In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: S.H., M.H. & C.H. (Minor Children) and S.H. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services, and Child Advocates, Inc. (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 04 2020, 7:05 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Don R. Hostetler Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
David E. Corey
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Termination of the Parent- March 4, 2020
Child Relationship of: Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-JT-2048
S.H., M.H. & C.H. (Minor
Children) Appeal from the
Marion Superior Court
and
The Honorable Mark A. Jones,
S.H. (Mother), Judge
Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Peter Haughan,
Judge Pro Tempore
v. Trial Court Cause Nos.
49D15-1810-JT-1243, 49D15-1810-
Indiana Department of Child JT-1244, 49D15-1810-JT-1245
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
and
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Child Advocates, Inc.,
Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem.
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] S.H. (Mother) appeals from the involuntary termination of her parental rights to
her three minor children, Sa.H., M.H., and C.H. (collectively, the Children).
She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination order.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] Mother and R.H. (Father) 1 are the biological parents of Sa.H. born in
September 2005, M.H. born in July 2006, and C.H. born in March 2010. In
March 2017, Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) removed the
Children when Father and Mother were involved in a domestic dispute and
1
Mother and Father’s marriage was dissolved during the course of this action. Father’s parental rights were
also terminated but he does not participate in this appeal. Accordingly, we will focus on the facts related to
Mother.
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Father threw an object, which injured M.H., and Father was arrested. Mother
and Father were under the influence of illegal drugs and/or alcohol at the time.
DCS filed a child in need of services (CHINS) petition, 2 and guardian ad litem
Ed Walker (the GAL) was appointed. In April 2017, Mother admitted that the
Children were in need of, and the family would benefit from, services designed
to eliminate substance abuse and domestic violence from the home and that the
Children were CHINS. The Children were placed with maternal grandfather
and step-grandmother (Grandparents), where they have remained since that
time.
[4] In June 2017, the juvenile court adjudicated the Children as CHINS and
entered a dispositional order that substantially adopted the recommendations in
DCS’s predispositional report. Mother was ordered to participate in home-
based counseling, therapy, and supervised parenting time, and keep in touch
with her case manager. Mother was required to “submit to random
drug/alcohol screens” within one hour of DCS’s request. Exhibits Vol. at 65,
70. If Mother submitted to ten clean screens from the date of the June 7, 2017
Parental Participation Order, she no longer had to submit to screens, but “[i]f
she tests positive for alcohol or any unprescribed substances, DCS shall refer a
substance abuse assessment and [Mother] shall follow those
recommendations.” Id. at 70. The juvenile court also ordered that the Children
2
By agreement of the parties, DCS exhibits from the CHINS proceedings were redacted, including the
allegations of the CHINS petition, before being admitted into evidence at the termination hearing.
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participate in homebased trauma-focused therapy and follow recommendations
of the therapist.
[5] In the fall of 2017, Mother participated in homebased therapy with Vicky
Brown a licensed mental health therapist and she engaged in homebased case
management with Tara Kimbrough, a life skills clinician. Mother was making
positive progress and working to obtain housing, and she was permitted
unsupervised parenting time. Additionally, Brown began providing therapy to
the Children to address post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) issues.
[6] Later in 2017, Mother started missing sessions with Brown and Kimbrough and
scheduled visitations with the Children. Brown was concerned that the
Children were being re-traumatized by Mother’s lack of consistency. Around
the time of Thanksgiving 2017, Mother became unemployed and missed eight
visits with the Children. In December 2017, Brown terminated services with
Mother due to lack of participation. Kimbrough also terminated services in
December 2017 due to non-compliance, multiple cancellations, and minimal
progress. The last time that Mother engaged in parenting time with the
Children was around Christmas 2017. DCS Family Case Manager (FCM)
Zachary Inman made new referrals for homebased counseling and case
management in January 2018, but the new referrals were unsuccessful because
the providers could not contact Mother.
[7] In March 2018, DCS requested that the permanency plan change from
reunification to adoption. At a March 21, 2018 permanency hearing, Brown
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recommended that Mother’s parenting time be suspended, observing that she
had not attempted to visit with Children in several months. The juvenile court
issued an order finding that the Children had been removed from Mother’s care
for a year, that DCS had made reasonable efforts to make it possible for the
Children to return safely to her home but that services “have not been effective
or completed [,]” and that Mother had “made no meaningful or appreciable
progress toward reunification.” Id. at 84, 85. The court suspended Mother’s
parenting time and ordered that DCS need not provide any services for Mother,
but noted that “any open services may remain in place.” Id. The juvenile court
found that it would be contrary to the health and welfare of the Children to be
returned home and changed the permanency plan to adoption.
