Monroe County, Indiana and Monroe County Plan Commission v. Boathouse Apartments, LLC (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing FILED
the defense of res judicata, collateral Jun 16 2020, 8:47 am
estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David B. Schilling William J. Beggs
Lee F. Baker Ryan M. Heeb
Monroe County Legal Department Bunger & Robertson
Bloomington, Indiana Bloomington, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Monroe County, Indiana and June 16, 2020
Monroe County Plan Court of Appeals Case No.
Commission, 20A-PL-177
Appellant-Plaintiffs, Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
Court
v. The Honorable Elizabeth A. Cure,
Judge
Boathouse Apartments, LLC, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Defendant. 53C01-1702-PL-257
Bradford, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] On February 3, 2017, Monroe County, Indiana, and the Monroe County Plan
Commission (collectively, “the County”) filed a complaint in the Monroe
Circuit Court, seeking a monetary penalty against Boathouse Apartments, LLC
(“Boathouse”), for alleged violations of certain Monroe County ordinances.
Boathouse subsequently filed a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss, arguing
that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the County’s
claims. The trial court granted Boathouse’s motion to dismiss. Because we
conclude that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction over the
County’s claims, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Boathouse owns three lots (“the Boathouse Property”) within the Lakes
Neighborhood Planned Unit Development in Bloomington. During 2016,
Boathouse began a project to construct six buildings of townhome apartments
on the Boathouse Property. In completing the project, Boathouse was required
to comply with the use and occupancy requirements of the Monroe County
Code of Ordinances (“the Monroe County Code”).
[3] On February 3, 2017, the County filed a complaint seeking a monetary penalty
against Boathouse, alleging that Boathouse had violated the use and occupancy
requirements of the Monroe County Code. Specifically, the County alleged
that Boathouse had permitted tenants to occupy the apartment units before a
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land use certificate and certificate of occupancy were issued. Boathouse
answered and filed affirmative defenses to the complaint on April 4, 2017.
[4] On October 14, 2019, Boathouse filed a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss,
claiming that the County had failed to comply with applicable ordinances in
bringing its claims against Boathouse and “[t]his failure deprives the Court of
subject matter jurisdiction over these claims.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 76.
As such, Boathouse requested “that the Court grant its Motion to Dismiss
because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear [the County’s]
claims.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 76. The County filed both a brief and a
supplemental brief in opposition to Boathouse’s motion to dismiss. On January
6, 2020, the trial court, ruling on a paper record, issued an order granting
Boathouse’s motion and dismissing the County’s lawsuit.
Discussion and Decision
[5] The County contends that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the County’s claims. Where, as here, the facts
before the trial court are not in dispute, “the question of subject matter
jurisdiction is purely one of law.” GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 401
(Ind. 2001). “Under those circumstances no deference is afforded the trial
court’s conclusion because “appellate courts independently, and without the
slightest deference to trial court determinations, evaluate those issues they deem
to be questions of law.” Id. “Thus, we review de novo a trial court’s ruling on
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a motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(1) where the facts before the trial
court are undisputed.” Id.
[6] Subject-matter jurisdiction is the constitutional or statutory
power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class
to which any particular proceeding belongs. So, in determining
whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the only relevant
inquiry is whether the petitioner’s claim falls within the general
scope of the authority conferred upon such court by the
constitution or by statute.
State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 711–12 (Ind. 2018) (internal quotations
omitted). “Courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have subject matter
jurisdiction.” Lakes & Rivers Transfer, a Div. of Jack Gray v. Rudolph Robinson Steel
Co., 736 N.E.2d 285, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “All circuit courts have: (1)
original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases and in all criminal cases.”
Ind. Code § 33-28-1-2(a). “The Monroe circuit court is a court of general
jurisdiction” and, as such, has the authority to maintain a civil docket. Ind.
Code § 33-33-53-2(a).
[7] The County contends that statutory authority expressly confers subject matter
jurisdiction over the County’s claims against Boathouse to the trial court. For
its part, Boathouse contends that the County’s alleged failure to comply with
local ordinances relating to enforcement of the Monroe County Code “deprives
the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction” over the County’s claims.
Appellee’s Br. p. 16. For the reasons stated below, we agree with the County.
