Charlton Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 22 2020, 10:27 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Darren Bedwell Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana Caroline G. Templeton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Charlton Jones, June 22, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2291
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Charnette D.
Appellee-Plaintiff, Garner, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G09-1805-F6-17571
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues
[1] Following a bench trial, Charlton Jones was convicted of possession of
marijuana and operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, both
Class A misdemeanors, and was sentenced to concurrent 365 day sentences on
each charge, with credit for four days served and 361 days suspended. Jones
appeals and raises two issues, which we restate as: (1) whether the State
presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction of possession of
marijuana, and (2) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
his conviction of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person.
Concluding the State produced sufficient evidence to support both convictions,
we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The facts most favorable to the judgment are as follows: Late on the evening of
May 18, 2018, Captain Erwin Faulk of the Indiana State Police (“ISP”) was
traveling on Interstate 70 in Indianapolis, Indiana, when he observed a truck
traveling sixty-eight miles per hour in a fifty mile per hour zone. The truck “was
swerving back and forth within its lane” and Captain Faulk “observed it come
out of its lane a couple times[.]” Transcript, Volume II at 76. On at least one
occasion and possibly two, the driver of the truck failed to signal when
changing lanes. At the time, however, Officer Faulk had a detainee in his
vehicle so he could not initiate a traffic stop because it was “against ISP policy
to stop another vehicle when we have a prisoner in the vehicle.” Id. at 77.
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Therefore, he requested assistance and continued to follow the truck until
another unit initiated a traffic stop.
[3] ISP Trooper Matthew Helmbrecht responded to the call for assistance, located
the truck, and initiated a traffic stop. Trooper Helmbrecht discovered that Jones
was the driver of the truck and that he had a friend in the car with him. Jones
told Trooper Helmbrecht that he knew he had been swerving, claiming that he
was on his cellphone. But while speaking with Jones, Trooper Helmbrecht
identified signs of intoxication such as the odor of alcohol, watery and blood
shot eyes, unsteady balance, and slurred speech. Trooper Helmbrecht also
noticed an odor emanating from inside the vehicle that based on his seven years
of training and experience, he believed to be marijuana and observed what
appeared to be “lose [sic] pieces of [m]arijuana stuck to [Jones’] pants[.]” Id. at
90. When asked if he had been drinking, Jones responded that he had.
[4] Trooper Helmbrecht asked Jones to exit his vehicle and began to administer a
field sobriety test. Jones failed the test and refused to undergo any further field
sobriety tests or a portable breath test. Trooper Helmbrecht asked Jones about
the marijuana on his pants and Jones said that “he had just rolled up and
smoked before being stopped” and described himself as being a “weed head.”
Id. at 100. When asked if there was any more marijuana in the vehicle, Jones
responded that he did not know but admitted that the vehicle and “everything
in the vehicle [was] his[.]” Id. at 100-01. After searching the vehicle, Officer
Helmbrecht located two plastic bags containing a substance he identified as
marijuana. Id. at 102. Jones was arrested and transported to Eskenazi Health
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Hospital for a chemical test, which showed an alcohol concentration equivalent
(“ACE”) of .02.
[5] The State charged Jones with possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor,
and operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A
misdemeanor. The State also filed an enhancement to the possession of
marijuana charge, alleging Jones had a previous conviction for possession of
marijuana which would enhance that charge to a Class A misdemeanor.
[6] At Jones’ bench trial, the trial court found him guilty as charged.1 Jones
admitted to having a prior conviction for possession of marijuana and therefore,
the trial court entered judgment of conviction for both possession of marijuana
and operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person as Class A
misdemeanors. Jones received an aggregate sentence of 365 days, with 361 days
suspended. Jones now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[7] Our standard of review in this area is well settled. When reviewing the
sufficiency of evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess witness
1
Prior to trial, the State amended its charging information to add a charge of operating a vehicle with a
schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in the body as a Class C misdemeanor. After the State
presented its case, Jones moved for an involuntary dismissal of all crimes charged pursuant to Indiana Trial
Rule 41(B). However, the trial court only granted Jones’ motion as to operating a vehicle with a schedule I or
II controlled substance or its metabolite in the body. See Tr., Vol. II at 200.
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credibility. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Instead, we consider
only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment.
Id. We consider conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment
and will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find that the
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Oster v. State, 992
N.E.2d 871, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The evidence is sufficient if
an inference may be reasonably drawn from it to support the judgment.
Temperly v. State, 933 N.E.2d 558, 567 (Ind. Ct App. 2010), trans. denied, cert.
denied, 565 U.S. 976 (2011). “A conviction may be based upon circumstantial
evidence alone.” Bockler v. State, 908 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)
(citation omitted).
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Possession of Marijuana
[8] Jones first contends that evidence that Trooper Helmbrecht “smelled” the odor
of marijuana and found a plant material that “looked” like marijuana was
insufficient to support his possession of marijuana conviction. Brief of
Appellant at 11. Jones maintains that because the substance found in his vehicle
was not admitted into evidence and the State failed to provide expert testimony
to confirm the substance was marijuana, his conviction for possession of
marijuana cannot stand. We disagree.
[9] To convict Jones of possession of marijuana as a Class A misdemeanor, the
State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones knowingly or
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intentionally possessed marijuana and had a prior conviction for a drug offense.
See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a), (b)(1). For offenses involving controlled
substances, the State is not required to introduce the contraband to obtain a
conviction for possession. Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1024 (Ind. 2009).
