Dorothy Goodpaster v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 13 2020, 9:12 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Katelyn Bacon Attorney General of Indiana
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Catherine Brizzi
- Appellate Division Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Dorothy Goodpaster, July 13, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-182
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Dylan Vigh, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff. Pro Tempore
Trial Court Cause No.
49G12-1905-CM-21495
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Following a bench trial in Marion Superior Court, Dorothy Goodpaster
(“Goodpaster”) was convicted of Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle
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while intoxicated (“OWI”) endangering a person and sentenced to 180 days
suspended to probation. Goodpaster appeals and argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support her conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On the evening of May 30, 2019, Goodpaster went to an American Legion
outpost, where she drank alcoholic beverages. On her way home, Goodpaster
was involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle at Rockville Road and
Rockville Avenue in Indianapolis. Officer Adam Jones (“Officer Jones”) was
dispatched to the scene of the accident, where he encountered Goodpaster
receiving medical treatment in an ambulance.
[4] Upon entering the ambulance to speak with Goodpaster, Officer Jones
immediately noticed the smell of alcohol coming from her person. He also
observed that her eyes were glassy and bloodshot. As he questioned
Goodpaster, Officer Jones noticed that Goodpaster appeared to be intoxicated.
He therefore advised her of her Miranda rights, after which she admitted that
she had been driving at the time of the accident. She claimed, however, to only
have drunk one alcoholic beverage that night. Officer Jones decided not to ask
Goodpaster to perform field sobriety tests, as he did not know if she had
sustained a head injury that might affect her performance on such tests. Instead,
after reading her the implied consent law, he asked Goodpaster to use a
portable breath test, to which she consented. The test indicated that Goodpaster
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was intoxicated. Officer Jones then asked Goodpaster to consent to a blood
draw, and she gave her consent. Officer Jones took Goodpaster to Eskenazi
Hospital, where registered nurse Holly Hepworth (“Hepworth”) drew two vials
of blood from Goodpaster. Officer Jones was present during the blood draw.
Officer Jones took the blood samples, sealed them, and placed them in storage
in the police property room.
[5] Indianapolis Marion County Forensic Services Agency forensic scientist
Savannah Chris (“Chris”) later took the blood samples from the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department property room and analyzed them for the
presence of alcohol. Chris’s tests indicated that Goodpaster’s blood had an
alcohol concentration equivalent of 0.114 gram of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood.
[6] On May 31, 2019, the State charged Goodpaster with Class A misdemeanor
operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person. A bench trial was
held on October 15, 2019. At trial, Goodpaster objected when the State offered
into evidence the laboratory report showing Goodpaster’s blood alcohol
concentration equivalent, claiming that the State had failed to lay a proper
foundation. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the matter under
advisement and instructed the parties to submit briefing on the issue of the
admissibility of the report.
[7] On December 9, 2019, the trial court issued an order admitting the laboratory
report into evidence and finding Goodpaster guilty as charged. On December
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19, 2019, the trial court sentenced Goodpaster to 180 days, all suspended to
probation, and also suspended her driver’s license for sixty days. Goodpaster
now appeals.
Standard of Review
[8] Goodpaster claims that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to prove
that she was intoxicated or endangered a person.
When reviewing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to
support a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge
the credibility of the witnesses; instead, we respect the exclusive
province of the trier of fact to weigh any conflicting evidence. We
consider only the probative evidence supporting the verdict and
any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from this
evidence. We will affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a
reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied (citing
McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005)).
Discussion and Decision
[9] To convict Goodpaster of Class A misdemeanor OWI, the State was required
to prove that she operated a vehicle while “intoxicated” and that she did so “in
a manner that endangers a person.” Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2.
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I. Intoxicated
[10] Goodpaster first claims that the State failed to prove that she was intoxicated.
“Intoxicated” means under the influence of alcohol so that “there is an
impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a
person’s faculties.” Ind. Code § 9-13-2-86.
