In re the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: D.P., Jr. (Minor Child), and D.P., Sr. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                                 FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                        Mar 20 2020, 10:20 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                           Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                      and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Harold E. Amstutz                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Lafayette, Indiana                                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Abigail R. Recker
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In re the Involuntary                                    March 20, 2020
    Termination of the Parent-Child                          Court of Appeals Case No.
    Relationship of:                                         19A-JT-2554
    D.P., Jr. (Minor Child),                                 Appeal from the Tippecanoe
    Superior Court
    and
    The Honorable Faith Graham,
    D.P., Sr. (Father),                                      Judge
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Trial Court Cause No.
    79D03-1902-JT-34
    v.
    Indiana Department of Child
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020                      Page 1 of 18
    Altice, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   D.P., Sr. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating
    his parental rights to his son, D.P., Jr. (Child). 1 Father challenges the
    sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination order.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [3]   Mother and Father (collectively, Parents) have been in a relationship since
    about 2016, and Mother became pregnant with Child in 2017. During the
    pregnancy, they moved from Wisconsin to Indiana with two of Mother’s
    children, A.C. (born in April 2012) and J.S. (born in April 2016). 2 Father acted
    as a father figure to A.C. and J.S. The Indiana Department of Child Services
    (DCS) became involved with the family in November 2017 due to allegations of
    physical abuse of A.C. as well as neglect due to lack of food while in Parents’
    care. The DCS assessment worker closed the case after a couple weeks.
    [4]   Thereafter, Child was born on January 7, 2018, at over thirty-eight weeks
    gestation. He weighed 6 pounds 7.4 ounces at birth. Medical records at the
    1
    The parental rights of Child’s mother A.S. (Mother) were also terminated with respect to Child and two of
    his half-siblings. Mother, however, does not participate in this appeal.
    2
    Mother has birthed four other children, none of whom are in her custody. Her parental rights have been
    terminated previously with respect to some or all of these children.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020                 Page 2 of 18
    time indicated “concerns with suboptimal parenting” and noted that J.S. was
    “in too-small carseat without sufficient clothing for cold weather” and that staff
    had witnessed A.C. “being struck in the arm” by Mother or Father at a previous
    appointment. Exhibits Vol. 2 at 111. Additionally, nursing notes taken the day
    following the birth indicated that “neither parent is caring for baby”, nurse is
    having to “constantly remind them to feed baby”, and nurse is finding the baby
    “crying hungry and in saturated wet clothes.” Id. at 112. The hospital reported
    these concerns to DCS, which then interviewed Parents and completed a home
    visit. Child was released from the hospital to Parents’ care on January 9, 2018,
    weighing 6 pounds 1.9 ounces. 3
    [5]   On February 14, 2018, Child was seen at Riggs Clinic for a well child check.
    The doctor instructed Parents to take Child to the emergency room right away,
    but they proceeded to wait about five hours before doing so. DCS had already
    been notified prior to their arrival at the hospital that evening. The trial court’s
    findings detail Child’s presentation on arrival:
    [Child] was pale, and his heart rate was low registering at 80/90
    when it should have been 140/160. Medical records indicate
    [Child] appeared “extremely thin and malnourished”. [Child’s]
    skin was wrinkled “due to a lack of adequate fat stores” and
    “appeared dry and flaking, which is another sign of
    malnutrition”. [Child] acted as though he had been starved.
    [Child] remained curled in a ball most of the time and did not
    wake or cry, often appearing very lethargic. [Child] was
    3
    The trial court’s findings incorrectly indicate that Child was released on January 7, 2018, which was the day
    of his birth, weighing 6 pounds 19 ounces. The medical records clearly provide otherwise.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020                   Page 3 of 18
    diagnosed as Failure to Thrive due to inadequate calories and
    admitted to the hospital weighing 6 lbs. 1.2 oz.
    Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 12.
    [6]   Despite Child’s critical condition, Parents became extremely upset about
    Child’s admission to the hospital and wanted to take him home. They believed
    there was nothing wrong with Child and repeatedly urged that his low weight
    was due to his “preemie status,” although Child was not born premature.
    Exhibits Vol. 2 at 146. Parents told DCS assessment worker Laura Somerville
    that Child was “chubby” and “had been eating very well.” Transcript at 33.
    [7]   On February 19, 2018, the treating physician spoke with Parents at length
    regarding the situation. Parents indicated that they were not worried about
    Child’s condition when they went to the well child check five days earlier.