[8] The juvenile court’s June 17, 2018 order following a review hearing reflected
that DCS objected to any visits and requested that parenting time continue to be
suspended and that, if phone calls were to be authorized, then time be allowed
for their therapist to speak to the Children prior to the call. The court’s order
permitted parenting time and phone calls only “upon positive recommendations
of DCS, GAL, and service providers.” Id. at 90. At subsequent review
hearings, Mother requested that the permanency plan be returned to
reunification, but DCS objected, and the court ordered that the plan continue to
be adoption. A Child and Family Team Meeting was held with Mother in July
2018, and, among other things, the team discussed their concerns about
Mother’s sobriety. The team agreed that they would re-visit the issue of
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Mother’s visitations with the Children if she submitted to ten screens that were
free from alcohol and non-prescription medication.
[9] On October 25, 2018, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of
Mother and Father. A permanency hearing was held in November 2018, and
Mother did not attend. As of January 2019, Mother was engaged in
homebased counseling but no other services. Mother appeared at a February
2019 permanency hearing and requested that the plan return to reunification,
which the trial court denied. On March 27, 2019, Mother filed a motion for
increased parenting time, but she did not appear for the April 10, 2019 hearing
on the motion. The juvenile court issued an order after the hearing
memorializing that DCS objected to “therapeutically supervised visitations,”
noting that “the screens she has submitted have been positive for alcohol” and
that the termination hearing was set for the following week on April 18. Id. at
110. The GAL likewise objected to visitations and asked the court to deny
Mother’s request for increased parenting time. In denying Mother’s request, the
juvenile court made findings that included: The court’s June 2017 Parental
Participation Order had ordered drug and alcohol screens; Mother tested
positive for alcohol in August 2018, and from August to November 2018 she
“took a number of screens, many of which were positive for alcohol”; in eight
random screens in February and March 2019 Mother was positive for alcohol
and the court did not have results for three others in March 2019; and the
Children’s therapist “does not recommend [Mother] have parenting time this
close to the termination hearing.” Id. at 110-11.
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[10] The termination trial was held on April 18 and May 30, 2019. Brown testified
to working with Mother on various issues, including Mother’s childhood
trauma, self-esteem and codependency issues, and substance abuse. Brown
testified that initially Mother was “doing very well” and was “very receptive to
services,” but that by the fall of 2017, Mother became noncompliant. Transcript
Vol. II at 38. Brown described that Mother became less consistent with her
visits with the Children, which at that time were unsupervised, changed jobs,
and was engaging in “very unhealthy” and dangerous behaviors, including
“frequenting a lot of different males,” which DCS considered to be a “self-
sabotage” behavior. Id. at 40. Brown testified that she explained to Mother
that when Mother failed to consistently visit with the Children, it was hard on
the Children and was compounding their trauma. Brown also testified that she
and Mother had multiple conversations about the fact that Mother was not to
consume alcohol. Brown discharged Mother from services on December 19,
2017 for missed sessions, inconsistency with services, and ten missed visitations
with the Children. Mother never visited with the Children after late December
2017 and by March 2018, Brown’s recommendation was that Mother not be
permitted to have any visitations.
[11] In September or October 2017, Brown began providing trauma-focused
cognitive behavior therapy to the Children for PTSD, a diagnosis that was
based on disclosures by the Children of experiences in the home with Mother
and Father involving neglect and abuse, including a lack of food in the home
such that Sa.H would give up food so that her siblings could have something to
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eat, the Children being subject to “whippings,” and Children being left alone
overnight at a young age. Id. at 67. Brown continued treating the Children
until November 2018. Sa.H. also told Brown about “multiple” physical fights
between Mother and Father where they argued over which of the two of them
drank the last of the vodka. Id. at 68. Brown had worked for fifteen years with
children who had suffered abuse and neglect and testified that she considered
the negative effects of the neglect on Sa.H. “at the very top” of the spectrum.
Id. at 71. Brown testified that the Children needed consistency, stability, and
routine and “they ha[d] never experienced routine” with Mother and Father.
Id. at 81. Brown testified that the Children were receiving the structure they
need with Grandparents. She stated that she had concerns about the Children
returning to Mother’s care, believing that Mother would continue in “the same
patterns” as she had in the past. Id. at 83. Her opinion was that the Children
should remain with Grandparents.
