Andrew Michael Wilke-Breightling v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                            FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                    Sep 15 2020, 8:58 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                 and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Jared M. Thomas                                          Curtis T. Hill
    Evansville, Indiana                                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Samuel J. Dayton
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Andrew Michael Wilke-                                    September 15, 2020
    Breightling,                                             Court of Appeals Case No.
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     19A-CR-1267
    Appeal from the Vanderburgh
    v.                                               Circuit Court
    The Honorable David D. Kiely,
    State of Indiana,                                        Judge
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Trial Court Cause No.
    82C01-1808-F4-5613
    Darden, Senior Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1267 | September 15, 2020               Page 1 of 12
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Andrew Michael Wilke-Breightling (“Wilke-Breightling”) pleaded guilty to one
    1                                                      2
    count of burglary, a Level 4 felony; one count of auto theft, a Level 5 felony;
    3
    one count of theft of a firearm, a Level 6 felony; and one count of theft of
    4
    property valued at between $750 to $50,000, a Level 6 felony. He now appeals
    after his guilty plea and sentencing, contending that his sentence is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the
    offender. We affirm.
    Issue
    [2]   The sole issue presented for our review is whether Wilke-Breightling’s sentence
    is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the
    5
    offender.
    1
    Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (2014).
    2
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(2)(C)(i) (2019).
    3
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(B)(i) (2019).
    4
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(A) (2019).
    5
    Wilke-Breightling appears to advance an argument that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing by
    improperly weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. We address that argument at the end of our
    analysis.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1267 | September 15, 2020               Page 2 of 12
    Facts and Procedural History
    6
    [3]   Prior to leaving town for a short visit, Steven C. Hairston (“Hairston”) left the
    keys to his truck with his neighbor, Linda Wilke (“Linda”). Hairston asked
    Wilke-Breightling, Linda’s then thirty-year-old grandson, to move the truck
    from the street and into Hairston’s yard because it was not properly registered.
    Hairston also paid Linda to have Wilke-Breightling mow his lawn while he was
    away.
    [4]   When Hairston returned to Evansville, he was notified by Vanderburgh County
    Animal Control that his dog was in their shelter. Hairston found this to be odd
    because a friend was supposed to be caring for his dog while he was out of
    town. On August 16, 2018, when Hairston went to his home, he discovered
    that his truck was missing, the back door of his home was open, and the interior
    of his home was ransacked. He observed that items of personal property were
    missing, such as three flatscreen televisions, several firearms including a Glock
    22, a Mossberg 715T rifle, and a Hi-Point .45 caliber carbine.
    [5]   Hairston, secretly recorded a conversation on his cell phone, when he went to
    Linda’s house to ask her about the theft. Initially, Linda told him that she did
    not know anything about the theft and that she had not seen Wilke-Breightling
    recently. Hairston then told Linda that he was going to call the police. At that
    6
    We refer to the victim’s name as it appears in the probable cause affidavit.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1267 | September 15, 2020       Page 3 of 12
    point, she told Hairston that he could have his property back if he did not call
    the police.
    [6]   When Hairston entered Linda’s house, he immediately recognized several items
    of his personal property inside. They included his rifle scope, his gun
    magazine, and his flat screen television. Upon seeing the items, Hairston called
    911.
    [7]   Detective M. Evans of the Evansville Police Department was one of the officers
    who responded to the 911 call. He interviewed both Linda and Hairston.
    Hairston relayed the facts as stated above to Detective Evans and agreed to
    forward the recording of the conversation he had with Linda to him. Although
    he could not immediately produce the serial numbers for his firearms, Hairston
    said he would search for them in his records and would provide the information
    later, if found. The items found in Linda’s home were subsequently returned to
    Hairston.
    [8]   Linda, who had been mirandized prior to Detective Evans’ arrival, told him
    that there were items of personal property that belonged to Hairston inside her
    home, but that she did not see Wilke-Breightling bring them into her home.
    When asked if Wilke-Breightling lived there with her, Linda disclosed that he
    had not lived there for some time, although he had previously lived there with
    her. She stated that he did not really have a home but that he had stayed with
    her the previous night.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1267 | September 15, 2020   Page 4 of 12
    [9]    Linda consented to a search of her home and the items mentioned above were
    found in the only bedroom in the home. Linda later acknowledged that she
    knew the television was from Hairston’s home. She said that when she asked
    Wilke-Breightling about the items of personal property, he said that Hairston’s
    home had been abandoned.
    [10]   A crime scene detective processed and photographed the home and the items of
    personal property, which were returned to Hairston.
    [11]   Wilke-Breightling was not present at the scene when the officers arrived;
    however, Linda gave them an address where she had last seen him. She also
    told the officers that two other individuals had stayed at her home during the
    period of time that Hairston was out of town. Linda did not know whether
    Wilke-Breightling was still in possession of Hairston’s truck or what he had
    done with it.
    [12]   On August 17, 2018, the State charged Wilke-Breightling with burglary, auto
    theft, theft of a firearm, and theft of property valued at between $750 to
    $50,000. On March 29, 2019, Wilke-Breightling indicated on the record that he
    intended to plead guilty without a sentencing recommendation by the State.
