Speedy Wrecker Service, LLC,, and Jeanne Walters Real Estate, LLC v. Daniel H. Frohman ( 2020 )

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
SPEEDY WRECKER SERVICE, LLC Thomas M. Frohman
Michael L. Carmin Bloomington, Indiana
Daniel M. Cyr
CarminParker, P.C.
Bloomington, Indiana
FILED
Apr 29 2020, 9:26 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
CLERK
JEANNE WALTERS REAL ESTATE, LLC Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Christine L. Bartlett
Ferguson Law
Bloomington, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Speedy Wrecker Service, LLC, April 29, 2020
and Court of Appeals Case No.
Jeanne Walters Real Estate, LLC, 19A-CT-2033
Appellants-Defendants, Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
Court
v. The Honorable Elizabeth A. Cure,
Judge
Daniel H. Frohman, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Plaintiff, 53C01-1806-CT-1262
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] Daniel H. Frohman sued Speedy Wrecker Service, LLC (“Speedy Wrecker”)
and Jeanne Walters Real Estate, LLC (“JW Realty”) (collectively, when
appropriate, “Appellants”) for towing his car from a private, permit-only
parking lot within twenty-four hours of finding it parked there. The parties
each filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the
Appellants’ motion and partially granted Frohman’s motion, finding the
Appellants violated Indiana statutes related to removing vehicles abandoned on
private property. The Appellants appeal, raising two issues of which we find
the following dispositive: whether in granting partial summary judgment to
Frohman the trial court erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutes.
Concluding the relevant statutes entitle the Appellants to summary judgment
rather than Frohman, we reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] JW Realty manages a permit-only parking lot located on private property1 in
downtown Bloomington, Indiana. The property used to be home to a bank,
and the building still exists, although it is no longer in use. In March or April of
2017, JW Realty spoke to nearby business owners and placed flyers on vehicles
parked in the lot informing them that parking was soon going to be restricted to
1
JW Realty does not own the property; it manages the parking lot on behalf of the owner.
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permit holders only and providing information about obtaining a permit.
Signage advising “Parking by Lease. Permit Parking” was installed in the
parking lot. Appellants’ Appendix, Volume 2 at 92. “Tow Warning” signs
were also installed. The “Tow Warning” signs state:
**Courtesy notice**
Permit parking only. Lot will be patrolled 24/7
Permits available for $53/month with auto monthly ACH draft
Call Jeanne Walters Real Estate 812.xxx.xxxx
Id. at 94. Those who purchased monthly permits were assigned a specific
parking space. See id. at 128-66 (Parking Space Lease Agreements).
[3] In May 2017, JW Realty hired Speedy Wrecker to patrol the lot and tow
unauthorized vehicles. Pursuant to the contract, Speedy Wrecker was
authorized to tow “all unauthorized, abandoned or trespassing vehicles”
regardless of the hour of the day, the day of the week, how long the vehicle has
been in the lot, or the number of other vehicles in the parking lot. Id. at 121.
According to a representative of JW Realty, “The parking lot is only for
individuals and businesses with permits to park their vehicles” and Speedy
Wrecker is authorized to tow a vehicle “[a]ny time when there is a vehicle
parked in the parking lot without a permit.” Id. at 85-86. Speedy Wrecker does
not give vehicle owners a warning before towing a vehicle.
[4] On Saturday, April 14, 2018, Frohman parked his vehicle in JW Realty’s lot
around 4:00 p.m. to attend an appointment nearby. There were no other
vehicles in the parking lot. He averred that he saw no signs indicating that he
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was not permitted to park there, either at the entrance to the lot or at the spot
where he parked. When Frohman returned to the parking lot approximately an
hour later, his car was gone. Walking around the parking lot, Frohman saw
several signs in the grass and one sign in the bank’s drive up window regarding
parking restrictions. After calling the number on the parking lot signage,
Frohman learned that Speedy Wrecker had towed his vehicle at
4:11 p.m., and he went to Speedy Wrecker’s storage facility at approximately
7:00 p.m. to retrieve his car. It cost him $240 cash.
[5] Frohman filed a complaint for conversion against the Appellants, alleging they
exerted unauthorized control over his car by unlawfully taking it from the
parking lot without giving him twenty-four hours’ notice as required by statute.
