In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of W.J.J (Minor Child) and W.J. and M.R. (Parents) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 10 2020, 11:11 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT W.J. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Michael B. Troemel Frances H. Barrow
Lafayette, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT M.R.
Jennifer L. Schrontz
Lafayette, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination June 10, 2020
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of W.J.J (Minor Child) 19A-JT-2736
Appeal from the Tippecanoe
and Superior Court
The Honorable Nancy L.
W.J. and M.R. (Parents), Gettinger, Senior Judge
Appellants-Respondents,
Trial Court Cause No.
v. 79D03-1908-JT-120
Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
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Bradford, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] M.R. (“Mother”) and W.J. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the
biological parents of W.J.J. (“Child”). Prior to Child’s birth, Parents’ parental
rights to another child were terminated. Since his birth, Child has twice been
adjudicated to be a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). During the second
set of CHINS proceedings, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
requested that the juvenile court find that it was no longer required to make
reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family pursuant to Indiana Code
section 31-34-21-5.6(b) (“the No Reasonable Efforts Statute”). Following a
hearing, the juvenile court granted DCS’s motion. DCS subsequently filed a
petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child. Parents appeal the
juvenile court’s order granting DCS’s petition. In challenging the termination
of their parental rights to Child, Parents contend that the No Reasonable Efforts
Statute is unconstitutional. Because we conclude otherwise, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Parents are the biological parents of Child, who was born on October 26, 2017.
Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS at birth after his cord tissue tested
positive for morphine. The case was successfully closed with reunification with
Mother on June 4, 2018.
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[3] On March 21, 2019, DCS received a report alleging that Child was a victim of
neglect due to substance abuse by Mother. On April 1, 2019, Mother was
observed to be under the influence while acting as Child’s sole caregiver.
Mother submitted to a drug screen which “returned positive for
methamphetamine and fentanyl.” Ex. Vol. I, p. 26. On April 4, 2019, DCS
removed Child from Mother’s care. At the time, Mother “appeared to be under
the influence of substances as evidenced by the following: hand tremors,
excessive nervousness, sweating, difficulty keeping eyes open, and she could
not follow a clear timeline.” Ex. Vol. I, p. 26.
[4] A few days later, DCS filed a second petition alleging that Child was a CHINS.
In this petition, DCS indicated that Mother was the sole caregiver of Child
because Father was incarcerated.1 Mother “admitted to being an addict, and
indicated [that] she [did] not want to participate in a residential or outpatient
treatment program[] for her substance[-]abuse issues.” Ex. Vol. I, p. 26. DCS
also outlined Mother’s history of substance-abuse issues and neglect, stating as
follows:
p. Mother was a perpetrator of neglect on 01/22/10 due to
caregiver impairment with use of marijuana for 2 reports, other
minors were the Victims; an out-of-home CHINS was filed and
opened, and the case was successfully closed with reunification
on 07/09/10.
1
The record reveals that Father was incarcerated for the entirety of the underlying CHINS and termination
proceedings, with the possible exception of a few days. His current release date is scheduled for May 18,
2022. See https://www.in.gov/apps/indcorrection/ofs/ofs?previous_page=1&detail=163009 (last visited
May 28, 2020).
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q. Mother was a perpetrator of neglect on 11/22/13 due to
caregiver impairment with use of marijuana and cocaine, another
minor was the Victim; an out-of-home CHINS was filed and
opened and ended with reunification with [the child’s] father in
that case.
r. Mother was a perpetrator of neglect on 12/02/14 due to
caregiver impairment with use of marijuana and cocaine, other
minors were the victims; an out[-]of[-]home CHINS was filed
and opened and the case was closed with TPR and adoption.
Ex. Vol. I, p. 26. The juvenile court subsequently adjudged the Child to be a
CHINS.
[5] On June 13, 2019, DCS filed a motion in which it requested that the juvenile
court “issue an order finding that [DCS] is not required to make reasonable
efforts to preserve and reunify the family” pursuant to the No Reasonable
Efforts Statute. Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 19. Parents objected to DCS’s
motion. Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted DCS’s motion.
Child’s permanency plan was subsequently changed to adoption.
[6] On August 7, 2019, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to
Child. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on October 16,
2019, after which it took the matter under advisement. On October 24, 2019,
the juvenile court entered an order terminating Parents’ parental rights to Child.