[12] Grandfather testified that before the Children came to live with him and his
wife, they saw the Children only on occasions such as holidays or birthdays
because “there was always an excuse.” Id. at 103. Grandfather recalled that,
about a year prior to when the CHINS case began, he had stopped by Mother
and Father’s home for a visit and saw “liquor bottles laying around
everywhere” during the middle of the day. Id. at 105. Grandfather said that,
prior to the CHINS case, he had talked to Mother about her alcohol use. He
also stated that he was concerned “many times” about the Children being left
home alone. Id. at 105. Grandfather said that Mother and Father moved “all
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the time” and lived with Grandparents eight to ten times in a ten-year period
because they needed a place to stay. Id. at 106. He described that when the
Children first came to live with them after their removal, Children were “real
thin,” seemed “angry,” and wet the bed most nights. Id. Grandfather said that
Mother had visits with the Children for a while but after Christmas Day 2017,
“She never called. She never contacted.” Id. at 108. Grandfather testified that
he and his wife wanted to adopt the Children.
[13] Patty Moore, a mental health therapist, testified for DCS. She had been
providing therapy for the Children via a DCS referral for approximately six
months prior to the termination hearing. She was treating M.H. for hoarding of
food, hiding food, and eating quickly out of fear of not having food; Sa.H. for
inappropriately taking on adult-like parenting roles; and C.H. for aggression
with adults and children. Moore characterized the trauma that the Children
had experienced as “[h]orrific.” Id. at 151. She had concerns that the Children
would revert to “survival behaviors,” such as lack of boundaries, feeling like
they have to care for themselves, and lack of respect for authority figures, if the
stability of Grandparents’ home was taken away from them. Id. Her opinion
was that visitation with Mother should not resume and that the Children should
remain with Grandparents.
[14] FCMs Zachary Inman and Janelle Baker, who replaced FCM Inman in
January 2019, each testified. FCM Inman stated that Mother initially was
“doing very well” and she received unsupervised and unrestricted visitations
beginning in September 2017. Id. at 194. However, between September 2017
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and the March 21, 2018 permanency hearing, Mother stopped visiting with the
Children, and based on all reports from service providers as well as the GAL,
FCM Inman recommended in March 2018 that the permanency plan be
changed to adoption. FCM Inman opined that “testing positive for alcohol
consistently would show somebody that is — could indicate that somebody is
drinking — is unable to stop drinking which could impair their ability to care
for the child.” Id. at 201. He recalled a March 2018 Family and Child Team
Meeting where Mother was made aware of “the importance of being clean from
alcohol.” Id. at 208. FCM Inman testified to observing the Children with
Grandparents and described them as “very well bonded” with each other. Id. at
199. He did not recommend that Mother have more time to develop a stable
home for the Children because the case had been pending two years and DCS
had not seen “any significant progress” and did not expect that she would
“make any progress anytime soon.” Id. at 204. He testified that it was DCS’s
position that Mother’s parental rights to the Children be terminated. FCM
Baker testified that her position with regard to the Children was consistent with
FCM Inman’s.
[15] The GAL testified that he visited the Children in their placement with
Grandparents and observed the interaction between them. His interactions
with Mother consisted of meeting her at team meetings and he also received
information from providers, but he did not visit with Mother and the Children
together. He testified to each child having an education liaison at his
recommendation and participating in Life Skills to help them cope with anger
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or express themselves. The GAL stated that in his opinion Mother had not
dealt adequately with issues that led to the Children’s removal, particularly
housing and alcohol abuse. After considering services offered to Mother, her
level of engagement, progress reports, the wishes of the Children, and the effect
of reunification on the Children, the GAL recommended adoption as the
permanency plan for the Children.
[16] Homebased caseworker Cristal Redd also testified. Redd began working with
Mother in March 2018, when Mother’s boyfriend J.C. (Boyfriend) talked to
Redd – who was working with Boyfriend on his own CHINS matter – about
Mother’s situation. DCS eventually made a referral for Redd to provide
services to Mother, and Redd worked with Mother toward finding employment
and housing. Redd testified that Mother consistently engaged in services and
was on time and prepared. Redd stated that Mother obtained employment and
was living with Boyfriend, his mother, his grandmother, and sometimes his
children. Redd testified that she participated in a Child and Family Team
Meeting at which it was discussed with Mother “not to engage” in consuming
any substances at all including alcohol. Id. at 177.
[17] Mother testified that her mother died in April 2017 and it was hard on her, that
she participated in DCS services when the Children were removed, and that
visitations went well. She said that after visitations were suspended in March
2018, she on many occasions requested phone calls and sought parenting time.
She testified to being enrolled in EMT school (six hours per week) since
January 2019 but not being currently employed. Mother also testified to having
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lived in a stable home for one year with Boyfriend at his grandmother’s home.
She stated that she began a relationship with him in December 2017 and that he
would be a part of the Children’s lives were she to be re-unified with them.