“The identity and quantity of a controlled substance, and the defendant’s
possession of or dealing in narcotics, may all be established through witness
testimony and circumstantial evidence.” Id. “Although chemical analysis is one
way, and perhaps the best way, to establish the identity of a compound,” “[t]he
opinion of someone sufficiently experienced with the drug may establish its
identity[.]” Vasquez v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind. 2001).
[10] Here, Trooper Helmbrecht testified at trial that he was trained to identify
marijuana and had seven years of experience with ISP, during which he
encountered marijuana on multiple occasions. He has “dealt with [m]arijuana,
weighed it, packaged it, put it into evidence, [and] smelled it on numerous . . .
occasions.” Tr., Vol. II at 92. Trooper Helmbrecht testified that even without
field testing the substance found on Jones, “it looked like [m]arijuana, smelled
like [m]arijuana, [and] I do not know it to be anything else but [m]arijuana.” Id.
Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, a
court could reasonably determine that the testimony of Trooper Helmbrecht
was sufficient to establish the identity of the substance as marijuana because he
was sufficiently experienced with marijuana. Moreover, Jones’ own statements
confirmed that he possessed marijuana. He explained the loose marijuana on
his pants by telling Trooper Helmbrecht that before he was stopped, he had just
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finished rolling up and smoking and even characterized himself as a “weed
head.” Id. at 100. After officers searched and found marijuana in Jones’ vehicle,
Jones confirmed that “if there was [m]arijuana in the vehicle it was his” and did
not belong to his passenger. Id. at 103. This evidence is sufficient to establish
that Jones possessed marijuana. See, e.g., Boggs v. State, 928 N.E.2d 855, 867
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that sufficient evidence existed when officers
testified that, based on their training and experience, the green, leafy substance
they found was consistent with marijuana and the defendant admitted that he
had a small amount of marijuana), trans. denied.
[11] Jones argues that the State failed to prove that the substance he possessed was
actually marijuana and not “industrial hemp.” At the time of Jones’ arrest in
2018, Indiana Code section 35-48-1-19(a) defined “marijuana” as “any part of
the plant genus Cannabis whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin
extracted from any part of the plant, including hashish and hash oil; any
compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant,
its seeds or resin.” There were seven exceptions that did not fall within the
definition of marijuana, one of which was “industrial hemp.” Ind. Code § 35-
48-1-19(b)(6) (2018). “Industrial hemp” was defined as:
(1) [A]ll nonseed parts and varieties of the Cannabis sativa plant,
whether growing or not, that contain a crop wide average
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration that does not
exceed the lesser of:
(A) three-tenths of one percent (0.3%) on a dry weight basis;
or
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(B) the percent based on a dry weight basis determined by the
federal Controlled Substances Act[.]
Ind. Code § 15-15-13-6 (2014).
[12] The State did not admit a lab report into evidence that would indicate the
percentage of THC present in the substance found on Jones and in his truck.
Regardless, the possession of marijuana statute does not require the State to
prove an exact percentage of THC content. To the extent that Jones suggests
the State was required to prove that the substance was not “industrial hemp,”
that is incorrect. Contrary to Jones’ assertion, it is not (and never has been) the
State’s burden to prove what the substance was not; that is Jones’ obligation. In
other words, the State was not required to establish that the substance Trooper
Helmbrecht found on Jones was not industrial hemp. Instead, it was the State’s
burden to show that the substance was marijuana – a burden that we have
already concluded the State has met through the testimony of Trooper
Helmbrecht. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, the State
presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones
possessed marijuana.
B. Operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a
person
[13] Jones next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the
“endangerment” element of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a
person. Jones contends that although he was speeding and swerving as Captain
Faulk followed him, he “successfully navigated nine intersections with traffic
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lights during that time, and stopped promptly when another officer pulled him
over.” Br. of Appellant at 20.
[14] To convict Jones of operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class A
misdemeanor, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he 1) operated his vehicle 2) while intoxicated 3) in a manner that endangered a
person. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(b). Based on the argument Jones presents, we need
only decide if the evidence of endangerment is sufficient.
[15] The endangerment element can be established by evidence showing that the
defendant’s condition or manner of operating a vehicle could have endangered
any person, including the public, the police, or the defendant. Staley v. State, 895
N.E.2d 1245, 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. It is not required that the
State prove that a person other than the defendant was actually in the path of
the defendant’s vehicle or in the same area to obtain a conviction. Id. at 1251.
Thus, it is sufficient to show endangerment if the defendant’s conduct renders
driving unsafe. Id.
[16] Here, although Jones did not injure anyone from his careless driving, the
manner in which he was driving could have endangered himself or others.
Captain Faulk testified that he observed Jones traveling sixty-eight miles per
hour in a fifty mile per hour zone and driving in an erratic manner on the
interstate. This evidence of Jones’ excessive speed coupled with swerving in and
out of his lane is sufficient to prove endangerment. See, e.g., Staley, 895 N.E.2d
at 1251 (holding there was sufficient evidence that the defendant endangered
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himself and others when he was driving ten miles over the speed limit with his
lights off); see also Boyd v. State, 519 N.E.2d 182, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding the defendant endangered himself or others when he was driving fifty-
four miles per hour, at night, in a thirty mile per hour zone). Jones’ argument to
the contrary is merely a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we
cannot do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. Therefore, the State presented
sufficient evidence to prove that Jones operated a vehicle while intoxicated
endangering a person.
Conclusion
[17] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Jones’ convictions for
possession of marijuana and operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering
a person. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
[18] Affirmed.
May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.
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