Discussion and Decision
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[7] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their child. Bester v.
Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although
parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the
termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their
parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001),
trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be
subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental
rights is proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is
threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly
harmed such that his physical, mental, and social development is permanently
impaired before terminating the parent–child relationship. Id.[8] In appealing from the termination of their parental rights to Child, Parents do
not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s
order.2 Instead, they challenge the constitutionality of the No Reasonable
Efforts Statute.
Whether a statute is constitutional on its face is a question of law.
When the issue presented on appeal is a pure question of law, we
review the matter de novo. Further, legislation under
constitutional attack is clothed in a presumption of
2
Parents challenge only one of the juvenile court’s finding, that being that Father was offered services while
incarcerated. Parents, however, do not challenge any of the juvenile court’s other findings or conclusions
and, as such, we accept the juvenile court’s findings as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind.
1992) (providing that unchallenged findings of the trial court must be accepted as correct).
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constitutionality. The challenger has the burden to rebut this
presumption. All reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of
an act’s constitutionality. When a statute can be so construed to
support its constitutionality, we must adopt such a construction.
G.B. v. Dearborn Cty. Div. of Family & Children, 754 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001) (internal citations omitted). The No Reasonable Efforts Statute
provides in relevant part,
Reasonable efforts to reunify a child with the child’s parent,
guardian, or custodian or preserve a child’s family … are not
required if the court finds any of the following:
****
(4) The parental rights of a parent with respect to a biological or
adoptive sibling of a child who is a child in need of services have
been involuntarily terminated by a court under:
(A) IC 31-35-2 (involuntary termination involving a
delinquent child or a child in need of services)[.]
Indiana Code § 31-34-21-5.6(b).
[9] Parents challenge the constitutionality of the No Reasonable Efforts Statute on
due process grounds. “Federal and state substantive due process analysis is
identical.” G.B., 754 N.E.2d at 1031. “In setting forth a claim for a violation of
substantive due process, a party must show either that the law infringes upon a
fundamental right or liberties deeply rooted in our nation’s history or that the
law does not bear a substantial relation to permissible state objectives.” Id. In
concluding that the No Reasonable Efforts Statute did not violate a parent’s due
process rights, we stated the following:
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We have previously found that a parent’s fundamental right to
raise his or her child without undue interference from the state is
not unlimited because the state has a compelling interest in
protecting the welfare of children. When parents neglect, abuse,
or abandon their children, the state has the authority under its
parens patriae power to intervene. This statute serves that
compelling interest.
Further, the challenged statute is not more intrusive than
necessary to protect the welfare of children. Specifically, the
statute is narrowly tailored to include only those parents who
have had at least one chance to reunify with a different child
through the aid of governmental resources and have failed to do
so.…
Because Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-5.6 serves a compelling
state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest, it does
not violate substantive due process under the Indiana and United
States Constitutions.
Id. at 1032 (internal citations omitted). We reached the same conclusion in
Matter of S.G. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 67 N.E.3d 1138, 1145 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2017).
[10] Parents “concede[] that the [No Reasonable Efforts Statute] has been upheld
several times” but “urge this court to review the constitutionality of this statute
through the eyes and perspective of the child.” Appellants’ Br. p. 8. In support,
Parents assert that Child had a due process right to be raised by his biological
parents. Parents cite to no authority for this proposition, and our research has
uncovered none. Parents merely argue that Child “should have been given the
opportunity for his parents to succeed, despite their past failings in the prior
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involuntary TPR” and for Child, “there has been a rush to judgment.”
Appellants’ Br. p. 13.
[11] To the contrary, we agree with DCS that “[f]ar from rushing to judgment, DCS
has spent years working with Parents and their children.” Appellee’s Br. p. 25.
Parents have not demonstrated an ability to remedy the reoccurring issues that
have led to the removal of multiple children from their care. The Indiana
Supreme Court, noting a child’s interest in and need for permanency, has held
that “children have an interest in terminating parental rights that prevent
adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, continuous
relationships.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). “A parent’s
historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent’s
current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental
rights is in the best interests of the children.” Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of Family
& Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Parents have
demonstrated both a historical and current inability to provide a safe and
suitable living environment for Child. As such, considering the applicability of
the No Reasonable Efforts Statute from Child’s perspective would warrant the
same result.
[12] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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