In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: A.T., Je.T., and Jo.T. (Minor Children) and J.T. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                   FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                               May 04 2020, 6:19 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                         Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Larry D. Stassin                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Crown Point, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Monika Prekopa Talbot
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In re the Termination of the                             May 4, 2020
    Parent-Child Relationship of:                            Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-JT-2586
    A.T., Je.T., and Jo.T. (Minor
    Children) and                                            Appeal from the Lake Superior
    Court Juvenile Division
    J.T. (Father),
    The Honorable Thomas P.
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Stefaniak, Jr., Judge
    v.                                               Trial Court Cause Nos.
    45D06-1902-JT-36, 45D06-1902-
    JT-37, 45D06-1902-JT-38
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Altice, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020                  Page 1 of 17
    Case Summary
    [1]   J.T. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights with respect to his
    minor children, A.T. (born June 16, 2011), Je.T. (born January 19, 2013), and
    Jo.T. (born September 2, 2016). He claims that the judgment must be set aside
    because the trial court’s determination that the conditions that led to the
    children’s removal would not be remedied was clearly erroneous, and the
    evidence failed to demonstrate that terminating his parental rights was in the
    children’s best interest.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   In August 2016, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) received
    reports that five-year-old A.T. and three-year-old Je.T. and their two older
    siblings were dirty and unkempt, and that Mother and Father (collectively, the
    parents) had not enrolled the older children in school. There were also
    allegations that the home was filthy and in a deplorable condition. As a result
    of these reports, DCS Family Case Manager Rebecca Ramone went to the Lake
    County residence on August 12, 2016 to speak with the parents.
    [4]   When Ramone arrived, she noticed an open well in the side yard. All four
    children were dirty and two of them were in soiled diapers. Ramone observed
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020   Page 2 of 17
    holes in the floors, ceilings, and walls of the residence, and clutter throughout.
    There was a broken window in the home, and Ramone noticed that the kitchen
    plumbing was leaking. There was only plywood on the floors in the living
    room. The parents’ bedroom contained a litter box that was overflowing with
    cat feces. Ramone also discovered the body of a decomposing dog in the
    basement.
    [5]   There was very little food in the house, and Father told Ramone that he was
    unable to clean the residence because of an alleged medical condition that he
    did not disclose. Father explained that he had mental health issues and
    Ramone saw some medications on a nightstand that were within the children’s
    reach. Father also told Ramone that the residence was “on the condemned list”
    and that he had agreed with the landlord to clean the property and “bring it up
    to code” in exchange for rent. Transcript at 26, 31.
    [6]   The children were removed from the household and placed in protective
    custody following Ramone’s visit. 1 Mother—who was eight months
    pregnant—remained at the residence with Father. On August 16, 2016, DCS
    filed petitions alleging that the children were in need of services (CHINS). DCS
    developed a plan for the parents and recommended parenting assessments,
    1DCS also removed two older siblings from the residence, K.T. (born December 27, 2001)
    and B.J.T. (born July 3, 2007) and filed CHINS petitions for them as well. Father is the father
    of KT. and B.J.T., but Mother is not their mother. This appeal only concerns children A.T.,
    Je.T, and Jo.T.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020         Page 3 of 17
    random drug and alcohol screens, home-based casework services, and
    supervised visitation with the children.
    [7]    On September 2, 2016, Mother gave birth to Jo.T., who was subsequently
    removed from the residence on November 9, 2016, because the parents
    continued to reside in the house that had been condemned and no
    improvements had been made to the property. DCS filed a CHINS petition
    with respect to Jo.T. the next day.
    [8]    At some point, case manager Xavia Collins visited the residence and observed
    that there was no stove in the kitchen, a broken toilet in the bathroom, and
    clutter throughout the residence and the garage. There was no running water in
    the house and no mattresses for the children. Father told Collins that he
    worked three jobs, but Collins was never able to verify Father’s employment.
    Father also stated that he suffered from depression and ADHD but he did not
    always take his prescribed medications because they made him feel badly.
    [9]    The children were adjudicated CHINS on May 2, 2017. That same day, the
    trial court ordered both parents to undergo clinical and parenting assessments,
    home-based casework services, supervised visitation, and random drug screens.
    Father was also ordered to participate in and complete further counseling and
    therapy recommendations.
    [10]   The parents initially participated in DCS services and the children were
    returned to the residence on a trial basis in June 2017 after it was determined
    that some of conditions in the home had improved. However, the children
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020   Page 4 of 17
    were removed again in September 2017 because they were dirty, unkempt, and
    had lice, and the residence remained on the condemned list. Father became
    hostile and aggressive, and the police had to separate Father and the DCS
    caseworker during the removal process.