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[8] “The Indiana General Assembly, through statutes, has both authorized local
units of government to create ordinances and established the manner in which
those ordinances are to be enforced.” Boss v. State, 944 N.E.2d 16, 22 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011). In doing so, the General Assembly “specifically withheld from
[local] units, however, the power to prescribe a penalty for conduct
constituting” a violation of a local ordinance. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
The General Assembly instead gave this power to the courts.
[9] In support of its contention that the trial court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the County’s claims against it, Boathouse cites to the Indiana
Supreme Court’s opinion in Ballman v. Duffecy, 230 Ind. 220, 102 N.E.2d 646
(1952). In Ballman, the Supreme Court considered whether a failure to comply
with certain statutes prior to filing suit divested the trial court of jurisdiction.
The applicable statutes in effect at the time set forth certain prerequisites for
seeking an appeal of a decision of a board of zoning appeals. 230 Ind. at 224,
102 N.E.2d at 647. Concluding that a party’s failure to follow the statutory
prerequisites prior to filing suit divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the
case, the Ballman court held as follows:
This court has heretofore said that a court in acquiring
jurisdiction must not only have jurisdiction of the parties and the
general subject of the controversy respecting real property, but
must have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the particular case.
A failure to comply with the statute is jurisdictional, and
therefore the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the parties or
the particular case.
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230 Ind. at 229, 102 N.E.2d at 650 (internal citations omitted). 1
[10] Boathouse asserts that the holding in Ballman supports its contention that the
trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the County’s claims
because the County failed to satisfy the requirements of certain local ordinances
before filing its lawsuit.2 We disagree. While a motion for dismissal under
Trial Rule 12(B)(1) has been found appropriate where a party failed to satisfy a
statutorily mandated prerequisites for filing suit, see id., 230 Ind. at 229, 102
N.E.2d at 650; In re Petition to Annex Approximately 7,806 Acres of Real Estate into
City of Jeffersonville, 891 N.E.2d 1157, 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), we have held
that when the relevant statutes do not include any prerequisite for filing suit, a
Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss is not the proper vehicle to bring a
1
Since Ballman was handed down, the Indiana Supreme Court has clarified the law relating to jurisdiction.
In K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind. 2006), the Supreme Court clarified the law regarding jurisdiction,
explaining as follows:
Like the rest of the nation’s courts, Indiana trial courts possess two kinds of “jurisdiction.”
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which any particular proceeding belongs. Personal jurisdiction requires that appropriate
process be effected over the parties.… Other phrases recently common to Indiana practice,
like “jurisdiction over a particular case,” confuse actual jurisdiction with legal error, and
we will be better off ceasing such characterizations.
Citing to its opinion in K.S., the Indiana Supreme Court observed “that ‘jurisdiction over the particular case’
is something of a misnomer and refers to failure to meet procedural requirements but does not constitute a
limitation on subject matter jurisdiction in the sense that the court cannot hear cases of the same general
class.” Packard v. Shoopman, 852 N.E.2d 927, 929–30 (Ind. 2006).
2
Boathouse also cites to the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act (“MMA”) in support of its claim that the trial
court did not have jurisdiction over the County’s case. However, we agree with the County that the MMA is
inapposite to this case. The MMA, which sets forth the prerequisites for filing a medical malpractice claim, is
a distinct statutory creation relating only to medical malpractice claims. See Ind. Code § 34-18-8-4. No
similar statutory scheme exists for enforcement of local ordinances such as those at issue in this case.
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challenge to the suit. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation v. Town of Brownsburg,
32 N.E.3d 798, 804–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
[11] The statutes at issue in this case do not contain any prerequisites for filing suit.
Indiana Code section 36-1-6-4(a) provides, in relevant part, that a municipal
corporation “may bring a civil action” if a person or entity “violates an
ordinance regulating or prohibiting a condition or use of property.” Further,
Indiana Code sections 36-7-4-1013 and 36-7-4-1014 detail remedies for
enforcement and allowable actions for violations of ordinances. Specifically,
Indiana Code section 36-7-4-1013(a) provides that if, after conducting an
investigation into an alleged violation of an ordinance, a municipal attorney or
an attorney representing the county comes to the reasonable belief that an entity
has violated an ordinance, “the municipal attorney or an attorney representing
the county may file a complaint against the person and prosecute the alleged
violation under IC 36-1-6.” Indiana Code section 36-7-4-1014 provides as
follows:
(a) The plan commission, board of zoning appeals, or any
enforcement official designated in the zoning ordinance may
bring an action under IC 36-1-6 to enforce any ordinance adopted
or action taken under this chapter.
