Anthony J. Castleman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 09 2020, 10:02 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stacy R. Uliana Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Bargersville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tiffany A. McCoy
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Anthony J. Castleman, July 9, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2632
v. Appeal from the Adams Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Patrick R. Miller,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
01D01-1907-F6-168
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 1 of 10
[1] Anthony Castleman appeals his convictions for Class A Misdemeanor
Conversion1 and Class A Misdemeanor Criminal Mischief,2 arguing that (1) his
two convictions violate Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy; (2) the
trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial; and (3) the evidence
was insufficient to support the convictions. Finding no double jeopardy
violation, no error, and the evidence sufficient, we affirm.
Facts
[2] Sometime in the late evening of June 20 or the early morning of June 21, 2019,
Enos Gore was driving in his white truck with his friend, Castleman, in the
passenger’s seat. The truck stalled on a country road that had been flooded with
high waters. At 6 a.m. on the morning of June 21, 2019, Susie Brown was on
her front porch when she observed a man in a black shirt splashing around in
the high flood waters in front of her property. According to Brown, the man
appeared to be “washing his pants,” tr. vol. II p. 141, and proceeded to walk
onto her property. Brown became nervous as the man approached her house,
but the man turned to walk onto the farm of her neighbor, Merlie Eicher.
Brown stopped being concerned and went inside.
[3] Later, Brown heard Eicher’s tractor start up, so she went back onto her porch.
She looked out and saw the same man in the black shirt driving the tractor into
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-3(a).
2
I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a)(1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 2 of 10
the high flood waters, where it stalled and became almost completely
submerged. The man crawled out through the tractor’s back window and
walked over to the passenger-side window of the stalled white truck.
[4] Approximately fifteen minutes later, police arrived, at which point Brown
observed the man in a black shirt, later identified as Castleman, and another
man in a gray shirt, later identified as Gore, walk towards the officers.
Lieutenant Dean Amstutz, who was on the scene, noticed that Castleman was
soaked from the torso down. He also noticed a strong smell of alcohol on
Castleman’s breath. Lieutenant Amstutz offered to give Castleman a ride to a
nearby apartment, during which time Castleman broke down in tears and
“start[ed] to talk to himself about how he’s in so much trouble.” Id. at 172.
[5] Sometime later that day, Eicher returned home and discovered his tractor
destroyed and submerged in water. He eventually called law enforcement.
Eicher told Brown’s husband about what had had happened, which prompted
Brown’s husband to tell Brown. Law enforcement decided to speak with Brown
because she had witnessed the events from that morning, and the officers
eventually obtained written statements from both Brown and Eicher.
[6] On July 3, 2019, the State charged Castleman with Level 6 felony theft and
Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief. Before his trial, Castleman filed a
motion in limine, which the trial court granted, that precluded Brown from
identifying Castleman as the person she had witnessed driving the tractor.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 3 of 10
[7] During Castleman’s September 16, 2019, jury trial, Castleman’s counsel asked
Corporal Patrick Piper of the Adams County Sheriff’s Office why law
enforcement did not request additional evidence from the crime scene. In
response, Corporal Piper said, “the witness statement from [Brown] identified
the male subject wearing a black shirt the morning prior. He was identified as . .
. Anthony Castleman.” Id. at 212. Castleman’s counsel objected, arguing that
Corporal Piper violated the order in limine.
[8] Then, while outside the jury’s presence, Castleman’s counsel moved for a
mistrial, contending that Corporal Piper’s comment unduly prejudiced
Castleman, even though it was Castleman’s counsel who asked the question.
The trial court concluded that “it’s not a direct violation of the motion in limine
because the motion in limine was directed directly at [Brown].” Id. at 215
(emphases omitted). Ultimately, the trial court denied Castleman’s motion, but
to ameliorate any prejudicial effect, went on to admonish the jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, before we call the next witness,
the last witness who testified, Officer Piper, in his testimony made
a statement that they, basically the law enforcement didn’t do
further investigation to this because [Brown] had identified
[Castleman] as their suspect. I will point that out to you that that is
not accurate. That was not testified to by [Brown]. She never made
a witness identification in this courtroom of anyone. She simply
described an individual she saw and you are to understand that
that’s the limits of her testimony at this point [sic] time. Regardless
of what Officer Piper may have stated in that statement.
Id. at 216 (emphases omitted).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 4 of 10
[9] At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Castleman guilty of the lesser-included
offense of Class A misdemeanor conversion and Class A misdemeanor criminal
mischief. On October 9, 2019, the trial court sentenced Castleman to concurrent
terms of 300 days in the county jail. Castleman now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Double Jeopardy
[10] First, Castleman argues that his two Class A misdemeanor convictions violate
Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy. See generally Ind. Const. art. 1 §
14. We review questions of double jeopardy de novo, giving no consideration to
the trial court’s decision below. Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447, 458 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2005).
[11] More specifically, Castleman argues that there is a reasonable probability that
the jury relied on the same facts to convict him of both conversion and criminal
mischief. Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ind. 2002). Under this “actual
evidence” test, Castleman must show that there is “a reasonable probability that
the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of
one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a
second challenged offense.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 53 (Ind. 1999).
There is no double jeopardy violation when the evidentiary facts establishing
the essential elements of one offense satisfy many, but not all, of the essential
elements of the second offense. Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 719 (Ind. 2013).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 5 of 10
[12] To convict Castleman of Class A misdemeanor conversion, the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Castleman knowingly or
intentionally exerted unauthorized control over the property of another person.
I.C. § 35-43-4-3(a). To convict Castleman of Class A misdemeanor criminal
mischief, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Castleman recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damaged or defaced another
person’s property without that person’s consent and that the pecuniary loss is
between $750 and $50,000. I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a)(1).