[11] Impairment may be established by: (1) the consumption of a significant amount
of alcohol; (2) impaired attention and reflexes; (3) watery or bloodshot eyes; (4)
the odor of alcohol on the breath; (5) unsteady balance; and (6) slurred speech.
Outlaw v. State, 918 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), opinion adopted, 929
N.E.2d 196 (Ind. 2010).
[12] Here, Officer Jones testified that Goodpaster smelled of alcohol and had glassy,
bloodshot eyes. He also testified that, based on his experience, he believed her
to be intoxicated and that the portable breath test confirmed his belief. This is
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Goodpaster was intoxicated.
See Woodson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 135, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that a
police officer may offer an opinion on intoxication and that a conviction may
sustained on the sole testimony of an arresting officer), trans. denied (citing
Wright v. State, 772 N.E.2d 449, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). 1
1
As part of her sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, Goodpaster argues that the trial court erred by admitting
the laboratory report because the State did not properly establish that Goodpaster’s blood was drawn under
the supervision of a physician or under a protocol prepared by a physician, as required by Indiana Code
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II. Endangerment
[13] Goodpaster also contends that the State failed to prove that she operated her
vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangered a person. To prove
endangerment, the State must prove that the defendant was operating the
vehicle in a condition or manner that could have endangered any person,
including the public, the police, or the defendant. Staten v. State, 946 N.E.2d 80,
84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied (citing Outlaw, 918 N.E.2d at 381). The
endangerment requirement does not require that the State prove a person other
than the defendant was actually in the path of the defendant’s vehicle or in the
same area in order to obtain a conviction. Id. “An officer does not have to wait
until the defendant crosses the centerline and adds another victim to the
statistics of those who have died in drunk driving accidents.” Id. Instead, it is
sufficient that the defendant’s condition renders driving unsafe. Id.
[14] Goodpaster does not deny that she was involved in a head-on collision with
another vehicle. But she claims that the State presented no evidence that she
section 9-30-6-6(a). Because the Officer Jones’s testimony was sufficient to establish Goodpaster’s
intoxication, the admission of the laboratory report was, at most, harmless error.
Moreover, in Boston v. State, 947 N.E.2d 436, 441 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), we held that the fact that a blood
sample was taken at a licensed hospital shows that the test “employ[s] the ‘technical adherence’ to a
physician’s directions or to a physician’s protocol required by our evidentiary rules for the admission of blood
test results.” Id. at 444. Here, there is no question that Eskenazi Hospital is a “licensed hospital” for purposes
of I.C. § 9-30-6-6. Thus, the fact that Nurse Hepworth drew Goodpaster’s blood at this licensed hospital is
sufficient to establish that it was done in accordance to a physician’s protocol. See id. The trial court therefore
properly admitted the laboratory report, which showed that Goodpaster had a blood alcohol concentration
equivalent of 0.114. Evidence that a person had, at the time of the alleged violation an alcohol concentration
equivalent of at least 0.08 is prima facie evidence of intoxication. Temperly v. State, 933 N.E.2d 558, 567 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied (citing Ind. Code § 9-13-2-131).
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was at fault in the accident and that, therefore, there is no evidence that she
endangered a person. We disagree.
[15] The State presented evidence that Goodpaster displayed outward signs of
impairment. Officer Jones testified that Goodpaster appeared to be intoxicated,
and the breath test confirmed this. More importantly, Goodpaster was involved
in a head-on collision on a city street. We think that the trial court, acting as the
trier of fact, could reasonably conclude from this that the accident was at least
partially attributable to Goodpaster’s intoxication. 2 There was sufficient
evidence from which the trial court could conclude that Goodpaster operated
her vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangered a person.
Conclusion
[16] The State presented evidence sufficient to prove that Goodpaster operated a
vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangered a person. We therefore
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[17] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
2
Goodpaster’s citation to Temperly, 933 N.E.2d at 568, is unavailing, as it was stipulated in that case that the
defendant did not cause the accident at issue and that the other driver drove his vehicle into the path of the
defendant’s vehicle. There is no such stipulation here.
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