(b) The plan commission, board of zoning appeals, or any
enforcement official designated in the zoning ordinance may also
bring an action to enforce:
(1) conditions imposed by the commission or board
of zoning appeals under this chapter; or
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(2) covenants made in connection with a subdivision
plat, a development plan, or a PUD district
ordinance (as defined in section 1503 of this chapter).
****
(d) The plan commission, board of zoning appeals, or designated
enforcement official may invoke any legal, equitable, or special
remedy in an action described in subsection (a) or (b).
(e) An action for the levy of a fine or penalty for enforcement of a
zoning ordinance may be brought in any court located within the
jurisdiction of the plan commission or board of zoning appeals.
[12] The above-quoted statutory sections clearly indicate that actions such as that
brought by the County, which seeks penalties for alleged violations of the
certain County ordinances, may be brought in court, with Indiana Code section
36-7-4-1014 allowing for the action to be brought in “any court located within
the jurisdiction.” The statutes do not contain any prerequisites for filing suit in
the trial court. As such, we conclude that Boathouse’s reliance on the Indiana
Supreme Court’s holding in Ballman is misplaced as it is distinguishable from
the instant matter.
[13] Furthermore, we agree with the County that the arguments set forth in
Boathouse’s motion to dismiss allege procedural, i.e., legal, error. “Subject
matter jurisdiction and legal error are distinct concepts.” Clark Cty. Bd. of
Aviation Comm’rs v. Dreyer, 986 N.E.2d 286, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 3013), trans.
granted, opinion vacated, 992 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 2013), and aff’d, 993 N.E.2d 624
(Ind. 2013). “Procedural error doesn’t rob the court of jurisdiction.” Reinhart,
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112 N.E.3d at 712. Stated differently, “[i]t goes without saying that a court’s
power to award relief and a claimant’s entitlement to relief on the merits are
very different things.” Price v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 80 N.E.3d 170, 174 (Ind.
2017). “Real jurisdictional problems would be, say, a juvenile delinquency
adjudication entered in a small claims court, or a judgment rendered without
any service of process.” K.S., 849 N.E.2d at 542 (emphasis in original). “Thus,
characterizing other sorts of procedural defects as ‘jurisdictional’
misapprehends the concepts.” Id. “Indeed, as strongly suggested by the K.S.
Court, practitioners and the judiciary, including ourselves, should stop using
the phrase ‘jurisdiction over a particular case,’ rather than ‘legal error.’” Dreyer,
986 N.E.2d at 291.
[14] Again, in its motion to dismiss, Boathouse alleged that the County failed to
comply with applicable ordinances in bringing claims against Boathouse and
“[t]his failure deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over these
claims.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 76. However, contrary to Boathouse’s
claim, we have previously concluded that procedural error or the failure to
follow statutory guidelines for initiating a particular action does not affect
subject matter jurisdiction, so long as the action was filed in the proper court for
such an action. Blackman v. Gholson, 46 N.E.3d 975, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)
(citing K.S., 849 N.E.2d 542 (providing a juvenile court’s failure to follow all of
the statutory procedures for initiating a delinquency petition did not affect
either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, but was mere procedural error);
Town of Brownsburg, 32 N.E.3d at 805 (holding alleged defect in annexation
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remonstrance signatures did not affect subject matter jurisdiction of trial court
to consider remonstrance petition)); see also Prosecuting Attorney of Hendricks Cty.
v. Hammer, 92 N.E.3d 649, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (providing that the
question of whether a suspended driver petitions the proper court under the
SDP statute is a “question of legal error, not jurisdictional error”). Thus, any
procedural or legal error that may have been committed by the County would
not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.
[15] In sum, the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over the County’s claims
against Boathouse. As such, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting
Boathouse’s Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss. We therefore remand the
matter back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.
[16] The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter remanded for further
proceedings.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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