.T.; Scott Lawrance, A.T.; Jennifer
VanSickle; John Miller, M.D.; and John Knote, M.D., each in their individual and official capacities, as
defendants. See Melton v. Ind. Athletic Trainers Bd., 53 N.E.3d 1210, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“Melton I”).
4
Melton also filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The trial court dismissed the petition
for judicial review for failure to timely file the agency record. See Melton I, 53 N.E.3d at 1214. Melton did
not challenge that part of the trial court’s decision on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 5 of 59
Melton’s license to the status it had been in before administrative proceedings
were initiated.5
II. Current Proceedings
[7] On February 8, 2017, pursuant to the remand instructions, the Board held an
administrative hearing at which Melton appeared in person and by counsel.
Melton admitted to the relationship with C.J. and to violating the professional
standards of athletic training. Melton said she took responsibility for what
occurred but characterized it as “consensual,” “embarrassing,” a mistake that
“ruined everything that I worked for,” and explained it happened because she
was “lonely” and “naïve.” App., Vol. 5 at 65-67. She felt the suspension she
had already served was “three years of living in fear of applying for other
licenses” that had “impacted [her] greatly” and was “more than enough.” Id. at
65, 68.
[8] The State offered C.J.’s testimony about the relationship and its effects on him,
including that he became estranged from his parents; suffered from stress and
anxiety; and had problems at school, academically, athletically, and personally.
The State also admitted documents about Melton’s performance as an athletic
trainer at New Palestine High School during the 2011-12 school year, just prior
to being hired by IU Health and assigned to work at the School. The
5
As already noted, supra ¶ 3, Melton’s license expired by operation of law on December 31, 2012 because she
did not take steps to renew it. The administrative complaint was filed in May 2013, and the first
administrative action against her license was the Board’s February 3, 2014 order suspending her license.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 6 of 59
documents included a written reprimand for violating school policy by
transporting students in her personal vehicle and a document listing twenty-one
instances of unprofessional behavior, including “[e]xtreme texting” with a
student after midnight and “[f]lirtatiousness with wrestlers and baseball
players.” App., Vol. 3 at 130.6 Both documents about Melton’s performance at
6
The entirety of Volume 3 (as well as pages 105-234 of Volume 2, the entirety of Volume 4, and pages 2-108
of Volume 5) of the Appellant’s Corrected Appendix is comprised of the agency record. Volume 3 is put
together in such a way that it is nearly impossible to navigate. For instance, beginning on page 10, Volume 3
contains the following:
Page 10: First page of the affidavit of Gary L. Vaughn, Ph.D.
Pages 11-17: Pages 2-8 of the administrative complaint against Melton in reverse order
Page 18: Page 1 of Vaughn’s Curriculum Vitae (“CV”), ending with the academic
position he held from 1992-93
Page 19: A later page of Vaughn’s CV, starting with his position as adjunct faculty from
2003-present
Page 20: Page 3 of Vaughn’s affidavit
Page 21: Page 2 of Vaughn’s affidavit
Page 22: First page of the administrative complaint against Melton
Page 23: Copy of “Psychologist Health Service Provider” license for Janine L. Miller
Pages 24-27: Pages of what appears to be part of a CV with no identifying information
and likely in incorrect order
Page 28: Blank page
Page 29: Page 2 of 2 of what appears to be an email
Page 30: Blank page
Page 31: Page 1 of 2 of an email to Melton
Page 32: Blank page
All told, there are sixty-five blank pages in the 239-page Volume 3 (the blank pages do bear a page number),
and multiple documents appear out of order and/or appear more than once (for instance, the first page of the
administrative complaint appears five times).
In short, Volume 3 of the appendix was not put together in a manner calculated to assist the court in any
way. (There are also many blank pages from pages 105-234 of Volume 2, but the documents themselves
appear to be in a coherent order. Volume 4 and pages 2-108 of Volume 5 do not suffer from these
deficiencies because they are entirely comprised of the transcript of the February 8, 2017 Board hearing.)
Even if this is the way the agency record was delivered to Melton, we can discern no reason why the
documents could not have been placed in an appropriate order before submitting them to this court. See Ind.
Code § 4-21.5-5-13(e) (concerning transmittal of the agency record to the trial court, stating, “By stipulation
of all parties to the review proceedings, the record may be shortened, summarized, or organized.”) (emphasis
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New Palestine had been shared with Melton during her employment at New
Palestine, which ended when she was asked to resign. Melton objected to these
documents as irrelevant, improper character evidence, and hearsay. See App.,
Vol. 5 at 21, 23. The State defended admission of the documents as relevant to
Melton’s state of mind because they showed “she was aware boundary issues
existed.” Id. at 21. The Board allowed the documents to be admitted.
[9] Melton offered the affidavits of two psychologists, one of whom opined that
Melton would not pose an unreasonable risk of harm to patients and
recommended reinstatement of her license, see App., Vol. 3 at 79, and the other
of whom had “no basis to disagree” with those recommendations after
“extensive interview, evaluation, and testing” of Melton, id. at 108. Melton
also provided the Board with a document described as “research about the
relevant sanctions from the [] Board as well as relevant other sanctions by other
boards in the state of Indiana, as well as the Indiana Supreme Court.” App.,
Vol. 5 at 88. The State provided the Board, with no objection from Melton,
“some teacher cases” regarding sanctions imposed by the Indiana Department
of Education for teacher misconduct. Id. at 89.
added). We also note that the table of contents for the appendix simply states that Volume 3 contains
“Administrative Record dated June 26, 2018 (Continued)” beginning on page 2. App., Vol. 1 at 2. Although
this is technically true, it does not exactly help us find or identify relevant documents contained therein and if
Melton’s counsel had taken the time to create a more detailed table of contents for Volume 3, they may have
realized that it was in an unacceptable condition. See Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 50(C) (“The table
of contents shall specifically identify each item contained in the Appendix, including the item’s date.”)
(emphasis added).
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[10] On March 27, 2017, the Board again found that Melton’s conduct violated
Indiana Code subsections 25-1-9-4(a)(5) and (11). Concluding, inter alia, that
C.J., his family, and the School suffered “significant harm” from Melton’s
actions, App., Vol. 2 at 123, that Melton “did not acknowledge the potential for
pain and suffering by [C.J. who was] in the inferior position” but simply
considered the relationship “a mistake,” id. at 124-25, and that Melton having
sex with C.J. was “more than a mistake” because it was “repeated over and
over again,” id. at 124, the Board placed Melton on indefinite suspension for at
least three years from the date of the order. With respect to the sanction, the
Board distinguished the previous Board decisions Melton had offered as
precedent and instead relied on its own comparisons with Indiana Department
of Education decisions relating to teachers accused of sexual acts with students,
albeit acknowledging that an athletic trainer is not a teacher. Id. at 125-26.
[11] On April 26, 2017, Melton filed in the trial court a petition for judicial review of
the Board’s March 2017 order under Indiana Code chapter 4-21.5-5 and a
complaint alleging violations of Section 1983 naming as defendants the Board,
IPLA,7 and the following five members of the Board in both their official and
individual capacities: Daniel Craig, A.T.; Larry Leverenz, A.T.; Scott
Lawrance, A.T.; John Knote, M.D.; and John Doherty, A.T. The Section 1983
complaint alleged in Count I that the Board’s “final ruling was contrary to Ms.
7
IPLA performs the administrative functions, duties, and responsibilities for the Board. Ind. Code § 25-0.5-
5-19.
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Melton’s Constitutional right, power, privilege and immunity” in that the
Board failed to provide “sufficient procedural and substantive due process
protections by not providing notice of the basis for her discipline and imposing
an arbitrary and capricious sanction” and thereby “exceeded the scope of the
authority provided by the Indiana General Assembly.” App., Vol. 2 at 65-66.
In Count II, the Section 1983 complaint alleged the Board’s final ruling
retaliated against Melton for her previous successful appeal and the resultant
attorney fee award.8 Id. at 67. In Count III, her petition for judicial review,
Melton alleged the Board’s order was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, in excess of statutory jurisdiction and authority and unsupported by
substantive evidence.” Id. at 70. Melton sought reversal of the sanction order,
injunctive relief, attorney fees and costs, and a damages award against the
Board Members “in their personal capacity to provide compensation for past
and future non-pecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices
complained of[,] including emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of
enjoyment of life and humiliation[.]” Id.
[12] In their answer to the Section 1983 counts,9 the Defendants asserted as
affirmative defenses (among others) that they:
8
Following the first appeal, the trial court entered an order on Melton’s petition for attorney fees and costs
awarding her $111,498.75 which the Board paid in December 2016. See App., Vol. 2 at 60.
9
The Defendants did not specifically answer Count III as “[a] petition for judicial review is not a ‘complaint’
to which an answer is required.” App., Vol. 2 at 100 (citing Ind. Code ch. 4-21.5-5).
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• violated no clearly established federal constitutional right
of which a reasonable person would have known at the
time and are entitled to qualified immunity;
• were acting as an adjudicatory body and thus are entitled
to absolute immunity;
• in their respective official capacities are not “persons”
subject to suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and
• in their respective official capacities are not subject to
claims for damages.