    [11]   Father failed to complete the home-based casework that would have assisted
    him with budgeting and finding appropriate housing, employment, and
    community resources. Mother rarely attended therapy sessions and she
    eventually became totally non-compliant. She had substance abuse and mental
    health issues and suffered emotional and physical abuse by Father. Mother was
    never able to achieve sobriety, and she admitted to using methamphetamine
    since she was twelve years old. A therapist believed that Mother would not
    commit to therapy or make herself available for DCS services. Mother’s
    visitations with the children were stopped in September 2018 due to her lack of
    compliance with scheduled visits.
    [12]   Although Father was offered services in an attempt at reunification with the
    children, he consistently resisted the various service providers and case
    managers. Even though Father completed the recommended assessments, he
    often became angry with the providers and case manager, and the police
    became involved on a number of occasions. The children were fearful of
    Father’s anger issues and while Father sporadically participated in counseling
    sessions, three consecutive therapists closed his case for noncompliance. It was
    noted that Father “exploded, verbally screamed, and stormed out of the room”
    during some of the family team meetings. Transcript at 78. Father discontinued
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020   Page 5 of 17
    therapy sessions in September 2017. Father was also physically, emotionally,
    and sexually abusive to Mother and at some point, Mother had obtained a
    protective order against Father. Father was incarcerated from April 2 to April
    19, 2018 for physically abusing Mother.
    [13]   On February 5, 2019, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother and Father’s
    parental rights. On September 26, 2019, the juvenile court held an evidentiary
    hearing on DCS’s petition. The evidence showed that Father never had
    appropriate housing throughout the pendency of the proceedings. At the time
    of the termination hearing, Father was living in Illinois, had not made a rent
    payment for two months, and admitted that his residence would not be
    appropriate for the children.
    [14]   Various agencies facilitated visitation between the parents and the children.
    Those agencies ultimately discontinued services because Father was hostile,
    uncooperative, and he made repeated threats to the staff. One of the agencies
    discontinued its visitation services because of the domestic violence incident
    involving Mother.
    [15]   According to DCS caseworkers, Father made almost no progress throughout
    the pendency of the three-year CHINS case. At the time of the termination
    hearing, Father was on probation for committing intimidation against a police
    officer. Collins testified that DCS had exhausted all efforts with regard to
    Father and that Father was still unable to parent the children. Therapist
    Maritza Perez had worked with A.T. and Je.T. since February 2019. She
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020   Page 6 of 17
    testified that both children have an unhealthy relationship with Father. A.T.
    had tantrums and screamed and hit and kicked others, but her behavior
    substantially improved after she moved into her current foster home.
    [16]   Perez testified that Father visited with the children only once or twice a month
    and exhibited inappropriate behavior during those visits. Moreover, A.T. was
    afraid of upsetting Father, and Je.T.’s anxiety about Father resulted in physical
    symptoms and behavioral issues at school.
    [17]   A.T. had been living in one foster home for more than a year until her
    placement was changed in July 2019. The first set of foster parents were not
    able to handle A.T.’s “outbursts.” Transcript at 95. Jo.T. was in a separate, pre-
    adoptive foster home for nearly one year, but his foster parents eventually told
    Collins that they were afraid of Father and they no longer wished to adopt Jo.
    T.
    [18]   A.T. and Jo.T. were subsequently placed in a foster home together on July 3,
    2019, where they have remained. A.T. loves her new school and gets along
    well with the other foster children in the home. Je.T. has been in a foster home
    with her older sister K.T. since September 22, 2017. Je.T.’s foster parents are
    meeting her needs, and she is enrolled in extracurricular activities.
    [19]   Collins testified that adoption was in the children’s best interests because Father
    did not have appropriate housing, and the foster parents in both homes
    provided nurturing homes and stable environments for the children. Collins
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020   Page 7 of 17
    added that the children were thriving in their foster homes and that both sets of
    foster parents planned to adopt the children in their care.
    [20]   On October 3, 2019, the trial court entered the following order terminating the
    parental rights of both Father and Mother:
    There is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in
    the removal of the children from the parents’ home will not be
    remedied in that: The Department of Child Services became
    involved with the family due to deplorable home conditions. The
    investigation confirmed the home to be unsuitable. The home
    was observed to have numerous holes in the floors, ceilings and
    walls. The kitchen sink was leaking and had a bucket under it.
    There were numerous flies throughout the home. The children’s
    mattresses were stacked in the rooms. There were multiple
    animals in the home with feces throughout. The basement was
    full of water and the home contained strong odor. There was an
    open well in the backyard of the residence that was a danger to
    the children. The children had poison ivy and severe lice. The
    children were dirty and the youngest child was in a soiled diaper.
