In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.S. and L.S. (Minor Children) and L.Y. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 10 2020, 7:48 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jennie Scott Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General
John R. Millikan
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Involuntary March 10, 2020
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of J.S. and L.S. 19A-JT-2004
(Minor Children) Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
and Court
The Honorable Kimberly S.
L.Y. (Mother), Dowling, Judge
Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Amanda Yonally,
Magistrate
v.
Trial Court Cause Nos.
18C02-1811-JT-130, -131
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
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Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] L.Y. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating her
parental rights to her minor children J.S. and L.S. (“Children”), arguing that
the evidence is insufficient to support it. 1 Finding the evidence sufficient, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The unchallenged findings of fact show that J.S. was born on June 10, 2014, to
Mother and father (“Father”). On August 14, 2014, the Indiana Department of
Child Services (“DCS”) removed J.S. from his parents’ care based on
allegations that he was not gaining weight properly and the conditions of the
home were poor. J.S. was admitted to a hospital and diagnosed with stage 2
malnutrition. At home, Mother and Father had pets that regularly urinated and
defecated on the floor. On September 19, 2014, J.S. was adjudicated a child in
need of services (“CHINS”) and was placed in foster care with H.W. DCS
family case manager (“FCM”) Hillary Mundon was assigned to J.S.’s case.
DCS provided carpet cleaning and cleaning supplies and helped Mother and
Father clean the home. Mother and Father were cooperative with services, and
the case was dismissed on January 12, 2016.
1
The parent-child relationship between the Children and their biological father was terminated in the same
order, but he is not participating in this appeal.
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[3] On November 24, 2015, while J.S.’s CHINS case was still pending and he was
at home for a trial home visit, Mother gave birth to J.S.’s brother L.S. On
February 11, 2016, DCS removed L.S. from his parents’ care based on
allegations that he had failed to thrive and had not received appropriate medical
care. L.S. was admitted to a hospital and diagnosed as “failure to thrive.”
Appealed Order at 2 (finding #11). L.S. had gained only two ounces between
December 16, 2015, and February 9, 2016, but he gained eight ounces within
his first two days at the hospital. L.S. was placed in foster care with H.W.
FCM Mundon was assigned to L.S.’s case.
[4] J.S. remained at home with his parents until May 9, 2016, when DCS removed
him based on allegations of medical neglect. J.S. had been injured by pulling a
television on his leg on May 6, 2016. Id. at 2 (#15); Tr. Vol. 2 at 82-83. Three
days later, H.W., who was providing childcare for J.S., observed that J.S. could
not walk and was crying inconsolably. H.W. and FCM Mundon took J.S. to
the hospital, where X-rays revealed that J.S.’s leg was broken. Neither J.S. nor
L.S. has been returned to Mother’s care since their removal from the home. In
June and August 2016, the trial court conducted CHINS factfinding hearings
and determined that J.S. and L.S. were CHINS. Dispositional hearings were
held, and dispositional orders were issued in September 2016 in L.S.’s case and
October 2016 in J.S.’s case.
[5] FCM Mundon was assigned to J.S.’s and L.S.’s cases until June 2016. FCM
Mundon observed a lot of name-calling and yelling in the home and noted that
Mother was often frustrated and angry. Appealed Order at 5 (#49). H.W. also
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overheard Mother call J.S. and L.S. names, including “little bastards.” Id.
(#50). Dr. Milissa Eley served as J.S. and L.S.’s doctor from the time they
were born until July 2018. She had concerns regarding Mother’s interactions
with J.S. because Mother often yelled at J.S. and openly called him names at
most visits, including “‘bastard,’ ‘fucker,’ and ‘asshole.’” Id. at 3 (#30). FCM
Mundon put services in place for Mother including parenting classes, home-
based therapy, and supervised visitation.