Id. at 101. During the litigation, the parties and the trial court agreed the
Section 1983 claims and the petition for judicial review were not dependent on
each other and would be managed separately. See App., Vol. 5 at 228
(Defendants’ Motion to Correct Error from April 9, 2018 Order stating, “When
determining how this case should be managed, the Court and all parties agreed
that the judicial review and Section 1983 claims were separate and thus should
be managed on separate tracks.”).10 The trial court set separate motions and
hearing schedules for the two claims.
10
Based on certain motions filed in the trial court and referenced in the Defendants’ Motion to Correct Error
(but not included in the appendix on appeal), it appears Melton did not disagree with this assertion.
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A. Petition for Judicial Review
[13] In February 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Melton’s petition for judicial
review, beginning the hearing by stating, “This is set for a petition for review, or
at least hearing oral argument on a petition for judicial review of an
administrative ruling. We do have some matters set later this year on part of
the original complaint that was filed[.]” Tr., Vol. II at 4. Melton agreed that
judicial review “would just be against the IPLA and the [Board]” and the Board
Members would “not necessarily be defendants.” Id. at 5. Melton claimed that
although the Board had no evidence of her being a danger to anyone, it “ran
wild . . . as if it were a criminal matter and she were a predator.” Id. at 10. And
she posited that the Board’s use of Department of Education cases as
comparators rather than its own decisions was because the Board’s own
decisions “made the sanction they gave [Melton] seem out of control.” Id. at 8.
At the conclusion of Melton’s presentation, the trial court asked, “[W]hat is
your ultimate request of this court?” Id. at 14. Melton’s counsel replied, “My
ultimate request of this court, Your Honor, is to reverse the [Board] and enter a
remedy against the [Board] and tell the [Board] to stop it. . . . What happened
the last time [on remand] was the [Board] and the [State] went off the rails
again. They cannot be trusted to fairly adjudicate this matter. . . . Ms. Melton
has had more than enough of a sanction. And she deserves to be reinstated.
And this court must tell the [Board] specifically the remedy for reinstating
her . . . .” Id.
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[14] For its part, the Board noted that Indiana Code section 25-1-9-13, which
requires the Board to “seek to achieve consistency” in imposing sanctions, only
requires the Board to explain a significant departure from prior decisions
involving similar conduct and argued there is no prior Board decision involving
similar conduct. Tr., Vol. II at 19. The Board responded to the trial court’s
question about what it wanted the court to do by stating, “What I want you to
do is affirm the Board’s decision.” Id. at 21. Section 1983 was never
mentioned during the hearing, nor were the Board Members.
[15] The trial court subsequently issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law on
the petition for judicial review, finding the Board’s decision was arbitrary and
capricious and without substantial evidence and that the Board violated
Melton’s constitutional rights:
1) Given that the Board’s March 27, 2017 [] Order was arbitrary and
capricious as well as without the support of substantial evidence, and
because the Board violated Melton’s constitutional rights to substantive
and procedural due process, free speech without retaliation, and equal
protection, reversal of the Board’s Order is appropriate in this case.
2) [] Melton’s petition for judicial review is therefore granted and
this matter is remanded to the Board with instructions to
reinstate Melton’s Indiana athletic trainers license effective as of
the date of this Order.
3) In addition, . . . the Court awards Ms. Melton her reasonable
attorneys’ fees and expenses associated with the pursuit of this
matter under [Section] 1983. . . .
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4) A trial related to the determination of Melton’s emotional distress
damages resulting from these constitutional violations under [Section]
1983 will be held as currently scheduled[.]
Appealed Order [of April 9, 2018] (“Judicial Review Order”) at 14 (emphasis
added).11 On or about April 16, 2018, the Board again changed the status of
Melton’s license from “suspended” to “expired.” See App., Vol. 5 at 236.
B. Section 1983 Claims
[16] On March 25, 2019, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to
Melton’s Section 1983 claims alleging that the Board, IPLA, and the Board
Members in their official capacities are not “persons” under Section 1983, they
are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial and qualified immunity, and claims that
the Board Members in their individual capacities violated Melton’s
constitutional rights fail as a matter of law. See App., Vol. 6 at 53-54. Melton
responded and claimed the Defendants’ motion was “an ill-conceived
recapitulation” of their response to the petition for judicial review and that
quasi-judicial and qualified immunities were inapplicable to the individual
defendants. Id. at 121.
[17] The trial court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment on June 7,
2019. The Defendants began their presentation by stating, “The issue for
judicial review has already been decided by this Court. We’re here today only
11
Citation to the appealed orders in this case is based on the .pdf pagination.
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on [Melton’s Section] 1983 claims. Specifically, those claims against the
individual Defendants to which [sic] there’s been no finding previously in this
Court.” Tr., Vol. II at 28. The Defendants asserted two kinds of immunity:
absolute quasi-judicial immunity and qualified immunity. In doing so, the
Defendants acknowledged that neither immunity would affect the Judicial
Review Order:
The only difference here today between the judicial review
briefing and this motion for summary judgment is that these claims
are against the individual Defendants. So in order to find that the
individual Defendants violated Ms. Melton’s Constitutional
rights under Section 1983, the Court would have to make a
finding against the individual Defendants and not against the
Board in general as was the case in the judicial review
proceeding.
Id. at 33 (emphasis added). Melton reiterated the Defendants’ point that “no
immunities apply to judicial review[ so] we are in an argument as to the issues
regarding Section 1983.” Id. at 34. She then argued that quasi-judicial
immunity is the exception not the rule and that the balance of the factors to be
considered in determining whether there is quasi-judicial immunity weigh
against it in this case. Next, Melton argued that “[t]he general presumption . . .
is that qualified immunity, not quasi-judicial immunity, applies.” Id. at 36.
However, Melton argued qualified immunity did not apply here because it was
“sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood what
he’s doing violates” Constitutional rights. Id. at 39.
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[18] On July 26, 2019, the trial court entered its order on the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, concluding:
4. Defendants are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from all
of Ms. Melton’s claims because their actions were adjudicative in
nature when they found Ms. Melton’s conduct violated Indiana
statute and suspended her license.
5. [T]he individual Defendants acted in an adjudicative manner.
. . . Throughout the proceedings, the individual Defendants had
to evaluate the evidence, apply the evidence to the agency
regulations, and ultimately determine an appropriate sanction.
6. Thus, their role is adjudicatory, as the incident giving rise to
Ms. Melton’s complaint was an evidentiary hearing, and there is
a process for correcting error via the administrative appeals
process and judicial review.
7. Because of the judicial nature of the individual Defendants’
role in this case, they are entitled to absolute immunity and
subsequently protected from personal liability. And because the
only claims against the Board and [IPLA] are based on the
adjudicative actions of the individual Defendants, they too are
entitled to absolute immunity.
8. There is no evidence that the individual Defendants’ conduct
is so abusive of the constitutional rights belonging to [Melton]
that reasonable officials would know that their conduct was
unconstitutional without guidance from the courts.
9. Therefore, even if they were not entitled to absolute
immunity, the individual Defendants in their individual capacity are
entitled to qualified immunity and judgment is granted in their favor
on Ms. Melton’s § 1983 claims.
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Appealed Order at 24-25 (“Section 1983 Order”) (emphasis added). With
respect to its conclusion that the Board Members were entitled to qualified
immunity, the trial court specifically refuted each of Melton’s claims that the
Board Members in their individual capacities violated her constitutional rights:
there was no First Amendment violation because she was not retaliated against;
there was no procedural due process violation because she was given an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner;
there was no substantive due process violation because “[a]lthough this Court
might disagree with the length of the suspension,” the suspension “is
reasonable, is permitted by Indiana Code, and did not substantially deviate
from any other decision with similar facts”; and there was no equal protection
violation because Melton did not identify a similarly situated person who was
treated differently. Id. at 25-26.
[19] The trial court entered summary judgment for all Defendants on Melton’s
Section 1983 claims and, finding no just reason for delay, entered final
judgment on Melton’s complaint.
Discussion and Decision
I. Summary of Issues to be Decided
[20] We begin by summarizing the issues to be decided in this appeal and the
interplay between them. Melton brought two separate claims in one complaint:
1) a petition for judicial review of the Board’s March 27, 2018 order and 2)
Section 1983 claims for damages arising out of the Board proceedings. The
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caption of Melton’s complaint indicates that she named as defendants in her
lawsuit the Board, IPLA,12 and the five members of the Board who participated
in the March 2017 sanctions order in their official and individual capacities.
Melton referred to all defendants collectively as “the Athletic Board,” App.,
Vol. 2 at 53, and both the Section 1983 claims and the allegations in the petition
for judicial review were made against “the Athletic Board,” see id. at 65-70. The
trial court granted Melton relief on the petition for judicial review and ordered
that the Board reinstate her license and then granted summary judgment to the
Defendants on the Section 1983 claims. Melton claims the Section 1983 Order
“reached opposite conclusions from the same trial court’s [Judicial Review
Order] without further evidence or new arguments.” Brief of Appellant at 31.