Frohman requested treble damages, costs, and attorney fees. Frohman also
sought an award of punitive damages to deter the Appellants from their
allegedly unlawful behavior in towing cars without twenty-four-hour notice.
Speedy Wrecker filed a motion for summary judgment in which JW Realty
later joined. Frohman filed a response and a cross-motion for summary
judgment in his favor. The trial court held a hearing—which has not been
transcribed—and issued its Order on Motions for Summary Judgment on July
16, 2019. Finding the Appellants “ignored all parts of the abandoned-vehicle
statutes except those that fit best with [Speedy Wrecker’s] business interest and
was easiest for [JW Realty] as well[,]” the order denied Appellants’ motion,
granted Frohman’s motion on the issue of liability, and set an evidentiary
hearing on the remaining issues in Frohman’s complaint. Appealed Order at 3.
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Appellants sought and obtained both trial court certification of the order and
permission from the Court of Appeals to pursue this interlocutory appeal.
Discussion and Decision
I. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
[6] When reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment, we apply the same
test as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only if the designated
evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Sedam v. 2JR
Pizza Enters., LLC, 84 N.E.3d 1174, 1176 (Ind. 2017). “A fact is ‘material’ if its
resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a
trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if
the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.”
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). The moving party bears the
initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact as to
a determinative issue. Id.
[7] Our review is limited to those facts designated to the trial court, T.R. 56(H),
and we construe all facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in
favor of the non-moving party, Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 (Ind.
2013). Because we review a summary judgment ruling de novo, a trial court’s
findings and conclusions offer insight into the rationale for the court’s judgment
and facilitate appellate review but are not binding on this court. Denson v. Estate
of Dillard, 116 N.E.3d 535, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Additionally, we are not
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constrained by the claims and arguments presented to the trial court, and we
may affirm a summary judgment ruling on any theory supported by the
designated evidence. Id. The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for
summary judgment does not alter this standard of review or change our
analysis: the party that lost in the trial court has the burden of persuading us
that the trial court erred. Id.
II. Removing Abandoned Vehicles
[8] The parties and the trial court all relied on the following two statutes
concerning abandoned vehicles:
(a) A person who finds a vehicle believed to be abandoned on
private property that the person owns or controls, including
rental property, may:
***
(2) personally arrange for the removal of the vehicle by
complying with subsection (b) and section 16 of this chapter.
(b) If the person wishes to personally arrange for the removal of
the vehicle, the person shall attach in a prominent place a notice
tag containing the following information:
(1) The date, time, name, and address of the person who
owns or controls the private property and a telephone number to
contact for information.
(2) That the vehicle is considered abandoned.
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(3) That the vehicle will be removed after twenty-four (24)
hours.
(4) That the person who owns the vehicle will be held
responsible for all costs incidental to the removal, storage, and
disposal of the vehicle.
(5) That the person who owns the vehicle may avoid costs
by removal of the vehicle or parts within twenty-four (24) hours.
Ind. Code § 9-22-1-15.
(a) If after twenty-four (24) hours the person who owns a vehicle
believed to be abandoned on private property has not removed
the vehicle from the private property, the person who owns or
controls the private property on which the vehicle is believed to
be abandoned may have the vehicle towed from the private
property.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), in an emergency situation a
vehicle believed to be abandoned on private property may be
removed immediately. As used in this subsection, “emergency
situation” means that the presence of the vehicle believed to be
abandoned interferes physically with the conduct of normal business
operations of the person who owns or controls the private property
or poses a threat to the safety or security of persons or property,
or both.
Ind. Code § 9-22-1-16 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the Appellants
did not place a notice tag on Frohman’s vehicle and did not wait twenty-four
hours thereafter before having the vehicle towed. The parties dispute only
whether, as a matter of law, the situation presented by Frohman parking his
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unpermitted car in a permit-only parking lot constitutes an “emergency
situation” allowing Appellants to remove the vehicle immediately.