    Following the conversation, the physician noted in part:
    [Parents] cannot seem to wake up every 2 hours to feed [Child]
    during the night – even though we have stressed that it is
    imperative that he eat often to make up for his huge deficit. I feel
    they have no insight or higher understanding of why he has had
    poor growth and they have not demonstrated that they ALONE
    can take care of his needs.
    Exhibits Vol. 2 at 157 (emphasis in original). The physician voiced strong
    concerns for Child’s safety if returned to Parents’ care. While hospitalized,
    Child’s weight steadily increased with regular feedings.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020   Page 4 of 18
    [8]    On the day of Child’s discharge from the hospital, February 20, 2018, he was
    taken into emergency custody by DCS. Somerville, with law enforcement
    present, informed Parents of this decision. Mother, in turn, became angry and
    threatened that she was going to take A.C. and J.S. and leave the state.
    Somerville advised Parents that they could not take the children out of the state,
    but Parents stormed out taking all of Child’s belongings with them. DCS’s
    original plan was to allow A.C. and J.S. to remain in the home with services,
    but as a result of Parents’ actions, Somerville decided to remove A.C. and J.S.
    as well.
    [9]    At the time of the removal of the older children later that afternoon, A.C. had
    bruising on one of her arms, J.S. had a large area of diaper rash, the children
    were without beds and had been sleeping on the floor with blankets, both had
    head lice, and A.C. reported not having been fed that day. A.C. also reported,
    and Mother later confirmed, that Parents had locked her in her room when she
    was bad and that she had destroyed the bottom of her door trying to get out.
    [10]   On February 22, 2018, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child, A.C., and J.S.
    were children in need of services (CHINS). The trial court ordered the
    continued detention of the children in foster care. Following a factfinding
    hearing, the trial court adjudicated all three children as CHINS in an order
    dated May 31, 2018 (the CHINS Order). In addition to outlining the details
    regarding Child’s hospitalization and diagnosis, the CHINS Order set out the
    following facts:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020   Page 5 of 18
    Since the [Child]’s placement outside the care of the parents his
    weight has doubled and he currently weighs approximately 14
    LBS. Upon removal, [J.S.] and [A.C.] appeared healthy aside
    from diaper rash. Parents reported [J.S.] was on the autism
    spectrum however the Nurse Practitioner and the daycare
    provider have not observed signs of autism….
    Mother and [Father] are currently in a relationship and reside
    together. Neither parent is employed. Parents report they
    obtained formula for the infant from the maintenance man and
    the landlord. Parents have a dog in the home that is displaying
    aggression and parents report no plan to have the animal
    removed.
    Id. at 131. In the CHINS Order, the court also proceeded to disposition and
    adopted the statements, findings, and plan as set out in the predispositional
    report. Among other things, Parents were ordered to keep all appointments
    with service providers, “maintain suitable, safe and stable housing with
    adequate bedding, functional utilities, adequate supplies of food and food
    preparation facilities,” secure and maintain a stable source of income “adequate
    to support all household members,” and attend all scheduled visitations. Id. at
    165. Additionally, Father was ordered to participate in a parenting assessment,
    homebased case management, and a psychological evaluation, as well as follow
    all resulting recommendations.
    [11]   DCS family case manager (FCM) Lisa Vos took over the family’s case in
    March 2018. DCS held family and team meetings and referred Parents for
    supervised visits, parenting assessments and education, psychological
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020   Page 6 of 18
    evaluations, mental health assessments, substance abuse assessments,
    individual therapy, and homebased case management.
    [12]   Father participated in a mental health assessment in April 2018, which resulted
    in a diagnosis of mild neurocognitive disorder due to traumatic brain injury
    from being hit by a car in 2000. The assessment found that Father has
    borderline intellectual functioning, poor insight, and poor memory. Based on
    the assessment, Father was referred for individual therapy and services related
    to disability filing and insurance. However, he was subsequently discharged
    from individual therapy for lack of attendance and failure to comply with
    recommendations. Father was also referred for a psychological evaluation, but
    he never scheduled that evaluation.
    [13]   Mother and Father both struggle with unemployment and have a history of not
    holding jobs for more than a few days. Father occasionally donates plasma for
    income. His homebased case manager attempted to help him file for social
    security disability benefits, but he refused to provide documentation or attend
    necessary doctor appointments. FCM Vos explained that Father had been
    discharged from several providers of homebased counseling due to
    noncompliance and had shown “a lot of reluctancy to work with [them] as far
    as getting put on any type of assistance”. Transcript at 86. Parents were often
    uncooperative and even dishonest with service providers.