And at first glance, these decisions do seem contradictory, as the trial court
explained in great detail in the Judicial Review Order how the Board violated
Melton’s constitutional rights in issuing the order suspending her license and
then found there were no constitutional violations in ruling for the Defendants
in the Section 1983 Order. However, this apparent contradiction can easily be
reconciled, as the parties themselves acknowledged in the proceedings below
that the two components of the complaint were separate and the outcome of
one component did not necessarily dictate the outcome of the other.
12
IPLA is named in the caption of the complaint but was not included in the section of the complaint titled
“Parties.” App., Vol. 2 at 55-56.
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[21] Both the petition for judicial review and the Section 1983 claims raised
constitutional issues, but they did so in different postures. The petition for
judicial review addressed the agency action, and the trial court found, among
other things, that the Board’s decision was contrary to Melton’s constitutional
rights, which is a reason for granting relief on judicial review. Accordingly, the
trial court reversed the Board’s order and remanded for reinstatement of
Melton’s license. But as will be discussed in greater detail below, only the
Board Members are “persons” amenable to a suit under Section 1983. Thus,
the Section 1983 claims of constitutional violations are applicable to the
individual actions of the Board Members. The trial court determined the
individual defendants were entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity and
also to qualified immunity because as individuals, they did not violate Melton’s
constitutional rights. Therefore, the trial court granted summary judgment to
the Defendants on the Section 1983 claims. Because the two prongs of
Melton’s complaint were addressed to different actions by different defendants,
there is no contradiction in the trial court’s orders.
[22] But even if there was a contradiction in the trial court’s rulings, it would be
irrelevant because of our standard of review. For both petitions for judicial
review and motions for summary judgment, our standard of review is de novo,
and we are not bound by the trial court’s findings in either situation. Thus, in
Melton’s appeal of the Section 1983 Order, we must decide based on our own
review of the designated evidence if the Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment, and in the Board’s appeal of the Judicial Review Order, we must
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decide based on our own review of the agency record if Melton is entitled to
relief from the Board decision. It just so happens that in this case, the agency
record and the evidence designated for summary judgment are one and the
same.
II. Melton’s Appeal:
Section 1983 Order
[23] Melton appeals the trial court’s Section 1983 Order claiming that “because [the
Board’s] individual members are not absolutely immune, and a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that [the Board] violated Melton’s constitutional
rights in multiple ways,” the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the
Board should be reversed. Br. of Appellant at 29-30.
A. Standard of Review
[24] When reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment, we apply the same
test as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only if the designated
evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Sedam v. 2JR
Pizza Enters., LLC, 84 N.E.3d 1174, 1176 (Ind. 2017). “A fact is ‘material’ if its
resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a
trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if
the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.”
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). The moving party bears the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 20 of 59
initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact as to
a determinative issue. Id.
[25] Our review is limited to those facts designated to the trial court, T.R. 56(H),
and we construe all facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in
favor of the non-moving party, Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 (Ind.
2013). Because we review a summary judgment ruling de novo, a trial court’s
findings and conclusions offer insight into the rationale for the court’s judgment
and facilitate appellate review but are not binding on this court. Denson v. Estate
of Dillard, 116 N.E.3d 535, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Additionally, we are not
constrained by the claims and arguments presented to the trial court, and we
may affirm a summary judgment ruling on any theory supported by the
designated evidence. Id.
B. Section 1983
[26] Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphases added). Section 1983 creates no substantive rights
of its own but was “designed to prevent the states from violating the
[C]onstitution . . . and to compensate injured plaintiffs for deprivations of those
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federal rights.” Culver-Union Twp. Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 629 N.E.2d 1231,
1233 (Ind. 1994). To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, “the plaintiff must show
that (1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the defendant acted under
the color of state law.” Myers v. Coats, 966 N.E.2d 652, 657 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012) (quotation omitted). But before evaluating a plaintiff’s claim, it is
necessary to determine whether a particular defendant is a “person” within the
meaning of the statute and thus, amenable to suit. Severson v. Bd. of Trustees of
Purdue Univ., 777 N.E.2d 1181, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
[27] There are three factors to be considered in determining whether a particular
entity is a “person” for Section 1983 purposes. Ross v. Ind. State Bd. of Nursing,
790 N.E.2d 110, 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). First, the type of governmental
entity being sued. Id. The United States Supreme Court has held that for
Section 1983 purposes, the term “person” does not include a state or its
administrative agencies. Crouch v. State, 147 N.E.3d 1026, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App.
2020) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)); see also
Howlett by & through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990) (explaining that
Will established that “the State and arms of the State, which have traditionally
enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject to suit under § 1983 in
either federal court or state court.”). Second, whether the plaintiff seeks
retrospective (monetary) or prospective (injunctive) relief. Ross, 790 N.E.2d at
117. And third, whether the suit is brought against a state official in an official
or individual capacity. Id. Based on these factors, five general rules have
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emerged regarding whether an entity is a “person” within the meaning of
Section 1983:
1) a municipality, municipal official, or other local governmental
unit or political subdivision may be sued for retrospective or
prospective relief; 2) a state or state agency may not be sued
under section 1983 regardless of the type of relief requested; 3) a
state official cannot be sued in his official capacity for
retrospective relief but can be sued for prospective relief; 4) a
state official can be sued in his individual capacity for
retrospective relief; and 5) an entity with Eleventh Amendment
immunity in federal court is not considered a section 1983
“person” in state court.
Id. With those rules in mind, we consider whether each of the defendants
named by Melton is a “person” for Section 1983 purposes.
1. IPLA and the Board
[28] There can be little doubt that IPLA and the Board are state agencies, and the
parties do not dispute this. IPLA and the Board are both created by statute. See
Ind. Code § 25-1-5-3(a) (establishing IPLA) and Ind. Code § 25-5.1-2-1
(establishing the Board). The executive director of IPLA and the members of
the Board are appointed by the governor. See Ind. Code § 25-1-5-5(a) (stating
“[IPLA] shall be administered by an executive director appointed by the
governor”) and Ind. Code § 25-5.1-2-2(a) (stating the Board “consists of five (5)
members appointed by the governor”). IPLA performs all administrative
functions, duties, and responsibilities for the Board. Ind. Code § 25-0.5-5-19.
As state agencies, neither IPLA nor the Board may be sued as a “person” under
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 23 of 59
Section 1983 regardless of the relief requested. See Ross, 790 N.E.2d at 117
(deciding the same as to the Indiana State Board of Nursing and the Health
Professions Bureau, which at the time Ross was decided served the same
function for the Board of Nursing that IPLA now does). Therefore, summary
judgment for IPLA and the Board on Melton’s Section 1983 claims was
appropriate.
2. Board Members
[29] The amenability of the Board Members to a Section 1983 suit is at the heart of
Melton’s appeal. In Kentucky v. Graham, the United States Supreme Court
offered the following illustration of the basic distinction between individual-
and official-capacity actions under Section 1983:
[Individual]-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon
a government official for actions he takes under color of state
law. Official-capacity suits, in contrast, generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent. As long as the government entity receives
notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is,
in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real
party in interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages
against an official in his [individual] capacity can be executed
only against the official’s personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to
recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must
look to the government entity itself.
On the merits, to establish [individual] liability in a § 1983 action,
it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state
law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. More is required in
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an official-capacity action, however, for a governmental entity is
liable under § 1983 only when the entity itself is a moving force
behind the deprivation; thus, in an official-capacity suit the
entity’s “policy or custom” must have played a part in the
violation of federal law. When it comes to defenses to liability,
an official in a[n individual]-capacity action may, depending on
his position, be able to assert personal immunity defenses . . . .
In an official-capacity action, these defenses are unavailable. . . .
. . . A victory in a[n individual]-capacity action is a victory
against the individual defendant, rather than against the entity
that employs him.
473 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1985) (quotations, citations, emphasis, and footnotes
omitted).
a. Official Capacity
[30] Because official capacity suits generally state a claim against the entity of which
the officer is an agent, state officials sued in their official capacities, like states
and state entities, are not generally “persons” subject to suit for damages under
Section 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. An exception to this general rule exists if
the state official is sued in his or her official capacity for prospective relief such
as an injunction based on an alleged ongoing constitutional violation. Chang v.
Purdue Univ., 985 N.E.2d 35, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
Under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 [] (1908),
when an official acts in an unconstitutional manner, his actions
are stripped of their official cloak, and he may be ordered to
perform his official duties in a manner consonant with the
Constitution. Under this legal fiction, the state is presumed not
to accede to unlawful actions taken by one of its officials, so that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 25 of 59
an order directed to the official to affirmatively correct his actions
is not being directed against the state. It has consistently been
held since Ex Parte Young . . . that suits may be brought against
public officials to enjoin them from invading constitutional
rights.