[9] Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law for which summary
judgment is particularly appropriate. Ramirez v. Wilson, 901 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Here, the parties dispute the proper interpretation
of “emergency situation.” Frohman argued to the trial court (and to an extent,
to this court) that the word emergency in Indiana Code section 9-22-1-16(b)
should be given its plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. See Appellants’ App.,
Vol. 2 at 237-38 (Frohman’s Memorandum in Opposition to Speedy
Wrecker[’s] Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support of [Frohman’s]
Motion for Summary Judgment citing Indiana Code section 1-1-4-1 regarding
statutory construction and Merriam Webster’s definition of emergency); see also
Appellee’s Brief at 13 (citing Indiana Code section 1-1-4-1). However, we only
use a term’s plain and ordinary meaning in the absence of a precise legislative
definition. Med. & Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Bush, 734 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000). Here, the statute itself defines “emergency situation.” Where
the General Assembly provides a definition for a word or phrase used in a
statute, the court is bound by that definition, even if it conflicts with the
common meaning ascribed to the word. Rush v. Elkhart Cty. Plan Comm’n, 698
N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. The goal in interpreting a
statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Int’l
Business Machines Corp., 964 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Ind. 2012). Thus, we look only to
the legislative definition of “emergency situation.”
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[10] Relevant to the circumstances of this case, an “emergency situation” for
purposes of allowing an abandoned vehicle to be removed immediately “means
that the presence of the vehicle believed to be abandoned interferes physically
with the conduct of normal business operations of the person who owns or
controls the private property[.]” Ind. Code § 9-22-1-16(b).2 The “normal
business operations” of JW Realty, at least at this location, were to operate a
parking lot for which they sold permits and received a monthly fee. Whether or
not there were parking spots available when Frohman parked there and whether
or not permits had been sold for all the spots, Frohman’s vehicle was physically
interfering with those normal business operations by using the parking lot
without having purchased a permit. It therefore presented an emergency
situation entitling JW Realty to act to immediately remove the vehicle.
[11] The trial court found that the Appellants “have interpreted the statute in such a
manner as to effectively render §9-22-1-15 and, §9-22-1-16 meaningless.”
Appealed Order at 2. But Frohman and the trial court have interpreted those
statutes to render the exception meaningless. The exception protects normal
business operations on private property. If the owner or operator of a for-pay
parking lot cannot invoke the emergency exception when an unauthorized car
parks in the lot, then essentially, there is no such business as a for-pay parking
lot. Under Frohman’s interpretation of the statutes, anyone could park in the
2
The alternative, that the abandoned vehicle “poses a threat to the safety or security of persons or property,”
is not at issue here. Ind. Code § 9-22-1-16(b).
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parking lot with impunity as long as they moved their car within twenty-four
hours and there would be no incentive to purchase a permit and thus no
business for JW Realty to operate. Is it frustrating to see an empty parking lot
in a convenient location but be forced to find a different spot because it is
permit only? Of course. Is it fair to expect to park for free in a parking lot for
which others have paid for a permit because you intend to park for only a short
time or because it appears plenty of parking spots are available? Of course not.
And that is what the emergency exception protects.
[12] We hold, as a matter of law, that the emergency exception applies here. As the
parties have not identified any genuine issues of material fact to be resolved,3
the Appellants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because their act of
removing Frohman’s vehicle from the parking lot was allowed by statute and
therefore did not constitute conversion. We therefore remand to the trial court
to vacate the partial summary judgment entered for Frohman, vacate the
3
Although the Appellants designated evidence that the lot had signage declaring the lot permit only and
warning that violators would be towed, Frohman designated evidence that he did not see signage that the lot
was permit only until after his car was towed. Regardless, the applicable statutes do not require signage and
this point of contention is therefore not a genuine issue of material fact because its resolution would not affect
the outcome of the case.
Of note, effective July 1, 2019, Indiana Code chapter 24-14-4 allows the establishment of and requirements
for a tow-away zone on commercial private property. Indiana Code section 24-14-4-2(a) requires the posting
of a tow-away zone sign that is conspicuous and clearly visible to the public. However, “[a] commercial
private property owner may have a motor vehicle towed from the owner’s commercial private property
without first displaying signage concerning the tow-away zone if the motor vehicle is removed under IC 9-22-1-16.”
Ind. Code § 24-14-4-2(b) (emphasis added). Thus, this newly enacted statute makes it clear that signage is not
a requirement for removal under the circumstances herein.
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evidentiary hearing regarding Frohman’s damages as he has sustained none,
and enter final judgment for the Appellants.
Conclusion
[13] The trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment to Frohman and
denying summary judgment to the Appellants. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to enter summary
judgment for the Appellants.
[14] Reversed and remanded.
Bradford, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
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