[6] Between June 2016 and February 2018, Dominique Geers was assigned as the
Children’s FCM. “When FCM Geers received the case, poor parenting skills
was the primary issue preventing reunification with the [C]hildren.” Id. at 5
(#54). “FCM Geers observed dysfunction with the parents’ communication
with J.S. and L.S., frustration and anger between the parents, and inconsistency
with the parents providing basic needs such as food, diapers and formula for
L.S. and J.S. at visits.” Id. (#55). “FCM Geers observed Mother and Father
yelling and cursing at the [C]hildren and at each other, and [p]arents did not
utilize appropriate discipline with J.S. and L.S.” Id. (#56-57). From October
2016 through February 2017, Spencer Osborn supervised Mother’s visitation
with the Children. Id. at 6 (#62). During supervised visitation, Osborn
observed Mother and Father frequently yelling and cursing at each other and at
the Children. Id. (#63).
[7] In May 2017, Mother and Father ended their relationship. Mother moved out
of the home and began living with her boyfriend. Between May 2017 and
February 2018, Mother did not provide FCM Geers with her address.
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[8] After a hearing held in June 2017, the trial court found that Mother had
complied with the Children’s case plans and had participated in home-based
casework, individual therapy, drug screens, and completed a substance abuse
assessment. Ex. Vol. 1 at 51; Ex. Vol. 3 at 59. However, the court also found
that Mother had not enhanced her ability to fulfill her parental obligations
because she continued to demonstrate poor and detrimental interactions with
L.S. during visitation and regularly produced drug screens that were positive for
illicit substances. Ex. Vol. 3 at 59-60. Between December 2016 and May 2017,
Mother used cocaine. Appealed Order at 6 (#66).
[9] After an October 2017 hearing, the trial court found that Mother had complied
with the case plan and was actively engaged in all services; had been doing drug
screens and been negative for all illegal substances; interacted with and was
attentive to the Children’s needs, and had enhanced her ability to fulfill her
parental obligations. Ex. Vol. 1 at 54; Ex. Vol. 3 at 63. However, Mother
needed stable housing and a source of income. Ex. Vol. 1 at 54.
[10] Between November 2017 and October 2018, Marci Smith provided supervision
for Mother’s visitations with the Children. Smith observed that Mother
constantly yelled and cursed during visitation and was inconsistent in
discipline. Appealed Order at 7 (#89).
[11] In February 2018, Courtney Barber became the Children’s FCM. When FCM
Barber got involved in the Children’s cases, she believed that Mother was doing
fairly well with services and that the primary barriers to reunification “included
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[Mother’s] lack of stable housing and consistent income.” Id. at 8 (#93). At
that time, Mother was living in a home with other people who were not deemed
appropriate by DCS. Tr. Vol. 2 at 213. In April 2018, Mother obtained suitable
housing for the Children and began exercising supervised visitation at her
home. Appealed Order at 8 (#95). Mother continued “excessively yelling” at
J.S. and L.S. Id. (#97). FCM Barber frequently addressed Mother’s excessive
yelling and cursing, and Mother was counseled about her parenting in April,
June, and July 2018. Id. (#98). “Mother yelled and cursed at J.S. and L.S.
progressively less frequently between April and June 2018.” Id. (#99).
[12] In June 2018, Mother’s visitation progressed to unsupervised. Id. (#96). “By
August of 2018, Mother had progressed to overnight and weekend visitation.”
Id. (#102). However, during one of the Children’s overnight visits in August,
police were dispatched to Mother’s home based on a report that Mother was
suicidal. Id. (#104). Police observed drug paraphernalia in the home. Id.
(#105). During the police visit, Mother started “screaming and acting
erratically.” Id. (#106). An officer attempted to handcuff her, and she
physically resisted. Mother’s boyfriend became aggressive and struck an officer.
Mother and her boyfriend were arrested and put in jail. Id. (#108).
[13] After that incident, Mother’s visitation was returned to supervised visitation.
