In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: B.J. v. Health & Hospital Corporation of Marion County d/b/a Eskenazi Health Midtown Community Mental Health (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 29 2020, 11:17 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Deborah Markisohn Bryan H. Babb
Marion County Public Defender Agency Sarah T. Parks
Indianapolis, Indiana Bose McKinney & Evans LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Civil April 29, 2020
Commitment of: Court of Appeals Case No.
B.J., 19A-MH-2523
Appellant-Respondent, Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
v. The Honorable Amy Jones,
Special Judge
Health & Hospital Corporation Trial Court Cause No.
of Marion County d/b/a 49D08-1909-MH-39411
Eskenazi Health Midtown
Community Mental Health,
Appellee-Petitioner,
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] B.J. appeals the trial court’s order of involuntary regular commitment at
Eskenazi Health Midtown Community Mental Health (“Eskenazi”). He raises
one issue which we restate as whether there was sufficient evidence to support a
special condition to his order of commitment. Concluding that the evidence is
insufficient to support such a special condition, we affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] B.J. is thirty-nine years old, has a history of mental illness, and lives with his
parents. In early 2019, B.J. was released from a one-year commitment during
which he took his prescribed medication and had therapy monthly. Upon being
discharged, he stopped taking his medication and his behavior became
increasingly worse to a point where his parents were “fearful that he would
harm [them].” [Transcript], Volume II at 17. Multiple times each day, B.J.
would walk to a neighborhood playground where he would curse, use vulgar
language, and yell; this concerned his neighbors, and some had considered
calling the police. In September 2019, B.J.’s father filed an Application for
Emergency Detention of Mentally Ill and Dangerous Person (“Application”)
with Eskenazi alleging B.J. was suffering from a psychiatric disorder. See
Appellant’s Appendix, Volume II at 13. Dr. Gregory Singleton, a doctor with
Eskenazi, filed a Physician’s Emergency Statement in support of the
Application. After reviewing the Application and the Physician Statement, the
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trial court issued an order for B.J. to be admitted to Eskenazi on an emergency
detention and set the matter for a commitment hearing on September 26, 2019.
[3] At the commitment hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Dr. Carley
Niehaus, Dr. Kenneth Smith, B.J.’s father, and B.J. Dr. Niehaus testified that
B.J. suffered from Schizoaffective Disorder. Dr. Smith testified that B.J. made
multiple threats to physically harm Dr. Smith and members of Dr. Smith’s
family. Drs. Niehaus and Smith both believed that B.J. was gravely disabled
and dangerous to others as a result of his mental illness. B.J. testified,
I am sober. I am drug free. And I am clear headed and not sick. I
. . . was affiliated with this guy who was in the [Alcoholics
Anonymous] program and I do not really appreciate their antics
to be honest. But anyway, I think you are going to do the right
thing today, judge.
Tr., Vol. II at 22. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that B.J.
suffers from Schizoaffective Disorder, is dangerous to himself or others, is
gravely disabled, and is in need of custody, care and treatment at Eskenazi. The
trial court ordered the regular commitment of B.J., involuntarily committing
him to Eskenazi. The trial court also imposed five special conditions made part
of the regular commitment, which included a mandate prohibiting B.J. from
consuming “alcohol or drugs, other than those prescribed by a certified medical
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doctor[,]” when he attains outpatient status.1 Appealed Order at 2. B.J. now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[4] Civil commitment proceedings have two purposes: to protect the public and to
ensure the rights of the person whose liberty is at stake. P.B. v. Evansville State
Hosp., 90 N.E.3d 1199, 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a special condition in a civil commitment
case, we look only to the evidence most favorable to the judgment and any
reasonable inferences therefrom. M.L. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown Mental Health
CMHC, 80 N.E.3d 219, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). We will not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 223-24. The burden rests
upon the petitioner—in this case, Eskenazi—to present sufficient evidence to
support the imposition of a special condition. Id. at 223.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[5] B.J. contends there was insufficient evidence that the special condition
prohibiting him from consuming alcohol or non-prescribed drugs bore a
1
The trial court also imposed as special conditions that B.J.: 1) take all medications as prescribed, 2) attend
all clinic sessions as scheduled, 3) maintain his address and phone number with the trial court and designated
facility, and 4) not harass or assault family members or others. B.J. does not challenge any of these special
conditions and therefore, we do not address them.
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reasonable relationship to his mental health treatment or to the protection of the
public. See Brief of the Appellant at 10. We agree.
[6] A trial court may impose special conditions on an individual who is
involuntarily committed upon release to outpatient care. Commitment of M.M. v.
Clarian Health Partners, 826 N.E.2d 90, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied; see
also Ind. Code § 12-26-14-3(4). However, the special conditions “must be
reasonably designed to protect the individual as well as the general public.”
Golub v. Giles, 814 N.E.2d 1034, 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. There
must be sufficient evidence in the record for the trial court to conclude that the
special condition “bears a reasonable relationship” to the committed
individual’s treatment. Id.
[7] We first addressed the validity of special conditions of commitment in Golub v.
Giles. There, Golub suffered from a bipolar disorder with psychotic symptoms.