Mother acknowledged that she visited the Children’s school once in an attempt
to see them and had texted with M.H., both in violation of court order.
[18] Mother also called as witnesses her aunt Jeannie Fisher and Boyfriend. Fisher
had known Mother her whole life and had seen the Children interact with
Mother. Fisher testified that the Children “were happy” with Mother and
described that Mother had “changed her life around” since DCS became
involved, as she divorced Father, was not drinking alcohol, and was living in a
four-bedroom home with Boyfriend, who Mother planned to marry. Transcript
Vol. III at 4, 6. Fisher testified that she “pray[ed] . . . that [Mother] gets her kids
back because those kids couldn’t ask for a better mother.” Id. at 4.
[19] Boyfriend testified that he and Mother had been together for one and one-half
years, that she was in school, and that she has a good relationship with his three
children, of whom he has shared custody, but he had never observed Mother
interact with the Children. Boyfriend discussed being clean from heroin for
about one and one-half years and indicated that he occasionally drank alcohol.
He stated that Mother no longer drank and estimated that he had not been to a
bar for drinks with Mother in “a few months.” Id. at 33. Boyfriend
acknowledged his criminal history that included convictions for “drunk
driving,” operating a vehicle while being a habitual traffic offender, “many”
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violations of probation, and a 2017 conviction for unlawful possession of a
syringe. Id. at 28, 29.
[20] On August 2, 2019, the juvenile court entered a detailed order terminating
Mother’s parental rights to the Children, concluding that (1) the conditions that
led to the Children’s removal or placement outside the home were “her lack of
stability with housing and employment and her issues with substance abuse and
alcohol use” and that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions
would not be remedied; (2) she continued to drink alcohol even though “she
was aware of the impact it might have on her Children” and the continued
parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children’s well-being; (3)
termination was in the Children’s best interests; and (4) DCS had a plan for the
Children, namely adoption by Grandparents. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 43,
44. The court elaborated:
The [C]hildren are safe and secure in their current preadoptive
placement with [Grandparents]. . . . The service providers and
the GAL believe that adoption by [G]randparents is in the
[C]hildren’s best interest. Neither parent has demonstrated a
willingness or ability to do what it takes to parent their
[C]hildren. Neither parent can provide their [C]hildren with a
safe and stable long-term home that will protect the [C]hildren
and provide them with the permanency that they need.
Id. at 45. Mother now appeals.
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Discussion & Decision
[21] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we will not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Matter of M.I., 127 N.E.3d
1168, 1170 (Ind. 2019). To prevail, the challenging party must show that the
court’s decision is contrary to law, meaning that the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences point unerringly to the opposite conclusion. Id. “Because
a case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in
person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640
(Ind. 2014).
[22] It is well recognized that a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of
his or her children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests. In
re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). Although parental rights are of
constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights
when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In
re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In addition, a court must
subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the
circumstances surrounding the termination. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to
punish the parents, but to protect their children. Id.
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[23] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in Indiana, DCS
is required to allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence, among other
things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of
the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services[.]
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). DCS must also prove by clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child and that there is a
satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child. I.C. § 31-35-2-
4(b)(2)(C), (D).
[24] On appeal, Mother contends that DCS failed to present clear and convincing
evidence that the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal or the reasons
for placement outside the home would not be remedied, that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children’s well-being, and
that termination is in the best interests of the Children. We will address each of
these in turn, as needed.
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Conditions Not Remedied
[25] Mother contends that DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Children’s
removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. In
deciding whether a reasonable probability exists that conditions will not be
remedied, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for her children at
the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of
changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans.
denied. The court must also evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to
determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or
deprivation of the children. Id. “A pattern of unwillingness to deal with
parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in
conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no
reasonable probability that the conditions will change.” In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d
204, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied (2002). The statute does
not simply focus on the initial basis for a child’s removal for purposes of
determining whether a parent’s rights should be terminated, but also those bases
resulting in the continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d
385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “Where there are only temporary improvements
and the pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court might
reasonably find that under the circumstances, the problematic situation will not
improve.” In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
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[26] Mother argues that the trial court’s order identified “lack of stability with
housing and employment, and her issues with substance abuse and alcohol use”
as the conditions that would not be remedied but that “Children were not
removed because Mother did not have a stable job or housing” and, rather,
were removed due to the incident of domestic violence when parents were
intoxicated on drugs and alcohol, which she claims “[she] did remedy.”
Appellant’s Brief at 15, 17. Therefore, she contends, the trial court’s conclusion
was erroneous and should be set aside. We reject this argument.