Mother “resumed an increased frequency of yelling and cursing at J.S. and L.S.
during visits.” Id. at 9 (#111). In October 2018, Mother’s supervised visitation
with J.S. and L.S. was ended because of her yelling, cursing, and arguing, and
later that month her visitation was suspended. Id. at 10 (#132).
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[14] Mother also resumed her drug use. While FCM Barber was assigned to the
Children’s cases, Mother submitted to nineteen drug screens. Id. (#131).
Thirteen of the drug screens were positive for an illicit substance, including
suboxone, hydrocodone, Xanax, and morphine. Mother was unable to provide
a valid prescription for suboxone.
[15] Mother’s financial and housing situation was also problematic. In September
2018, Mother did not have electricity in her home and was unable to provide
food for J.S. and L.S. during visits. Id. at 9 (#113). In October 2018, Mother
was evicted from her home and moved in with a neighbor. Id. (#127). Between
October 2018 and January 2019, FCM Barber was unable to make contact with
Mother.
[16] On November 21, 2018, DCS filed a verified petition for involuntary
termination of the parent-child relationship. J.S. and L.S. were removed from
H.W.’s care and placed in a pre-adoptive foster home. Id. at 10 (#134). In
early 2019, Mother returned to the residence she had lived in before April 2018
and continues to reside there. Id. at 10 (#128). That residence had been
previously deemed unsuitable for children by DCS because of the people who
were living there with Mother.
[17] On May 2 and 9, 2019, the trial court held a factfinding hearing. On July 30,
2019, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon and order
terminating parent-child relationship containing the foregoing and the following
findings:
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51. Mother admittedly is not an affectionate person. She is not
nurturing toward J.S. and L.S. and lacks adequate parenting
skills.
….
57. Parents did not utilize appropriate discipline with J.S. and
L.S.
….
61. Mother has demonstrated both progression and regression in
therapy.
….
65. Mother and Father would improve in their interactions with
the [C]hildren and each other, and then parents would regress.
….
71. Mother’s unstable housing delayed Mother’s progress toward
reunification with L.S. and J.S.
….
112. Mother has participated in home-based case work and
home-based therapy but has not made substantial progress in
addressing each of her treatment goals.
….
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136. J.S. and L.S. need a safe, stable, secure and permanent
environment in order to thrive. Mother and Father have not
shown the inclination or the ability to provide the [C]hildren with
such an environment.
137. Candace Ingle is the Court Appointed Special Advocate
[(“CASA”)] assigned to J.S. and L.S. Ms. Ingle has been L.S.’s
CASA since February 2016 and has been J.S.’s CASA since May
of 2016. Ms. Ingle has determined that it is in the best interest of
J.S. and L.S. to terminate both Mother and Father’s parental
rights.
138. …. As of the conclusion of the Fact-Finding Hearing in this
matter, J.S. had been out of the care of his parents for more than
36 months.
….
140. …. As of the conclusion of the Fact-Finding Hearing in this
matter, L.S. had been out of the care of his parents for more than
38 months.
141. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in J.S. and L.S.’s removal and continued placement
outside the home will not be remedied. The primary reason for
the removal of both [C]hildren from the care of their parents was
parental neglect, specifically medical neglect of both [C]hildren.
Although Mother has participated in some services throughout
the duration of the CHINS cases, she has not benefited from the
services in a way that would alleviate the conditions that resulted
in the [C]hildren remaining out of the home or ensure that she
would be capable of providing a home free of neglect. ….
Despite assistance and opportunities to improve parenting skills,
home conditions and stability in the three years since the
[C]hildren were removed, neither parent has demonstrated an
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ability to provide J.S. and LS. with a home free of abuse and
neglect. At the time of the Fact-Finding Hearing, Mother did not
have suitable housing for the [C]hildren. …. Mother and
Father’s habitual patterns of conduct support the substantial
probability of future neglect or deprivation of the [Children].
