Grady Styles v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 30 2020, 9:22 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Robert G. Bottorff II Curtis T. Hill, Jr,
Jeffersonville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Steven J. Hosler
Lauren A. Jacobsen
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Grady Styles, June 30, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2390
v. Appeal from the Washington
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Larry Medlock,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
88C01-1612-F1-636
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Grady Styles (“Styles”) was convicted in Washington Circuit Court of Level 3
felony child molesting and ordered to serve sixteen years in the Department of
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Correction, with twelve years executed and four years suspended to probation.
Styles appeals his sentence and raises two issues:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by issuing an inadequate
sentencing statement and by failing to consider certain mitigating
circumstances; and
II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Fifty-eight-year-old Styles was five-year-old L.B.’s step-grandfather. Styles was
the only father figure in L.B.’s life. In November 2016, L.B. reported that Styles
had performed oral sex on her and had made her fondle his penis.
[4] On December 9, 2016, the State charged Styles with Level 1 felony child
molesting and Level 4 felony child molesting. The charges provided in relevant
part:
Count I
Styles . . . with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, to wit:
L.B., age 5, knowingly or intentionally perform or submit to
sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct[.]
Count II
Styles . . . with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, to wit:
L.B., age 5, knowingly or intentionally perform or submit to
fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with
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the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the
child or the older person[.]
Appellant’s App. pp. 12–13. On December 7, 2017, Styles pleaded guilty to
Level 3 felony child molesting, a lesser included offense of the Level 1 felony
offense charged in Count I. Count II was dismissed.
[5] At the February 22, 2018 sentencing hearing, the trial court considered as
aggravating Styles’s criminal history, that L.B. was five years old, and that
Styles was in a position of care, custody and control over L.B. The trial court
considered that Styles lived a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time as
mitigating. The trial court also considered that Styles was sincerely remorseful
and that he received a significant benefit from his plea agreement. Tr. p. 38.
L.B.’s mother submitted a victim impact statement to the trial court and
described the trauma L.B. continues to suffer as a result of the molestation.
Appellant’s Conf. App. pp. 91–94. The court determined that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and ordered Styles to
serve sixteen years, with four years suspended, in the Department of
Correction.
[6] On August 27, 2019, Styles requested permission to file a belated appeal. The
trial court granted his motion on September 9, 2019, and this appeal ensued.
I. Abuse of Sentencing Discretion
[7] Styles argues that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing an inadequate
sentencing statement and failing to consider his proffered mitigating
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circumstances. In its sentencing order, “the trial court must enter a statement
including reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances for imposing a
particular sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007),
modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). We review the
sentence for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 490. An abuse of discretion occurs if
“the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances.” Id. A trial court abuses its discretion if it (1) fails “to enter a
sentencing statement at all[,]” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains
reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and
mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons,” (3)
enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by
the record and advanced for consideration,” or (4) considers reasons that “are
improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490–91. However, the relative weight or
value assignable to reasons properly found, or to those which should have been
found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id. at 491.
A. Sentencing Statement
[8] If the trial court finds the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
it must give a “statement of the court’s reasons for selecting the sentence that it
imposes.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-3. On review, we may examine both the written
and oral sentencing statements to discern the findings of the trial court. See
Vaughn v. State, 13 N.E.3d 873, 890 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
[9] Focusing on the trial court’s written sentencing statement, Styles argues that it
is inadequate because it “provides absolutely no ‘facts peculiar to’ Styles from
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which any independent review of the sentencing decision can be gleaned[.]” 1
Appellant’s Br. at 14. To the contrary, the trial court’s written sentencing
statement lists three aggravating circumstances found by the court and one
mitigating circumstance. Appellant’s App. p. 100. These circumstances were
identified in the court’s written statement after a thorough consideration of
further circumstances particular to Styles, as evidenced by the court’s oral
sentencing statement.
[10] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court gave a thorough explanation of why
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances supported its decision to impose a
sixteen-year sentence with four years suspended. Tr. pp. 37–39. The trial court
considered Styles’s criminal history, L.B.’s young age, the impact of the
molestation on L.B., Styles’s position of trust with L.B., Styles’s expression of
remorse, that he lived a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time, and the
testimony of Styles’s character witnesses at sentencing. The trial court then
determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances. Tr. pp. 38–39. Accordingly, when the trial court’s oral
sentencing statement is considered in conjunction with its written sentencing
1
We are not persuaded by Styles’s reliance on Jackson v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). In that
case, we held that the trial court did not issue an adequate sentencing statement because it selected a sentence
based solely on conduct apart from the circumstances of Jackson’s crime. Id. at 1252. Jackson entered into a
plea agreement, and sentencing was deferred pending his completion of the county Drug Court program.
Jackson was terminated from the program after he admitted to smoking spice and driving another program
participant to purchase spice. When the trial court sentenced Jackson, it focused on his behavior in the Drug
Court program. Because the “trial court was charged with imposing an initial sentence [for the offense to]
which Jackson pled guilty,” the trial court did not consider the “‘facts peculiar to the particular defendant’
with respect to the crime for which he was being sentenced.” Id. at 1251–52.
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order, we conclude that the trial court adequately explained its reasons for
imposing the sixteen-year sentence in this case.
B. Mitigating Circumstances
[11] Styles also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider
the following mitigating circumstances: 1) his expression of remorse, 2) his
guilty plea, 3) that the probation department determined that he is low risk to
reoffend, and 4) that Styles’s elderly mother relies on him as her caretaker and
his incarceration will cause her undue hardship. “An allegation that the trial
court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to
establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported
by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.
[12] From the trial court’s oral statement at the sentencing hearing, it is clear that
the trial court considered Styles’s expression of remorse as a mitigating
circumstance. The court stated, “I believe you are remorseful. I do. And I
believe you are remorseful for the right reasons. Most folks are remorseful
because they got caught. But . . . I believe you’re sincerely remorseful.” Tr. pp.