Stevens by Stevens v. Ind. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 566 N.E.2d 544, 548 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991) (citation omitted), trans. denied; see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,
521 U.S. 261, 294 (1997) (noting that the doctrine of Ex parte Young allows
official capacity suits “where a plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation of federal
law, and where the relief sought is prospective rather than retrospective”)
(O’Connor, J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
[31] The trial court did not make any specific findings about Melton’s official
capacity claims, and as noted in Kentucky v. Graham, immunity defenses are not
available to officials sued in their official capacities, 473 U.S. at 167, so the trial
court’s general conclusions about immunity do not support summary judgment
for the Board Members in their official capacities. In this regard, we agree with
Melton that immunity does not bar her request for injunctive relief. See Br. of
Appellant at 50. Nonetheless, we hold summary judgment is appropriate on
grounds other than immunity. See Denson, 116 N.E.3d at 539 (stating that we
may affirm summary judgment on any theory supported by the evidence).
[32] In Crouch v. State, the plaintiff, a former employee of the Indiana Attorney
General’s office, filed a Section 1983 complaint against the State of Indiana and
the State Personnel Director, in both her official and individual capacities, upon
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finding out that after his employment was terminated, the State Personnel
Department had identified him as not eligible for rehire. Among other things,
the plaintiff requested the trial court “[e]njoin the State from categorizing [him]
or any other employee as not eligible for rehire without first providing that
individual with notice and an opportunity to be heard.” 147 N.E.3d at 1030.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, with respect to the claim
against the State Personnel Director in her official capacity, we noted the rule
that a state official can be sued in her official capacity for injunctive relief, but
determined that the plaintiff’s request was to enjoin the State from undertaking
certain actions. Because the plaintiff did not request any prospective relief as to
the State Personnel Director in her official capacity, we affirmed the trial court’s
dismissal of the complaint against her in that capacity. See id.
[33] The same is true here. Melton requested “an award of injunctive relief
requiring the Athletic Board to adopt reasonable procedures in compliance with their
legislatively mandated duties, in as much as the Athletic Board’s procedures
pose an imminent threat of recurrence of injury[.]” App., Vol. 2 at 70
(emphasis added). Although the fact that Melton uses “the Athletic Board” to
refer to all defendants perhaps makes it less obvious than in Crouch, Melton’s
request for injunctive relief concerns the policies and procedures of the Board as
a body rather than the actions of any one or more Board Members. Melton did
not defend her request for official capacity relief at the summary judgment
hearing and beyond noting in her brief the general rule that state officials may
be sued in their official capacity for prospective relief, does not support her
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 27 of 59
official capacity claim on appeal. See Br. of Appellant at 50. Because Melton
did not request injunctive or other prospective relief as to the Board Members in
their official capacity, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to
the Board Members in their official capacities.13
b. Individual Capacity
[34] As for the Board Members in their individual capacities, the trial court
determined that they were entitled to both absolute quasi-judicial immunity and
qualified immunity. When a Section 1983 claim is asserted against a state
official in his or her individual capacity, he or she may assert privileges of
absolute or qualified immunity. Bd. of Trustees of Purdue Univ. v. Eisenstein, 87
N.E.3d 481, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Melton contends the trial
court erroneously granted the Board Members immunity.
[35] “It is well-settled that judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for all
actions taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless those actions are taken in
the complete absence of any jurisdiction.” Droscha v. Shepherd, 931 N.E.2d 882,
888-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).14 “The underlying purpose of the immunity is to
preserve judicial independence in the decision-making process.” Id. at 889.
“That same underlying policy justifies granting immunity to non-judicial
13
Even if Melton did state a claim for prospective relief against the Board Members in their official
capacities, given our resolution of the petition for judicial review, infra Section III, she would not be entitled
to that relief.
14
Melton does not contend the Board acted in the complete absence of jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 28 of 59
officers who perform quasi-judicial functions.” D.L. v. Huck, 978 N.E.2d 429,
433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The United States Supreme Court has extended
absolute immunity to certain others who perform functions closely associated
with the judicial process. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985). But
courts are cautious in applying the judicial immunity doctrine to areas outside
the traditional adversarial process. Lake Cnty. Juvenile Court v. Swanson, 671
N.E.2d 429, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
[36] In determining whether a person is entitled to the benefit of absolute immunity,
we use the functional approach established by the United States Supreme Court
and look to the nature of the function performed rather than the identity of the
person who performed it. Mendenhall v. City of Indpls., 717 N.E.2d 1218, 1226
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied; see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224
(1988); Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 201. The touchstone of the functional approach
is “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of
authoritatively adjudicating private rights.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc.,
508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993) (citation omitted). Therefore, absolute immunity is
available to members of a quasi-judicial adjudicatory body when they perform
duties functionally comparable to those of judicial officers. Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978) (granting absolute immunity to members of the
Department of Agriculture adjudicating an administrative complaint).
[37] There are “two overarching scenarios in which the functional approach leads to
a grant of immunity.” D.L., 978 N.E.2d at 433. The first is where there is a
direct adjudication of rights, either by a judge or by someone performing an
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 29 of 59
action that is functionally equivalent to that of a judge. Id. (citing Snyder v.
Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 286 (7th Cir. 2004)). The second involves individuals who
are carrying out the explicit orders of a judicial officer. Id. (citing Snyder, 380
F.3d at 287).
[38] To date, it appears Indiana state appellate courts have primarily had occasion to
consider the second scenario, in which quasi-judicial immunity has been given
to people “performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process
that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.”
H.B. v. State of Ind. – Elkhart Div. of Family & Children, 713 N.E.2d 300, 302 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Thus, for example, a probation officer who was
acting as an officer of the court in implementing and enforcing an order
regarding a child’s placement with a foster family was granted quasi-judicial
immunity. J.A.W. v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1142, 1152 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), aff’d,
687 N.E.2d 1202, 1203 n.3 (Ind. 1997); see also Thornton v. Pietrzak, 120 N.E.3d
1139, 1145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (probation officers who filed a notice of
probation violation were performing a task integral to the judicial process and
were therefore entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as an arm of the judge), trans.
denied. Likewise, case workers employed by the Department of Family and
Children to assist the juvenile court by implementing the court’s orders and
making recommendations about the placement of children in need of services
were granted quasi-judicial immunity. H.B., 713 N.E.2d at 303.
[39] But in this case, we are confronted with the first scenario: whether the Board
Members—undisputably non-judicial officers—were acting in a capacity that is
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 30 of 59
functionally equivalent to that of a judge. As the Supreme Court has explained,
“[w]hen judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is
because their judgments are ‘functional[ly] comparab[le]’ to those of judges—
that is, because they, too, ‘exercise a discretionary judgment’ as a part of their
function.” Antoine, 508 U.S. at 436 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
423 n.20 (1976)). Whether absolute immunity ought to be afforded is
dependent upon the nature of the functions performed by the party in question
and “the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have
on the appropriate exercise of those functions.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224. In
adjudicating controversies between parties, judges must be free to render
decisions without fear of personal liability for those decisions. Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363 (1978). “[T]he cloak of immunity is designed to
prevent a situation in which decision-makers act with an excess of caution or
otherwise . . . skew their decisions in ways that result in less than full fidelity to
the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their conduct out of a
fear of litigation or personal monetary liability.” Snyder, 380 F.3d at 286
(quoting Tobin for Governor v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 522 (7th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S 929 (2002)).
[40] To decide whether persons performing adjudicatory functions within federal
agencies are entitled to absolute immunity for judicial acts, the Supreme Court
has considered whether adjudication within a federal administrative agency
“shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial process that those who
participate in such adjudication should[, like judges,] be immune from suits for
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damages.” Butz, 438 U.S. at 513. The Court identified the following
“safeguards built into the judicial process” as “just a few of the many”
characteristics of the judicial process that “tend to reduce the need for private
damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct”: the need
to assure that the person can perform their functions without harassment or
intimidation; insulation from political influence; the importance of precedent;
the adversarial nature of the process; and the correctability of error on appeal.
Id. at 512. Ultimately, the Court determined that the “role of the modern
federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge . . . is ‘functionally
comparable’ to that of a judge” because “adjudication within a federal
administrative agency shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial
process[.]” Id. at 512-13.
[41] Melton contends none of the above safeguards except for the adversarial nature
of the process are present in this case. We disagree. Accepting as true Melton’s
assertion that the Board “rarely takes any action[,]” Br. of Appellant at 52, what
action it does take is of considerable import to the persons affected and should
be performed without fear of harassment or intimidation. “[T]he nature of the
adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most
intense and ungovernable desires that people can have.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at
226. For example, the First Circuit has recognized that “the act of revoking a
physician’s license—which bars the physician from practicing medicine in [a
given state]—is likely to stimulate a litigious reaction from the disappointed
physician, making the need for absolute immunity apparent.” Bettencourt v. Bd.
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of Registration in Med. of Commonwealth of Mass., 904 F.2d 772, 783 (1st Cir.
1990). “[A]bsolute immunity is available to quasi-judicial officers because the
threat of being subjected to any litigation impedes the officers’ ability to engage
in independent and fearless decision-making.” Tobin for Governor, 268 F.3d at
524.
[42] As for political influence, the Board Members are indeed appointed by the
governor. However, “for purposes of immunity analysis, the insulation-from-
political-influence factor does not refer to the independence of the government
official from the political or electoral process, but . . . to the independence of the
government official as a decision-maker.” Id. at 526 (quoting Brown v.