Id. at 5-11 (citation omitted). In addition, the trial court concluded that
termination of the parent-child relationship was in the Children’s best interests
and that DCS had a satisfactory plan for the Children’s care and treatment,
which included adoption. Id. at 11. Based on its conclusions, the trial court
terminated Mother’s parental rights. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[18] Mother seeks reversal of the termination of her parental rights. In considering
her appeal, we recognize that “a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and
control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests.’” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cty.
Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough
parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the
termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet
their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008). Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction,
and therefore “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all
other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2004 | March 10, 2020 Page 10 of 19
[19] A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship involving a CHINS must,
among other things, allege:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (emphasis added). DCS must prove each element
by “clear and convincing evidence.” R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 629; Ind. Code § 31-37-
14-2. DCS need only prove one of the options listed under subsection 31-35-2-
4(b)(2)(B). If the trial court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, the
court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
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[20] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving
the termination of parental rights.” C.A. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 15
N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
In considering whether the termination of parental rights is
appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness
credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable
inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of
the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings
of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial
court’s findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial
Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial court’s decision to
terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial
court’s judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and
convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and
convincingly support the judgment.
K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013)
(citations and quotation marks omitted). We further note that Mother has
directly challenged only one of the trial court’s findings. When findings of fact
are unchallenged, this Court accepts them as true. S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 608,
n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and
convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26
N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
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Section 1 – Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal from or the
reasons for placement outside Mother’s home will not be
remedied.
[21] Mother first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial
court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the Children’s removal and continued placement outside her home
will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i). In reviewing
whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the
Children’s removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother’s home will
not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231.
First, “we must ascertain what conditions led to placement and retention in
foster care.” Id. Second, we “determine whether there is a reasonable
probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quoting In re I.A.,
934 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind. 2010)). “[I]t is not just the basis for the initial
removal of the child that may be considered for purposes of determining
whether a parent’s rights should be terminated, but also those bases resulting in
the continued placement outside of the home.” In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. When the trial court makes its
determination, it must evaluate a parent’s fitness at the time of the termination
hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and
balancing a parent’s recent improvements against “habitual pattern[s] of
conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect
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or deprivation.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989
N.E.2d at 1231). In addition, a trial court may consider services offered by
DCS and the parent’s response to those services as evidence of whether
conditions will be remedied. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d
1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “Where there are only temporary
improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court
might reasonably find that under the circumstances, the problematic situation
will not improve.” In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). DCS
“is not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather,
it need only establish ‘that there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s
behavior will not change.’” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1157 (quoting In re Kay L.,
867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).
[22] Here, the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal and placement
outside Mother’s home arose from her parental neglect. L.S. was not gaining
weight, and Mother seemingly failed to recognize that a doctor’s visit was vital
to address his condition. She also failed to recognize that J.S. needed medical
attention after a television fell on him. Only through H.W.’s intervention did
J.S. receive medical care to determine that his leg was broken. Mother received
services to improve parenting skills, the home condition, and stability, but
Mother used drugs, failed to maintain stable housing, verbally abused the
Children, and did not provide appropriate discipline. At times she improved,
but her improvement was short-lived. Although the Children were removed in
early 2016, it was not until the summer of 2018 that unsupervised overnight and
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weekend visitation was attempted. That attempt was unsuccessful because
Mother and her boyfriend were arrested when the Children were spending the
night with Mother. Unsupervised visitation was resumed, but that was
terminated a month or two later due to Mother’s poor interaction with the
Children. Then, Mother was evicted from her home. The trial court found that
Mother did not have suitable housing for the Children at the time of the
termination hearing, but Mother contends that this finding is clearly erroneous.
Assuming, without deciding, that Mother is correct, if the remaining
unchallenged findings support the trial court’s conclusion, we may affirm. See
Kitchell, 26 N.E.3d at 1059.