    . . . The . . . home was on the condemn list for the city.
    ...
    Neither parent is providing any emotional or financial support
    for the child[ren]. Neither parent is in a position to properly
    parent these children. The children are . . . extremely bonded
    and thriving in their placement.
    ...
    After numerous attempts at reunification, the children remain
    outside of the parents’ care. The original allegations of neglect
    have not been remedied by the parents. Neither of these parents
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020   Page 8 of 17
    have demonstrated an ability to independently parent the
    children and provide the necessary care, support and supervision.
    There is no basis for assuming the parents will complete the
    necessary services and find one or both of themselves in a
    position to receive the children back into the home. For over
    three years, the parents failed to utilize the available services and
    make the necessary efforts to remedy the conditions, which led to
    intervention by DCS and the Court.
    ...
    The children continue to reside in a stable foster home which has
    indicated both a willingness and ability to adopt all the children.
    It would be unfair to the children to delay such permanency on
    the very remote likelihood of the parents committing to and
    completing services.
    The Court finds that after three years, in these cases, [the
    children] certainly have a right to permanency.
    There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
    parent—child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
    children in that: for the reasons stated above. Additionally, the
    children deserve a loving, caring, safe, stable and drug free home.
    It is in the best interest of the children . . . that the parent-child
    relationship between the children and his [sic] parents be forever
    fully and absolutely terminated.
    The Indiana Department of Child Services has a satisfactory plan
    for the care and treatment of the children which is Adoption.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020      Page 9 of 17
    Appendix Vol. II at 22-24. Father now appeals. 2
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Standard of Review
    [21]   When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the
    evidence or judge witness credibility. In re I.A., 
    934 N.E.2d 1127
    , 1132 (Ind.
    2010). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most
    favorable to the judgment.
    Id. We must
    also give “due regard” to the trial
    court’s unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Indiana
    Trial Rule 52(A).
    [22]   The trial court is required to “enter findings of fact that support the entry of the
    conclusions” terminating “the parent-child relationship.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-
    8(a), (c). When the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions in
    terminating parental rights, we apply a two-tiered standard of review when
    reviewing that determination. First, we determine whether the evidence
    supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support
    the judgment. 
    I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132
    . We will set aside the trial court’s
    judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. In re B.C., 
    441 N.E.2d 208
    , 211 (Ind.
    1982). A judgment is “clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial
    2
    [1]      Although Mother had appeared at the initial hearing and the trial court appointed counsel
    for her, she never met with counsel and failed to appear at the termination hearing. She is not
    a party in this appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020        Page 10 of 17
    court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” 
    I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132
    .
    [23]   We note that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
    protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their
    children. Meyer v. Neb., 
    262 U.S. 390
    , 399 (1923). A parent’s interest in the
    care, custody, and control of his or her children is “perhaps the oldest of the
    fundamental liberty interests.” Troxel v. Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 65 (2000).
    Indeed, the parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships in
    our culture.” Neal v. DeKalb Cnty. Div. of Family & Children, 
    796 N.E.2d 280
    ,
    285 (Ind. 2003). We recognize of course that parental interests are not
    absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the
    proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 264-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Thus, “[p]arental rights
    may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their
    parental responsibilities.”
    Id. at 265.
    [24]   I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) requires that a petition to terminate a parent-child
    relationship involving a child in need of services must allege that:
    (A) one (1) of the following exists:
    (i) the child has been removed from the parent for at least
    six (6) months under a dispositional decree;
    (ii) a court has entered a finding . . . that reasonable efforts
    for family preservation or reunification are not required,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020   Page 11 of 17
    including a description of the court’s finding, the date of
    the finding, and the manner in which the finding was
    made; or
    (iii) the child has been removed from the parent and has
    been under the supervision of a county office of family and
    children for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent
    twenty-two (22) months;
    (B) there is a reasonable probability that:
    (i) the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
    reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will
    not be remedied; or
    (ii) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses
    a threat to the well-being of the child;
    (C) termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
    [25]   DCS bears the burden of proving these allegations by clear and convincing
    evidence. Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    592 N.E.2d 1232
    , 1234
    (Ind. 1992).
    II. Father’s Claims
    A. The Children’s Removal
    [26]   Father claims that the trial court erred in granting the termination of parental
    rights because DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020    Page 12 of 17
    conditions regarding the children’s removal from the parents’ home will not be
    remedied. In reviewing such a determination, we engage in a two-step analysis.
    In re E.M., 
    4 N.E.3d 636
    , 643 (Ind. 2014). First, we identify the conditions that
    led to removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable
    probability that those conditions will not be remedied.
