Adam Garrison Campbell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Jun 30 2020, 8:48 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas P. Keller Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Courtney L. Staton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Adam Garrison Campbell, June 30, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2704
v. Appeal from the
St. Joseph Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. John M. Marnocha, Judge
The Honorable
Elizabeth A. Hardtke, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
71D02-1809-F3-65
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] A jury found Adam Garrison Campbell (“Campbell”) guilty of battery causing
serious bodily injury,1 a Level 5 felony, and Campbell pleaded guilty to battery
causing moderate bodily injury,2 a Level 6 felony. On appeal, Campbell raises
one issue which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by
ruling at trial that only part of Campbell’s statement was inadmissible on the
grounds that he made a statement without having first been advised of his
Miranda rights.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On September 1, 2018, Notre Dame University and the University of Michigan
were playing a football game in South Bend. Tr. Vol. 2 at 11-12. Dustin
Zimmerman (“Zimmerman”) arrived at an area near the stadium at 6:30 a.m.
to tailgate and watch television with family and friends. Tr. Vol. 4 at 83. Later
that afternoon, Zimmerman saw a little girl wandering by herself. Id. at 65, 84.
Zimmerman’s mother stopped the girl and told her to go back to her parents.
Id. at 65, 84. Soon after, a young boy escorted the girl back to her parents. Id.
at 84. Zimmerman noticed that the girl’s mother was watching them from
across the parking lot. Id. at 85. She approached Zimmerman and shouted,
“don’t worry about it. I’m watching my fucking kids.” Id. at 85-86. She
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(g).
2
See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(e).
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continued to yell profanities at Zimmerman. Tr. Vol. 3 at 103; Tr. Vol. 4 at 86.
Zimmerman told the woman that she needed to “watch [her] kid” and turned to
walk away. Id. At that point, Brandon Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) struck
Zimmerman in the face, and Gonzalez and Zimmerman began to fight. Tr. Vol.
3 at 104; Tr. Vol. 4 at 86-87, 121, 191-92. Campbell, who is Gonzalez’s cousin,
joined the fray. Tr. Vol. 4 at 23, 52, 58-59.
[4] As the fight progressed, Scott Knapper (“Knapper”), Zimmerman’s friend,
noticed that Zimmerman had fallen to the ground and was bleeding from his
back. Id. at 103. Knapper reached down, grabbed Zimmerman’s hand, and
helped him up. Id. at 103. At that point, Knapper noticed that he had been
stabbed. Id. Knapper saw Campbell holding a knife and smirking. Id. at 104.
Soon after, Zimmerman noticed that he too had been stabbed. Id. at 88.
[5] When police arrived, Campbell fled, but officers soon detained him. Tr. Vol. 3
at 96-97; Tr. Vol. 4 at 26. Campbell was taken to the South Bend Police
Department and interviewed by Detective James Taylor (“Detective Taylor”).
Tr. Vol. 4 at 119-20. Campbell was not advised of his Miranda rights. State’s Ex.
22; Appellant’s App. Vol. Two at 49.
[6] The State charged Campbell with Count I, Level 5 felony battery by means of a
deadly weapon for stabbing Zimmerman with a knife, and Count II, Level 3
felony aggravated battery, for knowingly inflicting injury on Knapper that
created a substantial risk of death. Appellant’s App. Vol. Two at 13. On February
18, 2019, Campbell filed a motion to suppress his statement made to Detective
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Taylor, alleging that he was in custody when he spoke to Detective Taylor and
that he had not been advised of his Miranda rights. Id. at 38-39. On March 29,
2019, a hearing was held on Campbell’s motion. Tr. Vol. 2 at 7. During the
hearing, a copy of Campbell’s recorded statement was not admitted into
evidence. Id. at 7-17. Instead, the State presented testimony from Detective
Taylor, who stated that Campbell was simply brought to the station as a person
involved in the case and was not being treated as a suspect at that time. Id. at
12. Detective Taylor testified that Campbell was not handcuffed, was seated in
a normal interview room used for witnesses, offered a cup of water, and was
informed that he was not being arrested. Id. at 12-15. The trial court took
Campbell’s motion to suppress under advisement, and on April 23, 2019, it
denied the motion. Id. at 17; Appellant’s App. Vol. Two at 48-49.