[23] The unchallenged findings show that over the course of three years, Mother
was on and off illegal substances and in and out of suitable housing, improved
her interactions with the Children, and then reverted to verbal abuse. Mother’s
habitual patterns are sufficient to support a finding that there is a reasonable
probability that her behavior will not change and the problematic situation will
not improve. Mother’s argument is merely a request to reweigh the evidence,
which we must decline. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support
the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the
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conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal and continued placement
outside her home will not be remedied.2
Section 2 – Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
conclusion that termination is in the Children’s best interests.
[24] Mother next argues that sufficient evidence does not support the trial court’s
conclusion that termination is in the Children’s best interests. To determine
whether termination is in a child’s best interests pursuant to Indiana Code
Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C), the trial court must look to the totality of the
evidence. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158. Termination of parental rights is not
appropriate solely because there is a better home available for the child. In re
K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). However, in assessing a child’s
best interests, the trial court “must subordinate the interests of the parents to
those of the child.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158. “[C]hildren cannot wait
indefinitely for their parent to work toward preservation or reunification–and
courts ‘need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that the child’s
physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before
terminating the parent-child relationship.’” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting
K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). “Permanency is a central consideration in
determining the best interests of a child.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265
(Ind. 2009). “[W]e have previously held that recommendation by both the case
2
Due to our resolution of this issue, we need not address Mother’s argument that the trial court erred in
concluding that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to the Children’s well-being.
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manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to
evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is
sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the
child’s best interests.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59.
[25] Here, FCM Barber testified that adoption “was best for the [Children] to
provide stability in their life and to achieve permanency for them.” Tr. Vol. 2 at
245. The Children’s CASA recommended that termination be granted,
emphasizing that the “case had been ongoing for four years with a break of just
a few months in between …. [S]ervices have been offered, and some have been
accepted, some have been refused and, we’re still at this point four years later.”
Tr. Vol. 3 at 33-34. The FCM’s and CASA’s testimony in support of
termination, combined with the evidence discussed above supporting the trial
court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the Children’s removal from or reasons for placement outside
Mother’s home will not be remedied, is sufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion that termination is in Children’s best interests. See A.D.S., 987
N.E.2d at 1158-59; see also A.I., 825 N.E.2d at 811 (concluding that CASA’s
and case manager’s testimony, coupled with evidence that conditions resulting
in continued placement outside of home will not be remedied, sufficient to
prove by clear and convincing evidence termination is in child’s best interests);
McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003) (concluding that CASA’s and case manager’s testimony that
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termination would serve children’s best interests sufficient to support court’s
best interests determination).
Section 3 – Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
conclusion that there is a satisfactory plan for the Children’s
care and treatment.
[26] Finally, Mother challenges the trial court’s conclusion as to Section 31-35-2-
4(b)(2)(D), arguing that DCS did not carry its burden to prove that the plan for
the Children’s care and treatment is satisfactory based solely on FCM Barber’s
testimony that the plan for the Children is adoption. We note that “Indiana
courts have traditionally held that for a plan to be ‘satisfactory,’ for the purposes
of the termination statute, it ‘need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general
sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child
relationship is terminated.’” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014) (quoting Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366,
375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied).
A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find
suitable parents to adopt the children. In other words, there need
not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only
that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent.
Accordingly, a plan is not unsatisfactory if DCS has not
identified a specific family to adopt the children.
Id. (citations omitted).
[27] Here, FCM Barber testified that adoption was the plan for the Children. In
addition, Mother does not challenge the trial court’s finding that J.S. and L.S.
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were placed with a pre-adoptive family in November 2018. DCS is taking
action to find a suitable adoptive parent for the Children. Accordingly, we
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion
that there is a satisfactory plan for the Children’s care and treatment. See In re
D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (where current foster family
was not ready to make final decision on whether to adopt child, DCS’s plan for
child to be adopted by that family or another family gave a general sense of
direction for child’s care and treatment and therefore was satisfactory), trans.
denied.
[28] Based on the foregoing, we affirm the involuntary termination of Mother’s
parental rights to the Children.
[29] Affirmed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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