[27] First, Mother did not, as she claims, remedy all the reasons for the initial
removal. She was directed to not consume alcohol; she failed to do that.
Second, our inquiry focuses not only on the conditions that caused removal, but
also on the reasons for Children’s continued placement outside the home. See
In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“it is not just the basis for
the initial removal that may be considered . . . but also those bases resulting in
the continued placement outside of the home”), trans. denied. Here, while the
Children were initially removed due to domestic violence and use of alcohol
and drugs, their continued placement outside the home was due to Mother’s
lack of stable housing, lack of stable employment, and her continued use of
alcohol.
[28] The record reflects that, while Mother initially engaged in services and made
progress, she stopped consistently visiting the Children in November and
December 2017, and she was terminated from services in December 2017 for
noncompliance. FCM Inman referred more services in January 2018, but the
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providers were never able to make contact with Mother. According to Brown,
who provided homebased therapy to Mother and, separately, to the Children,
the negative effects of the neglect on Sa.H. were “at the very top” of the
spectrum, the Children had “never experienced routine” with Mother, and
Brown was concerned with returning the Children to Mother’s care, believing
that Mother would continue in “the same patterns” as she had in the past.
Transcript Vol. II at 71, 81, 83. Brown testified to concerns over Mother’s
behavior with men, namely “frequenting a lot of different males,” a behavior
that Brown considered dangerous and unhealthy. Id. at 40. While Mother
urges that, by the time of the termination hearing, she had been living in stable
housing for a year with Boyfriend – which she notes DCS “never bothered” to
inspect – DCS providers and the GAL testified to having concerns with
Boyfriend, including but not limited to his criminal history, lack of a driver’s
license, lack of a stable job, and a CHINS history with his children. Transcript
Vol. III at 12. DCS thus did not consider Mother’s housing stable.
[29] FCM Inman stated that DCS had not seen any significant progress and
recommended termination. FCM Baker agreed. The GAL likewise believed
that Mother had not dealt adequately with issues that led to the Children’s
continued removal, particularly housing and alcohol use. In sum, Mother did
not fully engage in services or make the progress necessary to return the
Children to her care.
[30] The trial court’s determination that there is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal or the reasons for their
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placement outside Mother’s home will not be remedied is supported by clear
and convincing evidence. Because I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the
disjunctive, we need not review the trial court’s determination that continuation
of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children’s well-being.
Best Interests
[31] Mother also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
determination that termination was in the Children’s best interests. In making
this best-interests determination, the trial court is required to look beyond the
factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. In re J.C.,
994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The court must subordinate the
interest of the parent to those of the children and need not wait until a child is
irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. McBride v.
Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003). Our Supreme Court has explained that “[p]ermanency is a central
consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re G.Y., 904
N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). “Moreover, we have previously held that the
recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate to
terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in
removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d
226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[32] Mother takes issue with the statement in the court’s order that “[t]heir lives are
much better than they ever were when they were in the care and custody of
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their parents.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II at 45. We agree that a parent’s right
to his or her child may not be terminated solely because there is a better place
for the child to live; however, here, the record reflects, and the trial court’s
order identified, other bases to support the determination that termination is in
the Children’s best interests. Indeed, the trial court found that “[n]either parent
has demonstrated a willingness or ability to do what it takes to parent their
children” and “[n]either parent can provide their children with a safe and stable
long-term home that will protect the children and provide them with the
permanency that they need.” Id. at 45.
[33] The record supports these determinations. Mother was ordered to, but did not,
stop consuming alcohol, although this requirement was discussed with her at
Child and Family Team Meetings and by providers. She voluntarily quit
visiting the Children regularly in November 2017, although she was told that
such was compounding the Children’s trauma. Her last visit with them was in
December 2017. Therapist Moore, who was providing therapy for the Children
for six months prior to the termination hearing, characterized the trauma that
the Children had experienced with their parents as “[h]orrific,” and she was
concerned that Children would revert to “survival behaviors” if the stability,
which they currently were enjoying with Grandparents, would be taken away
from them. Transcript Vol. II at 151. Her opinion was that it was in the
Children’s best interests for them to remain with Grandparents. FCM Inman
testified that he believed it was in the Children’s best interests to terminate the
parent-child relationship. The GAL, based on the Children’s best interests that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2048 | March 4, 2020 Page 20 of 21
he was appointed to represent, recommended termination and adoption.
Considering the totality of the evidence, we conclude that DCS presented
sufficient evidence to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination
was in the best interests of the Children.
[34] Judgment affirmed.
Robb, J. and Bradford, C.J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2048 | March 4, 2020 Page 21 of 21