[7] The jury trial commenced on May 15, 2019. Tr. Vol. 3 at 2. During the State’s
case-in-chief, Campbell objected to the admission of his recorded statement,
arguing that he was in custody when Detective Taylor questioned him, so
Detective Taylor’s failure to read Campbell his Miranda rights made Campbell’s
statement inadmissible. Tr. Vol. 4 at 123. The trial court overruled Campbell’s
objection, finding that a reasonable person would not have felt compelled to
make a statement or believe that they were not free to leave. Id. at 133-36.
[8] The video of his interview was played for the jury, and Campbell again renewed
his objection to the admission of his statement, noting that during the first few
minutes of the interview, an officer had entered the room and returned
Campbell’s personal property that had been collected from Campbell when he
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had first arrived at the station. Id. at 139. Campbell argued that because his
property had been taken from him when he had first arrived, he was in custody
when Detective Taylor interviewed him, and, therefore, Detective Taylor
should have advised Campbell of his Miranda rights. Id. at 140-41. At this
point, the jury had viewed the first three minutes and forty-seven seconds of the
recorded statement. Id. at 147-48; State’s Ex. 22. The trial court granted
Campbell’s request to not admit the remaining part of the recorded statement.
Tr. Vol. 4 at 144. However, the trial court rejected Campbell’s argument that
the first part of his statement was also inadmissible. Id. at 144-45. Campbell
moved for a mistrial, contending that because the jury had viewed part of the
statement, there would be “unanswered questions” in the minds of the jurors.
Id. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial because it determined that the
portion of Campbell’s statement that the jury heard contained no inculpatory
statements. Id. The parties and the trial court agreed that it would be proper to
admonish the jurors, and after taking suggestions from the parties, the trial
court eventually admonished the jury as follows:
You saw a video of [Campbell] and Detective Taylor. You may
only consider the information you saw in the video from the
point it began to the point it ended. You may not speculate on
any other portions or sections of the video after it ended or
speculate or consider that while you are in your final
deliberations.
Id. at 150.
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[9] At the conclusion of the jury trial, Campbell was found guilty of Level 5 felony
battery resulting in serious bodily injury for attacking Knapper, a lesser-
included offense of the original charge under Count II. Id. at 228; Appellant’s
App. Vol. Two at 96. The jury was unable to return a verdict on the other count,
Count I Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon for allegedly
stabbing Zimmerman with a knife. Tr. Vol. 4 at 228; Appellant’s App. Vol. Two at
96. In lieu of a retrial on Count I, Campbell pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony
battery resulting in moderate bodily injury. Appellant’s App. Vol. Two at 135-39.
The trial court sentenced Campbell to an aggregate term of six years, with four
years executed. Id. at 183. Campbell now appeals. We will provide additional
facts as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
[10] Campbell claims the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the first
part of his statement to be admitted, even though he admits nothing he said
during that part of his statement was inculpatory. A trial court has broad
discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Peele v. State, 130 N.E.3d
1195, 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). An abuse of discretion occurs when the
admission of the evidence is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances. Id. at 1198-99. When an accused is subjected to custodial
interrogation, the State may not use statements from the interrogation unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards to secure the accused’s privilege
against self-incrimination. Davies v. State, 730 N.E.2d 726, 733 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)), trans. denied. When
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a person is in custody, Miranda requires that he be informed of the right to the
presence and advice of counsel during custodial interrogation by the police, of
the right to remain silent, and that any statement he makes may be used as
evidence against him. Bryant v. State, 959 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011).
[11] We agree with Campbell that the part of the statement reviewed by the jury
contained no inculpatory statements. The published portion of the recorded
statement shows Detective Taylor advising Campbell that he was at the station
“for the drama that happened out there while you [were] partying.” State’s. Ex.
22 at 00:14. Detective Taylor then collected personal information about
Campbell, such as Campbell’s date of birth, age, address, place of employment
and phone number. Id. at 00:51 to 02:07. Detective Taylor told Campbell that
he simply wanted to know what Campbell “might have seen or heard out
there.” Id. at 02:21. Detective Taylor also said that he wanted Campbell’s help
to gather information and learn what actually happened. Id. at 02:35.