    [14]   Throughout the CHINS case, Parents were referred to services with multiple
    agencies (including seven different agencies for supervised visits and six for case
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020   Page 7 of 18
    management services) and repeatedly discharged for failure to follow policies
    and for lack of attendance. Parents were found in contempt on November 19,
    2018 for failing to attend scheduled homebased case management sessions and
    supervised parenting time, as well as failing to obtain Medicaid/insurance and
    necessary medical exams. Even after being found in contempt, Parents were
    discharged from case management services again in December. Further, their
    supervised visits with A.C. and J.S. were eventually suspended due to lack of
    attendance that was causing the children distress, and their visits with Child
    were reduced to once per month.
    [15]   Parents were evicted from their home in November 2018 and began living in a
    tent with their dog. When they attended a free Christmas dinner, they met
    Cherry Buckley, the CEO of Seeds of Hope, a community ministry program
    that offers housing and wrap-around services. Seeds of Hope provided them
    with transitional housing in a rooming house, but they left after a few days
    because they did not like it and went back to living in their tent. Their tent
    flooded a couple weeks later, and Parents moved into a motel before contacting
    Seeds of Hope again. The Seeds of Hope program was unaware of the CHINS
    case at the time.
    [16]   In late January 2019, Parents moved into an apartment through Seeds of Hope
    and were required to pay rent of $500 per month plus utilities. On four
    occasions, Father was permitted to do maintenance work to reduce the rent, but
    he failed to meet work expectations each time and once did not show up. At
    some point Parents obtained a second dog, and they have sought assistance
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020   Page 8 of 18
    from Seeds of Hope to feed the dogs, who are “quite aggressive.” Id. at 133.
    Parents have been reluctant to use food pantries due to “the quality of food”,
    which has required Seeds of Hope to gather food for them on a couple
    occasions. Id. at 135.
    [17]   Nancy Bundy with Seeds of Hope tried to work with Parents on budgeting so
    that they could afford housing and utilities. This proved “extremely
    challenging” because Parents were vague about their income, dishonest about
    employment, and “the numbers just didn’t add up.” Id. at 136.
    [18]   Following the February 25, 2019 permanency hearing in the CHINS case, the
    trial court approved initiation of termination proceedings. DCS recommended
    this change in the permanency plan because, among other things, Parents
    continued to struggle with taking responsibility for their actions, had been
    repeatedly discharged from services due to lack of engagement, were on a step-
    down visitation schedule due to missed visits, and were dishonest with service
    providers. In her report, the CASA urged the court to allow the initiation of
    termination proceedings, noting:
    [DCS] has worked diligently to provide services to [Parents], but
    they have refused to be cooperative or participate in services in
    the last 12 months. There have been numerous family team
    meetings scheduled to discuss issues and parents either do not
    show up or fail to comply. They are currently working with the
    7th agency. The previous ones have resulted in discharge due to
    noncompliance.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020   Page 9 of 18
    The parents have been and continue to intentionally make
    misleading comments to all parties, including facilitators,
    potential employers, dentist, landlords and the court.
    ***
    [Parents] feel no responsibility for their situation. They are the
    victims, nothing is their fault. CASA finds this lack of accepting
    responsibility astonishing and telling of their role in this problem.
    All of the children have bonded with their foster parents and they
    are a family. The children refer to them as Mom and Dad and
    CASA has witnessed a loving atmosphere.
    CASA feels it is in the best interest of the children to terminate
    the parent’s rights [sic] and allow the foster parents [to] proceed
    with adoption.
    Exhibits Vol. 1 at 232-33.
    [19]   On March 7, 2019, DCS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of the
    parent-child relationship between Parents and Child, and the petition was
    amended a week later. 4 The factfinding hearing in the termination case was
    held on June 11, 2019, at which the above facts were presented into evidence
    through various witnesses and exhibits. Additionally, Buckley from Seeds of
    Hope testified that she had only learned of the DCS case and the children a few
    4
    Termination petitions were also filed with respect to A.C. and J.S. As Father is not their father, we do not
    address the termination proceedings related to A.C. and J.S. and their respective fathers.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020                   Page 10 of 18
    months before the hearing. In Buckley’s opinion, Parents are not ready to
    parent, can “hardly support themselves,” and “[will] be lucky if they can stay in
    housing, the two of ‘em.” Transcript at 129, 130. She expressed her concerns
    directly to Parents a couple months before the hearing, but Buckley testified, “I
    don’t think they heard me at all.” Id. While she understood Parents’ longing to
    raise their children, based on what she had seen of Parents during their nearly
    six months with Seeds of Hope, Buckley indicated that she “could not
    recommend that in good heart, heart for the safety of their children long-term.”