    Wilke-Breightling’s sentencing hearing was held on May 6, 2019. The trial
    court imposed the following sentence: eight years for his burglary conviction;
    five years for auto theft; two years for theft of a firearm; and, two years for theft
    of property valued at $750 and $50,000, with each of the sentences to be served
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1267 | September 15, 2020   Page 5 of 12
    concurrently; and, concurrently with an unrelated sentence under a separate
    cause number.
    Discussion and Decision
    [13]   Wilke-Breightling contends that his sentences are inappropriate in light of the
    nature of his offenses and his character. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule
    7(B), this court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
    consideration of the trial court’s decision, the [c]ourt finds that the
    sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character
    of the offender.” Our Supreme Court has explained that the principal role of
    appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, “not to achieve a
    perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1225
    (Ind. 2008). We independently examine the nature of Wilke-Breightling’s
    offenses and his character under Appellate Rule 7(B) with substantial deference
    to the sentence imposed by the trial court. See Satterfield v. State, 
    33 N.E.3d 344
    ,
    355 (Ind. 2015). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by
    compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such
    as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s
    character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good
    character).” Stephenson v. State, 
    29 N.E.3d 111
    , 122 (Ind. 2015).
    [14]   “In conducting our review, we do not look to see whether the defendant’s
    sentence is appropriate or if another sentence might be more appropriate;
    rather, the test is whether the sentence is ‘inappropriate.’” Barker v. State, 994
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1267 | September 15, 2020   Page 6 of 
    12 N.E.2d 306
    , 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Whether a sentence is
    inappropriate ultimately depends upon “the culpability of the defendant, the
    severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad other factors
    that come to light in a given case.” 
    Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224
    . Wilke-
    Breightling bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate.
    See
    id. [15]
      When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is
    the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the
    crime committed. Kunberger v. State, 
    46 N.E.3d 966
    , 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015);
    Thompson v. State, 
    5 N.E.3d 383
    , 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans denied. Here,
    Wilke-Breightling was convicted of Level 4 felony burglary. The sentencing
    range for a Level 4 felony is a fixed term of between two (2) and twelve (12)
    years, with the advisory sentence being six (6) years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5
    (2014). Wilke-Breightling received a sentence of eight years. He was also
    convicted of Level 5 felony auto theft with a sentencing range of a fixed term of
    between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4)
    years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (2014). He received a sentence of five years for
    this offense. Wilke-Breightling received a two-year sentence for his Level 6
    felony theft of a firearm conviction. The sentencing range for that offense is a
    fixed term of between six (6) months and three (3) years, with the advisory
    sentence being one and one-half (1½) years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (2016).
    Wilke-Breightling received a two-year sentence for his conviction of Level 6
    felony theft of property valued at between $750 to $50,000. The sentencing
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1267 | September 15, 2020   Page 7 of 12
    range for that offense is a fixed term of between six (6) months and three (3)
    years, with the advisory sentence being one and one-half (1½) years.
    Id. The trial court
    imposed sentences that were slightly above the advisory sentence or
    starting point for each offense.
    [16]   We first turn to Wilke-Breightling’s character to determine whether such
    supports a downward revision of his sentence. The record reveals no
    substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character, but, instead,
    reveals a significant long-term criminal history. When considering a
    defendant’s character for purposes of Appellate Rule 7(B) analysis, a
    defendant’s criminal history is one factor. Garcia v. State, 
    47 N.E.3d 1249
    , 1251
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. The significance of criminal history varies
    based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the
    current offense.
    Id. [17]
      We also note that, “[a] record of arrest, without more, does not establish the
    historical fact that a defendant committed a criminal offense and may not be
    properly considered as evidence of criminal history.” Cotto v. State, 
    829 N.E.2d 520
    , 526 (Ind. 2005) (citing Scheckel v. State, 
    620 N.E.2d 681
    , 683 (Ind. 1993)).
    “However, a record of arrest, particularly a lengthy one, may reveal that a
    defendant has not been deterred even after having been subject to the police
    authority of the State.”
    Id. “Such information may
    be relevant to the trial
    court’s assessment of the defendant’s character in terms of the risk that he will
    commit another crime.”
    Id. Court of Appeals
    of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1267 | September 15, 2020   Page 8 of 12
    [18]   In 2007, Wilke-Breightling was convicted of possession or use of marijuana in
    Maricopa County, Arizona, and was sentenced to three years on probation.
    However, because of a probation violation, seventy-five days of probation were
    revoked. Also, in 2007, Wilke-Breightling was convicted of unlawful use of a
    means of transportation in Maricopa County, Arizona and was sentenced to
    three years of probation. One year of that probation was revoked due to a
    probation violation. In 2011, he was convicted of a narcotic drug violation in
    Maricopa County, Arizona and was sentenced to probation. The presentence
    investigation report (“PSI”) does not indicate the length of probation.