Griesenauer, 970 F.2d 431, 439 (8th Cir. 1992)). Thus, in Tobin for Governor, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that even though members of the Illinois State Board
of Elections were appointed by the governor, that was not an impediment to
absolute immunity. 268 F.3d at 526. If it were otherwise, state judges who are
appointed would not be entitled to absolute immunity. Cf. id. There is no
indication the governor has any influence over the decisions of the Board.
[43] Moreover, multiple layers of review of a Board decision are available such that
any errors may be corrected through the appellate process. Not only is a Board
decision subject to judicial review in the trial court by statute, Ind. Code § 4-
21.5-5-1, but also by this court and ultimately, by the Indiana Supreme Court,
Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-16.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 33 of 59
[44] As to the importance of precedent, the Board is required by statute to seek
consistency in its decision-making and to explain any deviation from prior
decisions involving similar conduct. Ind. Code § 25-1-9-13. Even if we accept
Melton’s position that this is not the same as being “bound by precedent typical
of a legal inquiry,” Br. of Appellant at 54 (quoting Flying Dog Brewery, LLLP v.
Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 597 Fed. App’x 342, 351 (6th Cir. 2015)), this is
the only factor that weighs against quasi-judicial immunity. Along with the
adversarial process in place during Board proceedings, see generally Ind. Code
ch. 4-21.5-3 (describing the conduct of adjudicative proceedings), the safeguards
discussed above indicate that there are sufficient checks on malicious action by
Board Members.
[45] The Board Members, like a judge, perform a traditional adjudicatory function
in that they weigh evidence, decide facts, apply law, choose sanctions, and
otherwise resolve disputes on the merits against a backdrop of multiple
safeguards designed to protect the licensee’s constitutional rights. In similar
situations, federal courts have extended quasi-judicial immunity to the
individual members of administrative boards who exercise their discretion and
issue decisions – duties functionally comparable to those of judicial officers.
See, e.g., Di Ruzzo v. Tabaracci, 480 Fed. App’x 796, 797 (5th Cir. 2012)
(concluding members of the Texas Medical Board were performing quasi-
judicial functions with respect to a hearing regarding plaintiff’s alleged
unlicensed practice of medicine); Diva’s Inc. v. City of Bangor, 411 F.3d 30, 40-41
(1st Cir. 2005) (concluding members of city council were performing quasi-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 34 of 59
judicial functions in denying special amusement permit); Tobin for Governor, 268
F.3d at 522 (concluding members of the Illinois State Board of Elections were
acting in an adjudicative capacity when they evaluated the validity of a
nomination petition); Wilson v. Kelkhoff, 86 F.3d 1438, 1443-45 (7th Cir. 1996)
(granting absolute immunity to members of a prison review board who revoked
a plaintiff’s release after a hearing); Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 784 (concluding
members of the state medical board were fulfilling a quasi-judicial role in
revoking a physician’s license to practice medicine); Horowitz v. Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs of State of Colo., 822 F.2d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1987) (granting absolute
immunity to medical board members who performed both adjudicatory and
prosecutorial functions), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987).
[46] Even accepting as true all of Melton’s allegations about the Board’s “out of
bounds, unjustified and senseless” actions, see Br. of Appellant at 28, the trial
court’s decision that the Board Members were entitled to absolute immunity
was proper. Such immunity totally insulates officials from liability for actions
taken in their judicial or quasi-judicial capacity; the shield of absolute immunity
cannot be pierced even if the official acts in error, maliciously, or corruptly.
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 & 359.
[47] Although quasi-judicial immunity has not previously been extended by Indiana
state courts to members of a professional licensing board, given the nature of
the functions performed by the Board Members in deciding whether Melton
violated the standards of professional practice and what sanction should be
imposed therefor, and considering the federal cases that have granted quasi-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 35 of 59
judicial immunity to officials in similar circumstances, we see no reason why
quasi-judicial immunity should not be extended to the members of this
professional licensing board.15 Cf. Eisenstein, 87 N.E.3d at 497 (granting
absolute quasi-judicial immunity to university chancellor who was acting in a
quasi-judicial role in investigating, conducting a hearing, and determining
whether a violation of university policy had occurred).
[48] In sum, IPLA and the Board itself are not amendable to a Section 1983 suit.
The Board Members in their official and individual capacities are “persons” for
purposes of Section 1983, but 1) the Board Members in their official capacities
can only be sued for prospective relief and Melton’s request for an injunction is
directed to prospective action by the Board and 2) the Board Members in their
individual capacities are absolutely immune because they were performing a
quasi-judicial function in hearing the disciplinary case and determining a
sanction.16 Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment to the Defendants on Melton’s Section 1983 claims.
15
Given this resolution on the issue of absolute quasi-judicial immunity, we need not address whether the
Board members had qualified immunity.
16
Melton contends that even if applicable otherwise, quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to the Board’s
administrative actions in failing to void a report of her suspension to the National Practitioner Data Bank
(“NPDB”) and failing to alter its meeting minutes from the February 2017 hearing after the trial court’s
Judicial Review Order. The allegations in Melton’s complaint about the Board making a report to the NPDB
were raised in the context of supporting her retaliation claim and she made no allegations about the Board’s
failure to void the report. See App., Vol. 2 at 65, ¶ 51. She also made no allegations about failure to alter the
meeting minutes in her complaint. We therefore decline to address liability for these allegedly non-judicial
actions. See Cavens v. Zaberdac, 849 N.E.2d 526, 533 (Ind. 2006) (“Issues not raised to the trial court are
waived on appeal.”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 36 of 59
III. Board’s Cross-Appeal:
Judicial Review Order
[49] On cross-appeal, the Board contends the trial court improperly granted
Melton’s petition for judicial review because the Board’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence, the sanction was not arbitrary and capricious
or an abuse of discretion, and the Board did not violate Melton’s constitutional
rights.
A. Standard of Review
[50] Under the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act, a court may grant relief
only if it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been prejudiced
by an agency action that is:
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law;
(2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
(3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(4) without observance of procedure required by law; or
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence.
Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(d).
[51] A trial court and an appellate court review the decision of an administrative
agency with the same standard of review. Ind. Family & Social Servs. Admin. v.
Patterson, 119 N.E.3d 99, 105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied, cert. denied, 140
S. Ct. 667 (2019). In other words, in reviewing the decision of an administrative
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 37 of 59
agency, we are limited to determining whether the agency’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence and whether the agency’s action is arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or in excess of statutory authority. Davis v.
Ind. State Bd. of Nursing, 3 N.E.3d 541, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, it is the
agency’s decision that we review, not the trial court’s. We may not try the facts
de novo or substitute our own judgment for that of the agency; rather, we defer
to the agency’s findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, Jay
Classroom Teacher’s Ass’n v. Jay Sch. Corp., 55 N.E.3d 813, 816 (Ind. 2016), and
consider the record in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision, Ind.
State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d 988, 992 (Ind. 2014). We review an
agency’s conclusions of law de novo but give great weight to the agency’s
interpretation of the law. Patterson, 119 N.E.3d at 105. We will not reverse
simply because we may have reached a different result. Behavioral Health and
Human Servs. Licensing Bd. v. Williams, 5 N.E.3d 452, 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),
trans. denied.
[52] The “burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the party to
the judicial review proceeding asserting invalidity[,]” Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-
14(a), and that is true at both the trial and appellate levels, Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d
at 991 n.1 (rejecting claim by judicial review petitioner that because she
prevailed in the trial court, the agency had the burden of proof on appeal).
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B. Review of the Board’s Order
[53] The Board concluded that Melton had committed two violations of the
standards of professional practice under Indiana Code section 25-1-9-4. Melton
does not, and indeed could not, challenge that conclusion, inasmuch as she
admitted during the Board hearing in February 2017 that she violated the
professional standards by having a sexual relationship with a patient. See App.,
Vol. 5 at 65. That conclusion is therefore supported by substantial evidence.
Pursuant to Indiana Code section 25-1-9-9, if the Board finds that the licensee is
subject to disciplinary sanctions for, among other things, violating professional
standards, it may impose any one or more of the following sanctions:
permanent revocation of a license, suspension of a license, censure, reprimand,
probation, or assessment of a fine. Ind. Code § 25-1-9-9(a)(1)–(6). Upon
concluding Melton violated the professional standards of conduct and
considering evidence offered at the hearing about an appropriate sanction, the
Board suspended Melton’s license indefinitely but for “no less than three (3)
years[.]” App., Vol. 2 at 127.17
[54] Melton sought judicial review arguing not about the Board’s conclusions
regarding her conduct, but about the process by which the Board determined a
17
We agree with the Board that “[b]ecause the final order was entered March 27, 2017, the three-year period
[ended] on March 27, 2020.” Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 31. But to the extent the Board implies
by this that Melton’s suspension ended on March 27, 2020, we cannot agree. Because of the “indefinite
suspension” and “no less than three years” language, Melton’s suspension did not necessarily end on March
27, 2020. It could have ended as early as March 27, 2020 but could also extend beyond that date. The
Board’s decision does not indicate on what terms the suspension would be lifted after the expiration of three
years.