Golub had a well-documented history of behavior that included, inter alia,
lunging at a hotel manager, threatening his family members, discussing suicide,
and “exhibiting unpredictability that evinced a potential to strike out physically
in frustration and anger.” 814 N.E.2d at 1037. Following a commitment
hearing, the trial court issued an order of regular commitment and imposed six
special conditions, including a condition that Golub not use alcohol or drugs,
other than those prescribed by a certified medical doctor. Golub appealed and
with respect to the condition prohibiting him from consuming alcohol or drugs,
we noted the record was “devoid of any evidence showing that Golub used or
abused alcohol or drugs” nor was “the subject of alcohol and drug use . . . at
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issue at any time during the hearing[.]” Id. at 1041. We concluded that the
condition was improperly imposed because there was no evidence in the record
suggesting the “prohibition bears any relationship at all to Golub’s treatment or
the protection of the public.” Id. at 1042.
[8] Two Indiana cases have since followed the standard set forth in Golub. In
Commitment of M.M., M.M. suffered from bi-polar mania and was admitted as
an inpatient at Methodist Hospital in their psychiatric unit. On appeal, M.M.
argued, the hospital conceded, and we agreed that the condition prohibiting
M.M. from consuming alcohol or drugs was improper because there was “no
evidence in the record to suggest that such a prohibition [bore] any relationship
to M.M.’s treatment or the protection of the public[.]” 826 N.E.2d at 99.
Similarly, in M.L., M.L. suffered from bi-polar mania and was admitted to
Eskenazi on an emergency detention. At the evidentiary hearing, a doctor from
Eskenazi testified that he was dangerous both to himself and others. When
asked on direct examination whether M.L. used alcohol or drugs, the doctor
responded that he did not. However, the doctor still requested that the trial
court impose a special condition prohibiting M.L. from using alcohol or drugs,
other than those prescribed by a certified doctor. The trial court agreed and
imposed that special condition. On appeal, we struck the special condition
prohibiting M.L. from consuming alcohol or drugs from the order of
commitment, noting that “the record [was] barren as to M.L.’s use of alcohol or
drugs and there [was] no suggestion that the special condition [bore] any
relationship to M.L.’s treatment or the protection of the public.” 80 N.E.3d at
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224. Eskenazi argued that “[i]t should be obvious that M.L.’s use of alcohol or
drugs would have exacerbated his conditions of grave disability and
dangerousness.” Id. But we rejected that argument, explaining that Eskenazi
did not present any evidence supporting the “obvious” statement. Id.
[9] Likewise here, the record is devoid of any evidence as to B.J.’s use of alcohol or
non-prescribed drugs and there is no evidence in the record that the special
condition bears any relationship to B.J.’s treatment or to the protection of the
public. Unlike the doctor in M.L., neither Dr. Niehaus nor Dr. Smith was asked
about B.J.’s alcohol or drug use or requested that the trial court prohibit such
activity. The subject of alcohol or drugs was never raised by Eskenazi or the
trial court, nor did the trial court make a finding that B.J. had an alcohol or
drug problem. When B.J.’s father testified, he did not mention use of alcohol or
drugs as an explanation for B.J.’s behavior. Instead, he believed that B.J.’s
behavior was a result of his psychiatric disorder. Eskenazi claims that B.J.’s
assertion at the commitment hearing that he was sober, drug free, and affiliated
with a person in the Alcoholics Anonymous program supports the inference
that he used alcohol or drugs in the past and thus, supports the special
condition. See Brief of Appellee at 5-6. But B.J.’s statements alone, without
more, cannot serve as the basis to suggest that he previously used alcohol or
drugs such that a special condition prohibiting him from consuming alcohol or
non-prescribed drugs is appropriate and we cannot speculate as to the
connection. The burden, as we have stated, is on Eskenazi to establish that
connection. See M.L., 80 N.E.3d at 223. Moreover, Eskenazi failed to present
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evidence showing how the special condition bore any relationship to the
protection of the public. Similar to the patients in Golub, Commitment of M.M.,
and M.L., B.J. exhibited threatening and dangerous behavior to his family and
the public. But, as in those three cases, Eskenazi as the petitioner did not
present any evidence that would demonstrate a clear nexus between B.J.’s
threatening and dangerous behavior and substance use. In fact, Dr. Niehaus
testified that B.J.’s symptoms of Schizoaffective Disorder—delusions,
disorganized speech, auditory hallucinations, mania, and mood episodes—are
“not better explained by another medical condition or substance use.” Tr., Vol. II
at 8 (emphasis added).
[10] In sum, Eskenazi has failed to meet its burden of presenting evidence to support
the imposition of the special condition prohibiting B.J. from consuming alcohol
or drugs, other than those prescribed by a certified medical doctor. Eskenazi
also failed to show how the prohibition bore any relationship to B.J.’s treatment
or to the protection of the public. The trial court improperly imposed the special
condition and therefore, we reverse that part of the trial court’s judgment and
remand with instructions to strike the special condition prohibiting B.J. from
consuming alcohol or non-prescribed drugs once he attains outpatient status.
The remainder of the commitment order is affirmed.
Conclusion
[11] There is insufficient evidence to support the special condition prohibiting B.J.
from consuming alcohol or non-prescribed drugs when he attains outpatient
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status. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the trial court’s judgment imposing
the special condition prohibiting B.J. from consuming alcohol or non-
prescribed drugs and affirm the remainder of the Order of Regular
Commitment.
[12] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.
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