Campbell told Detective Taylor that he had documented the fight with his
phone. Id. at 02:49. When Detective Taylor asked Campbell if he had his
phone with him, Campbell said that his phone was “with his personal
property.” Id. at 02:54. Detective Taylor left the room and briefly spoke with
another officer about getting the phone. Id. at 03:05. Detective Taylor returned
to the room and asked Campbell, “What happened?” Id. at 03:25. Campbell
responded, “I had just invited a friend out. We walked over to the front of the
Ivory Court Inn.” Id. at 03:30. Campbell stopped talking as an officer brought
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Campbell’s personal property into the room, including Campbell’s phone. Id.
at 03:36. Campbell then continued, “She got dropped off in an Uber. She
called me, and then me and my friend . . . .” Id. at 03:43. The jury did not
review the remainder of the statement. Tr. Vol. 4 at 144, 147-48. Campbell
admits that he made no inculpatory statements during this exchange with
Detective Taylor, and we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to rule that the first part of Campbell’s statement was inadmissible.3
[12] Nonetheless, Campbell argues that he was prejudiced by the jury hearing the
first part of the statement because it invited the jury to hypothesize about the
content of the second portion of the statement, and Campbell asserts that the
trial court’s admonishment that jurors should not speculate about the content of
the second part of the statement did not prevent the jury from doing so. Proof
of such speculation, according to Campbell, can be found in the jury’s verdicts.
He reasons that because the jury deadlocked on Count I and found him guilty
of only a lesser-included offense of Count II, the jury must have speculated
about the content of the second part of the statement and that this tainted the
jury’s deliberations. Campbell asserts: “As the old adage goes, ‘Where there’s
smoke, there is fire.’ Although the jury was instructed not to speculate on what
else might have been said on the taped statement, it is hard to believe, given the
3
Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to rule that the first part of
Campbell’s statement was inadmissible, we need not address Campbell’s argument that the trial court’s ruling
was not harmless error.
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verdicts, that it was not a factor in their deliberations.” Appellant’s Br. at 14
(citation omitted).
[13] Appellate review of Campbell’s claim that the admonishment was inadequate is
foreclosed by the doctrine of invited error. A party’s failure to object
accompanied by the party’s affirmative request of a trial court raises the
question of invited error. Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind. 2014).
This doctrine forbids a party from taking “advantage of an error that she
commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of her own neglect or
misconduct.” Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 907 (Ind. 2005). The doctrine
may apply to a variety of errors the party requested of the trial court, such as the
adoption of an erroneous jury instruction or the admission of evidence
prejudicial to the defendant. See, e.g., Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 573 (Ind.
2018); Kingery v. State, 659 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind. 1995). Here, Campbell
requested the admonishment. The trial court proposed the following language
for the admonishment:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you saw a video of [Campbell]
and Detective Taylor. . . . [Y]ou may only consider the
information you saw in the video from the point it began to the
point it ended. You may not speculate on any other portions or
sections of the video after it ended.
Tr. Vol. 4 at 146. Campbell then asked the trial court to include the phrase “or
consider it in your deliberations.” Id. The trial court granted Campbell’s
request. Id. The final form of the instruction, as read to the jury, stated the
following:
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You saw a video of [Campbell] and Detective Taylor. You may
only consider the information you saw in the video from the
point it began to the point it ended. You may not speculate on
any other portions or sections of the video after it ended or
speculate or consider that while you are in your final
deliberations.
Id. at 150. Campbell did not object to this language; in fact, he had requested
the admonishment and contributed some of the wording to the admonishment.
Id.at 146-50. Thus, any alleged error in the admonishment is an error that
Campbell invited by: 1) affirmatively requesting the admonishment; 2)
proposing language for the admonishment; and 3) later failing to object to the
language of admonishment when the trial court read the admonishment to the
jury. See Brewington, 7 N.E.3d at 974. Thus, appellate review of this issue is
foreclosed.
[14] Nonetheless, we will briefly address Campbell’s argument on the merits. We
presume that a timely and accurate admonition cures any error in the admission
of evidence. See Suding v. State, 945 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Campbell’s attempt to rebut this presumption falls woefully short. Again, he
argues that because the jury deadlocked on Count I and found him guilty of
only a lesser-included offense of Count II, the jury must have hypothesized
about the content of the second part of the statement and that this speculation
tainted the jury’s deliberations. This is conjecture. There are a variety of
explanations for the jury’s verdicts, and the most plausible explanation is the
simplest one: the jury did not convict Campbell as charged because it
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concluded the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell
was guilty as charged. Campbell’s hypothesis about the jury’s speculation
about the content of the second part of his statement does not rebut our
presumption that the trial court’s admonishment cured any potential error. See
id.[15] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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