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sanction as well as the length of the sanction itself. Her petition alleges that the
Board violated her procedural due process rights (by referencing allegations of
flirting in her previous job and using sanction decisions by the Indiana
Department of Education in reaching its decision, neither of which she was
provided notice of in advance), substantive due process rights (by imposing an
“out of bounds” sanction and failing to give her credit for the suspension she
had already served), equal protection rights (by treating her differently than
other athletic trainers), and First Amendment rights (by retaliating against her
for her earlier appeal). See Reply of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee at
25. She also argued the sanction was in excess of the Board’s statutory
authority and without observance of procedure required by law because it “far
exceeded the bounds of proportionality to other decisions” by the Board
without adequate explanation, Br. of Appellant at 41, and further argued the
decision was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence.
1. Contrary to Constitutional Right
a. Procedural Due Process
[55] Melton argues she was denied procedural due process because she was deprived
of notice that the “flirting” allegations from her prior job would be considered
and also deprived of notice that the Board would consider Indiana Department
of Education disciplinary cases offered by the State as comparators. See Br. of
Appellant at 42. Generally stated, due process requires notice, an opportunity
to be heard, and an opportunity to confront witnesses. Ind. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 842 N.E.2d 885, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). The
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notice must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to offer the
interested parties an opportunity to present their objections. Id. “Such notice
must reasonably convey the required information to the affected party, must
afford a reasonable time for that party to respond, and is constitutionally
adequate when the practicalities and peculiarities of the case are reasonably
met.” Id. (citation omitted).
[56] In the case of In re M.L.K., 751 N.E.2d 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), the
appropriate scope of this notice was discussed. Parents received notice that the
trial court would hold a hearing regarding the State’s request to terminate
wardship of their child. At the hearing, the issue of the parents’ obligation to
reimburse the State for amounts it had expended in care of the child was also
addressed and following the hearing, the trial court entered an order
terminating the wardship and also ordering the parents to reimburse the State
over $20,000. Parents appealed, arguing their due process rights were violated
because they did not have notice that reimbursement would be an issue at the
hearing. We agreed, noting:
A party is entitled to some notice that an issue is before the court
which has not been pleaded or has not been agreed to in a pre-
trial order. This is especially true where the new issue is not
unequivocally clear by the evidence being submitted. This is not
being technical. This is being fair. A party should be given an
opportunity to meet the issues which the court is considering.
Id. at 296-97 (quoting Aldon Builders, Inc. v. Kurland, 152 Ind. App. 570, 580, 284
N.E.2d 826, 832 (1972)); see also Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 842 N.E.2d at 891-
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 41 of 59
92 (holding that where school petitioned for judicial review of a State Board of
Education order and the trial court held a “preliminary hearing” on a motion to
stay that order but then ruled on the merits of the petition for judicial review
based on that hearing, the Board of Education was not afforded sufficient notice
that the hearing would be its only chance to argue the case on the merits).
[57] The “notice” Melton claims she was denied is not of this dimension. The
February hearing addressed whether Melton’s conduct violated the standards of
professional practice as alleged by the administrative complaint and if so, what
sanction was appropriate. Nothing that happened at the hearing was outside
those bounds. The Board did not “substantively consider[]” and find that
Melton violated a standard of professional practice by flirting with student
athletes at New Palestine as Melton alleged in her complaint.18 See App., Vol. 2
at 61, ¶ 34. To the contrary, the Board did not find that these allegations were
true at all. Instead, the Board found that Melton “received an evaluation from
the New Palestine athletic director alleging [she] was flirtatious with wrestlers
and football players.” Id. at 82 at ¶ 40 (emphasis added). Thus, the Board
acknowledged they were only allegations and considered them as part of the
fullness of the circumstances relevant to an appropriate sanction; that is, the
Board considered that a prior employer had expressed concerns to Melton that
she was not observing appropriate student/trainer boundaries even before she
18
Had the Board found Melton violated a standard of professional practice by flirting with student athletes at
New Palestine, this would have been a due process notice issue because the administrative complaint only
referenced her conduct with C.J. while employed by IU Health.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 42 of 59
began a relationship with C.J. Melton was advised of those allegations during
her prior employment and had an opportunity to respond to them during the
hearing. The flirting allegations were not a new issue sprung upon Melton at
the February hearing; they were simply evidence relevant to a known issue.
Melton’s right to procedural due process was not violated by this evidence.
[58] As for the Department of Education disciplinary cases, Melton was not
deprived of notice that the Board would consider these cases. Before closing
her evidence, Melton offered “research about the relevant sanctions from the
Athletic Trainers Board as well as relevant other sanctions by other boards in
the state of Indiana, as well as the Indiana Supreme Court.” App., Vol. 5 at 88.
The State then stated its desire to offer “some teacher cases” and Melton
replied, “Fair enough. No objection.” Id. at 89.19 Thus, Melton knew and
consented to Department of Education disciplinary cases being available to the
Board. Moreover, these cases, as well as the cases provided by Melton, are akin
to legal research, not evidence, and the Board would have been entitled to do
research after the hearing and find these cases on its own without providing
notice to the parties.
[59] “It is commonly understood that procedural due process includes notice and an
opportunity to be heard.” D.L.D. v. L.D., 911 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Ind. Ct. App.
19
Melton argued in her closing argument why the Department of Education cases should not apply, see App.,
Vol. 5 at 103-04, but she did not object when they were offered.
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2009), trans. denied. Melton was provided those safeguards during the Board
proceedings and therefore her right to procedural due process was not violated.
b. Substantive Due Process
[60] Melton’s petition for judicial review alleged the Board violated her substantive
due process rights by imposing an “out of bounds” sanction, including that the
sanction was not proportional to other Board decisions, was not adequately
explained, and did not give her credit for the suspension she had already served.
App., Vol. 2 at 54, 69.
[61] Substantive due process bars certain government actions “regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them[.]” Cnty. of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998) (citation omitted); see also N.B. v. Sybinski, 724
N.E.2d 1103, 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“Substantive due process ensures that
state action is not arbitrary or capricious regardless of the procedures used.”),
trans. denied.20 “The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual
against arbitrary action of government.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558
(1974). But “only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be
20
The Board argues that because Melton raised procedural due process, equal protection, and First
Amendment claims, she cannot raise a more general substantive due process claim. See Br. of
Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 44-45. Where a particular Amendment provides “an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection” against a particular sort of government behavior, “that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). However, that is true only if a claim is covered by a specific amendment.
U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). We agree with Melton that her specific substantive due process
claims do not merely restate her procedural due process, equal protection, or First Amendment claims and
are not precluded by the rule announced in Graham.
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‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’” Cnty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 846
(quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)). The United States
Supreme Court has defined such conduct as that which “shocks the conscience”
and violates the “decencies of civilized conduct.” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172-73 (1952) (holding use of evidence procured by forced pumping of
suspect’s stomach to obtain conviction for illegal possession of drugs violated
substantive due process). The scope of substantive due process is very limited,
and courts should be “‘reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered
area are scarce and open-ended.’” Campos v. Cook Cnty., 932 F.3d 972, 975 (7th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125). Accordingly, “[s]ubstantive due
process protects against government action that is arbitrary, conscience-
shocking, or oppressive in a constitutional sense, but not against government action
that is incorrect or ill-advised.” Cunney v. Bd. of Trustees of the Village of Grand View,
N.Y., 660 F.3d 612, 626 (2nd Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
“The State will prevail if any rational basis for its action can be hypothesized.”
Honeycutt v. Ong, 806 N.E.2d 52, 58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
[62] No matter how many times Melton describes the suspension of her license as
“outrageous” or “outlandish,” we are not persuaded that the sanction is
arbitrary in the constitutional sense that it is irrational or “shocks the
conscience.” A rational basis for a three-year suspension for violating the
standards of professional practice by having a sexual relationship with a
student-athlete can be hypothesized. See id. In addition, Melton’s specific
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arguments about her sanction are also raised through other, non-constitutional
means, see App., Vol. 2 at 69 (alleging the sanction is arbitrary and capricious,
an abuse of discretion, and in excess of authority), and we will not expand the
concept of substantive due process under these circumstances.21
c. Equal Protection22
[63] The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states
from treating individuals who are similarly situated differently. Reilly v. Daly,
666 N.E.2d 439, 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. But it does not require
that all persons be treated either identically or equally. Id. at 445-46. Rather,
equal protection analysis is implicated only if an individual has been treated
differently from similarly situated persons. Id. at 446. To be considered
“similarly situated,” a plaintiff and those alleged to have been treated more
favorably must be identical or directly comparable in all material respects.
LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Vill. of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2010).
The similarly situated analysis “is not a precise formula but . . . similarly
situated individuals must be very similar indeed.” Id. (quotations omitted).
21
In addition, Melton’s claims are at least somewhat grounded in state statutes requiring that the Board seek
consistency and explain deviations from prior decisions, and state law claims are not enforceable by the due
process clause. Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 122 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1997).