[13] Based on the record, the evidentiary facts that the jury probably used to
establish that Castleman had committed conversion were that he knowingly or
intentionally entered Eicher’s property and started using the tractor without
Eicher’s authorization or consent. Then, the evidentiary facts that the jury
probably used to establish that Castleman had committed criminal mischief
were that Castleman, without Eicher’s consent, drove off in the tractor and
plunged it into deep flood waters, where it became submerged and severely
damaged; it is also undisputed that Eicher’s tractor was valued at
approximately $28,000 before it was damaged.
[14] Accordingly, Castleman cannot show that there was a reasonable probability
that the jury relied on the same evidentiary facts to establish the essential
elements of both offenses. Rather, the record shows that Castleman committed
two separate acts—unauthorized control of the tractor and unauthorized
operation/destruction of the tractor—during this timeframe. Therefore, because
the evidentiary facts establishing the essential elements of one offense establish
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 6 of 10
the essential elements of some, but not all, of the second offense, there is no
double jeopardy violation.
II. Mistrial
[15] Next, Castleman argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for
a mistrial after admitting testimony that potentially prejudiced the jury, despite
the trial court’s admonishment.
[16] A mistrial is an “extreme remedy” that should be used only when no other
curative measure will rectify the situation. Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 57
(Ind. 1995). Upon review of a denial of a motion for a mistrial, the defendant
must demonstrate that the conduct complained of was both in error and had a
probable persuasive effect on the jury’s decision. Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 821,
825 (Ind. 2002). More specifically:
[W]hen the trial court admonishes the jury to disregard the
inadmissible evidence, the prejudicial impact of the evidence may
be sufficiently mitigated. The question of whether a defendant was
so prejudiced that the admonishment could not cure the error is
one that must be determined by examining the facts of the
particular case. The burden is on the defendant to show that he
was harmed and placed in grave peril by the denial of the mistrial
motion.
Glenn v. State, 796 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations
omitted). The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion
of the trial court, and we will reverse only when the trial court’s decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Hall v. State,
722 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 7 of 10
[17] Specifically, Castleman contends that Corporal Piper violated the order in
limine and sufficiently prejudiced his case when Corporal Piper said, “the
witness statement from [Brown] identified the male subject wearing a black
shirt the morning prior. He was identified as . . . Anthony Castleman.” Tr. Vol.
II p. 212.
[18] We find Castleman’s argument to be unavailing. First, it should be noted that
the trial court did not find that Corporal Piper’s testimony violated the order in
limine because the order in limine was directed at Brown herself and
specifically prohibited only Brown from identifying Castleman. We agree with
the trial court’s assessment. By speaking about a different witness, Corporal
Piper did not violate the narrow confines of the order in limine.
[19] Secondly, even if Corporal Piper’s testimony violated the order in limine, the
trial court stepped in to rectify the situation by admonishing the jury to
disregard any testimony by Corporal Piper in which he referenced Brown’s
direct identification of Castleman as the man driving the tractor. An
admonishment such as this, we believe, was thorough and effective enough to
diminish any prejudicial effect that Corporal Piper’s testimony may have had.
[20] Finally, it bears repeating that a mistrial is an “extreme remedy” that should be
used only when other curative measures cannot rectify a situation. Moore, 652
N.E.2d at 57. Nothing in the record indicates that Corporal Piper’s testimony
placed Castleman in grave peril. Given that there were other curative measures
implemented by the trial court, a mistrial would not have been warranted in this
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 8 of 10
situation. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied
Castleman’s motion for a mistrial.
III. Sufficiency of Evidence
[21] Finally, Castleman argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his two
Class A misdemeanor convictions. When reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a conviction, we must affirm if the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom could have allowed a reasonable trier of
fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. McHenry v. State,
820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). It is not our job to reweigh the evidence or to
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we consider any conflicting evidence
most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 906
(Ind. 2005).
[22] As we have already stated, to convict Castleman of Class A misdemeanor
conversion, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Castleman knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over the
property of another person. I.C. § 35-43-4-3(a). To convict Castleman of Class
A misdemeanor criminal mischief, the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Castleman recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
damaged or defaced another person’s property without that person’s consent
and that the pecuniary loss is between $750 and $50,000. I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a)(1).
[23] The only piece of evidence Castleman claims is insufficient is the identification
of him as the person who committed those crimes. More to the point, he argues
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 9 of 10
that “the State had to present substantial evidence of a probative value from
which the jury could infer that he was the man who drove Eicher’s tractor into
the flood waters,” but failed to do so. Appellant’s Br. p. 14-15.
[24] There were only two people in the white truck on the night/morning of the
incident: Castleman and Gore. While Brown could not and did not directly
identify Castleman as the one who stumbled across her yard, entered Eicher’s
property, took off on Eicher’s tractor, and then damaged that tractor in the high
flood waters, she did describe the individual as someone wearing a black shirt.
Castleman was wearing a black shirt, and we know that Gore was wearing a
gray shirt. Plus, Lieutenant Amstutz, who was an officer on the scene, observed
that Castleman was wearing a black shirt and was soaked from the torso down.
Earlier that morning, Brown noticed a man leaving the white truck and
washing his pants in the high waters. Further, while transporting Castleman to
a nearby apartment, Lieutenant Amstutz witnessed Castleman crying and
stating that “he’s in so much trouble.” Tr. Vol. II p. 172.
[25] A reasonable factfinder could have inferred from this evidence that it was
Castleman who left the white truck, became soaked from the water, and
committed the two crimes. Thus, the evidence is sufficient.
[26] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bradford, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2632 | July 9, 2020 Page 10 of 10