    Id. at 130.
    [20]   FCM Vos testified regarding Parents’ lack of progress, frequent discharges from
    services, reluctance to work with homebased case managers and to provide
    needed information for Father to obtain disability benefits, and overall failure to
    take any responsibility. According to FCM Vos, “it kinda just feels like we’re
    right where we started.” Id. at 72. She recommended termination and
    adoption by the current foster family 5 as in Child’s best interests and opined
    that continuation of the parent-child relationship would harm Child.
    [21]   Similarly, the CASA supported termination of parental rights and adoption as
    in the best interests of Child, as well as A.C. and J.S. She noted Parents’
    “insignificant progress over the last seventeen months”, their failure to comply
    with “basically any of the requests from DCS”, their instability and inability to
    5
    Since May 2018, Child has been in the same foster home as A.C. and J.S. The children are all bonded with
    their foster family. The foster parents wish to adopt the sibling group.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020               Page 11 of 18
    keep appointments, and their penchant to always blame someone else for their
    situation. Id. at 112.
    [22]   Mother testified and acknowledged that she and Father have had financial
    struggles. She claimed, however, that they had “got[ten] back on track” and
    explained, “[Father] does plasma and he just told me today that he wants to go
    find him a job and me stay home and be the home, mom with the kids.” Id. at
    145. Mother indicated that Father was currently behind on his half of the rent
    and that if he did not pay, he could face eviction. Father testified that his most
    recent job lasted two or three days and the one before that did not last long
    because he “threatened to run a guy over with [a] forklift.” Id. at 168.
    [23]   On October 9, 2019, the trial court issued a detailed order granting the
    involuntary termination of Father’s (and Mother’s) parental rights. Father now
    appeals.
    Discussion & Decision
    [24]   When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the
    evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re R.S., 
    56 N.E.3d 625
    , 628
    (Ind. 2016). Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences
    most favorable to the judgment. In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 265 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2004), trans. denied. In deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess
    the evidence, we will set aside its judgment terminating a parent-child
    relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 
    717 N.E.2d 204
    , 208 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. In light of the applicable clear and convincing
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020   Page 12 of 18
    evidence standard, we review to determine whether the evidence clearly and
    convincingly supports the findings and whether the findings clearly and
    convincingly support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 628.
    [25]   We recognize that the traditional right of parents to “establish a home and raise
    their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
    Constitution.” In re M.B., 
    666 N.E.2d 73
    , 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
    Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for
    the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet
    their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 
    892 N.E.2d 144
    , 149 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those
    of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In
    re K.S., 
    750 N.E.2d 832
    , 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The purpose of terminating
    parental rights is not to punish the parents, but to protect their children. 
    Id.
    [26]   Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in Indiana, DCS
    is required to allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence, among other
    things, that one of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
    resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
    outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
    parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
    child.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020   Page 13 of 18
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services[.]
    
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4
    (b)(2)(B); 
    Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2
    . DCS must also prove
    by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interests of the
    child and that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
    I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C), (D); I.C. § 31-37-14-2.
    [27]   On appeal, Father asserts that there is insufficient clear and convincing
    evidence that the conditions resulting in Child’s removal would not be
    remedied, that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to
    the well-being of Child, and that termination is in the best interests of Child.
    We will address each in turn as needed.
    [28]   DSC presented ample evidence to establish by clear and convincing evidence
    that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child’s
    removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by
    Father. 6 In making this determination, the trial court must judge a parent’s
    fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking
    into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 
    742 N.E.2d 509
    ,
    512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The court must also evaluate the
    parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial
    6
    The trial court determined that DCS had proven both subsections (b)(2)(B)(i) and (b)(2)(B)(ii). Because
    DCS was required to establish only one of these by clear and convincing evidence, we focus our review on
    subsection (b)(2)(B)(i).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020                Page 14 of 18
    probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child. 
    Id.
     “A pattern of
    unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those
    providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a
    finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will
    change.” In re L.S., 
    717 N.E.2d at 210
    .
    [29]   Father’s primary argument in this regard is that his parental rights may not be
    terminated solely based on “his cognitive disabilities and intellectual challenges
    that resulted from his traumatic brain injury.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. “As our
    courts have long held: “Mental [disability] of the parents, standing alone, is not
    a proper ground for terminating parental rights.” In re V.A., 
    51 N.E.3d 1140
    ,
    1147 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cty. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    592 N.E.2d 1232
    , 1234 (Ind. 1992)).