22
The trial court may or may not have found an equal protection violation in the Judicial Review Order – in
paragraph 28 of trial court’s Conclusions of Law, it found that the allegation of an equal protection violation
was “without substantive evidence[,]” but in paragraph one of the order, stated that because the Board
“violated Melton’s constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process, free speech without
retaliation, and equal protection,” reversal was appropriate. Appealed Order at 12, 14 (emphasis added).
Because we are not bound by the trial court’s findings on judicial review, however, the apparent
contradiction does not need to be resolved.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 46 of 59
[64] Melton alleged the Board treated her less favorably than it did male athletic
trainers by imposing a harsher sanction on her than on those trainers.
Specifically, Melton focuses on the Board’s prior sanctions of 1) “a pedophile
deemed a danger to his own and other children” and 2) “an athletic trainer who
killed someone in a drunk driving incident[.]” Br. of Appellant at 34. The
Board contends Melton failed to identify a similarly situated person who was
treated differently,23 and we agree.
[65] In Dickson v. Aaron, 667 N.E.2d 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied, we
considered whether Aaron, a Black female teacher who, among other things,
ordered a pitcher of beer and drank in front of students during a field trip then
drove them home and whose teaching contract was subsequently cancelled, was
treated differently than Martin, a white male teacher who twice smelled of
alcohol at school and was suspended without pay. Id. at 763. We noted that
although both Aaron and Martin’s conduct were violations of the school’s
policies, the “type of conduct was in fact different” and the two were therefore
not similarly situated. Id. Both Aaron and Martin’s conduct involved alcohol,
but no students saw Martin drinking and his conduct was not criminal, whereas
Aaron consumed at least part of a pitcher of beer in front of students and her
conduct thereafter in driving them home could have resulted in a criminal
23
Melton argues she designated “multiple male athletic trainers who were treated more favorably than her”
via the list of athletic trainer disciplinary cases she provided to the Board. Reply Br. of Appellant and Br. of
Cross-Appellee at 40-41. The Board does not dispute that she identified multiple persons she believed were
similarly situated; it only disputes that those persons were similarly situated.
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conviction. Id.; see also Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees of Mich. City Area Schs.,
978 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding teacher who was terminated from
employment after being found guilty of driving while intoxicated and public
intoxication in one case and resisting law enforcement and operating a vehicle
without a license in a second case was not similarly situated to other teachers
who either had alcohol-related problems or had been arrested but not both and
were not terminated: “This does not suffice for equal protection purposes.”),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 844 (1993); Sims v. Mulcahy, 902 F.2d 524, 541 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding a Black woman employed as a parking monitor who was
disciplined more harshly for being tardy fifteen times in seven years was not
similarly situated to a white woman in the same position who was tardy nine
times over the same period), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 897 (1990).
[66] Considering the fine distinctions made in Dickson, Vukadinovich, and Sims, we
conclude Melton’s comparators are not “very similar indeed.” See LaBella
Winnetka, Inc. 628 F.3d at 942. We do not discount the seriousness of the
conduct by the other trainers, but we do note that it was not similar to Melton’s.
Neither male trainer’s conduct was part and parcel of the provision of athletic
training services. Neither male trainer’s conduct involved sexual contact with a
patient. Melton has not identified a similarly situated person who was treated
differently than she was.
d. First Amendment
[67] Finally, Melton contends the Board violated her constitutional rights by
retaliating against her for her successful appeal of the Board’s 2014 order. The
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First Amendment protects the right to seek redress of grievances, including via
the courts. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 553 (7th Cir. 2009). In order to
prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, Melton must show that 1) she
engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment, 2) she suffered a
deprivation that would likely deter such activity in the future, and 3) the activity
was a motivating factor in the Board’s decision. Milliman v. Cnty. of McHenry,
893 F.3d 422, 430 (7th Cir. 2018). The Board agrees that Melton’s first appeal
was a protected activity under the First Amendment, see Br. of
Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 47, but disagrees that Melton has shown her
previous appeal was a motivating factor in the Board’s sanction decision.
[68] Initially, we note that Melton’s claim of retaliation appears to be based on a
faulty premise: she argues that the Court of Appeals determined in the first
appeal that the Board’s “suspension of Melton was indeed a ‘wrong’ against
her.” Br. of Appellant at 47 (emphasis added) (citing Melton I, 53 N.E.3d at
1220). But what the Court of Appeals actually decided was that suspending her
without a proper hearing was a wrong against her. See Melton I, 53 N.E.3d at
1220. The court remanded for a hearing but made no comment on the sanction
itself. To the extent Melton cites the decision in her first appeal for the
proposition that any sanction the Board imposed following the remand hearing
was improper retaliation, she is mistaken.
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[69] Melton has not shown that her appeal was the “but-for cause” of the Board’s
2017 sanction.24 The sanction was imposed because of Melton’s admitted
conduct in violating the standards of professional practice. Moreover, the
sanction the Board imposed in March 2017 was shorter than the sanction
originally imposed and therefore shows no retaliatory intent. In 2014, the
Board suspended Melton for at least seven years, a suspension which could
have expired in 2021. In 2017, after remand, the Board suspended Melton for
no less than three years, a suspension which could expire in 2020, if it has not
already. Melton repeatedly refers to the March 2017 sanction as an “effective
seven-year suspension,” see, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 27, 33, 39, and contends
this suspension “[in] effect . . . equaled seven years because [she] had been
unable to practice as an athletic trainer since December 31, 2012 due to the
expiration of her athletic trainer’s license as well as the continued pendency of
the administrative complaint[,]” id. at 23. But in complaining about this
“effective seven-year suspension,” Melton does not acknowledge that the Board
had nothing to do with her license expiring on December 31, 2012 – she has not
24
Although we hold Melton has not proved the but-for causation element of a First Amendment retaliation
claim and therefore need not address the deterrence element, we note that we evaluate the deterrent effect by
an objective test: “whether the alleged conduct by the defendants would likely deter a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing to engage in protected activity.” Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir.
2020). The fact that Melton has in fact pursued this second appeal is not a consideration: “a specific
plaintiff’s persistence does not undermine his claim. In fact, a contrary rule would stymie every First
Amendment retaliation suit: Only plaintiffs who refuse to be silenced make their way to . . . court.” Id. at
646-47 (citation omitted). However, we believe the Board’s alleged conduct – still imposing a sanction for
wrongful conduct after a successful appeal alleging procedural defects, but imposing a lesser sanction upon
hearing Melton’s evidence in mitigation – would not likely deter a reasonable person from appealing earlier
conduct she felt was a violation of her rights.
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been licensed since January 2013 in part due to the fact she let her license expire
before any of these proceedings began. From January 2013 to February 2014,
her license was in “expired” status, as it was from the time of the first Melton
decision in April 2016 until the Board issued a new order in March 2017, and as
it has been from the time the trial court granted the petition for judicial review
in April 2018. The sanction we are reviewing here is a three-year suspension,
and Melton has failed to show that it was motivated by her earlier appeal. 25
[70] Finally, Melton contends the Board’s retaliatory intent is clear because the State
“explicitly asked [the Board] to find against Melton because she did not simply
‘just let this die’ . . . and instead ‘pursue[d] the appeal’” of the 2014 order, and
the Board “adopted” that logic when it found that Melton “believe[d] the seven
year suspension imposed in 2014 was a wrong against her” by the Board. Br. of
Appellant at 47 (quoting App., Vol. 5 at 90 (transcript of Board hearing) and
Vol. 2 at 124 ¶ 60 (Board’s 2017 order)). Melton takes the State’s above
statements from the Board hearing somewhat out of context: the State’s
comments were made as part of a larger argument to the Board summarizing
that Melton repeatedly showed concern only for how these proceedings have
affected her. See App., Vol. 5 at 90 (“Repeatedly in Miss Melton’s testimony
she talked about how this affected her. Over and over and over again. She
said, I’m so embarrassed. I never thought that I would do something like this
25
We also note, based on the captions of Melton’s action in Melton I and the caption in this case, that the
members of the Board changed between the 2014 and 2017 decisions. See supra ¶¶ 5 n.3, 11.
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that would affect the rest of my life. I’m sorry because I lost everything. This
has impacted me greatly. She said when asked why did she keep going instead
of just let this die, why did she pursue the appeal and come back. Because she
felt she had been wronged.”). Although we agree with Melton that the State’s
comment was inappropriate and if not for the Board being meticulous in its
findings and providing enough information for it to be apparent that the Board
was not punishing her for appealing, might have amounted to reversible error.
However, the Board’s one finding that Melton believed she had been wronged
by the seven-year suspension is both true based on her testimony and, in the
context of the Board’s sixty-eight other findings, not indicative of a retaliatory
intent in imposing a sanction for Melton’s conduct.
e. Summary
[71] Melton has not demonstrated that the Board’s action was “contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity” and she therefore is not
entitled to relief from the Board’s order on that basis.