37–38.
[13] Concerning Styles’s guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility, we observe
that Styles received a significant benefit from his guilty plea. At sentencing, the
trial court noted that had Styles been convicted of the Level 1 felony charged,
the advisory sentence would have been thirty years. Tr. p. 37. For this reason,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to find
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Styles’s guilty plea as a mitigating circumstance. See Norris v. State, 113 N.E.3d
1245, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (explaining that a guilty plea is not necessarily
a mitigating factor where the defendant receives substantial benefit from the
plea).
[14] Next, Styles claims the trial court should have considered the probation
department’s determination that Styles was a low risk to reoffend as a
mitigating circumstance. But Styles did not ask the trial court to find this
mitigator; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to
consider Styles’s risk assessment score as a mitigating circumstance. See
Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492; Koch v. State, 952 N.E.2d 359, 375 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011), trans. denied. Moreover, “the offender risk assessment scores do not in
themselves constitute, and cannot serve as, an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance.” J.S. v. State, 928 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ind. 2010). Our supreme
court has explained that scores on a risk assessment instrument “are not
intended to serve as aggravating or mitigating circumstances nor to determine
the gross length of sentence[.]” Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 575 (Ind.
2010).
[15] Finally, Styles argues that the trial court should have found as mitigating that
his elderly mother relies on him as a caretaker and will face undue hardship if
Styles is incarcerated. Styles presented evidence that when his mother moved to
Indiana from Georgia, she appeared to be infirm. However, his character
witness, Leroy Collins, testified that Styles takes good care of his mother and
“she gets around by herself now without any problems.” Tr. p. 14. There was
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no evidence that Styles’s incarceration will result in hardship for his mother
more than would normally occur when a family member is incarcerated. For
these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it did not find this proposed mitigating circumstance.
[16] For all of these reasons, Styles has not convinced us that the trial court abused
its discretion when it sentenced Styles.
II. Inappropriate Sentence
[17] Styles also claims that his sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Pursuant to Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B), “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if,
after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character
of the offender.” We must exercise deference to a trial court’s sentencing
decision because Rule 7(B) requires us to give due consideration to that
decision, and we understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court
brings to its sentencing decisions. Rose v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1055, 1063 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling
evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as
accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s
character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good
character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
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[18] The determination of whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on
our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the
damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
case.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Cardwell v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)). The appropriate question is not
whether another sentence is more appropriate, but whether the sentence
imposed is inappropriate. Rose, 36 N.E.3d at 1063.
[19] Although we have the power to review and revise sentences, the principal role
of appellate review should be to attempt to “leaven the outliers, and identify
some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of
the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each
case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. Our review under Rule 7(B) should focus
on “the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or
concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual
count.” Id. And it is the defendant’s burden on appeal to persuade us that the
sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848
N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
[20] A person convicted of a Level 3 felony “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of
between three (3) and sixteen (16) years, with the advisory sentence being nine
(9) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5. Styles was ordered to serve sixteen years with
twelve years executed and four years suspended.
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[21] Because four years of Styles’s sixteen-year sentence were suspended, he was not
ordered to serve the maximum sentence. “[F]or purposes of Rule 7(B) review, a
maximum sentence is not just a sentence of maximum length, but a fully
executed sentence of maximum length.” See Jenkins v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1080,
1085–86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. To determine whether Styles’s
sentence is inappropriate, we consider all aspects of the penal consequences
imposed by the trial court in sentencing the defendant, including whether a
portion of the sentence is ordered suspended “or otherwise crafted using any of
the variety of sentencing tools available to the trial judge.” Davidson v. State, 926
N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010).
[22] Styles argues that his sentence is inappropriate because he led a law-abiding life
for over fifteen years and is therefore not one of the worst offenders. Styles also
claims that there are no facts to “suggest” that his offense was one of the most
egregious imaginable. See Appellant’s Br. at 21.
[23] Concerning the character of the offender, first we consider Styles’s criminal
history. In the 1980s, Styles was convicted of possession of marijuana, battery,
and operating while intoxicated endangering a person. In 1999, Styles was
convicted of operating while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident.
While he was on probation for those offenses, he committed criminal
recklessness when he fired a shotgun at his neighbor’s house. He was convicted
of criminal recklessness in 2001. As the trial court noted, Styles lived a law-
abiding life for over fifteen years, until he committed the instant offense.
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[24] Three individuals testified on Styles’s behalf at the sentencing hearing and
expressed their opinion that Styles is a caring, hardworking man, who was
remorseful for his crimes. The trial court also noted that Styles’s expression of
remorse was sincere. But these circumstances must be weighed against the fact
that Styles was in a position of trust with his five-year-old step-granddaughter.
Styles was the only father figure in L.B.’s life and was one of her caretakers. He
manipulated L.B. into allowing him to perform oral sex on her. He also
persuaded L.B. to fondle his penis. And after Styles’s offenses were discovered,
L.B.’s mother believed he was attempting to scare and manipulate L.B. because
he often drove by L.B.’s bus stop while L.B. was exiting the school bus.
[25] The nature of Styles’s offense is heinous. Styles took advantage of the position
of trust he held with his five-year-old step-granddaughter to coerce her into
submitting to oral sex. Also, L.B. explained to her mother that she fondled
Styles’s penis because she did not want him to be sad, further establishing that
Styles manipulated L.B. and took advantage or her trust in him.
[26] After considering the nature of the offense and his character, we conclude that
Styles has not met his burden of persuading us that his sentence is an outlier
that warrants revision. Styles’s sixteen-year sentence with four years suspended
is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.
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Conclusion
[27] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Styles. And his
sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.
[28] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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