    [19]   In 2017, Wilke-Breightling was charged with auto theft and driving without
    ever receiving a license, but those charges were dismissed. In 2018, he was
    charged with driving while suspended and that case was pending when the
    PSI was prepared for the instant case. The State has requested and we have
    taken judicial notice of the fact that Wilke-Breightling pleaded guilty to Class A
    misdemeanor driving while suspended. We also take notice of the fact that
    Wilke-Breightling, on an unrelated charge in 2019, was convicted of Level 6
    felony resisting law enforcement and Class C misdemeanor reckless driving.
    He received an aggregate sentence of two years for those offenses to be served
    concurrently with the sentences in the instant case.
    [20]   Further indicative of his penchant for illegal activity is his long history of
    substance abuse. The PSI reflects that Wilke-Breightling first consumed alcohol
    at the age of nine and began drinking alcohol on a daily basis at the age of
    thirteen. Between the ages of eighteen and twenty-eight, he drank a fifth of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1267 | September 15, 2020   Page 9 of 12
    alcohol daily. Wilke-Breightling also began using marijuana at the age of nine
    and has continued to use “a couple of grams” daily since. Appellant’s App.
    Vol. II, p. 59. He began using methamphetamine at the age of thirteen and
    continued to use approximately one gram daily since then. At the age of
    twenty-one, he began using two to six ten-milligram pills of Oxycodone daily.
    When he was twenty-eight years old, he began using two milligrams of Xanax
    once or twice daily.
    [21]   Next, we observe that “‘the offender risk assessment scores do not in themselves
    constitute, and cannot serve as, an aggravating or mitigating circumstance.’”
    Kayser v. State, 
    131 N.E.3d 717
    , 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting J.S. v. State,
    
    928 N.E.2d 576
    , 578 (Ind. 2010)). “Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained
    that scores on a risk assessment instrument ‘are not intended to serve as
    aggravating or mitigating circumstances nor to determine the gross length of
    sentence[.]’”
    Id. (quoting Malenchik v.
    State, 
    928 N.E.2d 564
    , 575 (Ind. 2010)
    (emphasis added)). “Instead, these ‘offender assessment instruments are
    appropriate supplemental tools for judicial consideration at sentencing’ and can
    be used by the trial court ‘in formulating the manner in which a sentence is to
    be served.’”
    Id. Here, Wilke-Breightling’s scores
    were such that he is not a
    good candidate for probation as he is likely to reoffend. In the past, several
    times when given the opportunity to serve sentences while on probation, he
    violated the terms and conditions of his probation.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1267 | September 15, 2020   Page 10 of 12
    [22]   The nature of the offense analysis compares the defendant’s actions with the
    required showing to sustain a conviction under the charged offense. 
    Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224
    . We now turn to the nature of Wilke-Breightling’s offenses.
    [23]   Wilke-Breightling was in a position of trust with Hairston. Hairston paid Linda
    for Wilke-Breightling to mow the lawn in Hairston’s absence. Hairston also
    gave the keys to his truck to Linda and asked Wilke-Breightling to move the
    truck off the street for him. Instead, Wilke-Breightling took advantage of the
    situation, broke into Hairston’s home, stole items of personal property from the
    home, including Hairston’s truck. He then brought and stored the stolen items
    of personal property inside his grandmother, Linda’s home. He deceived her
    regarding how he obtained possession of the stolen property, which potentially
    exposed her to criminal liability as an accomplice in the crimes in her effort to
    protect him.
    [24]   Each of the sentences imposed were only slightly enhanced above the advisory
    sentence and were ordered to be served concurrently. We find nothing in the
    nature of the offenses and the character of the offender to warrant a downward
    revision of his sentence.
    [25]   Wilke-Breightling appears to suggest that the trial court abused its discretion by
    failing to properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. In particular,
    he observes that the trial court failed to note that his criminal history included
    offenses linked to his substance abuse and suggests that the trial court gave little
    to no weight to his guilty plea.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1267 | September 15, 2020   Page 11 of 12
    [26]   To the extent Wilke-Breightling asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
    in the weight it gave to the aggravating circumstance of his criminal history and
    the mitigating circumstance of his guilty plea, his assertion is not well taken.
    “A sentencing court cannot abuse its discretion by failing to properly weigh
    aggravating and mitigating factors.” Sanders v. State, 
    71 N.E.3d 839
    , 843 n.1
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 490 (Ind.
    2007)).
    [27]   Nevertheless, Wilke-Breightling faced four felony charges in the instant case
    and received concurrent sentences, slightly above the advisory sentence, to run
    concurrently to other unrelated criminal offenses. He has not been deterred
    from criminal activity since he began consuming alcohol and drugs at an early
    age. He has a long and extensive criminal history with numerous attempts at
    rehabilitation and probation violations. We find nothing in the record to suggest
    that the trial court’s analysis was incorrect.
    Conclusion
    [28]   Wilke-Breightling’s sentences are not inappropriate in light of the nature of his
    offenses and his character.
    [29]   Affirmed.
    Riley, J., and May, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1267 | September 15, 2020   Page 12 of 12