2. In Excess of Statutory Authority/
Without Observance of Required Procedure
[72] Melton also alleged in her petition for judicial review that the Board’s sanction
decision “far exceeded the bounds of proportionality” relevant to other Board
decisions and that the variance was not adequately explained. See Ind. Code §
25-1-9-13. Therefore, Melton argued, the Board’s decision was in excess of its
statutory authority and without observance of procedure required by law.
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[73] In LTV Steel Co. v. Griffin, 730 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. 2000), the Indiana Board of
Safety Review dismissed charges of serious and knowing workplace safety
violations against a company upon finding the state safety inspector who
conducted the investigation had a conflict of interest in violation of the state
ethics code. But exclusive jurisdiction to receive, hear, and adjudicate
complaints alleging a violation of the state ethics code is entrusted to the State
Ethics Commission. See Ind. Code §§ 4-2-6-4, -9(a). The court therefore held
the safety board’s dismissal was not in accordance with law and was in excess
of the board’s statutory jurisdiction because there is nothing in the safety
board’s governing statutes that authorizes it to adjudicate violations of the
ethics code. LTV Steel Co., 730 N.E.2d at 1258.
[74] Here, the Board has the statutory authority to set standards for the practice of
athletic training, enforce those standards, and impose discipline if it finds those
standards have been violated. See generally Ind. Code chs. 25-5.1-2 and 25-1-9.
Unlike in LTV Steel Co., no other entity has that authority here, and the
discipline imposed was within the panoply of acceptable disciplinary sanctions
set out by the legislature. Thus, the Board did not exceed its statutory authority
in disciplining Melton. In addition, by statute, the Board must seek to achieve
consistency in its decision-making and explain significant departures from prior
decisions involving similar conduct. The Board issued a written order
explaining that it found the athletic trainer discipline cases cited by Melton to
be dissimilar to her case and providing the reasoning behind its sanction
decision. It therefore observed the procedures set forth by law. The fact that
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Melton disagrees with the Board’s sanction decision does not make it outside
the proscribed law.
3. Arbitrary and Capricious/
Unsupported by Substantial Evidence
[75] Finally, Melton alleged the Board’s sanction decision was arbitrary and
capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence. See App., Vol. 2 at 69-70.
[76] Melton argues the Board’s findings are unsupported by substantial evidence
because multiple findings were based on hearsay, unqualified witness
testimony, or unsupported by admissible evidence. However, administrative
hearings, unlike judicial proceedings, are conducted “in an informal manner
without recourse to the technical, common law rules of evidence applicable to
civil actions in the courts.” Ind. Code § 4-21.5-3-25(b); see Ind. Evidence Rule
101(a) (“These rules apply to proceedings in the courts of this State[.]”) (emphasis
added). Melton’s technical challenges to the evidence considered by the Board
are therefore irrelevant. Nevertheless, an administrative agency’s findings
“must be based upon the kind of evidence that is substantial and reliable.” Ind.
Code § 4-21.5-3-27(d).
[77] When we conduct judicial review of an agency’s decision, we may not reweigh
the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs.
Admin. v. Pickett, 903 N.E.2d 171, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). In determining
whether findings are supported by substantial evidence, “[w]e analyze the
record as a whole, looking for such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-1972 | September 14, 2020 Page 54 of 59
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pack v. Ind. Family & Soc.
Servs. Admin., 935 N.E.2d 1218, 1225-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citation and
quotation omitted). Evidence will be considered substantial when it is “more
than a scintilla[,]” Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Watson, 938 N.E.2d 672,
681 (Ind. 2010), and where there is a “reasonably sound basis of evidentiary
support” for the Board’s decision, we will uphold the Board’s findings of fact,
Pack, 935 N.E.2d at 1226. In short, “the facts are to be determined but once.”
Andrade v. City of Hammond, 114 N.E.3d 507, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans.
denied, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 127 (2019).
[78] Having thoroughly reviewed the record of the Board proceedings and the
Board’s order, we conclude the Board’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence. There is substantial and reliable evidence in the record that C.J. was
harmed by his relationship with Melton,26 that Melton was aware of appropriate
boundaries but did not observe them, and that Melton was either unable or
unwilling to recognize that her behavior was damaging to anyone other than
herself. See App., Vol. 5 at 66, 74, 76 (Melton testifying, “I never thought that I
would ever jeopardize my life the way I have” and also, “I didn’t kill
anyone. . . . [C.J. is] still alive and well. I did not physically take him away.”).
26
Melton’s challenges to the findings about the relationship’s effects on C.J. focus on the facts least favorable
to the Board’s decision and essentially ask us to reweigh the evidence and judge C.J.’s credibility for
ourselves. Also, to the extent Melton argues there is no expert testimony to support a finding of harm, we
note only that Melton offered no authority for the proposition that an expert is required to verify a person’s
testimony about the effects of an event on his or her own life.
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[79] Finally, a decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is made without any
consideration of the facts and lacks any basis that might lead a reasonable
person to make the same decision as the administrative agency. Ind. Pesticide
Review Bd. v. Black Diamond Pest & Termite Control, Inc., 916 N.E.2d 168, 179
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. A decision may also be arbitrary and
capricious where only speculation furnishes the basis for a decision. Id. In
other words, an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious “where there is no
reasonable basis for the decision.” Ind. State Bd. of Health Facility Adm’rs v.
Werner, 841 N.E.2d 1196, 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
[80] Melton’s litany of complaints seems to fall primarily in the category of alleging
the Board made its decision without any consideration of the facts, but what she
is actually arguing is that the Board’s decision was made without consideration
of the facts she felt were important. For instance, she argues the Board
“mentioned yet ignored” the evidence provided by mental health professionals
that Melton did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm to patients if her license
was reinstated. App., Vol. 2 at 63, ¶ 42. However, the Board did not ignore
this evidence; it acknowledged the affidavits but noted it was also concerned
with the harm she had already inflicted – and the Board was in fact charged
with imposing a sanction for Melton’s past conduct. See Ind. Code § 25-1-9-4.
[81] Melton also argues her sanction was inconsistent with prior decisions, but
Melton has not shown that the sanction of a three-year suspension for her
conduct was a significant departure from prior decisions involving similar
conduct. Melton identified several Board decisions that she believed involved
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conduct similar to hers, but the Board did not agree the conduct was similar
and explained why; namely, the cases offered by Melton did not involve sexual
contact in connection with the delivery of services to the public. Further, the
ultimate issue is whether we agree that previous Board decisions were similar,
and we have already determined in addressing Melton’s equal protection
argument that they are not. See supra ¶ 66. Again, the fact that Melton believes
her conduct was similar does not mean the Board was obligated to agree or that
finding otherwise was an arbitrary and capricious decision. Melton further
faults the Board for, upon finding its own previous cases to be insufficient
comparators, using teacher discipline cases as a guide. As noted above, see
supra ¶ 9, Melton did not object to the State offering those cases for the Board’s
consideration, and also, Melton herself offered attorney discipline cases, which
would be subject to the same objections Melton has now made to the teacher
cases – that they are decided under a different rubric than the discipline of
health professionals. The Board specifically acknowledged that athletic trainers
are not teachers but also noted the similarities between the position Melton was
in at the School and teachers in reaching its decision.
[82] In short, the Board has broad discretion in imposing sanctions—up to and
including permanent revocation of a license—on an athletic trainer whom it
finds to be subject to disciplinary sanctions. See Davis, 3 N.E.3d at 548 (case
involving the State Board of Nursing, also subject to the provisions of Indiana
Code chapter 25-1-9, revoking a nursing license). We conclude the Board
afforded Melton fair proceedings and acted within its authority in suspending
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her license. There is a reasonable basis for the Board’s decision, and it is not
arbitrary and capricious. We therefore affirm the Board’s decision in all
respects and reverse the trial court’s Judicial Review Order, including the
provision awarding Melton attorney fees and expenses.27
Conclusion
[83] The trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Defendants on
Melton’s Section 1983 claims because IPLA and the Board are not amenable to
a Section 1983 lawsuit, the Board Members in their individual capacities have
absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their adjudicative actions, and although
Melton requested injunctive relief, she did not request such relief from the
Board members in their official capacities. Accordingly, the trial court’s
Section 1983 order is affirmed.
[84] In keeping with our standard for reviewing agency actions that the facts are to
be determined “but once[,]” Andrade, 114 N.E.3d at 514, we conclude Melton
has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating the Board’s action was invalid
pursuant to the provisions of Indiana Code section 4-21.5-5-14(d), as the
Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and we will not substitute
27
In challenging the grant of summary judgment in her opening brief, Melton argued that immunity does not
foreclose an award of attorney fees and expenses. See Br. of Appellant at 50 (citing Ross, 790 N.E.2d at 121-
22). Although this may be true if the plaintiff otherwise obtains at least some relief on the merits of a claim,
see Ross, 790 N.E.2d at 121, Melton is not the prevailing party on any of her claims and therefore is not
entitled to an award of attorney fees and expenses.
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our judgment for that of the Board regarding the appropriate sanction for
Melton’s professional misconduct. The trial court’s Judicial Review Order
deciding otherwise is reversed, and the Board’s March 2017 decision is
affirmed.
[85] Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Bradford, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
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