    [30]   The trial court’s findings, here, do not indicate that termination was based
    solely, or even substantially, on Father’s cognitive disability. Rather, the
    evidence and findings reveal that time and again DCS provided Father with
    services to address his difficulties with scheduling, parenting, housing, and
    finances, including unsuccessful attempts to help him obtain disability benefits. 7
    Father, along with Mother, failed to comply with services or regularly visit
    Child, was unsuccessfully discharged by many providers, was dishonest with
    7
    Father suggests that DCS failed to provide special services or tailor their normal services to Father’s
    disabilities, but he does not explain what additional services should have been provided him. The record,
    however, reflects that a number of services were referred and rereferred throughout the case, and Father
    consistently rebuffed efforts by said providers.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020                 Page 15 of 18
    those trying to assist him, and failed to take any responsibility for Child’s dire
    health condition that resulted from malnourishment while in his care. At the
    time of the termination hearing, Father had not secured employment or
    disability income and his housing was not stable, as he was behind on rent and
    not reliable in working off his rent when given the opportunity. Buckley, who
    had helped Parents with housing and services through Seeds of Hope for nearly
    six months leading up to the termination hearing, testified that Parents can
    “hardly support themselves,” and “[will] be lucky if they can stay in housing”.
    Transcript at 129, 130.
    [31]   We have no doubt that Father loves Child, and we recognize that Father has no
    substance abuse issues or criminal history. But the reality is that at the time of
    the termination hearing, after sixteen months of services being offered him,
    Father was in no better position to safely parent and provide for Child than he
    was at the time of removal. Cf. R.W., Sr., v. Marion Cty. Dep’t of Child. Servs., 
    892 N.E.2d 239
    , 248-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming termination where Mother
    refused to “take readily available steps to bridge the communication gap caused
    [by her disability]” and parents were not able to appropriately supervise the
    children, had failed to complete homebased services, had not achieved the
    dispositional goal of securing and maintaining safe and stable housing, and had
    made no significant overall improvement in the conditions leading to removal);
    R.G. v. Marion Cty. Office, Dep’t of Family & Children, 
    647 N.E.2d 326
    , 330 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 1995) (considering parents’ mental disabilities as a factor in affirming
    the termination of parental rights and concluding that termination was
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020   Page 16 of 18
    appropriate because “Mother and Father ha[d] been both unable and unwilling
    to develop the skills necessary to fulfill their legal obligations as a parent”),
    trans. denied. Contrary to Father’s assertions on appeal, it was not too early in
    the process to terminate his parental rights and there is no indication that
    “extending the CHINS case a few months” would have procured a different
    result for him. Appellant’s Brief at 20. In light of the facts presented at the
    termination hearing, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial
    court’s determination that the conditions that led to Child’s removal and
    continued placement outside Father’s home will not be remedied.
    [32]   Turning to the best interest factor, Father asserts that DSC failed to prove with
    “individualized proof that [he] is unable to provide permanency for [Child]”
    and is, therefore, unfit. Id. at 24. In making this best-interests determination,
    the trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and
    consider the totality of the evidence. In re J.C., 
    994 N.E.2d 278
    , 290 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2013). The court must subordinate the interest of the parent to those of
    the child and need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before
    terminating the parent-child relationship. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family
    & Children, 
    798 N.E.2d 185
    , 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Our Supreme Court has
    explained that “[p]ermanency is a central consideration in determining the best
    interests of a child.” In re G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1265 (Ind. 2009).
    “Moreover, we have previously held that the recommendations of the case
    manager and court-appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition
    to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020   Page 17 of 18
    sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the
    child’s best interests.” In re J.S., 
    906 N.E.2d 226
    , 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
    [33]   Father seems to suggest that the trial court’s best interest determination was
    based solely on the fact that there is a better place for Child to live. On the
    contrary, the evidence established that while in Father’s care, Child’s life was
    put at serious risk as a result of malnourishment. Father and Mother were not
    cognizant of Child’s dire condition at the time and have failed to accept
    responsibility since. Further, as discussed above, they have made little effort to
    prepare themselves to be able to safely parent Child and provide for his needs.
    Both the CASA and FCM Vos recommended termination was in Child’s best
    interests. Specifically, the CASA noted Father’s “insignificant progress over the
    last seventeen months” and failure to comply with “basically any of the requests
    from DCS”. Transcript at 112. Given the lack of progress, the likelihood of
    conditions not being remedied by Father, and the recommendations of the
    CASA and FCM Vos, the trial court properly determined that termination of
    Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of Child.
    [34]   Judgment affirmed.
    Robb, J. and Bradford, C.J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2554 | March 20, 2020   Page 18 of 18