    Id. In the
    second step, a
    parent’s fitness is judged as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking
    into consideration evidence of changed conditions—balancing a parent’s recent
    improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there
    is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.
    Id. Habitual conduct
    may include a parent’s criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse,
    history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing
    and employment. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    987 N.E.2d 1150
    , 1157
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
    [27]   DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it must
    establish that there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior will not
    change. In re B.J., 
    879 N.E.2d 7
    , 18-19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. We
    entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a
    parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before
    termination.
    Id. Requiring trial
    courts to give due regard to changed conditions
    does not preclude them from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best
    predictor of future behavior.
    Id. [28] In
    this case, the reasons for the children’s initial removal from the residence
    were the deplorable, unsanitary, and dangerous conditions of the home, along
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020   Page 13 of 17
    with the dirty and unkempt conditions of the children. The residence was on
    the condemned list and was set to be demolished. In addition to the structural
    defects, animal odor was prevalent in the residence and there was the body of a
    decomposed dog in the basement. There was medication within the children’s
    reach, a minimal amount of food in the household, and no stove. Although
    Father told Collins that he worked three jobs, DCS was never able to verify
    Father’s employment.
    [29]   Even after the children were returned on a trial basis, the parents showed no
    sustained improvement. As a result, the children were removed from the home
    again in September 2017 because the residence remained on the condemned list
    and the children were dirty, unkempt, and had lice.
    [30]   Father had been incarcerated for domestic violence against Mother, and when
    the children were initially removed from the residence, the police had to
    intervene and hold him back because he charged the caseworker. Father was
    also aggressive during the removal after the trial home visit, and the police had
    to physically separate Father and Collins. Father was uncooperative and
    hostile at family team meetings, and he stopped attending counseling and
    therapy in September 2017.
    [31]   The conditions that resulted in the children’s removal were no different at the
    time of the termination hearing. Father was living in Illinois, and he admitted
    that the residence was not appropriate for the children. Moreover, Father had
    failed to pay rent for two months, and he was not meeting even a minimum
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020   Page 14 of 17
    standard of cleanliness in the home. At the time of the termination hearing,
    Father was on probation for committing the offense of intimidation against a
    police officer.
    [32]   Collins testified that Father required continued therapy because he has not
    successfully dealt with his anger issues, and he poses a danger to those around
    him. Perez testified that A.T. and Je.T. have an unhealthy bond with Father
    and the visits did not go well. Moreover, the visits were only sporadic and
    Father saw the children only once or twice a month.
    [33]   In sum, Father’s habitual unwillingness or inability to address his anger issues,
    employment and housing concerns, and his failure to participate in court-
    ordered services and visitations with the children all demonstrate “the requisite
    reasonable probability” that the reasons for the children’s removal were
    unlikely to change. See Lang v. Starke City OFC, 
    861 N.E.2d 366
    , 372 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2007), trans. denied. Thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that
    there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the children’s
    removal will not be remedied.
    B. Best Interests of the Children
    [34]   Father next claims that the termination order must be set aside because the
    evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that termination of the
    parent-child relationship is in children’s best interests. When deciding whether
    termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, the trial court must
    look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020   Page 15 of 17
    evidence. Z.B. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    108 N.E.3d 895
    , 903 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2018). In doing so, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents
    to those of the children involved.
    Id. The court
    need not wait until a child is
    irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.
    Id. We have
    previously held that the recommendation by both the case manager and
    child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the
    conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by
    clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.
    
    A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59
    .
    [35]   In this case, DCS caseworkers and the therapist recommended termination of
    the parent-child relationship and adoption for the children. Collins testified that
    DCS had exhausted all of its efforts with regard to Father, that Father was still
    unable to parent the children, and that adoption was in the children’s best
    interests. Collins further testified that Father did not have appropriate housing,
    was unable to maintain the housing he did have because he was behind in rent,
    and the current foster parents provided nurturing homes and stable
    environments for the children. Collins added that the children were thriving in
    foster care and that both sets of foster parents planned to adopt the children.
    Perez also testified that adoption of the children by their foster parents was in
    the children’s best interest.
    [36]   These recommendations, along with the evidence demonstrating Father’s lack
    of progress, his continuing anger issues, his lack of employment, his inability to
    provide adequate housing for the children, and his unwillingness to participate
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020   Page 16 of 17
    in court-ordered family services, establish that termination and adoption are in
    the children’s best interests. See id.; see also Ramsey, 
    707 N.E.2d 814
    , 818 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 1999). Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating Father’s
    parental rights.
    [37]   Judgment affirmed.
    Bailey, J. and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2586 | May 4, 2020   Page 17 of 17